2026:HHC:28756 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 146 of 2014 Reserved on: 30.06.2026 Date of Decision: 15.07.2026 Bhim Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr H.S. Rangra, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 26.05.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Mandi (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 28.03.2011 and order of sentence dated 29.03.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.4, Mandi (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:28756 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Manoj Kumar (PW2), Kishori Dutt Sharma (PW4), Raman Thakur (PW3) and Amit Kumar were travelling in a Scorpio bearing registration No. HP-34C-1818 from Kullu to Palampur on 28.05.2008. The informant was driving the Scorpio. A truck bearing registration No. HP-34-1355 came from Joginder Nagar and hit the Scorpio at Mahed. Raman Thakur (PW3) sustained injuries in the accident. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW5/A) was recorded in the daily diary. HC Leeladhar (PW5) went to the spot to verify the correctness of the information. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW5/B) was registered. HC Leeladhar (PW5) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW5/D), and took the photographs of the spot (Ext.P1 to Ext.P4) whose negatives are Ext.P5 to Ext.P8. The truck and Scorpio were seized vide memos (Ext.PW4/A and Ext.PW4/B). An application was filed for conducting the medical examination of the injured. Doctor Jiwanand (PW1) examined the injured and 3 2026:HHC:28756 found that he had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW1/A). The mechanical examination of the vehicle was conducted by HC Devkinandan (PW5A), who issued the report (Ex.PA). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Dr Jiwanand Chauhan (PW1) medically examined the injured. Manoj Kumar (PW2), Raman Thakur (PW3), and Kishori Dutt Sharma (PW4) were travelling in the Scorpio. HC Leeladhar (PW5) investigated the matter. HC Devkinandan (PW5A) mechanically examined the vehicles. Devinder Kumar (PW6) is the owner of the truck bearing registration No. HP-34-1355 and proved that he had employed the accused as a driver. 4 2026:HHC:28756 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), stated that he was coming from Joginder Nagar. He denied that he was driving the truck in a rash and negligent manner. He claimed that the witnesses deposed falsely against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of eye witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars. The road was wide at the place of the accident, and the truck was being driven towards the right side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows: Sections Sentences 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Mandi, 5 2026:HHC:28756 District Mandi (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars. The accused had not disputed that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The accused was driving the truck towards its right side, which is apparent from the photographs and the spot map. The informant had stopped the Scorpio after seeing the truck, but the truck had hit it. The negligence of the accused was the proximate cause of the accident. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of witnesses contradicted each other in material particulars. Many people had gathered on the spot, but the prosecution did not examine any of them. The witnesses made different statements regarding the position of the Scorpio after the accident. Some witnesses said that the Scorpio went to the fields after the accident, while some said that it was on the edge of the road. These contradictions made the prosecution's 6 2026:HHC:28756 case highly suspect. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr H. S. Rangra, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/state. 10. Mr H.S. Rangra, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. Both the learned Courts below have held that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed. The use of the term “high speed” without providing an approximate speed does not amount to any proof of negligence. The prosecution has not proved any specific negligence of the accused. The learned Trial Court has imposed an excessive sentence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that both the learned Courts below have concurrently found that the accused was driving the truck towards the right side of the road, which was the 7 2026:HHC:28756 proximate cause of the accident. The photographs and the site plan also show that sufficient space is available towards the left side of the truck. The Courts have properly appreciated the evidence on record, and this Court should not re-appreciate the evidence unless there is some perversity. The petitioner failed to prove any perversity. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of 8 2026:HHC:28756 jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, 9 2026:HHC:28756 material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised 10 2026:HHC:28756 by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that 11 2026:HHC:28756 of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The informant Manoj Kumar (PW2) stated that he was driving a Scorpio bearing registration No. HP-34C-1818 to Palampur. Raman Thakur (PW3), Amit Kumar and Kishori Dutt Sharma (PW4) were travelling with him. A truck bearing 12 2026:HHC:28756 registration No. HP-34-1355 came from Padhar side at high speed. He stopped the Scorpio after seeing the truck, but the truck hit the Scorpio. Raman Thakur (PW3) sustained injuries, and the Scorpio was damaged. The accident occurred because of the high speed of the truck and the negligence of the driver. The matter was reported to the police. The police prepared the site plan and took the photographs. The accused Bhim Singh was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 19. Raman Thakur (PW3) corroborated his version and stated that he, Manoj Kumar (PW2), Amit and Kishori Dutt Sharma (PW4) were travelling in the Scorpio bearing registration No. HP 34C-1818, which was being driven by Manoj. A truck bearing registration No. HP 34-1355 came from Joginder Nagar at high speed and hit the Scorpio near Mehad. The driver of the Scorpio had slowed it and taken it towards the Kachha portion of the road before the accident. However, the truck hit the Scorpio on the wrong side. Accused Bhim Singh was driving the truck, and the accident occurred because of his negligence and the high speed of the truck. 20. Kishori Dutt Sharam (PW4) also corroborated the testimonies of these witnesses. He stated that he, Raman Thakur 13 2026:HHC:28756 (PW3), Amit and Manoj Kumar (PW2) were travelling in the Scorpio bearing registration No. HP-34C-1818. Manoj was driving the Scorpio. A truck bearing registration No. HP-34-1355 hit the Scorpio at high speed near Mehad. The driver of the Scorpio had stopped it after seeing the truck. However, the truck hit the Scorpio on the wrong side of the road. Raman Thakur (PW3) sustained an injury to his head. The accused was driving the truck, and the accident occurred because of his negligence. 21. The statements of these witnesses are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW5/D) wherein the width of the road is shown to be 14 feet metalled and 7 feet unmetalled. 2½ feet of metalled road and 7 feet of unmetalled road is shown towards the left side of the truck, and 4½ feet of the road is shown towards the right side of the truck. Manoj Kumar (PW2) specifically stated that the position of the vehicle remained the same as it was at the time of the accident. His testimony establishes that the positions of the vehicle had not changed at the time of the arrival of the police, and the site plan can be relied upon to depict the spot position. The photographs (Ext.P2 and Ext.P3) show that the truck was being driven with sufficient space towards the left side, whereas no space is available towards the left side of the Scorpio. The photographs 14 2026:HHC:28756 and the site plan corroborate the statements of the witnesses that the accused was driving the truck towards the right side of the road. 22. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses. Manoj Kumar (PW2) stated that he had stopped the Scorpio towards the side of the road, whereas Raman Thakur (PW3) stated that Manoj had slowed down the Scorpio after seeing the truck. This contradiction will not make the prosecution's case suspect. The incident had occurred on 25.05.2008, whereas the witnesses deposed before the Court on 23.12.2008 after a lapse of about 7 months from the incident. The memories fail with time, and the contradictions are bound to come. These cannot be used to discard the prosecution's case. Further, the perceptions of the witnesses are different and stereotyped testimonies cannot be expected from them. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for 15 2026:HHC:28756 the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as follows: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two 16 2026:HHC:28756 statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness 17 2026:HHC:28756 sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)” 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly 18 2026:HHC:28756 keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony 19 2026:HHC:28756 of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]]. 32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements that are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok 20 2026:HHC:28756 Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether 21 2026:HHC:28756 the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 24. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as follows: "42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if 22 2026:HHC:28756 found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 25. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies. The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core of the case rather than the details. 26. In the present case, the discrepancy relates to the movement of the Scorpio, which is not material because the accident occurred when the truck was being driven towards the right side of the road and not the left side. Thus, the movement of Scorpio was not material, and this discrepancy will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. 27. It was suggested to Raman Thakur (PW3) in his cross- examination that the accident occurred on a curve and the road was quite wide. This corroborates the prosecution's version that the accident had occurred on a wide road and the accused could have avoided the accident by driving the vehicle towards the left side of the road. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu 23 2026:HHC:28756 Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 383: - “38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross- examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. 39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner. **** 42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.” 28. Thus, this suggestion will strengthen the prosecution's case. 29. Raman Thakur (PW3) admitted in his cross- examination that the Scorpio moved and turned towards its left side. Kishori Dutt Sharma (PW4) stated that the Scorpio went to the 24 2026:HHC:28756 field. He corrected to say that the tyre of the Scorpio had gone to the field. It was submitted that these statements show that the witnesses are making incorrect statements regarding the position of the Scorpio after the accident, and no reliance can be placed upon their testimonies. This submission cannot be accepted. The contradiction whether the tyre of the Scorpio had gone to the field or had remained on the edge of the road is no contradiction at all because it can arise with the difference of perception and failure of memory. The photographs (Ex.P1 and Ex. P2) show that some part of the front tyre of the Scorpio is on the edge of the road and some is in the field. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the testimonies of the witnesses. 30. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses to show that they were making false statements. The statements of the witnesses corroborate each other, and these are corroborated by the photographs and the site plan. Thus, learned Courts below had rightly held that the truck had hit the Scorpio on the right side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. 31. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 25 2026:HHC:28756 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 32. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road. 33. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: 26 2026:HHC:28756 “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 34. In Shakila Khader v. Nausheer Cama, (1975) 4 SCC 122: 1975 SCC (Cri) 379: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 103, the car went to the right side of the road, hit the parapet and turned turtle. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver was negligent. It was observed at page 126: “6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving that led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but also the width of the road, the density of the traffic, and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles, resulting in going to the wrong side of the road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of an eye, it is not difficult for the eyewitness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a 27 2026:HHC:28756 vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for assessing the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting them is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident, but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct, as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray stain on the parapet wall is self- contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road, hit an electric post and parapet wall, and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did, it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so, it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle, and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn, as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case, and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was responsible for the accident, and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic.” 28 2026:HHC:28756 35. The accused breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Hence, the prosecution's version that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused has to be accepted as correct. 36. It was submitted that the learned Courts below had relied upon the testimonies of the witnesses that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed. These statements are not sufficient without mentioning the approximate speed of the vehicle. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The Learned Appellate Court has rightly noticed that the proximate cause of the accident was not the high speed of the truck, but driving the truck towards the right side of the road. Thus, the submission that the accused was convicted because of the high speed is not correct. 37. Dr Jiwanand Chauhan (PW1) examined Raman Kumar (PW3) and found that he had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He was not cross- examined at all, which means that this part of his testimony was not disputed by the defence. Hence, it was duly proved on record that Raman had sustained injuries in the accident, which were caused by the negligence of the accused. 29 2026:HHC:28756 38. Thus, there is no infirmity in the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court, as upheld by the learned Appellate Court, convicting the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. 39. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 months and pay a fine of ₹1,000/-, and in case of default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 7 days for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, which cannot be said to be excessive. 40. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the learned Trial Court erred in declining this benefit. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor 30 2026:HHC:28756 suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be 31 2026:HHC:28756 convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 41. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 42. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still 32 2026:HHC:28756 apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 43. Therefore, it is not permissible to grant a benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, and a deterrent view has to be taken; hence, the sentence of two months cannot be said to be excessive in any manner requiring any interference from this Court. 44. No other point was urged. 45. Thus, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are fully sustainable. Hence, the present revision fails and is dismissed. 46. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 47. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 15th July, 2026 (Nikita)