BADRI PRASAD CHANDRAKAR ( DIED) THORUGH LEGAL HEIR, SMT. CHANDRIKA CHANDRAKAR v. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
WA/971/2025 · 2026-01-07
Shri Arvind Kumar Verma
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 15253 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 15253 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1
2026:CGHC:1105-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 971 of 2025 Badri Prasad Chandrakar ( Died) Through Legal Heir, Smt. Chandrika Chandrakar W/o. Late Badri Prasad Chandrakar, Aged About 66 Years R/o. Naya Kumharbhatha, In Front of Shri Krishna Mandir, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (C.G.)
... Appellant versus 1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Transport, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Chhattisgarh Infrastructure Development Corporation Through Its Managing Director, Office of First Floor, Udyog Bhawan, Telibandha, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation Through Its Managing Director, Office at Habib Ganj, Bhopal (M.P.)
... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant
: Mr. A.N. Bhakta and Mr. Vivek Bhakta, Advocates For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Dy. Advocate General For Respondent No.2 : Ms. Purnima Singh, Advocate Hon'ble Shri
Ramesh Sinha,
Chief Justice
Hon'ble
Shri Arvind Kumar Verma
, Judge
Judgment
on Board
Per
Ramesh Sinha
, Chief Justice
0 8 .01
.2026
1 Heard Mr. A.N. Bhakta and Mr. Vivek Bhakta, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA
2 General, appearing for respondent No.1/State as well as Ms.Purnima Singh, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent No.2 on I.A. No. 01/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 41 days in filing the instant appeal. 2 For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed. Delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard finally. 3 By way of present writ appeal under Section 2 of Sub-Section (1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench Act, 2006, the appellant, who was legal heir of the sole writ petitioner (Badri Prasad Chandrakar) in the writ petition, has challenged the
order dated 12.08.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No.9419 of 2019 (Badri Prasad Chandrakar (Died) through Legal Heir, Smt. Chandrika Chandrakar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), by which the writ petition filed by the petitioner (Badri Prasad Chandrakar) for grant of annual increment for the period from 17.11.1984 to 05.07.1990 has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 4
Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the original petitioner (Badri Prasad Chandrakar) was initially appointed on the post of Conductor in erstwhile Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vide order (Annexure P-3) on
01.10.1983. Subsequently, vide order dated 17.11.1984, he was
3 dismissed from service, which was challenged by the petitioner before the Labour Court, Raipur under the MP Industrial Relations Act, 1960 and vide order (Annexure P-4) dated 25.05.1990 passed in Case No. 215/84/MPIR Act, learned Labour Court, Raipur allowed the application of the petitioner, without back wages. Vide order (Annexure P-5) dated 03.07.1990, he was re- instated in service. After reorganization of State of MP, the petitioner’s services were allocated to the State of Chhattisgarh and he was posted alike other employees in CG Infrastructure Development Corporation. The petitioner moved an application on 15.04.2019 before the respondent No.2 for grant of annual increments from 17.11.1984 to 05.07.1990, which was dismissed vide order dated 17.07.2019 (Annexure-P/1) and moreover, vide
order dated 31.08.2019 (Annexure-P/2), the application preferred by the petitioner for grant of same relief vide application dated 12.12.2018 has also been rejected. Ultimately, vide Annexure P-6 dated 04.06.2019, petitioner was superannuated with effect from
29.06.2019. After his superannuation, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition bearing WPS No. 9419 of 2019 challenging the 17.07.2019 (Annexure P/1) and order dated 31.08.2019 (Annexure P/2) passed by the respondent No.2. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 12.08.2025. Hence, this appeal. 5
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge erred in law and on facts in dismissing the writ petition, as
4 the impugned orders dated 17.07.2019 and 31.08.2019 were passed in complete disregard of the legal consequences flowing from the award of the Labour Court dated 25.05.1990. It is submitted that the dismissal order dated 17.11.1984 was set aside by the learned Labour Court and the appellant was ordered to be reinstated in service. Once the termination was quashed, continuity of service necessarily followed. Denial of back wages does not amount to denial of continuity of service unless expressly so directed. Therefore, the interregnum period from 17.11.1984 to 05.07.1990 is required to be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of annual increments and other consequential service benefits. 6
Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the respondents have misdirected themselves in law by treating the period in question as a break in service for the purpose of grant of increments, which is contrary to settled service jurisprudence. Annual increments are a normal incident of service and flow from continuity, and cannot be denied in the absence of any specific
order depriving the appellant of such benefit. It is further contended that the cause of action is recurring in nature as the denial of increments has a direct bearing on fixation of pay, pension, and other retiral benefits. 7 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respective respondents submit that the appellant seeking grant of annual
5 increments for the period from 17.11.1984 to 05.07.1990, during which he admittedly did not work, and for which the Labour Court expressly denied back wages. It is submitted that the award dated 25.05.1990 passed by the learned Labour Court granted reinstatement without back wages, clearly reflecting the intention that the appellant would not be entitled to monetary or service- related benefits for the intervening period. Grant of annual increments for the said period would amount to indirectly conferring back wages, which has been specifically denied by the Labour Court. Learned counsel further submit that reinstatement does not automatically confer continuity of service for all purposes unless specifically directed. In the absence of any express grant of continuity with consequential benefits, the appellant cannot claim increments for the period during which he neither worked nor discharged any duties. The respondents also submit that the impugned orders dated 17.07.2019 and 31.08.2019 are reasoned, legal, and in strict conformity with the award of the Labour Court as well as the applicable service rules. No violation of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution is made out, nor has the appellant demonstrated any parity with similarly situated employees. Hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6 8 We have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9 It is not in dispute that the Labour Court, vide award dated 25.05.1990, set aside the dismissal of the petitioner and directed his reinstatement in service without back wages. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was reinstated on 03.07.1990 and continued in service till his superannuation on 29.06.2019. 10 The core issue for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to annual increments for the period from 17.11.1984 to 05.07.1990, during which he admittedly did not work and for which the Labour Court expressly denied back wages.
11 It is well settled that reinstatement does not ipso facto confer continuity of service for all purposes unless the same is specifically directed. Denial of back wages by the Labour Court clearly indicates its intention that the petitioner would not be entitled to monetary or service-related benefits for the interregnum period. Grant of annual increments for the said period would amount to indirectly conferring benefits which were expressly denied by the Labour Court. 12 The contention of the appellant that continuity of service necessarily follows reinstatement cannot be accepted in the absence of any specific direction to that effect in the award. The respondents were, therefore, justified in treating the period in question as non-qualifying for the purpose of annual increments. 7 Further, the claim for increments was raised after an inordinate delay of nearly three decades and only on the verge of superannuation. Such a belated claim cannot be entertained, particularly when the petitioner had accepted reinstatement and continued in service without demur. The impugned orders dated 17.07.2019 and 31.08.2019 are reasoned, legal, and in consonance with the award of the Labour Court and the applicable service rules. No violation of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution has been established. 13 In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no infirmity in the
order dated 12.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra