1 2026:CGHC:2679-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 176 of 2026 Kunal Pratap Singh S/o Vijay Kumar, Aged About 34 Years B Class Registered Contractor, R/o Near Gyatri Mandir, Sakri, Tahsil Sakri, Bilaspur C.G. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department of Water Resources, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur C.G. 2 - Engineer-In-Chief, Water Resources Department, Chhattisgarh, Shivnath Bhawan, Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar, Raipur C.G. 3 - Chief Engineer (Tender Cell), O/o Engineer-In-Chief, Water Resources Department, Chhattisgarh, Shivnath Bhawan, Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Raipur C.G. 4 - Chief Engineer, Hasdeo Basin, Water Resources Department, Bilaspur (C.G.) 5 - Superintending Engineer, E/M, Water Resources Circle, Sakri, Bilaspur C.G. 6 - Executive Engineer, E/M, L.M.T.W. And Gate Division, Department, Sakri, Bilaspur C.G. 7 - Executive Engineer, Kharung Water Resources Division, Bilaspur C.G. ... Respondents ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioner : Mr. Malay Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Addl. Adv. General ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 16.01.2026 1. Heard Mr. Malay Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State-respondents. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the following prayers :- “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to produce the entire records. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 01/01/2026 passed by respondent no.2 bearing No.4263823/Tender Cell/2025/3539 (TC) (ANNEXURE P/1) 10.3 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to declared the petitioner qualified and issue the work order in favour of the petitioner pursuant to the NIT No.19/SAC/e- procurement/2025-26 dated 20/11/2025. 10.4 Any other relief(s)/order(s)/direction(s) in favour of petitioner, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice. 10.5 Cost of the petition.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that on 09.10.2025, Respondent No.1 issued Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) No.16/SAC/ e-procurement/ 2025-26 for the work of “Painting of Vertical Lift Gates and E/M parts of Kudri Barrage Scheme under Block Baloda, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)”, with a probable contract value of Rs.197.51 lakhs and an Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) of Rs.1.49 lakhs. However, no bids were received within the stipulated period, 3 and consequently, no further proceedings were undertaken. Thereafter, on 20.11.2025, Respondent No.1 issued a second NIT bearing No.19/SAC/e-procurement/2025-26 for the same work with identical specifications and eligibility criteria. Clause 2.1.1 of the NIT required submission of a valid bid security (EMD) with minimum validity of twelve months from the date of commencement of bid submission. The petitioner, being eligible and already executing works for the department, submitted its bid along with an FDR dated 27.11.2025 for Rs.1,49,000/- as EMD. The petitioner was the sole bidder in response to the second NIT, and no other participant submitted any bid. However, vide order dated 01.01.2026, Respondent No.2 disqualified the petitioner on the ground that the tenure of the EMD was insufficient as per the NIT conditions. Hence, this petition. 4. Mr. Malay Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the order 01.01.2026 passed by Respondent No.2 declaring the petitioner disqualified is arbitrary, illegal, and contrary to the law applicable to the facts of the present case. He further argued that the petitioner had submitted an FDR of Rs.1,49,000/- as Earnest Money Deposit, which was in auto-renewal mode and could not be withdrawn prior to its maturity on 27.11.2026, nor encashed without production of the original FDR. Upon acceptance of the bid, the original FDR was required to be deposited with the respondents and could only be released upon due authorization of the competent authority in whose favour 4 it was prepared. In the present case, the FDR was prepared in favour of Respondent No.6 and could be released only upon its endorsement, thereby fully securing the respondents’ interest. Hence, the rejection of the petitioner’s bid on the ground of insufficient EMD validity is wholly unsustainable in law. Furthermore, the petitioner was the sole bidder under NIT No.19/SAC/e-procurement/2025-26 dated 20.11.2025, possessed all requisite qualifications, held a higher Class “B” registration whereas the NIT required only Class “C” registration, and was already executing two ongoing works with the same department, thereby having sufficient experience in the Water Resources Department. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents opposes the aforesaid submission and submitted that the order passed by Respondent No.2 disqualifying the petitioner is legal, justified, and strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of NIT No.19/SAC/e-procurement/2025-26 dated 20.11.2025. He furtehr submitted that as per Clause 2.1.1 read with Clause 2.5.1 of the tender conditions, the Earnest Money Deposit was required to have a minimum prescribed validity, which the petitioner failed to comply with. Mere assertion of auto-renewal of the FDR does not satisfy the mandatory requirement of definite and express validity as stipulated in the NIT. Tender conditions being sacrosanct, no relaxation or deviation can be permitted, especially in matters of 5 bid security. He also submitted that the contention that the petitioner was the sole bidder or possessed higher qualifications is wholly irrelevant, as eligibility and responsiveness of the bid must be strictly examined in accordance with the tender terms. It is further submitted that the decision-making process was fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory, and no arbitrariness or illegality can be attributed to the impugned order, which warrants no interference by this Hon’ble Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders and the material available on record. 7. The law with respect to interference in tender matters is limited to certain extent as has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in large number of cases including in the case of Tata Motors Limited vs Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (BEST) and others1 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the factum of interference in the tender matters and has held as under: "48. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty-bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must 1 2023 SCC OnLine SC 671 6 remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. The courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the government and ublic sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer." 8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Others, {Civil Appeal No. 11005 OF 2024, decided on 04.10.2024}, taking note of the decisions rendered in various other celebrated judgments, observed as under: “21. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal proposition propounded in catena of decisions of this Court relied upon by the learned counsels for the Respondents to the effect that the Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal in the matter of award of contracts and it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made; and that the Government and its instrumentalities must have a freedom of entering into the contracts. However, it is equally well settled that the decision of the government/ its instrumentalities must be free from 7 arbitrariness and must not be affected by any bias or actuated by malafides. Government bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and public interest even while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process and that the entire bidding process is carried out in absolutely transparent manner. 9.22. At this juncture, we may reiterate the well- established tenets of law pertaining to the scope of judicial intervention in Government Contracts. 23. In Sterling Computers Limited vs. M/s. M & N Publications Limited and Others2, this Court while dealing with the scope of judicial review of award of contracts held: - “18. While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the “decision making process”. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] where it was said that: (p. 144a) “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” By way of judicial review the court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But at the same time as was said by the House of Lords in the aforesaid case, Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] the courts can certainly examine whether “decision-making process” was 2 (1993) 1 SCC 445 8 reasonable, rational, not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 24. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India3, this Court had laid down certain priniciples for the judicial review of administrative action. “94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.” 3 (1994) 6 SCC 651 9 25. It has also been held in ABL International Limited and Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Others4, as under: - “53. From the above, it is clear that when an instrumentality of the State acts contrary to public good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably, in its contractual, constitutional or statutory obligations, it really acts contrary to the constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the Constitution.” 26. In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others5, this Court after discussing number of judgments laid down two tests to determine the extent of judicial interference in tender matters. They are: - “22. (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached;” (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 27. In Mihan India Ltd. vs. GMR Airports Ltd. and Others6, while observing that the government contracts granted by the government bodies must uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with the contractual matters, it was observed in Para 50 as under: - “50. In view of the above, it is apparent that in government contracts, if granted by the government bodies, it is expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with contractual 4 (2004) 3 SCC 553 5 (2007) 14 SCC 517 6 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 574 10 matters. Right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India abhors arbitrariness. The transparent bidding process is favoured by the Court to ensure that constitutional requirements are satisfied. It is said that the constitutional guarantee as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of India demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise. It is expedient that the degree of compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest.” 28. It was sought to be submitted by the learned Counsels for the Respondents relying upon the observations made in Central Coalfields Limited and Another vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and Others7, that whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. However, in the said judgment also it is observed that if the employer has exercised the inherent authority to deviate from the essential term, such deviation has to be made applicable to all the bidders and potential bidders. It was observed in Para 47 and 48 as under:- “47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but alsofrom the point of view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. As pointed out in Tata Cellular [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour someone or a decision “that no responsible authority 7 (2016) 8 SCC 622 11 acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached” as held in Jagdish Mandal [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] followed in Michigan Rubber [Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216]. 48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. Even if the term is essential, the employer has the inherent authority to deviate from it provided the deviation is made applicable to all bidders and potential bidders as held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] . However, if the term is held by the employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even thatdecision should be respected. The lawfulness of that decision can be questioned on very limited grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions discussed above, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot.” 10. Upon due consideration of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the controversy in the present writ petition lies in a narrow compass, namely, whether the disqualification of the petitioner on account of non-compliance with the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) conditions prescribed in NIT No.19/SAC/e-procurement/2025-26 dated 20.11.2025 suffers from arbitrariness or illegality. 11. The tender conditions clearly stipulate that the bid security must have a minimum prescribed validity period, and compliance with the said condition was mandatory. The petitioner admittedly 12 submitted an FDR which did not expressly satisfy the tenure requirement as specified in the NIT. The plea of auto-renewal, as urged by the petitioner, cannot be accepted as a substitute for strict adherence to the tender conditions, particularly when the terms of the tender do not contemplate such flexibility. It is well settled that tender conditions are to be construed strictly and neither the bidder nor the Court can rewrite or relax the essential terms thereof. 12. The contention of the petitioner that it was the sole bidder or that it possessed higher qualifications and prior experience is of no consequence once the bid is found to be non-responsive. The employer is well within its domain to reject a bid that does not conform to the mandatory conditions of the tender, and judicial review in tender matters is confined to examining the decision- making process, not the merits of the decision itself. In the present case, no mala fide, arbitrariness, or procedural impropriety has been demonstrated by the petitioner. 13. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no infirmity in the impugned order dated 01.01.2026 passed by Respondent No.2. 14. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra