1 2026:CGHC:2634-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 353 of 2018 • State of Chhattisgarh, Through Incharge Out Post Chichola, Police Station Churiya, District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. ...Appellant versus • Yogesh Kumar Baghel, S/o Tumman Lal, aged about 22 Years, R/o Village Kuhikoda, O.P. Chichola Police Station Churiya, District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Ms. Shubha Shrivastava and Ms. Ritika Verma, Panel Lawyers. For Respondent : None. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board 16.01.2026 Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J. 1. This acquittal appeal preferred by the Appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 27.01.2018 passed by the Additional Judge, Dongargarh to the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, C.G. in Special Criminal Case No.03/2017, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges under Sections 363, 366 & 376 of Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, 'the Act, 2012') on the basis of benefit of doubt. AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2026.01.19 17:14:12 +0530 2 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 20.12.2016, prosecutrix lodged a written report (Ex.P-10) at Police Outpost Chichola alleging that the accused/respondent, who frequently visited her village, induced her to accompany him on the false pretext of marriage. Believing his assurance, she went with him to Raipur and thereafter to villages Kalyanpur and Kuhikoda, where the accused/respondent kept her for about eight months. It is alleged that during this period, the accused/respondent repeatedly committed sexual intercourse with her against her will without marrying her, subjected her to physical assault, wrongfully confined her and prevented her from lodging any complaint. It is further alleged that on 09.12.2016, the accused/respondent assaulted her, drove her out of the house and refused to marry her. On the basis of the said report, FIR (Ex.P-11) was registered against the accused/respondent. 3. During investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-13 and the prosecutrix was sent for medical examination, where PW-6 Dr. S.S. examined her and gave the MLC report vide Ex.P-8. Vide Exs.P-3 & P-6, undergarments of accused/respondent and prosecutrix were seized. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and FSL report has been brought on record (unexhibited). 4. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and after completing investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused/respondent before the concerned trial Court. Accused/respondent abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 5. The trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment 3 acquitted the accused / respondent herein of the said charges leveled against him. 6. Learned counsel for the Appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court is unjustified in acquitting the accused/respondent of the aforesaid charges by recording perverse findings. She further submits that there is ample evidence on record to establish that, at the time of the incident, the prosecutrix was a minor. In addition thereto, there is sufficient evidence to show that the accused/respondent, abducted the prosecutrix and on the false pretext of marriage, forcibly established physical relations with her on several occasions. She also submits that despite the existence of cogent and clinching evidence, the learned trial Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused/respondent without appreciating the evidence on record in its correct perspective. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has also considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- 25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 Cr.P.C., the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 4 9. The first question for consideration before this Court is whether the learned trial Court is justified in holding that the victim/prosecutrix was not below 18 years of age on the date of the incident. 10. In order to ascertain the age of the prosecutrix, prosecutrix was examined as PW-7. In her statement, she clearly admitted that she does not know her date of birth and that only her father/PW-5 knows the same. PW-5 father of the prosecutrix admitted that the date of birth of his daughter/prosecutrix is 09.01.1998, whereas the date of the incident was 20.04.2016, which clearly shows that the prosecutrix was more than 18 years of age at the relevant time. Further, PW-13 Mahendra Kumar Tandon, ASI, also admitted that he did not seize the Kotwari Register to ascertain the conclusive date of birth of the prosecutrix. He further admitted that the said register could have been easily obtained for this purpose, however, no effort was made by him to seize the same. Apart from the above, there is no cogent and clinching evidence or any primary documentary proof on record to establish that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the incident. In the absence of any reliable evidence to prove the age of the prosecutrix, the learned trial Court, after properly appreciating the evidence available on record, was justified in holding that at the time of the incident, the prosecutrix was major and above the age of 18 years. Accordingly, we affirm the said finding recorded by the learned trial Court. 11. The next question for consideration is whether the respondent/accused is the author of the crime in question. 12. PW-1 prosecutrix herself admitted in her evidence that during the period of about eight months when she resided with the 5 accused/respondent, she used to interact/talk with the persons residing in the neighbourhood. She further admitted that throughout the said period, she maintained cordial relations with the neighbours of the accused/respondent. She also admitted that her family members had demanded a sum of Rs.1.5 lakh from the accused/respondent for compromise and that, had the accused/respondent paid the said amount to her, she would not have lodged the report against him. Further, PW-1 Dukala Bai, in whose house the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent had stayed, stated that when the accused/respondent came to her house along with the prosecutrix, both of them went upstairs and slept there during the night. Likewise, PW-2 Anandi Ram stated that the accused/respondent and the prosecutrix had dinner at his house and stayed there for the night, and that both of them left his house together next morning. In his cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent had voluntarily gone together. He further admitted that after their return, a meeting of the Satnami community was held, wherein both of them agreed to live together and, as they belonged to the same caste, the community elders decided that they should be married and permitted them to live together. After a garland ceremony, they were sent to the house of the accused/respondent, whereafter they lived together as husband and wife for about eight months. Furthermore, PW-4 Mehtaru also admitted that the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent resided together as husband and wife for a period of approximately seven to eight months. 13. This apart, PW-5 father of the prosecutrix, stated that on the date of incident, after returning from distributing wedding invitation cards, he found his daughter/prosecutrix missing and thereafter he went to the 6 police station to lodge a report. On the same night, he came to know from the accused’s uncle that the boy and the girl had been found. Thereafter, a village meeting was held for compromise, but the accused refused. Subsequently, the accused/respondent took the prosecutrix to his village Kuhikoda and after about eight months, another meeting was held there. In his cross-examination, PW-5 admitted that in the said meeting, the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent stated that they had gone together voluntarily and expressed their willingness to live together, whereafter they went to reside together. He further admitted that the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent stayed together for about eight to nine months. He also admitted that the matter would have been compromised in Court had the accused party paid a sum of Rs.1.5 lakh. Furthermore, PW-14 Dayakishore, Inspector, admitted that when the prosecutrix came to the police station to lodge the report, she did not inform him of any injury marks on any part of her body. 14. Thus, from perusal of the aforesaid evidence, it appears that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the alleged acts and that she stayed with the accused/respondent as husband and wife for about eight to nine months on her own free will and thereafter, she lodged the report against the accused/respondent, which appears to be an afterthought. Additionally, the evidence on record shows that in the village community meeting, the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent stated that they had gone together voluntarily and expressed their willingness to live together, whereafter they continued to reside together. These circumstances clearly indicate that the allegations of abduction and commission of forcible acts are not established against the accused/respondent. The learned trial Court, after elaborately discussing 7 and analyzing the evidence led by the prosecution, rightly came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges levelled against him by extending the benefit of doubt. 15. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the trial Court, we are of considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused/respondent of the said charges is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 16. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of the accused/respondent is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh