Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2026:CGHC:1390
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 129 of 2015 1 - Smt. Nirmani Wd/o Late Hari Narayan Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Matkot, Tahsil Tokapal, District Bastar Chhattisgarh. 2 - Smt. Neelawati W/d/o Late Hari Narayan Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Matkot, Tahsil Tokapal, District Bastar Chhattisgarh.
Appellant(s) Versus 1 - Smt. Munni Bai And Ors. D/o Jagat Singh Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Matkot, Marigudapara Tahsil Tokapal, District Bastar Chhattisgarh. 2 - Smt. Parwati D/o Jagat Singh Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Matkot, Patel Para, Tahsil Tokapal, District Bastar Chhattsgarh 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh D/o Through- District Collector, Bastar Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh.
Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate
For Resp No. 1 & 2 : Mr. Krishna Kumar Dewangan, Advocate For State : Mr. Ritesh Giri, PL Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Judgment on Board RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.01.12 17:15:18 +0530
2 09/01/2026
1. The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the judgment and decree dated 11.12.2014 passed in Civil Appeal No. 8-A/2012 (Smt. Nirmani & Anr. v. Smt. Munni Bai & Others) by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Bastar, whereby the First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree dated 18.03.2011 passed in Civil Suit No. 12- A/2009 (Smt. Munni Bai v. Smt. Nirmani & Others) by the learned Trial Court. The present appeal has been preferred by defendant Nos. 1 and 2, who are the appellants herein. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The instant Second Appeal was admitted by this Court on 14.03.2023 on the following substantial questions of law:
“1. Whether both the learned Courts below were justified in allowing the civil suit of the plaintiff, whereas the suit was barred by limitation? 2. Whether the learned Courts below were justified in allowing the civil suit of the plaintiff despite the fact that the suit suffered from non-joinder of necessary parties?”
3. The material facts, which are largely undisputed, are that agricultural land situated at Village Matkot bearing Khasra Nos. 22, 38 and 55/1 admeasuring 4.66 acres, land at Village Bade Arapur admeasuring 11.44 acres and land at Village Telenga Arapur admeasuring 5.83 acres, in all measuring 21.93 acres, was originally recorded in the name of Dribnath,
3 son of Durga Prasad, in the revenue records of the year 1932-33. After the death of Dribnath, his only daughter Daymati succeeded the said property and her name was recorded in the revenue records in the year 1986-87. It is further an admitted position that Daymati was married to Jagat Singh and had two daughters and one son, namely Munni Bai (plaintiff) & Parwati (defendant No.4) and Harinarayan (who is the husband of both defendants No.1 & 2). It is also not in dispute that the Naib Tahsildar, Keshloor, while deciding the mutation application filed by Munni Bai i.e. the plaintiff, passed an order on 08.11.2006 to adduce the evidence, against which the revision was filed by the defendants, which was allowed and the order passed by the Naib Tehsildar was set- aside.
Before the Trial Court, plaintiff Munni Bai pleaded that the suit property, which originally belonged to her maternal grandfather Dribnath, devolved upon her mother Daymati and thereafter she, along with her sister Parwati and brother Harinarayan, became entitled to succeed the said property. It was pleaded that the defendants/appellants are the wives of deceased Harinarayan and that Daymati had kept the plaintiff’s husband Devanath as ‘Gharjamai’ for looking after agricultural operations. According to the plaintiff, after the death of Harinarayan in the year 2005, the defendants obstructed her from cultivating the land, whereupon she came to know that only the name of Harinarayan had been recorded in the revenue records in respect of the property standing in the name of Daymati. Referring to the proceedings before the revenue authorities, the plaintiff sought declaration of her
4 share and other consequential reliefs. The defendants/appellants, in their written statement, admitted that the suit land was initially recorded in the name of Dribnath and thereafter in the name of his daughter Daymati in the year 1986-87 and also admitted the relationship between the parties. However, it was specifically pleaded that since Munni Bai and Parwati were married long back, they were residing in their respective matrimonial homes and never remained in possession of the suit land. The allegation of obstruction was denied. It was further pleaded that during her lifetime, Daymati, with the consent of her daughters, got the name of her only son Harinarayan recorded in the revenue records pursuant to a resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat, and that such entry was made in the year 2000-01. It was contended that the plaintiff never challenged the said entry during the lifetime of Harinarayan and filed the suit only after his death; therefore, the suit was barred by limitation and also suffered from non-joinder of necessary parties. The Trial Court framed four issues and, upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, decreed the suit holding the plaintiff entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property and granted declaration accordingly, which was affirmed by the First Appellate Court.
Hence, this appeal by defendant Nos. 1 and 2/appellants. 4.
Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the Courts i.e. First Appellate Court and the Trial Court have committed a manifest error of law in decreeing the suit, ignoring the fact that the suit was clearly
5 barred by limitation. It is argued that the name of Harinarayan was recorded in the revenue records in the year 2000-01 during the lifetime of Daymati and with the consent of the plaintiff and her sister (defendant No.4), and the said entry was never challenged for several years. According to learned counsel, the plaintiff, having full knowledge of the said mutation, approached the Civil Court only after the death of Harinarayan in the year 2005, rendering the suit hopelessly time-barred. It is further contended that the suit was also liable to be dismissed on account of non-joinder of necessary parties. Learned counsel submits that the findings recorded by both the Courts below are contrary to settled principles of law governing limitation and non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. another son of Daymati namely; Dhanurjay and the children of Harinarayan and, therefore, the impugned judgments suffer from perversity, warranting interference of this Court.
5.
Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 supports the impugned judgments and submits that since the respondents are daughters of late Daymati, they had a lawful right to claim their share in the suit property and that both the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have rightly decreed the suit in their favour, calling for no interference. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgments passed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. 7. This Court has carefully examined the material available on record. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that the First Appellate Court has appreciated the entire pleadings, documentary evidence and oral
6 testimony and has recorded well-reasoned findings on all material issues. 8. The First Appellate Court has categorically recorded that there is no dispute between the parties that the suit land was originally recorded in the name of Dribnath and thereafter stood transferred in the name of his daughter Daymati. It has further been held that the plaintiff Munni Bai is admittedly the daughter of late Daymati and that her name was not recorded along with Harinarayan in the revenue records. 9. The main defence of the appellants was that the plaintiff had relinquished her rights or had consented to the mutation of the entire property in favour of Harinarayan. The First Appellate Court, upon appreciation of Exhibits D-1 to D-8, has recorded a clear finding that such alleged consent was not proved. It was noticed that the Form “E” mutation register did not bear the signature of the plaintiff and that the Gram Panchayat resolution relied upon by the appellants was not produced before the Court. 10. The First Appellate Court has also relied upon the cross-examination of defence witness Faganu Ram, wherein it was admitted that Daymati herself had spoken in the Gram Sabha in favour of entering the name of the plaintiff. On the basis of such evidence, it was rightly held that the appellants failed to establish valid consent or relinquishment by the plaintiff. The finding that the mutation in favour of Harinarayan was not legally valid is a pure finding of fact. 11.
The First Appellate Court has further held that any transfer or relinquishment of rights in immovable property exceeding Rs.100/-
7 could have been effected only through a registered instrument in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act, which admittedly was not done. In the absence of any legally valid transfer, the objection raised by the appellants was rightly rejected. 12. As regards the issue of succession, the First Appellate Court has rightly applied Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and held that upon the intestate death of Daymati, her property devolved equally upon her children, namely Munni Bai, Parwati and Harinarayan. Consequently, the plaintiff was rightly held entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property. 13. So far as, non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. another son of Daymati namely; Dhanurjay and children of Harinarayan is concerned, the First Appellate Court has recorded a categorical finding that since the said objection was not raised before the trial Court, they could not be permitted to raise for the first time in appeal. Even otherwise, no prejudice was shown to have been caused to the appellants. 14. On the issue of limitation, the First Appellate Court has correctly held that once the mutation in favour of Harinarayan was found to be invalid in law, it could not create a bar of limitation. The plaintiff’s right in the property continued to subsist and, therefore, the suit was not barred by time. 15. The First Appellate Court has also observed that in case of joint and undivided property, possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be possession of all, and therefore, the plaintiff was not required to
8 independently prove physical possession. 16. All the aforesaid findings are concurrent findings of fact, based on proper appreciation of evidence and correct application of law.
The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity or legal infirmity warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission are answered against the appellants. 19. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. 20. A decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Rahul