1 2026:HHC:9644 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CMPMO No. 781 of 2025 Decided on : 20.3.2026 Decided on: 31.3.2026 Desh Raj Thakur … Petitioner Versus H.P. City Transport & Bus Stand Management & Development Authority & anr. …Respondents _____________________________ ______________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge Whether approved for reporting? ___________________________________________________ For the Petitioner: Mr. Suneet Goel, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vishwas Kaushal, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Balvinder Singh, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner Desh Raj Thakur has filed the present petition, under Section 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 6.12.2025, passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla. 2. By way of order dated 6.12.2025, learned District Judge, Shimla, H.P. has allowed the application filed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), moved by the 2 2026:HHC:9644 respondents to condone the delay in filing the objections, against the award dated 4.6.2025. 3. Parties to the present lis are referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned District Judge, Shimla. 4. Brief facts leading to filing the present petition may be summed up as under: The petitioners have filed application under Section 34 (3) of the Act by pleading that objections, under Section 34 of the Act, have been preferred before the learned District Judge. Since, those objections have been filed after the prescribed period of limitation, as such, application under Section 34(3) of the Act has been filed on the ground that copy of the award had been received on 4.6.2025, and the same was, thereafter, sent to the Department on 9.6.2025. The file was, subsequently sent to the competent authority for approval for filing the objections, against the award and the approval was received on 28.8.2025. On 3.9.2025, a letter was written to their counsel. The matter for depositing the awarded amount before the Court was 3 2026:HHC:9644 sent to the competent authority and the same was approved on 9.9.2025. The period of 90 days has expired on 3.9.2025 and the present application has been moved on 19.9.2025. Delay in filing the objections is stated to be due to the reason that seeking approval from the competent authority is a time consuming process. The delay is also stated to be unintentional. As such, a prayer has been made to condone the delay. 5. When, put to notice, the application had been contested by the respondent, on the ground, that application is devoid of merit and sufficient grounds have not been explained for condoning the delay. The petitioners are stated to be grossly negligent in filing the objection, against the award dated 4.6.2025. 6. The prayer, so made in the application, has also been opposed on the ground that vague averments have been made in the application and no dates have been given. 7. In nut-shell, the prayer made in the application has been opposed on the ground that each date has to be explained to the judicial conscience of the Court. 4 2026:HHC:9644 8. On merit, factual position, as asserted in the application, has been controverted. However, passing of the award has not been disputed. 9. The learned District Judge has considered the application and allowed the same, vide order dated 6.12.2025, by holding that there appears to be delay of 16/17 days, which has properly been explained. 10. Another reason, which has been given for condoning the delay is the fact that in the Government offices, files move through different channels. 11. Aggrieved from the said order, the present petition has been filed before this Court on the ground that the applicant has miserably failed to explain each day’s delay to the judicial satisfaction of the learned District Judge. 12. The approach adopted by the learned District Judge is also assailed by way of present petition on the ground that the petitioners-Department is not entitled to any special treatment and the case set up by the petitioners has to be dealt with by the learned District Judge, as an ordinary litigant’s application. The 5 2026:HHC:9644 impugned order is also stated to be based on surmises and conjectures. 13. On the basis of above facts, Mr. Suneet Goel, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Vishwas Kaushal, Advocate has prayed that the present petition may kindly be allowed by setting aside the order dated 6.12.2025, passed by the learned District Judge. 14. Per contra, the prayer, so made, has been opposed by Mr. Balwinder Singh, Advocate, appearing for the respondent, on the ground that it is no longer res-integra that while deciding the application for condonation of delay, a liberal approach has to be adopted by the Court, as, according to learned counsel for the respondent, the matter should be decided on merits, and not on the basis of technical grounds, such as limitation etc. 15. In addition to this, it has also been argued by learned counsel for the respondents herein that the delay has already been explained before the learned District Judge to the judicial satisfaction of the said 6 2026:HHC:9644 Court. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the present petition. 16. Copy of the application for condonation of delay has been annexed with the petition. As per the stand taken in the application, copy of the award was received on 4.6.2025, and the same was submitted to the office of the petitioners on 9.10.2025. Thereafter, the matter was dealt with, at various stages, till the same has been filed before the Court. The application has duly been supported by the affidavit of Dy. Divisional Manager (Legal) HRTC, Shimla. 17. Admittedly, the matter has to be dealt with, at various stages, before filing the application for condonation of delay, before the learned District Judge. Although, no special treatment is legally required to be given to the petitioners, but considering the length of delay, which, as per the application, is only 16-17 days, this Court is of the view that when, the inaction has not been attributed to the authorities of the petitioners, in that eventuality, approach of the learned District Judge, cannot be faulted with, that too, 7 2026:HHC:9644 under Article 227 of the constitution of India, as primary purpose of this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is to prevent only manifest injustice, and the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner herein could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court, as to how injustice has been caused to the petitioner, in allowing the application for condonation of delay, as the result of allowing the application for condonation of delay, is nothing, but admitting the case to be heard on merit. In the limited jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court can only interfere, if manifest injustice has been caused to the petitioner by allowing the application for condonation of delay. 18. It is no longer res-integra that the Court should adopt a liberal approach while deciding the application, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & anr. versus Mst. Katiji & others, reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353. Relevant paragraph-3 of the judgment is reproduced as under: “3.The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to 8 2026:HHC:9644 parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 9 2026:HHC:9644 Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a liti- gant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is admin- istered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experi- ence shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in- herited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- mak- ing, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more diffi- cult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "suffi- cient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” 18. As stated above, in the absence of the motive, which the petitioners (respondents herein) are going to achieve in not filing the objections, within the prescribed period of limitation, had they were not prevented to do so, for the reasons, as mentioned in the application, the 10 2026:HHC:9644 relief which has been granted to them by the learned District Judge, cannot be faulted with. 19. In view of above, this Court cannot interfere with the well reasoned order, passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. 20. The pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. (Virender Singh) 31.3.2026 Judge Kalpana