1 2026:CGHC:1786 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2643 of 2023 1 - Sonchand Banjare S/o Late Shiv Prasad Banjare Aged About 72 Years Retired Additional Collector, Resident Of Old Bus Stand Karbala Road, Near B.J.P. Office, Juna Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of General Administration, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Department General Administration Vallabh Bhawan Bhopal (M.P.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Kunal Das, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 12/01/2026 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs :- “10.1- That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire service record of the petitioner for kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court. 10.2- That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the DPC dated 30/12/2019 ABHIGYA SAXENA Digitally signed by ABHIGYA SAXENA 2 particularly negative remark as mentioned 1990 (G) as well the negative discussion mentioned in the DPC details also in the larger interest of justice. 10.3- That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authority to grant the monetary and other consequential benefits to the petitioner since the Right of the petitioners has accrued till the superannuation day in the larger interest of justice.. 10.4- Any other relief, which may be deemed, fit by this Hon'ble Court just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be provided in favour of the petitioner. 2. Facts of the case :- By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 30.12.2019 passed by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) and forwarded by the Additional Secretary to the Secretary, General Administration Department (GAD), Mantralaya, State of Chhattisgarh vide communication dated 21.01.2020, whereby the petitioner was assigned adverse gradings/remarks recorded as “G, Kh, G, K, K” for the relevant periods, which are illegal, arbitrary, unauthorized, and wholly unsupported by any material evidence or lawful basis. It is the specific case of the petitioner that such adverse valuation has been made mechanically and in utter disregard of the settled principles governing assessment of service records, resulting in serious prejudice to the petitioner by adversely affecting his promotion and consequential monetary benefits and other service dues. The petitioner further submits that the impugned decision was taken during the pendency of 3 Contempt Case (Civil) No.1067/2019 as well as W.P.(S.) No.3356/2007 before this Hon’ble Court, and despite the said proceedings being sub judice, the respondents failed to place or disclose the impugned valuation/remarks before this Hon’ble Court in their reply, thereby suppressing material facts and acting without bona fides. The preparation and communication of the impugned adverse remarks during the pendency of judicial proceedings, without placing the same before this Hon’ble Court, vitiates the entire decision-making process, rendering the impugned order violative of the principles of natural justice, fairness, and transparency, and consequently liable to be quashed, for which reason the petitioner has been constrained to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner respectfully submits that, in terms of the government circulars issued by the State Government from time to time, a departmental enquiry is required to be concluded within an outer limit of six months, whereas in the present case the enquiry against the petitioner was allowed to linger on for nearly two years, rendering the entire process arbitrary and illegal. It is further submitted that even after the State Government, in appeal, set aside the order passed by the Commissioner, the sealed cover was not opened in the impugned DPC proceedings and, in fact, the authorities themselves have admitted that no sealed cover existed in the petitioner’s service 4 record in the year 1993, which exposes the falsity of the affidavit earlier filed by the respondents claiming that the sealed cover was pending. The continued inaction on the part of the respondent authorities is thus ex-facie illegal, arbitrary, and actuated by mala fides. Learned counsel further contends that during the pendency of Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1067/2019, the respondents sought to introduce a new and unfounded ground by alleging that the petitioner’s promotion was long due but could not be granted on account of pending adverse remarks, whereas during the pendency of W.P.(S.) No.3356/2007 neither any such adverse remark was disclosed nor raised in the reply filed by the respondents, clearly demonstrating suppression of material facts and lack of bona fides. It is submitted that the alleged grounds now sought to be relied upon are false, baseless, unsupported by any document, and pertain to issues which had already been resolved by the competent authority long back, on the basis of which the petitioner was granted successive promotions from time to time until his superannuation. The fixation of the remark “G” for the year 1990, allegedly on the basis of the year 1987, and in the absence of any report for the year 1989, is wholly illegal, unauthorized, and unsustainable in law, particularly when the respondents themselves have admitted that the relevant records for the year 1989 were not available. Learned counsel further submits that Clause 8.3 of the DPC guidelines has been completely ignored, despite the petitioner fulfilling the requisite 5 conditions, inasmuch as he was awarded the remark “K” in the year 1992 and had consistently earned “K” remarks in the preceding three years, yet the respondents deliberately failed to assign the petitioner his rightful and legitimate grading. It is also urged that the adverse remark “G” pertaining to the year 1987, which related to the petitioner’s initial appointment, could not have been carried forward indefinitely, especially when the dispute stood resolved and the petitioner was thereafter promoted to the post of Tahsildar and subsequently to higher posts, which fact itself demonstrates that the adverse remark had lost its relevance and stood effaced. 4. Learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. It is further submitted that the respondents have acted strictly in accordance with law and policy, and no arbitrariness or illegality can be attributed to the impugned order. The respondents have also taken bona fide steps for creation and enhancement of posts, which necessarily involves a multi-stage administrative process, and delay in such process cannot be a ground to compel regularization contrary to statutory rules. Since the petitioner has already retired employee and the petitioner is not entitled to claim post-retirement promotion or consequential pensionary benefits. It is lastly submitted that the petitioner has already been considered multiple times pursuant to directions of this Court and his claim has been rejected by a reasoned order. 6 Therefore, no further interference is warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction, and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents enclosed along with the petition. 6. The core issue which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the petitioner, merely on account of long continuance in service, can claim promotion with retrospective effect and consequential monetary and retiral benefits, particularly after his superannuation. 7. The undisputed record reveals that the petitioner’s case for promotion was duly considered by the respondent authorities on several occasions pursuant to directions issued by this Court in earlier writ petitions as well as contempt proceedings, and ultimately, the competent authority rejected the claim by passing a reasoned and speaking order. No procedural irregularity, perversity, arbitrariness, or mala fide can be attributed to the decision-making process adopted by the respondents. The mere fact that the petitioner continued in service for a long period does not confer upon him any indefeasible right to claim promotion with retrospective effect or to seek consequential monetary or retiral benefits, particularly after his superannuation. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited, and this Court does not sit in appeal over the assessment made by the Departmental Promotion Committee unless the same is shown to 7 be vitiated by patent illegality, which is conspicuously absent in the present case. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Government of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Dr. Amal Satpathi & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3512, has categorically held that no retrospective service benefits can be granted from a date when an employee was not borne in the cadre, as such action would disturb settled rights and is contrary to service jurisprudence and it was held thus:- “19. It is a well settled principle that promotion becomes effective from the date it is granted, rather than from the date a vacancy arises or the post is created. While the Courts have recognized the right to be considered for promotion as not only a statutory right but also a fundamental right, there is no fundamental right to the promotion itself. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to a recent decision of this Court in the case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Dharamdeo Das, wherein it was observed as follows: “18. It is no longer res integra that a promotion is effective from the date it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. No doubt, a right to be considered for promotion has been treated by courts not just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself. In this context, we may profitably cite a recent decision in 8 Ajay Kumar Shukla v. Arvind Rai10 where, citing earlier precedents in Director, Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran Mohanty and Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab12, a three-Judge Bench observed thus: 41. This Court, time and again, has laid emphasis on right to be considered for promotion to be a fundamental right, as was held by K. Ramaswamy, J., in Director, Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran Mohanty in para 4 of the report which is reproduced below: ‘4……. There is no fundamental right to promotion, but an employee has only right to be considered for promotion, when it arises, in accordance with relevant rules. From this perspective in our view the conclusion of the High Court that the gradation list prepared by the corporation is in violation of the right of respondent- writ petitioner to equality enshrined under Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution, and the respondent-writ petitioner was unjustly denied of the same is obviously unjustified.’ 42. A Constitution Bench in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, laying emphasis on Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India held that if a person who satisfies the eligibility and the criteria for promotion but still is not considered for promotion, then there will be clear violation of his/her's fundamental right. Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for himself and 9 Anand, C.J., Venkataswami, Pattanaik, Kurdukar, JJ., observed the same as follows in paras 22 and 27: ‘Articles 14 and 16(1) : is right to be considered for promotion a fundamental right 22. Article 14 and Article 16(1) are closely connected. They deal with individual rights of the person. Article 14 demands that the ‘State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws’. Article 16(1) issues a positive command that: ‘there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State’. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet of Article 14 and that it takes its roots from Article 14. The said clause particularises the generality in Article 14 and identifies, in a constitutional sense “equality of opportunity” in matters of employment and appointment to any office under the State. The word “employment” being wider, there is no dispute that it takes within its fold, the aspect of promotions to posts above the stage of initial level of recruitment. Article 16 (1) provides to every employee otherwise eligible for promotion or who comes within the zone of consideration, a fundamental right to be “considered” for promotion. Equal opportunity here means the right to be “considered” for promotion. If a 10 person satisfies the eligibility and zone criteria but is not considered for promotion, then there will be a clear infraction of his fundamental right to be “considered” for promotion, which is his personal right. “Promotion” based on equal opportunity and seniority attached to such promotion are facets of fundamental right under Article 16(1). * * * 27. In our opinion, the above view expressed in Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.13, and followed in Jagdish Lal [Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana14, and other cases, if it is intended to lay down that the right guaranteed to employees for being “considered” for promotion according to relevant rules of recruitment by promotion (i.e. whether on the basis of seniority or merit) is only a statutory right and not a fundamental right, we cannot accept the proposition. We have already stated earlier that the right to equal opportunity in the matter of promotion in the sense of a right to be “considered” for promotion is indeed a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16(1) and this has never been doubted in any other case before Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.], right from 1950.’ “20. In State of Bihar v. Akhouri Sachindra Nath, it was held that retrospective seniority cannot be 11 given to an employee from a date when he was not even borne in the cadre, nor can seniority be given with retrospective effect as that might adversely affect others. The same view was reiterated in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India16, where it was held that when a quota is provided for, then the seniority of the employee would be reckoned from the date when the vacancy arises in the quota and not from any anterior date of promotion or subsequent date of confirmation. The said view was restated in Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Assn. (Direct Recruit) v. State of U.P., in the following words: ‘37. We are also of the view that no retrospective promotion or seniority can be granted from a date when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre so as to adversely affect the direct recruits appointed validly in the meantime, as decided by this Court in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India held that when promotion is outside the quota, seniority would be reckoned from the date of the vacancy within the quota rendering the previous service fortuitous. The previous promotion would be regular only from the date of the vacancy within the quota and seniority shall be counted from that date and not from the date of his earlier promotion or subsequent confirmation. In order to do justice to the promotes, it would not be proper to do injustice to the direct recruits…… 12 38. This Court has consistently held that no retrospective promotion can be granted nor can any seniority be given on retrospective basis from a date when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre particularly when this would adversely affect the direct recruits who have been appointed validity in the meantime.” (emphasis supplied) 20. In the instant case, it is evident that while respondent No. 1 was recommended for promotion before his retirement, he could not assume the duties of the Chief Scientific Officer. Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules, clearly stipulates that an employee must assume the responsibilities of a higher post to draw the corresponding pay, thus, preventing posthumous or retrospective promotions in the absence of an enabling provision.” 9. In view of the above discussion, this Court is further guided by the settled position of law that while an employee has a fundamental right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the applicable rules, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself, much less a right to retrospective promotion or seniority. Grant of such relief would disturb settled service positions and is impermissible in service jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner, having already retired from service, cannot claim post- retirement promotion or consequential financial benefits in the absence of any statutory provision enabling the same. The 13 allegations regarding adverse remarks, sealed cover procedure, and delay in departmental proceedings do not, in the facts and circumstances of the case, warrant interference, especially when the petitioner was considered repeatedly and his claim stood rejected by a reasoned order. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is found to be devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) JUDGE Saxena