2026:HHC:28403 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 836 of 2025 Reserved on: 25.06.2026 Date of Decision: 14.07.2026. M/s Energy Clones Mercantile Pvt Ltd. & another ...Petitioners Versus M/s Fujiyama Power System Private Ltd. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr Sumeet Raj Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr J.S. Bagga, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for setting aside the order dated 17.12.2021, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the learned Trial Court ordered the issuance of summons against the petitioners (accused before the learned Trial Court) for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:28403 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the complainant is engaged in the business of manufacturing inverters, solar power generating systems, batteries, etc. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 have business relations with the complainant. Accused No. 1 is in full control and responsible for the day-to-day business, administrative and financial affairs of Accused No.1. Accused Nos. 1 and No.2 ordered a solar power generating system and allied items from the complainant. An amount of ₹8,18,204/- was payable by them. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 issued a cheque of ₹8,18,204/- in favour of the complainant. The complainant presented the cheque at his bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The complainant served a legal notice upon the accused, asking them to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice was served upon the accused, but they failed to pay the money. Hence, the 3 2026:HHC:28403 complaint was filed before the Learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused and ordered the issuance of a summons to the accused vide order dated 17.12.2021. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused have filed the present petition asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance. Notice was not served upon the accused, and the service of notice was a condition precedent for maintaining the complaint. The complainant failed to disclose that the accused No.2 was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time of commission of the offence. The averments made in the complaint do not satisfy the requirements of Section 141 of the NI Act. The allegations are inherently improbable, and no reasonable person would have reached a conclusion drawn by the learned Trial Court. The complaint was filed with an ulterior purpose to compel the complainant to settle the dispute. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’ and not with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. 4 2026:HHC:28403 Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5. I have heard Mr Sumeet Raj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, and Mr J.S. Bagga, learned counsel, for the respondent/complainant. 6. Mr Sumeet Raj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, submitted that the documents annexed to the complaint do not show that the accused owed a liability of ₹8,18,204. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the documents on record. The complaint was filed to compel the accused to settle the matter with the complainant, which is impermissible. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the Learned Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ankul Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another AIR 2025 SC4567 in support of his submission. 7. Mr J.S. Bagga, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court had gone through the preliminary evidence and found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. The averments in the complaint, 5 2026:HHC:28403 prima facie, make out a case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. A cheque carries with it a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability, and the Court should not scuttle the proceedings at the threshold without allowing the accused to lead the evidence to rebut the presumption. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: - ➢ Shiv Kumar alias Jawahar Saraf vs. Ramavtar Agarwal, 2020 SCC 617; and ➢ K. Ranganayakulu vs. State of Telangana & Ors. 2026 INSC 555. 8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: 6 2026:HHC:28403 “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 7 2026:HHC:28403 (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal 8 2026:HHC:28403 proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was asserted in the complaint that Accused Nos 1 and No.2 had business relations with the complainant, and they issued 9 2026:HHC:28403 a cheque of ₹8,18,204/- in favour of the complainant to discharge their liability. The averments in the complaint, prima facie, show that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the liability. 13. It was submitted that the cheque was not dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, but with an endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 283: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 970 that the dishonour of a cheque on the ground that the drawer had stopped the payment will also attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed at page 388: 12. In Modi Cements Ltd. [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri) 252], a similar question had arisen for the consideration of this Court. The question was whether dishonour of a cheque on the ground that the drawer had stopped payment was a dishonour punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Relying upon two earlier decisions of this Court in Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] and K.K. Sidharthan v. T.P. Praveena Chandran [(1996) 6 SCC 369: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1340], it was contended by the drawer of the cheque that if the payment was stopped by the drawer, the dishonour of the cheque could not constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act. That contention was specifically rejected by this 10 2026:HHC:28403 Court. Not only that, the decision in Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] to the extent that the same held that dishonour of the cheque by the bank after the drawer had issued a notice to the holder not to present the same would not constitute an offence, was overruled. This Court observed: (Modi Cements Ltd. case [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri) 252], SCC pp. 257-58, paras 18 & 20) “18. The aforesaid propositions in both these reported judgments, in our considered view, with great respect, are contrary to the spirit and object of Sections 138 and 139 of the Act. If we are to accept this proposition, it will make Section 138 a dead letter, for, by giving instructions to the bank to stop payment immediately after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability, the drawer can easily get rid of the penal consequences, notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence was committed. Further, the following observations in para 6 in Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] (SCC p. 742) Section 138 is intended to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of a negotiable instrument to draw a cheque without sufficient funds in his account maintained by him in a bank and induce the payee or holder in due course to act upon it. Section 138 draws the presumption that one commits the offence if one issues the cheque dishonestly. In our opinion, do not also lay down the law correctly. *** 20. On a careful reading of Section 138 of the Act, we are unable to subscribe to the view that Section 138 of the Act draws a presumption of dishonesty against the drawer of the cheque if he, without sufficient funds to his credit in his bank account to honour the cheque, issues the same and, therefore, this amounts to an offence under Section 138 of the Act. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we are unable to share the views 11 2026:HHC:28403 expressed by this Court in the above two cases, and we respectfully differ with the same regarding the interpretation of Section 138 of the Act to the limited extent as indicated above.” (emphasis in original) 13. We may also, at this stage, refer to the decisions of this Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 234: 2002 SCC (Cri) 121], where to this Court considering an analogous question held that even in cases where the dishonour was on account of “stop- payment” instructions of the drawer, a presumption regarding the cheque being for consideration would arise under Section 139 of the Act. The Court observed: (SCC p. 240, para 19) “19. Just such a contention has been negatived by this Court in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri) 252]. It has been held that even though the cheque is dishonoured by reason of a ‘stop- payment’ instruction, an offence under Section 138 could still be made out. It is held that the presumption under Section 139 is also attracted in such a case. The authority shows that even when the cheque is dishonoured by reason of ‘stop-payment’ instructions by virtue of Section 139, the court has to presume that the cheque was received by the holder for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course, this is a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show that the ‘stop-payment’ instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his account there were sufficient funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and that the stop-payment notice had been issued because of other valid reasons, including that there was no existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of a cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138 would not be made out. The important thing is that the burden of so proving would be on the accused. Thus, a court cannot quash a complaint on this ground.” 12 2026:HHC:28403 14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza [(2003) 3 SCC 232: 2003 SCC (Cri) 603: 2003 Cri LJ 1723] where this Court held that “stop-payment instructions” and consequent dishonour of a post-dated cheque attract the provision of Section 138. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 232g-233c) “Chapter XVII, containing Sections 138 to 142, was introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transactions. The said provisions were intended to discourage people from not honouring their commitments by way of payment through cheques. The court should lean in favour of an interpretation that serves the object of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely. The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post- dated cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in the discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence, and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption, coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act, leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post- dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. A contrary view would render Section 138 a dead letter and will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal obligations undertaken by them through their own acts, which, in other words, can be said to be taking advantage of one's own wrong.” (emphasis supplied) 13 2026:HHC:28403 14. Therefore, the accused would be, prima facie, liable for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N I Act, even if the cheque has been dishonoured with an endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’. 15. It was submitted that the accused did not have any liability to pay the amount. This submission will not help the petitioners. The complainant had specifically asserted in the complaint that the cheque was issued by the accused and was duly signed by them. These averments have to be, prima facie, accepted as correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 513 that the cheque carries with it a presumption of consideration which is to be rebutted by leading evidence, and any factual dispute is to be resolved by weighing evidence. It was observed: “10. It is also relevant to bear in mind that the burden of proving that there is no existing debt or liability is to be discharged in the trial. For a two-judge Bench in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 234, Justice S.N. Variava made the following pertinent observation on this aspect: — “17. There is, therefore, no requirement that the complainant must specifically allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of 14 2026:HHC:28403 proving that there was no existing debt or liability was on the respondents. This they have to discharge in the trial. At this stage, merely on the basis of averments in the petitions filed by them, the High Court could not have concluded that there was no existing debt or liability.” 11. The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued in the discharge of liability must also receive due weightage. In a situation where the accused moves the Court for quashing even before the trial has commenced, the Court's approach should be careful enough not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which supports the complaint. The opinion of Justice K.G. Balakrishnan for a three-judge Bench in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 would, at this stage, deserve our attention: — “26. … we are in agreement with the respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. As noted in the citations, this is, of course, in the nature of a rebuttable presumption, and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.” 12. At any rate, whenever facts are disputed, the truth should be allowed to emerge by weighing the evidence. On this aspect, we may benefit by referring to the ratio in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2020) 3 SCC 794, where the following pertinent opinion was given by Justice R. Banumathi: — 22. ………….. When disputed questions of fact are involved, which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 CrPC. Though the 15 2026:HHC:28403 Court has the power to quash the criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act on legal issues like limitation, etc., the criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act against Yogeshbhai ought not to have been quashed merely on the ground that there are inter se disputes between Appellant 3 and Respondent 2. Without keeping in view the statutory presumption raised under Section 139 of the NI Act, the High Court, in our view, committed a serious error in quashing the criminal complaint in CC No. 367 of 2016 filed under Section 138 of the NI Act.” 13. Bearing in mind the principles for the exercise of jurisdiction in a proceeding for quashing, let us now turn to the materials in this case. On careful reading of the complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate, what is discernible is that a possible view is taken that the cheques drawn were, in the discharge of a debt for the purchase of shares. In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of a factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.” 16. It was further held that the Courts should be slow in scuttling the complaint at a pre-trial stage. It was observed: “14. The parameters for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to quash the criminal proceedings under S.482 CrPC, have been spelt out by Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian for the two judges' bench in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: AIR 1992 SC 604, and the suggested precautionary principles serve as good law even today, for invocation of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 16 2026:HHC:28403 “103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 15. In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge had rightly relied upon the opinion of Justice J.S. Khehar for a Division Bench in Rajiv Thapar (supra), which succinctly expresses the following relevant parameters to be considered by the quashing Court, at the stage of issuing process, committal, or framing of charges, “28. The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same.” 16. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the Court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility, particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defence, 17 2026:HHC:28403 without having to adduce any evidence, needs to be of an unimpeachable quality to altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint. 17. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence, and the consequence then is that the proper forum, i.e., the trial Court, is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption. 18. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court, will not, in our opinion, be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here, subject to the determination by the trial Court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, the scuttling of the criminal process is not merited.” 17. Therefore, the Court cannot hold that the cheque was issued without any legal liability and quash the complaint without allowing the complainant to prove his case before the learned Trial Court. 18. It was submitted that the statement of account filed by the complainant is suspicious because it contains the same invoice number. This submission will not help the petitioner. The 18 2026:HHC:28403 statement of account (Ext. CW-1/H1) shows that it is running into multiple pages and is in continuation. This is apparent from the fact that the balance that has been carried forward has been mentioned on the second page onwards. It shows an amount of ₹11,51,331/-, which is more than the cheque amount. 19. It was submitted that there is a discrepancy in the copy of the ledger and the tax invoice filed by the complainant, which makes the complainant's case suspect. This submission will not help the petitioners. The entry dated 24.04.2021, shows that an amount of ₹11,51,331/- was due from the accused. This is precisely the amount mentioned in the tax invoice. Thus, there is no discrepancy in the tax invoice and the statement of account. 20. It was submitted that the notice was not received by the accused, and the essential condition for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 138 of the N I Act is missing. This submission will not help the petitioners. The complainant had specifically asserted in para-6 of the complaint that the complainant had served a legal notice dated 20.09.2021 upon the accused Nos. 1 and 2, through registered post and which was served upon the correct address of the accused. This is duly 19 2026:HHC:28403 corroborated by the copy of the postal receipts (Ext.CW-1/ and Ext. CW1/F2), which show that the letters were sent to the accused at the addresses mentioned in the complaint. There is a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, read with Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, that a letter sent to the correct address is deemed to be served, and it would be open for the petitioner/accused to rebut the presumption before the learned Trial Court by leading the evidence. However, the complaint cannot be quashed by holding that the notice was not served upon the accused. 21. It was submitted that the accused No. 2 is stated to be in full control and responsible for the day-to-day affairs, day-to- day business, administrative and financial affairs, which does not satisfy the requirement of Section 141 of the NI Act. This submission will not help the petitioners. The cheque is shown to be signed by accused No.2, and he is liable by virtue of his position as an authorised signatory. It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court K.Ranganayakulu (supra) that an authorised signatory is liable by virtue of his position as a signatory. Therefore, the accused No. 2 would be liable to the complainant by virtue of his being a signatory, and even if something is lacking in the complaint, the 20 2026:HHC:28403 same is not sufficient to quash the complaint and the summoning order. 22. In Anukul Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with an FIR lodged for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and it was held that a civil dispute cannot be converted into a criminal case. 23. In the present case, the cheque has been issued, which is punishable under Section 138 of the NIA, and no civil dispute is being converted into a criminal matter. Thus, the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 24. In the present case, the order was passed in the year 2021, and the present petition was filed in the year 2025. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioners have approached the Court to assail the order of cognisance after an inordinate delay. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4545, that a person cannot approach the Court for quashing the criminal proceedings after an inordinate delay. It was observed: “43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the Complainant that the present 21 2026:HHC:28403 set of petitions is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as also for the failure of the petitioners to avail of their alternate efficacious remedy in the form of Revision Petitions under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. 44. It need not be emphasised that powers under Section 482 of the Cr. PCs are discretionary in nature, and though there may not be a total ban on the exercise of such power where the situation so warrants, at the same time, there are limitations of self-restraint that are recognised and followed by the Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One such limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the same within the period of limitation and thereafter filed the petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to overcome the objection of limitation. Similarly, the Courts have refused to entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., where it is filed with unexplained delay and laches, and in the meantime, the trial has proceeded. 45. In Prabhu Chawla (Supra), the Supreme Court quoted with approval its earlier judgment in Madhu Limaye (Supra), wherein it had been held that though the availability of an alternate efficacious remedy of a Revision under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. does not affect the amplitude of the inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. that the High Court possesses, at the same time, easy resort to inherent power is not to be allowed except under compelling circumstances; it should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the Cr. P.C. itself. It was held that while it is true that Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is pervasive; it should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code, such as, for instance, in Section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C. 46. This Court in Vipin Kumar Gupta (Supra), placing reliance on its earlier judgment in Rajesh Chetwal v. State Neutral Citation no. 2011: DHC: 4313, held that though there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing of a petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the principles of inordinate delay and laches shall be applicable, and where 22 2026:HHC:28403 such petitions are filed with an inordinate delay and laches, this itself shall be a ground to dismiss the same.” 25. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances are shown to set aside the order of cognisance. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th , June 2026. (Ravinder)