2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CWP No : 9449 of 2014 Decided on: 03.07.2026 _____________________________________________________________ Suman Kumari ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Others ....Respondents Coram: Honble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the petitioner: Mr. Sohail Khan, Advocate, vice Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Varun Chandel, Additional Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 to 3-State. Ms. Sakshi Bhardwaj, Advocate, vice Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, Advocate, for respondent No.4. Ranjan Sharma, Judge Petitioner, Suman Kumari, being a non- selectee for the post of ASHA Worker has come up before this Court, seeking the following relief(s):- “(i). That a writ in the nature of certiorari may be issued and Annexure P-3 qua petitioner may kindly be quashed set-aside; (ii) That a writ in the nature of mandamus may be issued directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner as Asha Worker 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE for Development Block, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, H.P." FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. Case as set up by Learned Counsel is that the Central Government envisaged the community based functionaries, named as the Accredited Social Health Activists for villages, who shall be the first port of call for health-related demands of the rural and deprived sections of the population. For giving effect to his objective, the Respondent State notified Accredited Social Health Activists, [referred to as “ASHA Workers Policy”], Annexure P-1, prescribing that the selection shall be made from eligible female candidates in Gram Panchayats in the State who were resident of the village; and were in the age group of 25 to 45 years; and who possessed the educational qualification of eighth class pass ; and have communication skills ; and candidates were to be selected by a selection committee headed by the Block Medical Officer as Chairman and Block Development Officer and Tehsil Welfare Officer as its members. 3 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE 2(i). It is averred that in terms of the policy, as originally issued and amended from time to time and the State Authorities, selected and appointed the Respondent No 4 [Anju Devi] as ASHA Worker in Gram Panchayat Jhandutta District Bilaspur (HP) in the year 2014. 2(ii). Petitioner has assailed her non-selection as ASHA Worker in Gram Panchayat Jhandutta and has impugned the selection/appointment of the Respondent No 4, on the ground, firstly, that though the petitioner belonged to BPL/IRDP category, vide Annexure P-2, but action of the State Authorities in ignoring this aspect resulted in her non-selection was illegal; and secondly, once the petitioner was a permanent resident of the village (under concerned Gram Panchayat) since long coupled with the fact that the husband of petitioner was sick then she should have been given priority in selection/appointment over and above Respondent no 4, who started residing in the village (under the concerned Gram Panchayat) about last 15 years ago but the action of the State Authorities in ignoring these material aspects 4 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE which had resulted in her non-selection was illegal; and lastly, in terms of the Scheme, selection was to be made by consensus but in case no consensus could be arrived, then, preference was to be given to candidates from marginalized community SC/ST /BPL ; widow divorced /destitute; candidates having effective communication skills; candidates with some experience in social or community work but State Authorities not given preference to the petitioner, which was illegal. In this backdrop, a prayer was made to quash and set aside the selection/appointment of Respondent No 4, Annexure P-3, with the prayer to appoint the petitioner as ASHA Worker in Gram Panchayat Jhandutta. STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES IN REPLY: 3. Pursuant to issuance of Notice by this Court on 16.12.2014, Respondents have filed the Reply-Affidavit dated 04.02.2015. 3(i). Perusal of the Reply-Affidavit indicates that State Government notified the ASHA Workers Policy 5 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE in the year 2012, Annexure P-1. It is averred that selection of ASHA Workers for Gram Panchayats including Gram Panchayat Jhandutta was made by Selection Committee in accordance with the ASHA Workers Policy and Respondent No 4 was selected and appointed on the basis of her higher merit. It is averred that the petitioner participated in the selection process {interview} and due to lower merit once she remained unsuccessful, then, no cause of action accrues to the petitioner to assail her non- selection or to impugn the selection of the Respondent no 4 in these proceedings. It is in this backdrop that the prayer was made for dismissing the writ petition. NO REBUTTAL BY PETITIONER: 4. Petitioner has neither prayed for nor has she filed any rejoinder, so as to rebut the stand taken by State Authorities. 5. Heard, Mr. Sohail Khan, Learned vice counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Varun Chandel, Learned Additional Advocate General for Respondents 1 to 3- State; and Ms. Sakshi Bhardwaj, Learned vice counsel 6 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE for the Respondent No 4. ANALYSIS: 6. Taking into account the entirety of facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view that the non-selection of the petitioner and the selection and appointment of the Respondent No.4 [Anju Devi] as an ASHA Worker, in Gram Panchayat Jhandutta, in District Bilaspur, does not suffer from any infirmity, perversity or illegality, for the following reasons: NO AUTOMATIC APPOINTMENT BEING IRDP: 6(i). First contention of Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that though the petitioner belongs to BPL /IRDP category, Annexure P-2, yet her non-selection ignoring BPL status is illegal. The above plea is misconceived, for the reason, that merely because the petitioner belonged to BPL category [Annexure P-2] will not confer an automatic right of appointment on the petitioner as ASHA Workers. Moreover, the Asha Workers Policy -Scheme does not provide for automatic appointment on account of being BPL by giving a go-bye to 7 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE the selection process [i.e. interview etc.], conducted by duly constituted selection committee. RESPONDENT NO 4 BEING RESIDENT OF VILLAGE ELIGIBLE: 6(ii). Second contention of Learned Counsel is that the Respondent no 4 has been erroneously selected/appointed as the aforesaid respondent had started residing in Gram Panchayat Jhandutta about 15 years back and has affluent business and her children were studying in convent schools vis-à-vis the prolonged permanent residency of the petitioner is illegal. The above contention, cannot sustain, for the reason, that firstly, the ASHA Workers Scheme- Policy, Annexure P-1, confers eligibility on candidates who are “resident of village” under Gram Panchayat Jhandutta), in which the post of ASHA worker was sought to be filled up, then, the plea is misconceived; and secondly, it is settled law that the eligibility of a candidate is to be determined inaccordance with norms, in force on the date of commencement of selection process; and thirdly, once the Scheme as applicable, at the relevant time, nowhere restricts 8 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE eligibility of candidates for those who had resided in a village {under concerned Gram Panchayat} for specific duration and in the absence of any such restriction or prohibition in the Scheme-Policy, the petitioner cannot be permitted to invoke or to carve out an ineligibility qua the Respondent No.4-selected candidate. In these circumstances, the contention of Learned Counsel for the petitioner is turned down. MERE SICKESS OF HUSBAND OR BEING RESIDENT OF SAME VILLAGE NO GROUND FOR PRIORITY: 6(iii). Third contention is that once the husband of the petitioner was sick and she was a permanent resident of gram panchayat then, the authorities were bound to give priority in selection, which was ignored is illegal. The above contention is misconceived, for the reason that “petitioner has neither any locus nor any valid right to claim automatic priority”, on account of sickness of husband or for being a resident of same village under the Gram Panchayat dehors the Scheme or the Policy. Moreover, a claim not contemplated under the Scheme-Policy cannot be granted to the petitioner and accordingly, the same 9 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE is rejected. CLAIM FOR PREFERENCE CANNOT BE INVOKED WHEN MERIT AT VARIANCE: 6(iv). Last contention of Learned Counsel is that the action of Respondents in not giving preference in selection/appointment to petitioner, who belong to the marginalized community i.e. BPL Category is illegal. The above plea does not hold the water, for the reason, firstly, the petitioner had applied for post of Asha Worker and she was duly considered for selection by the selection committee as per the norms/criteria; and secondly, the non-selection of the petitioner due to lower merit in interview is a valid ground to negate the claim of the petitioner in instant proceedings; and thirdly, once the non- selection of petitioner was due to higher merit of Respondent no 4 but the petitioner has chosen not to file any rejoinder to Reply-Affidavit and thus the stand of State Authorities remains uncontroverted therefore the plea of the petitioner cannot sustain; and fourthly, the plea of the petitioner that while making selection, the Respondent-State Authorities 10 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE were bound to give preference to the petitioner as she belonged to marginalized community [i.e. BPL category] is totally misconceived, for the reason, that principle of preference in selection, applies in an eventuality where merit of two or more candidates was equal; and lastly, in instant case, the merit of the petitioner was lower than the merit of the Respondent no 4 and thus, in case of unequal merit the principle of preference in selection/appointment was not applicable and it cannot be invoked. Moreover, plea of preference in selection cannot be invoked, so as to confer an automatic right of appointment by giving a complete go-bye to the merit of respective candidates as determined by the selection committee. Even, the claim for preference, when, the merit of two or more candidates was at variance or unequal has been approved by the Honble Supreme Court in various judgements, as detailed here-in-under. 6(iv-a). The mandate of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Secy. (Health) Deptt. of Health & F.W. and another v. Dr. Anita Puri and others, (1996) 6 SCC 282, in following terms: 11 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE “7. Admittedly, in the advertisement which was published calling for applications from the candidates for the posts of Dental Officer it was clearly stipulated that the minimum qualification for the post is B.D.S. It was also stipulated that preference should he given for higher dental qualification. There is also no dispute that M.D.S. is higher qualification than the minimum qualification required for the post and the Respondent No. 1 was having that degree. The question then arises/ is whether a person holding a M.D.S. qualification is entitled to be selected and appointed as of right by virtue of the aforesaid advertisement conferring preference for higher qualification? The answer to the aforesaid question must be in the negative. When an advertisement stipulates a particular qualification as the minimum qualification for the post and further stipulates that preference should be given for higher qualification, the only meaning it conveys is that some additional weightage has to be given to the higher qualified candidates. But by no stretch of imagination it can be construed to mean that a higher qualified person automatically is entitled to be selected and appointed. In adjudging the suitability of a person for the post, the expert body like Public Service Commission in the absence 12 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE of any statutory criteria has the discretion of evolving its mode evaluation of merit and selection of the candidate. The competence and merit of a candidate is adjudged not on the basis of the qualification he possesses but also taking into account the Other necessary factors like career of the candidate throughout his educational curriculum, experience in any field in which the selection is going to be held; his general aptitude for the job to be ascertained in course of interview, extra- curriculum activities like sports and other allied subjects, personality of the candidate as. assessed in the interview and all other germane factors which the expert body evolves for assessing the suitability of the candidate for the post for which the selection is going to be held. In this view of the matter, the High Court in our considered opinion was wholly in error in holding that a M.D.S. qualified person like Respondent No. 1 was entitled to be selected and appointed when the Government indicated in the advertisement that higher qualification person would get some preference. The said conclusion of the High Court, therefore, is wholly unsustainable and must be reversed.” 6(iv-b). The expression “preference” implies that the weightage is to be given, where merit of two 13 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE or more candidates was equal and the plea for automatic appointment by giving preference without undergoing and by giving go-bye to selection is impermissible, as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive Officer v. E. Tirupalu and others alongwith connected matters, (1996) 8 SCC 253, in following terms:- “7. It is quite evident from the facts enumerated hereinabove that no prejudice could be regarded to have been caused to the respondents by their being regarded as ex- inmates. the total number of vacancies which were available were more than the total number of candidates who were inmates and ex-inmates. It is unfortunate that these in- house candidates were not selected. Clause (b) of Rule 6 which refers to preference being given to the inmates in appointment in the Devasthanams does not and cannot imply that irrespective of the merits of the candidates, the inmates have to be given appointments. The appellants have rightly resorted to the procedure of making selection from the inmates, ex- inmates and general candidates who were eligible, by holding written test/interviews and clause 6 can only mean that with the merits of the candidates being 14 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE equal, preference would be given to the inmates of the Balamandir.” 6(iv-c). A similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Singh and others vs Haryana State Electricity Board and others alongwith connected matters, (1996) 4 SCC 319, in following terms:- “10. It was contended by Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal No.3423 1996 and the learned counsel appearing for the other appellants that the High Court wrongly held that the Board had either overlooked or deviated from the condition that preference would be given to those candidates who possessed higher qualifications. It was submitted that though in the counter affidavit filed by the Board the correct position in this behalf was not properly explained, the record produced before the court clearly disclosed that the selection committee had before hand decided the norm as regards the manner in which preference was to be given for higher qualifications. It has been stated in SLP(C) No.24555 of 1995 and it is not denied by the respondents that the selection committee had adopted the norm of giving more marks for higher qualifications. It had given 2 marks to the candidates possessing diploma qualification and had obtained upto 75% marks. 3 marks were given to those candidates who possessed diploma and had obtained 15 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE more than 75% marks and also to them who had obtained B.E. or B. Tech. degrees. Those who possessed AMIE degree were given 4 marks. 5 marks were given to those candidates who possessed M.E. or M. Tech. degrees. On the basis of this material it can be said that weightage was in fact given for higher qualifications. The High Court was, therefore, not right in holding that the benefit of higher qualifications was denied to those candidates who possessed them. We are also of the opinion that it was not necessary to indicate in advance to the candidates the manner in which benefit of higher qualifications was to be given to them. Once we find that the selection committee had fixed the norm in this behalf in advance and that norm was applied uniformly to all the candidates it will have to be held that it acted in a fair manner and did not contravene the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, tried to support the finding of the High Court on this point by contending that in view of the representation made in the advertisement what was required to be done by the Board was to consider first those candidates who had higher qualifications and the candidates with lesser qualifications could have been considered only thereafter. This contention was rejected by the High Court, and in our opinion rightly. Ordinarily, giving of preference for higher qualifications would imply that other things being equal the 16 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE candidates with higher qualifications will be preferred.The representation made in the advertisement did not imply or convey that the selection was to be made in two stages, that is, firstly, the candidates having higher qualifications were to be considered and only thereafter the candidates with minimum qualifications were to be considered and that too if adequate number of candidates possessing higher qualifications did not become available. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents has to be rejected.” 6(iv-d). While dealing with a similar situation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. Y.V.V. R. Srinivasulu and others, (2003) 5 SCC 341, has outlined that “preference” in selection can be invoked where merit or other things are qualitatively and quantitatively equal and expression “preference” does not mean giving en-bloc preference ignoring the inter se merit and suitability, in following terms: “11. Whenever, a selection is to be made on the basis of merit performance involving competition, and possession of any additional qualification or factor is also envisaged to accord preference, it cannot be for the purpose of putting them as a whole lot ahead of others, dehors 17 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE their intrinsic worth or proven inter se merit and suitability, duly assessed by the competent authority. Preference, in the context of all such competitive scheme of selection would only mean that other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal, those with the additional qualification have to be preferred. There is no question of eliminating all others preventing thereby even an effective and comparative consideration on merits, by according enbloc precedence in favour of those in possession of additional qualification irrespective of the respective merits and demerits of all candidates to be considered. If it is to be viewed they way the High Court and Tribunal have chosen to, it would amount to first exhausting in the matter of selection all those, dehors their inter se merit performance, only those in possession of additional qualification and take only thereafter separately those with ordinary degree and who does not possess the additional qualification. Assuming for consideration without even accepting the same to be right or correct view to be taken, at least among the class or category of those possessing the additional qualification, inter se merit performance should be the decisive factor for actual selection for appointment and relief could not have been granted to respondents 18 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE for the mere asking only on the basis of the interpretation of the provision to some one who came to court, ignoring the fact that those before the court at any rate in spite of the view taken do not come up to the level of selection considered in the context of numerous others with higher ranks of merit performance, in addition to they being also in possession of the additional qualification, as those before the court. That apart, the old rule relating to the post of ACTO, which has become obsolete having been superseded, or even the advertisement if it has stated on the basis of the obsolete rule, that preference will be given first to candidates who possess a degree in Commerce and degree in Law, secondly to those who possess a degree in Commerce and thirdly to those who possess a degree in Law, cannot either support the claim of the respondents No.1 to 3 nor in any manner lend credence to the interpretation placed by the High Court and the Tribunal. The word 'first' has to be construed in the context of even giving preference only in the order and manner indicated therein, inter-se among more than one holding such different class of degrees in addition and not to be interpreted vis-à-vis others who do not possess such 19 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE additional qualification, to completely exclude them, en bloc.” 6(iv-e). While dealing with a similar issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has outlined in the case of Dr Sharmad vs. State of Kerala and others [Civil Appeal No. 13422 of 2024 and connected matter], 2025 SCC OnLine SC 71, that “preference” can be granted, incase, the merit of two or more candidates is equal, in following terms:- 28. Arun Kumar Agarwal (Dr.) (supra) is distinguishable on facts. Since ‘preference’ has been referred to, it goes without saying that the ratio thereof could apply where other qualifications/things being equal, preference is given to an aspirant having higher qualification. In the case before us, although both Dr. Sharmad and Dr. Jyotish were holders of M. Ch. degrees, as on date of occurrence of the vacancy on the said post of Associate Professor i.e. 13th November, 2012, Dr. Jyotish did not have the requisite experience of 5 years physical teaching as an Assistant Professor (he admittedly having been promoted to such post only on 22nd July, 2008). Question of preferring Dr. Jyotish to Dr. Sharmad did not arise at all since the former was deficient insofar as 20 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE experience on the post of Assistant Professor is concerned.” Based on factual matrix and the broad principles outlined by the Honble Supreme Court in the cases of Dr Anita Puri, E. Tirupalu, Prem Singh, Y.V.V. R. Srinivasulu and Dr. Sharmad (supra), indisputably, the petitioner had lesser merit vis-à-vis the higher merit of the Respondent No. 4 [Asha Devi] in selection [interview] conducted by a duly selection committee for post of ASHA Worker in Gram Panchayat Jhandutta, in District Bilaspur, Annexure P-3, therefore, in case of unequal merit, the petitioner has neither any right nor any locus to claim preference in selection/appointment, by giving a complete go-bye to the relative merit in selection is impermissible. The plea of the petitioner for giving appointment, by giving preference, but by ignoring the comparative merit shall negate the core principle of public employment and the contention of the petitioner is accordingly, turned down. NO CHALLENGE TO SCHEME DISENTITLES THE PETITIONER FOR RELIEF: 21 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE 6(v). Pertinently, in terms of the Scheme, the petitioner had participated in the selection (interview) and after having remained unsuccessful, the petitioner loses right to assail her non-selection under the said scheme. Moreover, in instant proceedings, petitioner has not questioned the Scheme-Policy [Annexure P-1]. Further, the petitioner was not selected due to her lower merit assessed by selection committee. Even absence of any cogent and convincing proof of arbitrariness or malafides against the members of selection committee [and without impleading them] the claim cannot sustain. Besides, the claim of the petitioner for preference in selection/appointment on the ground that she belonged to the marginalized section of society, [i.e. being BPL] cannot be invoked contrary to the settled law, which mandates that "preference in selection can be invoked" in case the merit of two or more candidates was equal and this principle cannot apply, where the merit of two or more candidates is unequal or is at variance as in this case; and this principle cannot be invoked to give a complete go-bye to the selection process 22 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE and/or to bye-pass comparative merit of respective candidates determined by the selection committee, as in this case, wherein, the petitioner secured lower merit vis-a vis the higher merit of Respondent No. 4, who was validly selected and was appointed as an Asha Worker after due advertisement and selection. Thus, the claim of petitioner being devoid of any merit, cannot sustain. CONCLUSION: 7. Based on above analysis, the selection and resultant appointment of the Respondent No 4 as an ASHA Worker in Gram Panchayat Jhandutta, [Annexure P-3], does not suffer from any infirmity, perversity or illegality. Consequently, non-selection of the petitioner due to her lower merit in selection is legal and valid. Accordingly, the claim of petitioner is turned down. 8. No other point was raised/argued. DIRECTIONS: 9. In view of above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, instant writ petition, is dismissed, in following terms:- 23 2026:HHC:28344 REPORTABLE (i) Selection of the Respondent No 4 as ASHA Worker on 02.09.2014, Annexure P-3, in Gram Panchayat, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur does not suffer any infirmity or illegality and the same is upheld; (ii). Claim of the petitioner for preference in selection is not tenable on facts as well as in law, when preference can be invoked where, merit of two or more candidates is equal and not in case where merit is at variance, as in fact situation of instant case; and (iii) Parties to bear their respective costs. In aforesaid terms, the writ petition and all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall accordingly stand disposed of. (Ranjan Sharma) Judge July 03, 2026 [Shamsh Tabrez]