1 2026:CGHC:1873 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 178 of 2018 Mukund Singh Soni S/o Shri Krishna Kumar Soni Aged About 47 Years R/o Gram Chapora, Tahsil Kota, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh (Plaintiff), District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Govind Ram Kewant S/o Pachkoud Kaiwarth Aged About 49 Years R/o Gram Chapor, Tahsil Kota, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Ganeshiya Bai @ Fulvahin Bai Kaiwarth Aged About 40 Years R/o Gram Chapor, Tahsil Kota, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh (Defendants), District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.01.14 17:33:24 +0530 2 For Appellant :Ms. Renu Kochar, Advocate. For Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 :Ms. Shreya Jaiswal, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board 13.01.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/plaintiffs challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 19.05.2017 passed by the Learned 5th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, Distt- Bilaspur (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 42-A/2016 (Mukund Singh vs. Govind Ram Kaiwarth & Another) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 26.04.2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class- II, Kota, District Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 34-A/2011 (Mukund Singh vs. Govind Ram Kaiwarth & Another). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiff preferred the suit seeking permanent injunction in respect of land ad-measuring 0.60 Acre out of land bearing Khasra No. 92/01 Rakba 4.487 Hectare (11.22 acre) pleading inter alia that the defendants are interfering with 0.60 acre of 3 the plaintiff’s land; therefore, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendants be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit land. As per the plaintiff’s averments, the suit property belongs to the plaintiff’s ancestor, and the name of the plaintiff’s father is duly recorded in the revenue records. The plaintiff is in peaceful possession of the suit land. The ancestors of the defendants were never in possession of the suit property, and the defendants have no right, title, or interest therein, nor are they in possession of any land adjoining the suit land. That in June 2011, the defendants started disturbing the plaintiff and threatened to forcibly harvest and destroy the crop standing on the suit land, compelling the plaintiff to file the present suit for permanent injunction. 3. The defendants denied filed their written statement and denied the plaint averments. They stated that the map shown in Schedule ‘A’ is incorrect. According to the defendants, their ancestors are the owners of their land and they are in possession thereof. The defendants further contended that they have never encroached over the question land and they are not having possession over the same i.e. over the land 4 bearing Khasra No. 92/01 is a different land altogether. The defendants filed their written statement along with a counter- claim; however, they did not file any document in support of their claim. 4. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 26.04.2016 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Thereagainst, the Civil Appeal preferred by the plaintiff has been dismissed vide the impugned judgment and decree by the learned First Appellate Court. Thus, this appeal. 5. While dismissing the suit by the learned trial Court as well as the First Appeal by the learned First Appellate Court, it has categorically been observed that though the plaintiff has levelled an allegation that the defendants are trying to encroach the suit land, but no documentary proof has been adduced in this regard. Even the plaintiff has not submitted the chauhaddi and demarcation map and also not submitted an application for appointment of Commissioner despite the well settled principle of law that the burden of proof is heavy upon the party, who has raised the claim. 5 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 7. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 8. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufÏcient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 9. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6 10. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 11. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 12. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the 7 CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 13. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib