2026:HHC:28284 _____________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 362 of 2026 Reserved on: 22.06.2026 Date of Decision: 13.07.2026 Robin Dhiman ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the petitioner : Mr Rajesh Kumar, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3 /State. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for the quashing of FIR No. No. 237 of 2009, dated 07.10.2009, registered at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). and the consequential proceeding arising out of the said F.I.R. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner had applied for a passport, and an adverse police verification report was issued on 2 2026:HHC:28284 01.01.2024, mentioning that an F.I.R was pending against the petitioner. He had not received any notice, summons, or intimation from any Court or the police authority regarding the registration of the FIR. The petitioner approached the Police Station Nahan, and Station House Officer (SHO) confirmed that the case file was forwarded to the Court on 04.01.2010 through RC No. 2 of 2010; however, the record was not traceable in the Police Station. The petitioner also approached the Court of Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srimour at Nahan, H.P, who found that the record was not traceable and directed the police to supply the available record, but the Police failed to produce any record. The FIR was registered 15 years ago, and no proceedings have been initiated due to the loss of the file. The Court can take cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 within 3 years, which has lapsed. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 3. The notice of the petition was issued to the State. The State filed a reply asserting that the case file was forwarded to the competent Court vide diary No. 2 of 2010, dated 04.01.2010. The office of Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmour at Nahan, 3 2026:HHC:28284 H.P., informed the police about the non-traceability of the judicial record and directed the police to provide the available record. The non-availability of the record would not assist the petitioner. F.I.R was registered for the commission of theft. The case property was also recovered, and the F.I.R should not be quashed. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. The report of learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour at Nahan, H.P. was also called in the matter and learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour at Nahan, H.P. submitted a report that FIR No. 237 of 2009 was available with the office, along with the bail record, but no formal charge sheet was available in the office 5. I have heard Mr Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondents No.1 to 3/State. 6. Mr Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the record is not traceable. Fifteen years have elapsed since the registration of the FIR. There is a limitation of 3 years for taking cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC. This period has already elapsed. No proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner. 4 2026:HHC:28284 The existence of the F.I.R. would harm the petitioner; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR ordered to be quashed. 7. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondents No.1 to 3 /State submitted that the charge-sheet was forwarded to the Court; however, the receipt is not available with the police. The FIR was registered for the commission of a theft. The case property was also recovered, and the F.I.R. should not be quashed. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra 2013 (4) SCC 642 that no time limit can be stipulated for the disposal of a criminal trial, but the continuation of a trial for a prolonged period violates the right to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was observed: - 16. In Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] a proponement was advanced that unless a time-limit is fixed 5 2026:HHC:28284 for the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the right to speedy trial would be illusory. The Constitution Bench, after referring to the factual matrix and various submissions, opined that there is a constitutional guarantee of speedy trial emanating from Article 21, which is also reflected in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state as follows: (SCC p. 268, para 83) “83. But then, speedy trial or other expressions conveying the said concept are necessarily relative in nature. One may ask—speedy means, how speedy? How long a delay is too long? We do not think it is possible to lay down any time schedules for the conclusion of criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the workload in the particular court, means of communication, and several other circumstances have to be kept in mind.” After so stating, the Court gave certain examples relating to a murder trial where a smaller number of witnesses are examined and certain trials which involve a large number of witnesses. It also referred to certain offences which, by their very nature, e.g., conspiracy cases, cases of misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, sedition, acquisition of disproportionate assets by public servants, cases of corruption against high public officials, take a longer time for investigation and trial. The Court also took note of the workload in each court, district, region and state-wise, and the strikes by the members of the Bar which interfere with the work schedules. The Bench further proceeded to observe that in the very nature of things, it is difficult to draw a time-limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go, and if it is a minor offence, not an economic offence and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise but each case must be left to be decided on its own facts and the right to speedy trial does not become illusory when a time-limit is not fixed. 6 2026:HHC:28284 17. In the said case, in para 86, the Court culled out 11 propositions which are meant to subserve as guidelines. The Constitution Bench observed that the said propositions are not exhaustive, as it is difficult to foresee all situations, and further, it is not possible to lay down any hard-and-fast rules. The propositions which are relevant for the present purpose are reproduced below: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC pp. 271-72) “86. … (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial), one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including the nature of the offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on— what is called the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial, and the State includes the judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. *** (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors—‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order—including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has 7 2026:HHC:28284 concluded—as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.” It has been laid down therein that it is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for the trial of offences inasmuch as any such rule is bound to be qualified. 18. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899], another Constitution Bench, while accepting the principle that denial of the right to speedy trial to the accused may eventually result in a decision to dismiss the indictment or a reversal of conviction, further went on to state as follows: (SCC pp. 639- 40, para 92) “92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle, nor is the accused called upon to show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by the factors—(1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay.” 19. However, thereafter, certain pronouncements, namely, Common Cause v. Union of India [Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33: 1996 SCC (Cri) 589], Common Cause v. Union of India [(1996) 6 SCC 775: 1997 SCC (Cri) 42], Raj Deo Sharma [Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1692] and Raj Deo Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar [Raj Deo Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1324], came to the field relating to prescription of outer limit for the conclusion of the criminal trial and the consequences of such delay, being either discharge or acquittal of the 8 2026:HHC:28284 accused. The controversy required to be addressed and, accordingly, the matter was referred to a seven-Judge Bench in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] and the larger Bench by the majority opinion, analysing the dictum of Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] and Kartar Singh case [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] and other legal principles relating to the power of the legislature, the power of the Court and spectrums of jurisdiction, recorded certain conclusions. Conclusions 3 and 4, which are pertinent for the present case, are as under: (P. Ramachandra Rao case [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830], SCC p. 603, para 29) “29. … (3) The guidelines laid down in the Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and- fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations, and no generalisation can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for the conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause [Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33: 1996 SCC (Cri) 589], Raj Deo Sharma [Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1692] and Raj Deo Sharma (2) [Raj Deo Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1324] could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case [Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33: 1996 SCC (Cri) 589], Raj 9 2026:HHC:28284 Deo Sharma case [Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1692] and Raj Deo Sharma (2) [Raj Deo Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1324]. At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.” (emphasis added) 20. At this juncture, we may notice a few decisions to show how the principles laid down in Abdul Rehman Antulay [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] and P. Ramachandra Rao [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] have been applied by this Court either for the purpose of quashing the prosecution or refusal to accede to the prayer in that regard. 21. In Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar [(2009) 3 SCC 355 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 95] the two-Judge Bench took note of the factual scenario that the investigation was conducted by an officer who had no jurisdiction to do so; that the accused-appellant therein could not be accused of causing delay in the trial because he had successfully exercised his right to challenge an illegal investigation; that despite direction by the High Court to complete the investigation within a period of three months on 7- 9-1990, nothing had happened till 27-2-2007 and the charge- sheet could only be filed on 1-5-2007 and, accordingly, opined that it was not a case where there was any exceptional circumstance which could be possibly taken into consideration 10 2026:HHC:28284 for condoning the inordinate delay of more than two decades in investigation and, accordingly, quashed the proceedings before the trial court. 22. In Sudarshanacharaya v. Purushottamacharya [(2012) 9 SCC 241 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1070], a criminal prosecution was launched for the commission of an offence for misappropriation and criminal breach of trust. On an application being filed for quashing of the proceedings, the High Court declined to quash the proceedings, taking note of the fact that the accused had also played a role in the procrastination of the proceedings and directed that the case be heard on a day-to-day basis. The matter travelled to this Court, and a contention was advanced that it would be unfair to submit the appellant-accused to the agony of a trial after a long lapse of time. The Division Bench referred to the principles laid down in P. Ramachandra Rao [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] and, further taking note of the conduct of the accused, declined to quash the proceedings. 23. At this stage, we think it apposite to advert to another aspect which is sometimes highlighted. It is quite common that a contention is canvassed in certain cases that unless there is a speedy trial, the concept of fair trial is totally crucified. Recently, in Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 9 SCC 408 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1139], a three-Judge Bench, after referring to the pronouncements in P. Ramachandra Rao case [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830], Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999], Satyajit Banerjee v. State of W.B. [(2005) 1 SCC 115: 2005 SCC (Cri) 276], pointed out the subtle distinction between the two in the following manner: (Mohd. Hussain case [(2012) 9 SCC 408 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1139], SCC pp. 427-28, para 40) “40. ‘Speedy trial’ and ‘fair trial’ to a person accused of a crime are an integral part of Article 21. There is, however, a qualitative difference between the right to a speedy trial and the accused's right to a fair trial. Unlike the accused's right of fair trial, 11 2026:HHC:28284 deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused in defending himself. The right to a speedy trial is, in its very nature, relative. It depends upon diverse circumstances. Each case of delay in the conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen in the facts and circumstances of such a case. Mere lapse of several years since the commencement of prosecution by itself may not justify the discontinuance of prosecution or dismissal of indictment. The factors concerning the accused's right to speedy trial have to be weighed vis-à-vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence of the people in the judicial system. Speedy trial secures rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. The nature and gravity of crime, persons involved, social impact and societal needs must be weighed along with the right of the accused to speedy trial and if the balance tilts in favour of the former the long delay in conclusion of criminal trial should not operate against the continuation of prosecution and if the right of the accused in the facts and circumstances of the case and exigencies of situation tilts the balance in his favour, the prosecution may be brought to an end.” (emphasis added) 24. It is to be kept in mind that on the one hand, the right of the accused is to have a speedy trial and on the other, the quashment of the indictment or the acquittal or refusal for sending the matter for re-trial has to be weighed, regard being had to the impact of the crime on the society and the confidence of the people in the judicial system. There cannot be a mechanical approach. From the principles laid down in many an authority of this Court, it is clear as crystal that no time-limit can be stipulated for the disposal of the criminal trial. The delay caused has to be weighed on the factual score, regard being had to the nature of the offence and the concept of social justice and the cry of the collective. 10. In the present case, the charge sheet was submitted to the court, as per the police; however, the charge sheet is not traceable in the Court. The police do not have any record of the 12 2026:HHC:28284 submission of the charge sheet before the Court. Therefore, the plea taken by the State that the charge sheet was sent to the court is not acceptable. 11. Section 468 of the CrPC deals with the period of limitation for taking the provisions and provides that the period of limitation is 3 years, when the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year, but not exceeding 3 years. The offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC is punishable with imprisonment for 3 years. Thus, the period of limitation for taking cognisance would be 3 years. It was laid down by the Patna High Court in Meera Devi v. State of Bihar, 2011 SCC OnLine Pat 479, that the Court cannot take cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 after three years. It was observed: It appears that the period of limitation for taking cognizance for the offence punishable under Section 379 of the I.P.C. is three years, and the maximum period of sentence is also three years. It does not appear from the impugned order that the learned Magistrate has considered the period of limitation as to whether the cognisance is barred by the period of limitation, and it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice or not. In the case of Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2005 (2) PLJR (SC) 193, it has been held in paragraph 8 that “……..the learned Magistrate should have paused to consider the question of limitation before taking cognisance and he should have addressed 13 2026:HHC:28284 himself to the question whether there were grounds to extend the period of limitation. On account of failure to do so, we would have, in the normal course, quashed the order of the Magistrate taking cognisance and directed him to consider the question of applicability of Section 473. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to remit the matter to the trial court for taking a decision on this aspect…………..” It appears that in that decision also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that the learned Magistrate should have considered the question of limitation before taking cognisance. In this view of the matter, the decision in the case of Ramesh (Supra) is not helpful to the opposite parties; rather, it appears that it is helpful to the petitioners. Admittedly, it does not appear from the impugned order that while taking cognisance, the learned Magistrate has taken note of the fact that the occurrence has taken place on 24.11.1998 and the cognisance is being taken for the offence punishable under Section 379 of the I.P.C. 12. In the present case, no charge sheet has been filed, and no cognisance has been taken. It would be impermissible for the learned Magistrate to take cognisance at this stage after the expiry of the period of limitation. 13. No proceedings are being conducted against the petitioner, and only the FIR is shown to be pending against the petitioner, which would not be taken to the logical conclusion in the absence of the record. The petitioner cannot be condemned 14 2026:HHC:28284 forever simply because an FIR was lodged against him, and the continuation of the FIR cannot be permitted. 14. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and F.I.R. No. 237 of 2009, dated 07.10.2009, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 379 read with Section 34 of IPC at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. are quashed. 15 Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending applications, if any. 16. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy but, if required, may verify passing of the order from the website of the High Court. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 13th July, 2026 (Ravinder)