Page No.# 1/7 GAHC010030942019 undefined THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/1581/2019 DINESH CHANDRA SINHA S/O- LT BIRENDRA KUMAR SINHA, VILL- GANDHI NAGAR, P.S. DHOLAI, P.O. BEKIRPAR- 788123, DIST- CACHAR, ASSAM VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS. REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT., DISPUR, GHY-6 2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ASSAM KAHILIPARA GHY-19 ASSAM 3:THE DIRECTOR STATE COUNCIL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING ASSAM KAHILIPARA GHY-24 ASSAM 4:THE PRINCIPAL NORMAL SCHOOL SILCHAR P.O. SILCHAR- 788001 DIST- CACHAR ASSAM 5:PADMABATI DEKA VICE-PRINCIPAL Page No.# 2/7 NORMAL SCHOOL SILCHAR PRESENTLY WORKING AS VICE PRINCIPAL NORMAL SCHOOL JORHAT P.O. JORHAT- 785001 DIST- JORHAT ASSA Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N DHAR, J MEDHI,MR. P DAIMARY,MR. R. KARIM,MS. N M LONGKENG,MR. P K DEKA,MR. I H LASKAR,MS. S DASGUPTA,MS. U BARUAH,MR. T U LASKAR Advocate for the Respondent : SC, ELEM. EDU, MR. B GOGOI, SC, SCERT,MS A LAHKAR (R5),MR. S ISLAM (R5),MR. A U CHOUDHURY (R5) BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA ORDER 24.09 .2026 Heard Mr. P.K. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B. Gogoi, learned Addl. Advocate General for the SCERT; and Mr. P.N. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, Elementary Education. 2] By this writ petition the petitioner has raised the following claims: “i) After interference with the order of suspension by this Court vide dated 10.05.2018, passed in WP(C) No. 735/2015, the period during which the petitioner was under suspension, was not treated as a period “on duty”. ii) Further, the claim of the petitioner is that, in spite of the petitioner having successfully completed his B.Ed. Degree, the advance increment required to be granted by the respondent authority to the petitioner for acquiring the B.Ed. Degree was not granted. iii) His third claim is that the petitioner is senior to the Private Respondent No. 5. However, during the period of his service his claim for being promoted to the next higher post of Vice Principal in the school, where the petitioner was employed, was not considered, and instead, the private respondent was promoted as Vice Principal.” Page No.# 3/7 3] The primary grievance of the petitioner is that he is senior to the private respondent, as per the provisional gradation list dated 18.09.2014, in which the petitioner was placed at Serial No. 4 and the private respondent at Serial No. 5. In spite of this, the private respondent was selected and promoted to the post of Vice Principal by overlooking the claim of the petitioner. 4] After issuance of notice, the respondents have filed their counter affidavit where the final gradation list has been enclosed, wherein the name of the private respondent was placed at Serial No.4 and the petitioner was placed at Serial No.14. 5] The petitioner's grievance is that he was not aware of the fact that the final gradation list was published nor the department furnished him any copy in spite of application being filed. Consequently, he was unable to ventilate his grievance against the final gradation list. Presently, the petitioner had already superannuated from service. His primary grievance is that he should be given the benefits notionally as he was placed senior to the private respondent in the provisional gradation list. 6] Per contra, Mr. B. Gogoi, learned Addl. Advocate General submits that the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner are totally incorrect. Referring to Annexure 6, (page No.26 of the writ petition) he submits that the writ petitioner was allowed to serve as Assistant Teacher in pursuance to the order dated 19.09.2000 passed in WP(C) No.5196 of 2000 and a copy of the said judgment is enclosed as Annexure 5. He submits that the said order contained no specific direction to appoint the petitioner. However, the authorities, in their wisdom decided to appoint the petitioner to the post of Assistant Teacher. He submits that the writ petitioner was appointed as a Physical Instructor in the Normal Page No.# 4/7 School, Silchar. However, the department interpreted the directions of the Court order dated 19.09.2000 passed in WP(C) No.5196/2000 and decided to appoint the petitioner as an Assistant Teacher. The order was issued on 22.11.2000 by the Department without examining as to how the petitioner came to be appointed as Assistant Teacher, or whether his initial entry into that post was in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that his initial appointment as Assistant Teacher was with effect from 1987 is incorrect. The petitioner was appointed as a Physical Instructor in the year 1987 and therefore, there is nothing wrong in the particulars reflected in the final gradation list which reflects that the petitioner's date of joining as an Assistant Teacher is 22.11.2000, which is the correct date as it is reflected in the order issued by the Director of SCERT. 7] It is submitted that this being the position on facts, the claim made by the petitioner for notional benefits on the ground that his claims for promotion to the post of Vice Principal were overlooked and the case of the private respondent was considered is untenable. It is further submitted that the submission of the writ petitioner that his period of suspension be treated as a period “on duty” has already been considered by the department and as per communication dated 19th of September, 2026 issued to the learned counsel for the respondent and a copy of which is also placed before this Court, it is seen that the period of suspension with effect from 12.12.2014 to 18.05.2015 has been treated “on duty” and the earned leave has been calculated as reflected in the said communication. 8] That apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the PPO has already been issued and therefore, all his claims with regard to salary and Page No.# 5/7 other service benefits have already been resolved by the department, as without resolving the same the PPO would not have been issued. 9] It submitted that the claim of the writ petitioner for advance increment for completion of B.Ed. is not acceptable as there is no averment made in the writ petition to show when the B.Ed. degree was conferred on the writ petitioner. It is submitted that with the enactment of the RTE Act, B.Ed. degree is made a mandatory requirement and therefore, the same is no longer considered to be eligible for grant of advance increment. 10] Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties before the Court, it is seen that the writ petitioner's initial appointment into the service was that as a Physical Instructor vide the order dated 10.09.1987 and which position is not disputed on facts. 11] The contention of the petitioner is that Physical Instructors and Assistant Teachers draw the same scale of pay. Therefore, his engagement as Assistant Teacher vide the order dated 22.11.2000 does not stand in the way of treating him as having served in a post equivalent to that of Assistant Teacher from his initial date of entry in 1987. In other words it is the contention of the writ petitioner that since the post of Physical Instructor and the Assistant Teacher draw the same scale of pay, they are to be considered to be equivalent posts. Therefore, the petitioner’s appointment as Assistant Teacher should be given effect from the date of his initial entry into the service, notwithstanding that he was initially appointed as a Physical Instructor. Consequently, in the final gradation list, the petitioner ought to have been shown as senior to the private respondent. Considering his entry into service was in the year 1987 and prior to that of the private respondent. Such a contention on the face of it is liable to be Page No.# 6/7 rejected, inasmuch as the grant of an equal or similar pay structure does not equate the posts to which persons are appointed. Even placing them within the same cadre does not make the posts interchangeable or one and the same, under the Service Rules in question. The petitioner was initially appointed as a Physical Instructor and by virtue of the Court order dated 19.09.2000 passed in WP(C) No.5196/2000 he was allowed to serve as an Assistant Teacher. The attempt made by the writ petitioner to persuade the Court that his service as Assistant Teacher must be reckoned from the date of his original entry as Physical Instructor in 1987 is wholly contrary to and unacceptable under the accepted principles of service jurisprudence is beside being contrary to the Service Rules. The private respondent having been appointed in the year 1988 as an Assistant Teacher and the writ petitioner having been allowed to work as an Assistant Teacher in the year 2000 clearly reveals that the private respondent is senior to the writ petitioner in the post of Assistant Teacher and therefore, the claim of the writ petitioner for notional benefits cannot be granted and the same is therefore, rejected. 12] Insofar as the grant of service benefits by treating the period of his suspension from 12.12.2014 to 18.05.2015 as a period spent “on duty” is concerned, the Court has been informed by the learned counsel for the respondent on instructions that the said claim has already been considered and the necessary orders have been passed and that the earned leave has also been duly calculated by the respondent authority. Therefore, no grievance survives in respect of the same as sought to be projected by the writ petitioner. Insofar as the third claim for the grant of advance increment for the B.Ed. degree is concerned, there are no clear averments in the writ petition as to when the petitioner obtained the B.Ed. degree, save and except the communication dated Page No.# 7/7 15.06.1996 forwarded by the Principal (i/c), Normal School, Silchar. It is therefore not clear when the petitioner was conferred the B.Ed. degree or whether his claim for advance increment for that period is maintainable. Nevertheless, liberty is granted to the petitioner to file an appropriate application before the Director, SCERT to claim for any such benefits of advance increment from the date of acquiring the B.Ed. degree as may be permissible under law. If such an application is filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, the authority concerned will pass appropriate order with a further period of 60 days therefrom. 13] This writ petition accordingly, stands disposed of in terms of the order passed today. 14] Pending interlocutory application, if any stands dismissed. 15] Interim order, if any passed earlier, stands vacated. JUDGE Comparing Assistant