2026:HHC:28280 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 165 of 2026 Reserved on: 23.06.2026 Date of Decision: 13.07.2026. Yogesh Kumar ...Petitioner Versus The State of H.P. & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Ms Madhurika Sekhon, Advocate. For Respondents : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/ State. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 156/2025 dated 07.09.2025, registered at Police Station West, Shimla, District, Shimla for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS),2023 and the proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:28280 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Special Court (Rape/POCSO), Shimla, District Shimla, H.P (learned Trial Court). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant (the name being withheld to protect her identity) met the petitioner on Instagram, and the two started talking to each other. The petitioner took the informant to his brother’s house on 15.02.2024. The petitioner told the informant that he would send a marriage proposal to her parents. He assured the informant that he would marry her soon and entered into a physical relationship with her without her consent. He used to maintain a physical relationship with the informant whenever he would visit Shimla. Petitioner’s relatives were to visit the informant's parents in her native village on 14.12.2024 to settle the terms of the marriage. However, the informant fell ill, and she was unable to go to her native place. She told this fact to the petitioner. The petitioner's relatives refused to visit the informant’s home. The informant's parents told the petitioner's parents that the marriage proposal could be discussed between the elders; however, the petitioner's parents refused. The petitioner called the informant and his parents during the night. He was 3 2026:HHC:28280 intoxicated, and he abused the informant and her parents. The informant tried to talk to the petitioner, but the petitioner blocked her mobile number. Subsequently, a girl informed the informant that she was about to marry the petitioner. The informant made a complaint to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police filed a charge sheet after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R. and the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of it. It was asserted that the petitioner had sent a marriage proposal to the informant's family, and there was no intention to deceive the informant. The engagement broke because the informant was not present at her home despite knowledge. She had not even informed the petitioner about her absence. Mere breakdown of the relationship between the parties does not constitute an offence punishable under Section 69 of the BNS. The allegations in the FIR disclose a failed relationship. The relationship was consensual, and there was no fraud or deception involved in it. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be 4 2026:HHC:28280 allowed and the F.I.R and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a status report reproducing the contents of the F.I.R and the details of the investigation conducted by the police. 5. I have heard Ms Madhurika Sekhon, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State. 6. Ms Madhurika Sekhon, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR, even if taken to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any offence. The relationship between the parties was consensual, which could not culminate in marriage because of the informant's conduct. The petitioner had sent his relatives to the informant's native place to settle the marriage, but the informant did not visit her native place. An FIR cannot be registered because of the failed relationship. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. She relied upon the following judgments in support of her submissions: 5 2026:HHC:28280  Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. The State of Maharashtra & anr. Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2019 (@SLP(Crl) No. 2712 of 2019); and  Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra & another: 2025: INSC 1351 7. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent, submitted that the allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner had maintained the physical relationship with the informant after promising to marry her. The reason assigned by the petitioner that the relationship could not culminate in a marriage because the informant was absent is unbelievable. It shows that the petitioner had a, mala fide, intention from the beginning, and he never wanted to marry the informant. The competent Court has framed the charges, and the order of framing charges has not been assailed. The present petition for quashing of FIR is not maintainable after the framing of the charges; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - 6 2026:HHC:28280 “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in 7 2026:HHC:28280 support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. 8 2026:HHC:28280 As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are 9 2026:HHC:28280 willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was specifically asserted in the FIR that the petitioner took the victim to his brother’s room, where he promised to marry her and maintained a physical relationship with her without her consent. It was also stated that the petitioner maintained a physical relationship with the informant whenever he visited Shimla after promising to marry her. Thus, the allegations in the FIR show that the physical relationship was maintained on the basis of a promise made by the petitioner to marry the informant. 13. The status report and the FIR also mention that the relatives of the petitioner were to visit the informant's native place on 14.12.2024 to settle the terms of the marriage. The informant fell ill and could not visit her native place. The petitioner and his relatives refused to visit the informant's native place despite the fact that the informant's parents requested them to visit and settle the terms of the marriage; it is asserted in the petition that the marriage could not be settled because of the 10 2026:HHC:28280 absence of the informant. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that this is not a plausible reason for terminating the relationship. The terms of the marriage could have been settled by the parents of the parties had there been an intention to do so. Further, the FIR mentions that the petitioner called the informant and her parents during the night in a state of intoxication and abused them, which conduct shows that the petitioner was bent upon terminating the relationship between him and the informant. Therefore, a prima facie inference can be drawn at this stage that the petitioner had maintained the relationship with the victim by making a promise to marry, which he never intended to fulfill. 14. In Parmod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the relationship continued for 6 years. The parties travelled great distances to meet each other, and resided in each other's houses on multiple occasions. There was an argument regarding the marriage, but the sexual relationship continued between them. In the present case, the circumstances are entirely different. The relationship continued for less than 1 year. The petitioner blocked the informant’s number after the 11 2026:HHC:28280 talk of the marriage could not materialise, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 15. In Samadhan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the relationship continued for 3 long years and physical intimacy occurred because of close emotional attachment. The FIR was lodged when the accused failed to fulfil the demand of ₹ 1,50,000/-. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that these allegations did not constitute the commission of the offence of rape. 16. In the present case, the relationship was based upon a promise to marry. This is also evident from the fact that the petitioner's relatives were scheduled to visit the informant's parents in her native place. However, the relationship could not culminate in marriage because of the informant's absence. The petitioner's act of asking his relatives to visit the informant's relative in her native place showed that the allegation made by the informant that the petitioner had promised to marry her has substance. 17. The status report mentions that the matter is listed for recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses on 27.04.2026, which means that the charges have been framed by 12 2026:HHC:28280 the learned trial Court. The petitioner has not challenged the order of framing the charges and has filed a petition for quashing the FIR. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed on page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add, even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 13 2026:HHC:28280 18. This Court also held in Reena Devi vs State of H.P. (2019) 3 Sml.LC 1773 states that a petition for quashing the F.I.R. based on compromise cannot be filed after the charges have been framed or notice of accusation has been put. It was observed: “9. Before arriving at any conclusion to ascertain the appropriate remedy for an accused, against whom a notice of accusation has been issued, or the charge has been framed, and who wants to challenge the same, the tour of the following stages will give the required exposure. Stage-1 The most prominent and the earliest provision, which ignites the engine of criminal law and brings it into motion, is the registration of FIR, under Section 154 of the CrPC. Needless to say, this provision confines itself to cognizable offences. After the investigation, if in the opinion of the Station House Officer, a case for the prosecution is made out, then he files a report under Section 173 of the CrPC. Any person arraigned as an accused in such an FIR can seek its quashing from the High Court having jurisdiction, by filing a petition under section 482 CrPC. Stage-2 Section 190 of the CrPC, envisages three situations, upon which the Magistrate can take cognizance of offence, namely, (a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitutes such offence; (b) Upon a Police Report of such facts; (c) Upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer or upon his own knowledge that such an offence has been committed. Exercising powers under Section 204 of CrPC, the Magistrate taking cognisance of offences, may proceed against an accused, if he believes in the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding. Any person who has been arraigned as an accused and is aggrieved either by registration of FIR, filing of charge-sheet, taking cognisance, or issuance 14 2026:HHC:28280 of the process can seek adjudication under Section 482 of the CrPC. Order taking cognisance can also be challenged by filing a revision petition in the Sessions Court or High Court. There will be a situation where, after the filing of the petition for quashing of FIR, in the meantime, the charge-sheet is filed; the law is no more res Integra that in all those cases, FIR and all consequential proceedings can be quashed. An accused cannot approach a Sessions Court till this stage because the only available statutory remedy is by invoking the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC. Stage-3 The next stage in criminal proceedings is similar to the transformation of a caterpillar emerging as a butterfly, and it begins on the framing of charges under Sections 211 and 228 of the CrPC or on the issuance of notice of accusation under Section 251 of the CrPC. If not challenged, it shall culminate under section 229, 241 or 248 of the CrPC only by a judgment of acquittal or conviction. Once charges stand framed or the notice of accusation stands issued, as the case may be, then the appropriate remedy to challenge the same is only by filing a Criminal Revision Petition in the Court where it lies and not by filing a petition under section 482 CrPC. Stage 4: The next stage is post-conviction or acquittal. A judgment of conviction can only be challenged under Chapter-29 of the CrPC (Sections 372 to 394). During the pendency of such an appeal, the parties may file an application for compounding of the offences, but such applications in appeal would be within and not without. A convict cannot bypass Chapter 29 and, instead of filing a statutory appeal before the First Appellate Court, cannot straightaway resort to Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the CrPC. Stage-5 The next stage is challenging the dismissal of the appeals of the convicts, and that can be done by approaching the Courts under its Revisionary 15 2026:HHC:28280 Jurisdiction, under sections 397-401 CrPC. During the pendency of such Revision Petitions, if parties compound the offences, then the process is similar to that in the appeals. 10. The other stages, if any, would also tread a similar path and cross similar obstacles. 11. The above survey leads to an irresistible conclusion that once charges have been framed, then the remedy is not to file a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC but to invoke the revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 & 401 CrPC. However, in the present petition, what is sought to be quashed is the FIR and all consequential proceedings, based upon the out-of-court compromise entered between the victim and the accused, and the challenge is not on the merits of charges or accusations.” 19. A similar view was taken in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2025 SCC Online HP 6561, wherein it was observed: 13. Note submitted by the petitioner mentions that out of forty witnesses, seventeen witnesses have been examined. The charge-sheet was filed on 22.12.2023, and the supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 30.08.2024. There is nothing in the petition as to why the petitioner has approached this Court after the lapse of two years from the date of filing of the charge-sheet. The petition is also silent as to why the order of framing charge was not challenged by the petitioner and why the prosecution was permitted to examine the prosecution's witnesses. The jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4545, that the Court should not entertain the belated petitions for quashing the FIR. It was observed: “43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the Complainant that the present set of petitions is liable to be dismissed on 16 2026:HHC:28280 the ground of delay and laches, as also for the failure of the petitioners to avail of their alternate efficacious remedy in the form of Revision Petitions under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. 44. It need not be emphasised that powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.s are discretionary in nature, and though there may not be a total ban on the exercise of such power where the situation so warrants, at the same time, there are limitations of self-restraint that are recognised and followed by the Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One such limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the same within the period of limitation and thereafter filed the petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to overcome the objection of limitation. Similarly, the Courts have refused to entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., where it is filed with unexplained delay and laches and in the meantime, the trial has proceeded.” 14. In the present case, the petitioner has a remedy of challenging the order framing charge, but he did not do so within the limitation. He filed the present petition to circumvent the period of limitation prescribed for challenging the order of framing the charges. 15. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the aggrieved person may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed on page 145:— “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions 17 2026:HHC:28280 Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. In the present case, the trial has sufficiently progressed. Statements of seventeen witnesses have been recorded. Since the petitioner has approached this Court belatedly, this Court declines to exercise the inherent jurisdiction and relegates the petitioner to avail the remedies in the ongoing trial. It is not necessary to discuss the judgments cited at Bar and to comment whether the F.I.R. and subsequent proceedings disclose the commission of an offence or not. 20. It is undisputed that the charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: 18 2026:HHC:28280 “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 21. Therefore, the present petition cannot be allowed on this consideration as well. 22. No other point was urged. 23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 24. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 13th July, 2026. (ravinder)