1 2026:CGHC:2713 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 178 of 2021 1 - Toplal S/o Late Ramadhar Aged About 35 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya Tehsil Basna District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 2 - Vidhyadhar S/o Late Jhanakram Aged About 57 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya Tehsil Basna District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 3 - Sushil S/o Late Jhanakram Aged About 54 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya Tehsil Basna District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 4 - Bhuska S/o Late Jhanakram Aged About 51 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya Tehsil Basna District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 5 - Neera Bai D/o Late Jhanakram Aged About 59 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Mundha, Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 6 - Jagatpal S/o Roopanand Aged About 26 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya, Tehsil Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.01.19 17:35:42 +0530 2 7 - Makardhwaj S/o Roopanand Aged About 23 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya, Tehsil Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 8 - Puranmoti W/o Late Jhanakram Aged About 84 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya, Tehsil Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - Lalit S/o Late Ujal Aged About 59 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya Tehsil Basna District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Kalash D/o Late Ujal Aged About 57 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Kodoguda, Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Dasomati D/o Late Ujal Aged About 55 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Raksha, Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 4 - Sadhaano D/o Late Ujal Aged About 49 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Koyalaridih, Tehsil Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 5 - Sukomati W/o Late Ujal Aged About 79 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya, Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 3 6 - Baiga S/o Late Punitram Aged About 69 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Bichiya, Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 7 - Munu S/o Late Punitram Aged About 42 Years Caste Aghariya, R/o Village Udela, Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 8 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellants : Shri Palaash Jha, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board 16.01.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/defendants challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 16.03.2021 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, Saraipali Distt- Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 20-A/2016 (Toplal & Others vs. Lalit & Others) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2016 passed by the learned First Additional Civil Judge, 4 Class- II, Mahasamund Distt- Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 55-A/2014 (Lalit & Others Vs. Toplal & Others). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit for injunction, declaration, partition, and possession in respect of Khasra No. 513/3 admeasuring 0.10 hectare, situated at Patwari Halka No. 4/18, Revenue Nirman Mandal Bhavarpur, Tahsil Basna, District Mahasamund (C.G.), contending that the suit land was purchased on 23.03.1965 by Gunsay, son of Late Punit Ram, through a registered sale deed for a consideration of Rs. 500/- and that Gunsay died issueless without executing any Will; it is their case that Late Punit Ram, the grandfather of the parties, had distributed his lands among his five sons, and though Gunsay independently purchased the suit land, the defendants No. 1 to 8, behind the back of the plaintiffs and without following mandatory legal procedure, fraudulently got their names mutated in the revenue records vide order dated 20.12.2009 recorded in Sheet No. 26, despite defendants No. 9 and 10 also being legal representatives of Late Punit Ram having a share in the suit land, and although the said mutation order 5 was challenged in appeal on 31.12.2010, the appeal was dismissed as time-barred on 21.11.2011, hence the plaintiffs claim entitlement to 1/4th share and possession over the suit land as the closest legal heirs of Gunsay. 3. The defendant Nos. 1 to 8, the appellants herein, in their written statement denied the averments made in the plaint in toto and specifically contended that no illegality or mischief was committed in the mutation proceedings, as Munadi and all mandatory procedures were duly followed prior to mutation and name transfer in the revenue records. It was further pleaded that a family settlement had already taken place and no further partition was required, particularly as the defendants’ family had been residing with Gunsay and his wife and had taken care of them during their lifetime. It was also asserted that the suit land was the self-acquired property of Gunsay and could not be subjected to partition among the brothers, especially in view of the fact that Late Punit Ram also had daughters, and thus the provisions of Order XX Rule 18 CPC were attracted. 4. It was further pleaded that possession of the suit land was handed over to Gunsay by the seller on execution of the 6 registered sale deed dated 23.03.1965 and that Gunsay and Jhanak resided together; although no mutation was effected during Gunsay’s lifetime, after his death the names of defendants Nos. 1 to 8 were recorded on the basis of possession and agricultural records. Objections were also raised that the suit was time-barred, undervalued, and bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as the sisters of Gunsay and their legal heirs were not impleaded, and that if any partition suit was maintainable, the entire ancestral property of Late Punit Ram ought to have been included, as the suit land, never having been part of any family partition, could not be claimed after the death of Gunsay issueless; the remaining defendants, though served, did not appear and were proceeded ex parte. 5. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court partly allowed the suit of the plaintiffs by the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2016 holding therein that the plaintiffs established their case by placing cogent and sufÏcient material and the learned trial Court passed the decree to the effect that both the parties are entitled to joint ownership in respect of land 7 bearing Khasra No. 513/3 Rakba 0.10 hectare situated in Village Bichia P.H. No. 4/18 R.I. Circle Bhavarpur Tehsil Basna District Mahasamund. The trial Court also held that the plaintiffs are entitled to one fourth share of land bearing khasra No. 513/3 Rakba 0.10 hectare situated in Village Bichia P.H. No. 4/18 R.I. Circle Bhavarpur Tehsil Basna District Mahasamund from the joint ownership of the defendants after making partition in accordance with law and thereafter granted the permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs to the effect that the defendants cannot interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs after partition. 6. Against the said judgment and decree, the defendants filed the Civil Appeal before the learned first appellate Court who by judgment impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellants/defendants. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants assailed the impugned judgment and decree by contenting that the declaration of one fourth share without prescribing the 8 manner of partition of the property, the impugned judgment and decree is not at all sustainable in the eyes of law. 9. So far as the contention of the appellants/defendants regarding non-prescription of the manner of partition of the one-fourth share by the learned Trial Court is concerned, it is evident from the impugned judgment and decree that the plaintiffs have been held entitled to obtain one-fourth share in the suit property from the defendants by seeking partition in accordance with law. Therefore, no illegality or infirmity can be found in the impugned judgment and decree on this count. 10. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 11. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing 9 cogent and sufÏcient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 12. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 14. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 10 15. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 16. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib