Page No.# 1/13 GAHC020005802026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/168/2026 SHRI CHENNYEIM KONYAK S/O LATE WOKHO KONYAK, R/O WAGIN WARD, FOREST COLONY, CHENTWETNYU VILLAGE, MON, NAGALAND VERSUS SHRI YAMMAN KONYAK B/O LATE YUTING, R/O MON TOWN, LONGKEI VILLAGE, MON, NAGALAND Advocate for the Petitioner : A HUKAVI SUMI, Advocate for the Respondent : , Linked Case : RSA/1/2026 SHRI CHENNYEIM KONYAK S/O LATE WOKHO KONYAK R/O WAGIN WARD FOREST COLONY CHENTWETNYU VILLAGE MON NAGALAND. Page No.# 2/13 VERSUS SHRI YAMMAN KONYAK B/O LATE YUTING R/O MON TOWN LONGKEI VILLAGE MON NAGALAND ------------ Advocate for : JOSHUA SHEQI Advocate for : C. T. JAMIR SR. ADV appearing for SHRI YAMMAN KONYAK Linked Case : I.A.(Civil)/169/2026 SHRI CHENNYEIM KONYAK S/O LATE WOKHO KONYAK R/O WAGIN WARD FOREST COLONY CHENTWETNYU VILLAGE MON NAGALAND. VERSUS SHRI YAMMAN KONYAK B/O LATE YUTING R/O MON TOWN LONGKEI VILLAGE MON NAGALAND. ------------ Advocate for : A HUKAVI SUMI Advocate for : appearing for SHRI YAMMAN KONYAK BEFORE HONBLE MR JUSTICE NCHUMBEMO MOZHUI O R D E R (ORAL) 01.10.2026 Heard Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel for the Applicant and Page No.# 3/13 Mr. I. Imchen, learned counsel for the Opposite Party. 2. The instant application has been filed praying for condonation of 6 (six) days U/S 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in preferring the appeal against the impugned Order dated 24.03.2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Mon, Nagaland. 3. The brief facts of the case is that in the year 1994, the Appellant had taken a loan from the Respondent, for an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) and executed an Agreement dated 02.09.1994 with an interest of 20% per month. Being unable to repay the loan amount the Appellant alongwith the Respondent appeared before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mon, by executing a readymade Agreement for a sum of Rs. 5,60,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Sixty Thousand) by Agreement dated 18.07.1996. Further an Agreement dated 03.09.1996 was executed between them wherein the Land Permit belonging to Lt. Khoshei Konyak, a well wisher of the Appellant was transferred to the Respondent temporarily so as to repay the loan amount with interest. When the matter was so situated the Appellant came across Judgment dated 07.04.1997 in Case No. Misc/CRI-1/1996 passed by the Court of Magistrate, First Class, Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Mon transferring the property of Lt. Khoshei Konyak to the Respondent. The said proceeding nor the petition was made known to the Appellant or Lt. Khoshei Konyak. 4. Being aggrieved the Appellant filed a Civil Suit No. 01/2019 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mon, and by Judgment dated 14.09.2022, Page No.# 4/13 the case was dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved by the Judgment dated 14.09.2022, the Appellant approached the First Appellate Court, Mon, by filing Civil Appeal No. 04/2023. The Civil Appeal was also dismissed on the following grounds:- (i) There is no record of the Trial Court; (ii) There cannot be an Misc/Petition without the main case; (iii) No hearing on condonation of 8055 (Eight Thousand and Fifty Five) days; and (iv) None of the main issues for disposal of the suit is settled and decided on merit. 6. Being aggrieved, the Appellant has approached this Court by filing the Regular Second Appeal. However, while preferring the second appeal there was a delay. 7. Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel for the Applicant submits that there was a delay of 6 (six) days in preferring the appeal. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the Applicant that the learned Appellate Court fixed the matter on 24.09.2025 on the objection raised by the Respondent as regard to the maintainability of the appeal. 8. After hearing the parties, the Order was reserved and kept open and it was only on 22.04.2026 the Order was pronounced in the presence of both the parties. However, when the Appellant’s counsel received the copy Page No.# 5/13 of the Order, it was found that the Order was pronounced on 24.03.2026 whereby the learned Appellate Court below have dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 04/2023. It is further the submission of the learned counsel for the Applicant that the WhatsApp communication about the counsel to attend the case on 22.04.2026 was communicated on 15.04.2026. 9. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the Applicant that the limitation period for preferring the appeal is 90 (ninety) days from the date of the Order dated 22.04.2026, which is the date of pronouncement of the Appellate Court. However, the said appeal could not be preferred between the time-frame within the limitation period on the ground that the Appellant, being an old man, had health issues and could not consult his advocates. It was only sometime in the mid of June, 2026 the Appellant expressed his willingness to prefer the appeal and requested for preparation of the appeal. The appeal memo could not be prepared as the Court was on summer break and the counsel had to leave station with his family out of town and return only on 10.07.2026. Thereafter, the counsel prepared the appeal and proceeded to Mon to append the signature of the Appellant and it was only on 27.07.2026 the appeal was filed alongwith the instant I.A. As such, there was a delay of 6 (six) days. The delay caused was not intentional but because of the reasons stated above. 10. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the Applicant relies on the judgment of the hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan reported in (2008) 14 SCC 528 which is reproduced as under:- Page No.# 6/13 “11. “8.The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (AIR 1998 SC 3222) it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975 (2) SCC 840) this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 10. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1979 (4) SCC 365) which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan (1969 (2) SCC 770), this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake Page No.# 7/13 was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive. 12. In O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (1984 (4) SCC 66), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji (1987 (2) SCC 107), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice- oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is Page No.# 8/13 administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.” 11. Mr. I. Imchen, learned counsel for the Opposite Party, on the contrary, submits that the impugned Order was passed and pronounced on 24.03.2026 and not 22.04.2026 and the delay caused is not 6 (six) days as submitted by the Applicant’s counsel. As the date of passing the Order was 24.03.2026 as per the records, there is a delay of 35 (thirty five) days. The Applicant cannot assume that the impugned order was passed on 22.04.2026 for the fact that the learned Court below, by Order dated 03.02.2026, had fixed the matter on 24.03.2026 for pronouncement of Judgment. It is further submitted that one of the counsel appearing for the Applicant was present on the particular day and he was fully aware of the Order, which is further substantiated with the signatures appended by the counsel in the Order sheet. Taking into the fact that there was 35 (thirty five) days delay the Applicant had explained the delay only for the 6 (six) days whereas the remaining 29 (twenty nine) days delay remains unexplained for the reasons best known to the Applicant. 12. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the Opposite parties relies on the authorities under:- (i) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ram Kumar Choudhury reported in (2024) SCC online 3612 :- “7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the Page No.# 9/13 delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).” (ii) Mohd. Sahid and Ors. vs. Raziya Khanan reported in (2019) 11 SCC 384:- “19. The order-sheet and other materials placed on record clearly show that the appellants had full knowledge about the proceedings of Original Suit No. 591 of 1979 and also about the disposal of Writ Petition (C) No. 19550 of 1985 and the appellants have filed application for condonation of delay with incorrect facts. Both the first appellate court and the High Court record concurrent findings that the appellants have filed the application for condonation of delay with incorrect facts and were negligent in pursuing the matter and rightly refused to condone the delay. We do not Page No.# 10/13 find any perversity or infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.” (iii) Pathapati Subba Reddy vs. Special Deputy Collector reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336 :– “20. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 11 | 2 2 the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 21. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.4, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 25. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. Page No.# 11/13 27. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (iv) Postmaster General and Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd and Anr. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 536 :– “13. The learned Additional Solicitor General heavily relied on the following principles: “(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. Page No.# 12/13 (3) ‘Every day’s delay must be expalined’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” By showing the above principles, the learned ASG submitted that there is no warrant for according step motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant. It is relevant to mention that in that case, the delay was only of four days.” 13. Heard the parties at length. 14. This Court, while considering the question with regard to the condonation of delay, have perused the records placed before the Court. The preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability was heard on 24.09.2025 and the order was reserved and fixed on 30.10.2025 for pronouncement. 15. Further, on perusal of the records the matter was again listed on 03.02.2026 though as per the Order dated 24.09.2025 the matter was Page No.# 13/13 fixed on 30.10.2025. By Order dated 03.02.2026 the Court could not pronounce the Judgment/Order for the reason that the same is not ready as the Presiding Officer was undergoing training and re-fixing the matter on 24.03.2026. 16. A bare perusal of the above records will indicate that the whole proceeding was recorded and Order passed accordingly on 24.09.2025, 03.02.2026 and 24.03.2026. It is also not disputed that the impugned Order dated 24.03.2026 was passed for the fact that one of the counsel for the Applicant was also present and he had appended his signature in the said impugned Order which is not refuted by him. 17. Keeping in view the impugned Order dated 24.03.2026 passed in Civil Appeal No. 04/2023 the actual delay caused in preferring the appeal is 35 (thirty five) days and not 6 (six) days as claimed by the Applicant. Though the Applicant claim that there was a delay of 6 (six) days, the same is in conflict with the impugned Order dated 24.03.2026 and as such, explanation given for 6 (six) days delay has been explained, there is no explanation to the delay of 29 (twenty nine) days. The hon’ble Apex Court has held that there should be a sufficient cause in explaining each delay caused and in absence of such explanations as in the present case, which is 29 (twenty nine) days, I am not inclined to condone the delay. 18. Accordingly, the instant application is dismissed. 19. No order as to cost. JUDGE Comparing Assistant