1 2026:CGHC:2692 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 457 of 2017 Vijay Singh S/o Late Shashi Shekharnath Singh, Aged About 56 Years Occupation Agriculture And Service, R/o Village Lundra, Tahsil Lundra, Dhourpur , District Surguja Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Madhu Singh D/o Mangal Singh, Aged About 44 Years R/o Village Lundra, Tahsil Lundra, Dhourpur , District Surguja Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 2 - Mangal Singh, S/o Budhe Singh, Aged About 72 Years Occupation Agriculture, R/o Village Lundra, Tahsil Lundra, Dhourpur ,District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant : Shri Sunil Tripathi, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board 16.01.2026 SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.01.19 17:35:42 +0530 2 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 28.06.2017 passed by the Learned First Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, Distt- Surguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 15-A/1999 (Vijay Singh vs. Madhu Singh & Another) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 16.11.1998 passed by the learned First Civil Judge, Class- II, Ambikapur Distt- Ambikapur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 157A/1998 (Vijay Singh vs. Madhu Singh & Another). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that the plaintiff and the defendants are residents of Village Lundra and the relations between them are not cordial. The plaintiff’s younger brother, Late Narendra Kumar Singh, died on 20.11.1993 after sustaining burn injuries under suspicious circumstances. Defendant No. 1 has falsely projected herself as the wife of Late Narendra Kumar Singh and, on that basis, has submitted an application for recording her name in respect of the plaintiff’s land situated at Village Karettar. The plaintiff categorically asserts that Defendant No. 1 was never married 3 to Late Narendra Kumar Singh and that Late Narendra Kumar Singh had never contracted any marriage during his lifetime. By falsely claiming herself to be the wife of Late Narendra Kumar Singh, Defendant No. 1 has adversely affected the proprietary rights and title of the plaintiff, compelling the plaintiff to institute the suit seeking a declaration that Defendant No. 1 is not the legally wedded wife of the plaintiff’s younger brother, Late Narendra Kumar Singh, and that she be permanently restrained by way of permanent injunction from entering upon or interfering with the suit property. 3. The defendants in their written statement denied the averments made in the plaint and contended that Defendant No. 1, Smt. Madhu Singh, was married to the plaintiff’s younger brother, Narendra Kumar Singh, on 18.04.1993 at Mahamaya Temple, Ambikapur. As the plaintiff and his mother were not agreeable to the said marriage, the marriage was solemnized at the Mahamaya Temple, Ambikapur, where Narendra Kumar Singh and his relatives performed the marriage in accordance with customary rites and rituals. Subsequent to the marriage, the plaintiff and his mother, Late 4 Bindu Kunwar, started harassing and pressurizing Late Narendra Kumar Singh with the intention that he should abandon Defendant No. 1, Smt. Madhu Singh. Due to continuous harassment and mental torture, Late Narendra Kumar Singh committed suicide by setting himself on fire. Defendant No. 1, Smt. Madhu Singh, is the legally wedded wife of Late Narendra Kumar Singh, and the present suit has been instituted by the plaintiff with the malafide intention of usurping the property of Late Narendra Kumar Singh. 4. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 16.11.1998 by holding therein that the defendant No. 1 Madhu Singh is the legally wedded wife of plaintiff’s brother i.e. Narendra Kumar Singh and thus the claim as made by the plaintiff was refused by the learned trial Court. 5. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned First Appellate Court who after hearing the parties by the judgment dated 29.01.2023, while reversing the judgment of the trial Court dated 16.11.1998 has remanded the matter for its fresh trial. 5 Thereagainst the defendants have approached this Court by filing an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of the CPC in M.A. No. 145/2003 which has been allowed by this Court by judgment dated 11.11.2016 and set aside the judgment dated 29.01.2003 passed by the learned first Appellate Court and restored the Civil Appeal to its original Number with a direction to decide the same in accordance with law. Subsequently by the impugned judgment and decree dated the learned first appellate Court dismissed the Civil appeal preferred by the plaintiffs and maintained the judgment of the trial Court, thus this appeal. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant raised question towards the alleged marriage of defendant No. 1 with Late Narendra Kumar. 8. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless 6 such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 9. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufÏcient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 10. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 12. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is 7 entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 13. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 14. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib