2026:HHC:28401 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 561 of 2025 Reserved on: 25.06.2026 Date of Decision: 14.07.2026. Sunita Sharma & another ...Petitioners Versus The State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Nitin Soni, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1. Mr Saurav Rattan, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the order framing charge and the subsequent proceedings pending in the Court of Learned Additional Sessions 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:28401 Judge Fast Track, Special Court, POCSO, Sirmour at Nahan (learned Trial Court) (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant (name being withheld to protect her identity) was studying with the petitioners’ son, the co- accused, Raj Kumar. The petitioners settled the marriage between Raj Kumar and the informant in the year 2014. It was agreed that marriage would be solemnised after 2-3 years because the petitioners were constructing a house. The co-accused, Raj Kumar Sharma, and the informant remained in touch. The informant was to take an examination in 2015 at Shimla. Raj Kumar Sharma offered to accompany her to Shimla. Both of them stayed in the hotel. Raj Kumar Sharma forced the informant to maintain sexual relations with him. The betrothal ceremony was solemnised between Raj Kumar Sharma and the informant. The informant went to the house of Raj Kumar Sharma, where the petitioners asked her to appear in a competitive examination to get a good job. She went to Chandigarh for coaching. Raj Kumar Sharma used to visit her at Chandigarh. He took her to a hotel and maintained 3 2026:HHC:28401 physical relations with her. The petitioner no. 1, the mother of Raj Kumar Sharma, called the informant after one and a half months to select the ornaments. She left the home. Raj Kumar Sharma and the informant were alone in the home. Raj Kumar Sharma asked her to establish physical relations with her. When she refused, Raj Kumar Sharma gave her beatings. The marriage was to be solemnised on 28.3.2019, but could not be solemnised due to some mishap. Raj Kumar Sharma was transferred to Gwalior, and this fact was not revealed to the informant. The informant revealed her physical relationship with Raj Kumar Sharma to his family members. They abused her. Raj Kumar Sharma admitted to a physical relationship with the informant. The petitioners assured to get them married in 2019. The date of marriage was postponed to 2020-21. The informant’s mother and Up-Pradhan went to the house of Raj Kumar Sharma. The petitioners demanded ₹5.00 lacs and a vehicle. The victim’s father sold his land located at Kala Amb to meet the petitioners’ demand. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. It was found after the investigations that the petitioners had constructed their house after taking a loan of ₹27,90,000/-. The result of the analysis did not show any blood or 4 2026:HHC:28401 semen on the material objects collected by the police; however, human blood was detected on the informant’s blood sample, and human semen was detected on the smegma slide of Raj Kumar Sharma. It was found after the investigation that Raj Kumar Sharma was not serious about the marriage. He had made a false promise to marry the informant to maintain sexual relations with her. The petitioners demanded dowry of ₹5.00 lacs and a vehicle; therefore, the charge sheet was filed before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court framed the charges against the petitioners for the commission of offences punishable under Section 417 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of framing of charges and continuation of the proceedings, the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that there is no evidence that the informant or her parents had ever paid any money to the petitioners. No cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act can be taken by the Court without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate in terms of Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition HP 5 2026:HHC:28401 Amendment Act. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned trial Court be quashed. 5. The petition is opposed by filing a reply on behalf of respondent No.2/victim, taking a preliminary objection regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on the merits. It was asserted that the complaint discloses the commission of a cognisable offence. The investigation supported the allegations made in the complaint. It is impermissible to re-appreciate the evidence while exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to stifle a legitimate prosecution brought before the Court. The petitioners, being the parents of the main accused, actively participated in the offence by raising an unlawful demand of dowry and pressurising the informant and her family members. It was specifically stated in the complaint that petitioners had demanded a sum of ₹5,00,000/- and a car from the informant's family as a condition for marriage. The informant's father was forced to sell his land to meet these unlawful demands. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6 2026:HHC:28401 6. No reply was filed on behalf of the respondent/State despite the repeated opportunities. 7. I have heard Mr Nitni Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State and Mr Saurav Rattan, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. 8. Mr Nitni Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the learned Trial court could not have taken cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under the Dowry Act without the sanction of the competent authority. Learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance and framing the charges. There is no evidence that any money was paid to the petitioners, and the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC are not fulfilled. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order of framing charges and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondents/State, submitted that the contents of the FIR disclose the commission of a cognisable offence. The police 7 2026:HHC:28401 investigated the matter and found that the allegations were duly supported by the material collected on record. The petitioners are seeking the evaluation of the evidence, which is impermissible at this stage. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. Mr Saurav Rattan, learned counsel for the respondent No.2/informant adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent No.1/State. 11 I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under 8 2026:HHC:28401 Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there 9 2026:HHC:28401 is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10 2026:HHC:28401 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It was asserted in the charge sheet that a demand of ₹5,00,000/- was made. The informant's father sold the land located at Kala Amb and paid the money to the petitioners before 11 2026:HHC:28401 the marriage. However, this conclusion is not supported by the informant’s statement, in which it was only stated that her father had sold the property located at Kala Amb. The informant's mother stated that the petitioner told her and her husband that they required money, and no money was paid to them. They had to borrow the money from their daughter for the construction of their house. Her husband had sold a plot located at Kala Amb so that ₹5,00,000/- and a vehicle could be given to the petitioners. She has also not said that the money was ever paid to the petitioners. Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in framing the charges for taking ₹5,00,000/- on the promise of marriage. 16. The allegations in the complaint and the charge sheet show that a demand of dowry was made by the petitioners from the informant and her parents, which constitutes an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Section 8A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, H.P Second Amendment Act, 1978, provides that no Court shall take cognisance of an offence punishable under this Act except upon a police report under Section 173 and the previous sanction of the District Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area. The charge sheet filed by the police is silent regarding the obtaining of the sanction, and the learned 12 2026:HHC:28401 Deputy Advocate General fairly conceded that no such sanction was obtained from the District Magistrate. It was laid down by this Court in Ashok Kumar Bais v. State of HP. 2009 STPL 7455, that the provision of Section 8A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, as amended in the State of H.P. are mandatory and no cognisance of offence could have been taken without the sanction. It was observed: 13. Insofar as the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, they were charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the 'Dowry Act' and referred to Section 8A of the said Act, which reads as under: "8-A. Cognisance of Offence No Court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except on a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint made by a person aggrieved by the offence, as the case may be, within one year from the date of the commission of the offence: Provided that no police officer of the rank lower than that of the Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate any case registered under this Act: Provided further that no Court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except with the previous sanction of the District Magistrate, having jurisdiction in the area." [Emphasis supplied] 14. The above amendment was made by H.P. Act No.39 of 1978 by Section 6, which came into force w.e.f. 4.12.1978. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that neither the Dy.S.P. had investigated the case nor a previous sanction of the District Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area was sought; therefore, the court could not have 13 2026:HHC:28401 taken cognisance. I find force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. 15. Both the provisos to the amended sections are mandatory, and the position which emerges is that: (i) the case could not have been investigated by a police officer of the rank lower than that of the Deputy Superintendent of Police; and (ii) the cognisance of any offence by the court under the Dowry Act is barred, in the absence of the previous sanction of the District Magistrate, having its jurisdiction in the area, which is sine qua non for the 10 institution of the complaint under this Act. 16. Consequently, any challan presented, where the investigation officer is below the rank of Dy.S.P. and any challan or complaint moved without the prior sanction to the District Magistrate has to be rejected. 17. In view of this, in my opinion, the cognisance of the offences taken by the trial court, for the offences under the Dowry Act, is wrong and illegal and deserves to be set aside. 17. Therefore, there is a force in the submission of Mr Nitin Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance and framing the charges against the petitioners. 18. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Rape/POCSO), Sirmaur, District at Nahan, H.P., in the case titled State of H.P vs. Raj Kumar & Ors. in 14 2026:HHC:28401 case No.47-ST/7 of 2022, qua petitioners Sunita Sharma and Roop Chand Sharma are ordered to be quashed. 19. It is expressly made clear that this Court has not said anything regarding the merits of the allegation of the demand of dowry made by the petitioners, and the State would be free to take action as per the law after taking sanction, as may be permissible. 20. The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending applications, if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th , July 2026. (ravinder)