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High Court of Himachal Pradesh · body

2026 DAILYLAW 15192 (HP)

Budhi Singh v. STATE OF HP

CWPOA/2253/2019 · 2026-07-10

Jiya Lal Bhardwaj

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:HHC:28346 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWPOA No.2253 of 2019 Decided on: 10.07.2026 Budhi Singh and another ...Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another ...Respondents Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes For the petitioners: Mr. Dilip Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Ompal and Ms. Ridhima Karol, Advocates. For the respondents: Mr. Hemant Kumar Verma, Deputy Advocate General. Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge (Oral) The petitioners by way of present petition have prayed for the following substantive reliefs:- “(i) That decision conveyed vide memorandum dated 30.7.2009, Annexure P-5, rejecting the claim of petitioners for pay parity with Masons of HPPWD may kindly be quashed and set aside; (ii) That the petitioners may be held entitled to pay parity with Masons of HPPWD and other departments and consequently they may be held entitled to the pay scale of Rs.950-1800/- w.e.f. the date of their appointment, revised to Rs.3120- 5160/- w.e.f. 1.1.1996 with further revision from time to time; 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:28346 (iii) That the petitioners may also be held entitled to all consequential reliefs as a result of granting them the aforesaid revision of pay scale, including arrears of salary and interest at market rate on the delayed payments;” 2. The facts as emerge from the pleadings are that petitioners No.1 & 2, who are matriculate and middle pass respectively, were appointed as Masons, vide appointment orders dated 16.01.1997 and 17.02.1997. As per the Recruitment and Promotion Rules (in short ‘R&P Rules’) for the post of Mason in Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department (in short ‘HPPWD’), the essential qualification is middle pass and the candidate should be able to use tools, in common use in trade such as level square, plumber etc.; must be able to work on heights/over scaffolding; must be able to lay bricks in simple bound and; must be able to and prepare centering for RCC. There are no R&P Rules for the post of Mason in the respondent-Department, where the petitioners were appointed as Masons. The petitioners have been appointed in the pay scale of Rs.750-30-950-35-1160- 40-1320-45-1410/- (with initial start of Rs.770/- per month) plus other allowances sanctioned from time to time. It has been averred that it is only the petitioners, who were appointed as Masons in the respondent-Department and the 3 2026:HHC:28346 post of Mason was treated as Class-IV post. However, the pay scale of Rs.750-1410/-, which was admissible to Beldars in HPPWD and other Departments was given to the category of the petitioners and the post of Mason in other Departments is a Class-III post carrying the pay scale of Rs.400-600/-, prior to 01.01.1986 which was revised to Rs.950-1800/- w.e.f. 01.01.1996. Different categories of skilled and semi-skilled post in the pay scale of Rs.950- 1800/- were re-designated as Junior Technician, respectively as per Notification dated 30.08.1997 (Annexure P-3). It has also been averred in the petition that the pay scale of Mason in other Departments was revised to Rs.3120-5160/- w.e.f. 01.01.1996. The petitioners made representations for grant of pay scale at par with their counterparts in other Departments. Respondent No.2 had forwarded their representations vide letter dated 15.12.2007 (Annexure P-4) to respondent No.1, wherein it was clearly mentioned that there are no R&P Rules available for the post of Mason in the Department and that the matter for grant of pay scale of Rs.3120-5160/- instead of Rs.2520-4140/-, who were working as Masons on the analogy of HPPWD be considered. However, the said request made by the petitioners came to 4 2026:HHC:28346 be rejected vide letter dated 30.07.2009 (Annexure P-5). 3. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by the rejection of their claim for grant of pay scale of Rs.950-1800/- w.e.f. their dates of appointments and thereafter Rs.3120-5160/- w.e.f. 01.01.1996, have approached this Court, inter alia on the grounds that the petitioners are the only Masons working in respondent-Department and since there are no R&P Rules framed for the post of Mason in the respondent- Department, they may be granted pay scales as granted to the Masons in HPPWD, as per Annexure P-1. It has further been averred that once as per Notification dated 30.08.1997, the pay scale of the categories of skilled and semi-skilled posts under various Departments of HP was revised from Rs.400-600/- and Rs.400-660/- to Rs.950- 1800/- with initial start of Rs.1,000/- w.e.f. 01.01.1986, the petitioners who were working as Mason in respondent No.1- Department once having satisfying the essential qualifications prescribed for the post of Mason in HPPWD and other Departments of the State and further discharging the same duties and responsibilities, they could not have been denied the same pay scales at par with their counterparts in the HPPWD. Once the petitioners are skilled 5 2026:HHC:28346 workers, they cannot be treated at par with Beldars, which is a Class-IV post and not fall under the category of the skilled/semi-skilled post and hence they have prayed that the decision rejecting the claim of the petitioners for pay at par with the Masons of HPPWD may be quashed and set aside and further the petitioners may be held entitled to pay parity with Masons of HPPWD and other Departments and they may be granted the pay scale of Rs.950-1800/- from the dates of their appointments and thereafter revised pay scale of Rs.3120-5160/- w.e.f. 01.01.1996. 4. The respondents filed reply to the petition and averred that during the year 1986, HPAP Battalion No.3 was raised by the State, wherein 62 posts of follower Constable (Class-III) were also created which included 2 posts of follower Constable Masons. However, during the year 1996, Government abolished 62 posts (Class-III) of follower Constables (Tradesmen) and these follower Constables were adjusted against the vacant posts of general duty Constable lying vacant in the said Battalion. Thereafter, the State Government created 62 (Class-IV) posts of non combatised staff in lieu of the 62 (Class-III) posts of follower Constables which were abolished. The 62 posts created in Class-IV 6 2026:HHC:28346 included 2 posts of Masons, against which the petitioners were appointed. Once the petitioners had accepted the offer, they are estopped to agitate the matter at this stage. However, it is admitted that there are no R&P Rules for the posts of Mason. The petitioners are not skilled/semi-skilled workers as are in PWD. As per the essential qualification prescribed in HPPWD, the Mason should be able to use tools, in common use in trade such as level square, plumber etc. He must work on heights/over scaffolding and must be able to lay bricks in simple bound and must be able to prepare centering for RCC. No such qualification was laid down at the time when the petitioners were appointed in service. The petitioners were not holding the above qualifications at the time of their appointments and as such, they cannot claim parity at par with Masons in PWD. It has further been averred that the posts of Mason were created in Class-IV category in the Police Department, keeping in view the job requirement. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record carefully. 6. Mr. Dilip Sharma, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by Mr. Ompal and Ms. Ridhima Karol, learned 7 2026:HHC:28346 counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that once the petitioners are skilled workers and had been discharging the same duties as discharged by the Masons in the HPPWD, they are entitled to the same scale, irrespective of the fact that they were appointed on a Class-IV post. He further vehemently argued that once the petitioners fulfilled the essential qualification to hold the post in HPPWD and further there are no R&P Rules in the Police Department, where they were appointed, denial of the same pay scale to them is against the mandate contained in the judgment passed by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Randhir Singh vs. Union of India and others, (1982)1SCC 618. 7. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has also drawn attention of this Court to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Dineshan K.K., (2008)1SCC586, to buttress his submissions that since the petitioners had also performed the same duties as performed by the Masons in HPPWD, they are also entitled to the same pay scale on the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, which has now assumed the status of a fundamental right. 8 2026:HHC:28346 8. Mr. Hemant Kumar Verma, learned Deputy Advocate General representing the respondents, on the other hand has vehemently opposed the prayer made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners and contended that even if there are no Rules in place, this Court may not draw any equivalence and further grant the pay scale as granted to the Masons in the HPPWD, in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.T. Veerappa and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2006) 9 SCC 406. He further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab State Power Corporation Limited vs. Rajesh Kumar Jindal and others, (2019) 3 SCC 547, wherein it has been held that it is the duty of the employee seeking parity of pay under Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India to prove and establish that he has been discriminated against, as the question of parity has to be decided after consideration of various factors. 9. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made at the bar. No doubt as per the various pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is not within the realm of the Court to determine pay structure 9 2026:HHC:28346 and classification of the posts and it is in the exclusive domain of the executive and the expert bodies and the Courts/Tribunals cannot sit over the wisdom of the executive in prescribing the qualification, pay and grade pay in a particular service. But at the same time, if the employees are treated differently merely because they belong to different Departments or the basis for classification or post is ex-facie irritational, arbitrary or unjust, it is open to the Court to interfere. 10. In the present case, there are no R&P Rules in place in the respondent-Department. The post of Mason is a skilled post. The Mason working in any Department of the State Government has to perform the same duties and functions. The petitioners when appointed as Masons were possessing the requisite qualifications to hold the posts of Mason as per the R&P Rules in HPPWD. Furthermore, once the State Government had issued the Notification dated 30.08.1997, when the posts of skilled and semi-skilled have been designated as Junior Technician with respect to trade/job specifications prescribed, the category of Mason cannot be classified as Class-IV post. Thus, the action on the part of the respondent-Department to first classify the post 10 2026:HHC:28346 of Mason as Class-IV post in their Department and thereafter, grant the petitioners the pay scale of Class-IV post is illegal, unjust, arbitrary and discriminatory and also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 11. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Randhir Singh’s case (supra) has aptly considered the matter and has held as under :- “9. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. If any-thing, by reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileges of a police officer', their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver- constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay for equal work' is not a principle which the courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force at least on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The scale of pay shall be effective from January 1, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect.” 12. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme 11 2026:HHC:28346 Court had come to the conclusion that the Drivers have to perform the same functions and duties as performed in other Departments and thus, they were held entitled to the same pay scale on the analogy of the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation and others vs. G.S. Uppal and others, (2008) 7 SCC 375, has held that the judicial review in matters of fixation of pay and determination of parity is limited, but again reiterated that the Court would be justified in interfering with the pay fixation if it finds such a decision to be unreasonable, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced hereunder: “21. There is no dispute nor can there be any to the principle as settled in the above-cited decisions of this Court that fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties is the function of the Executive and the scope of judicial review of administrative decision in this regard is very limited. However, it is also equally well-settled that the courts should interfere with the administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity when they find such a decision to be unreasonable, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and taken in ignorance of material and relevant factors. [see K.T. Veerappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2006) 9 SCC 406].” 22. Mr. M.N. Krishnamani, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Raj Kumar Gupta and Shri A.N.Bardiyar appearing for respondents in C.A. Nos. 9244/03 and 9248/03; Mr. Rishi Malhotra, Advocate appearing for respondents in 12 2026:HHC:28346 C.A. 9239/2003, in support of the judgment of the Division Bench, contended that no exceptions can be taken to the well- reasoned judgment recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court. They submitted that the Division Bench has analysed in great detail the factual situation and legal proposition covering the field of controversy, therefore, there is apparently no infirmity or perversity in the judgment impugned in these appeals inviting interference by this Court. 23. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, we have scrutinized the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the backdrop of the factual situation of the case as well as in the light of the principle enunciated in the above-cited decisions. 24. It is well-settled that the State can make reasonable classification if it has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It is admitted position in the present case that posts of SDOs/SDEs/AEs can be filled up by the Corporation by any one of the three known methods, namely, direct recruitment, on promotion or by transfer/deputation. Once a person is appointed to a post in a particular cadre, the source of his recruitment or the method of his appointment becomes irrelevant. The Corporation has framed its Service Bye-Laws and by virtue of Rule 5.1 of Part-V of the Service Bye-Laws, each post in the Corporation will carry a time scale of pay; the present pay scale being indicated in Appendix-II and further that the pay scale is subject to revision by the Board, which will, however, generally follow the pattern adopted by the Government of Haryana from time to time. 25. The employees of the Corporation, since its inception in 1970, had been getting the same pay scales as that of the employees of the Haryana Government and the Board of Directors having already equated the pay scales of the Engineers of the Corporation commensurate to the pay scales of the Government employees, but the State Government has not concurred with the decision of the Board of Directors. 26. By virtue of Clause 81(v) of the Memorandum of Association of the Corporation, the Directors of the Corporation in their discretion have powers to appoint, remove or suspend such Managers, Secretaries, Officers, Clerks, Agents and Servants of permanent, temporary or special services, as they may from time to time think fit, 13 2026:HHC:28346 and to determine their powers and duties and fix their salaries or emoluments and to require security of such amount as they think fit in such instances. The power to fix the salaries or emoluments of the employees of the Corporation, thus, specifically rests with the Directors of the Corporation and by virtue of Rule 5.1 of Part-V of the Service Bye-Laws, as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment, the Corporation had favourably considered the claim of the respondents by recommending the same scales for them, as were being given to their counterparts in the service of the Government Departments. 27. The proposal of the Board of Directors of the Corporation for revision of pay scales to its employees came up before the Standing Committee in its meeting held on 28.05.1992 and the Standing Committee approved the pay scales in a selective manner. The revision in pay scales of the Superintending Engineers, Accounts Officers, Circle Head Draftsmen, Divisional Head Draftsmen, etc. were approved, whereas the revision of pay scales of the respondents, who are AEs/SDOs/SDEs, was postponed and it was decided that the matter would be examined separately by the Finance Department. 28. The State of Haryana in its written statement filed before the High Court admitted that although the technical qualifications of incumbents on the posts of AEs/SDOs/SDEs in various Government Departments, Boards and Corporations are identical, yet the nature of duties and responsibilities, quantum of workload and level of technical expertise involved do vary from organization to organization depending upon the nature of activities undertaken by the respective organizations. It is further contended that the salary and allowances of the deputationists of the Corporation are governed by the terms and conditions of their deputation as decided by the Government from time to time. Therefore, the respondents cannot be treated and equated at par with the similar categories of employees of the State Government. 29. The learned Single Judge of the High Court as also the learned Judges of the Division Bench have considered the controversy in detail in their judgments holding the respondents entitled for the revision of pay scales on a par with their counter-parts working in the State of Haryana. 30. It is not in dispute that a deputationist holds the post in a particular cadre office for the duration he remains on 14 2026:HHC:28346 deputation and is a part of that cadre. No material has been placed on record by the appellants to show that the deputationists are appointed against only certain particular posts or that they cannot be posted or transferred to the posts held by the respondents. In fact, it is an admitted position that the posts are mutually interchangeable. In this situation, it is reasonable to infer that a deputationist performs the same duties as those performed by other persons working in the cadre. It is also an admitted position that the qualifications laid down for recruitment in the Corporation are identical to those prescribed in the Departments of the Government. It is further clear that the respondents have continued to work in the pay scale of Rs.2000-3500 w.e.f. 01.01.1986. As against this, their counter-parts in the Government and also the persons, who are posted in the Corporation by way of deputation, would get the scale of Rs.3000-4500 on completion of five years of service and are placed in the scale of Rs.4100-5300 (to the extent of 20% of the posts) on completion of 12 years of service. The respondents were obviously placed at a disadvantageous position. The decision of the Government in rejecting the proposal of the Board of Directors suffers from the vice of invidious discrimination and cannot be sustained because the very same decision of the Board with regard to all other employees has since been accepted and approved by the State Government. On the scrutiny of the material on record, it is clear that the appellants did not produce any evidence on record to establish that the working conditions, responsibilities and nature of duties, etc. of the respondents are different from their counter-parts working in the same categories in the State Government, Boards and other Corporations, etc. and also the persons who are working with the Corporation on deputation. 31. A careful examination shows that the issue was not really about grant of pay scales to Corporation Engineers on par with PWD Engineers. When the pay revision took place, the revised pay scales that were given to Engineers of the State Government were also given to the engineers of the Corporation with effect from 1.1.1986 thereby maintaining the parity. What was not extended to the Corporation employees, which is the subject matter of the grievance, is the further revision by way of “removal of anomaly in pay scales” given to AEE/AE/SDO/SDE of the State Government with effect from 1.5.1989 vide circular dated 2.6.1989 of the Finance Commissioner. The real 15 2026:HHC:28346 question would be whether what is given by way of anomaly removal in the case of Engineers of the State Government, should automatically be extended to the corresponding categories of engineers of the Corporation. 32. When, after a pay revision, an anomaly is found in the pay scale given to a class of Government servants and such anomaly is rectified, it is not a new pay revision but a correction of the original pay revision, or an amendment to the pay scale that has already been granted. Therefore, where the pay revision extended to the government servants has already been extended to the employees of the Corporation also, it follows that any correction of anomaly in the revised pay scale given to the government servants should also be made in the case of those who were earlier given parity by extending the pay scale which is the subject matter of the correction. It should be borne in mind that the question whether Corporation engineers were on par with PWD Engineers and should be given parity in pay scales was already decided when the pay scale revision granted to Government (PWD) engineers was extended to the corporation Engineers also with effect from 1.1.1986. That question did not again arise when the anomaly in the pay revision was rectified with reference to the Government engineers. When the anomaly in the pay scale of Government engineers was rectified, the rectification should apply to Corporation engineers also to maintain the parity. 33. The plea of the appellants that the Corporation is running under losses and it cannot meet the financial burden on account of revision of scales of pay has been rejected by the High Court and, in our view, rightly so. Whatever may be the factual position, there appears to be no basis for the action of the appellants in denying the claim of revision of pay scales to the respondents. If the Government feels that the Corporation is running into losses, measures of economy, avoidance of frequent writing off of dues, reduction of posts or repatriating deputationists may provide the possible solution to the problem. Be that as it may, such a contention may not be available to the appellants in the light of the principle enunciated by this Court in M.M.R. Khan v. Union of India [1990 Supp. SCC 191] and Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union [(2000) 4 SCC 245]. However, so long as the posts do exist and are manned, there appears to be no justification for granting the respondents a scale of pay lower than that sanctioned for 16 2026:HHC:28346 those employees who are brought on deputation. In fact, the sequence of events, discussed above, clearly shows that the employees of the Corporation have been treated at par with those in Government at the time of revision of scales of pay on every occasion.” 14. Again the same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. D.G.O.F Employees Association and another, 2024 (1) SLR 99 (SC) that if the employees are treated differently merely because they belong to different Departments or the basis for classification or post is ex-facie irritational, arbitrary or unjust, it is open to the Court to interfere. In the present case, the petitioners had been working as Masons with respondents-Department, which had no R&P Rules in place and further even as per the communication dated 15.12.2007 (Annexure P-4), respondent No.2 had also requested respondent No.1 to consider for grant of pay scale to the petitioners on the analogy of employees of the PWD, wherein it was specifically mentioned that there are no R&P Rules for the post of Mason and draft R&P Rules are being prepared. However, while rejecting the claim of the petitioners to grant them the same pay scales as granted to the Masons in HPPWD, no reasons have been assigned as evident from letter dated 30.07.2009 (Annexure P-5) and, 17 2026:HHC:28346 therefore, the same is quashed and set aside. 15. This court would not have ventured into equating the pay scales, had it been with respect to some other posts. The Mason in the PWD had also to do the same job as being performed by the petitioners in the respondent- Department and thus there is no justification to deny the same pay scale to the petitioners as granted to the Masons in HPPWD, more particularly when there are no R&P Rules in place in the respondent-Department. 16. Learned Deputy Advocate General has also drawn attention of this Court to a judgment passed by this Court in CWPOA No.308 of 2019, titled, Saroj Kumari vs. State of HP and another, wherein prayer was rejected to grant the pay scale being given in another Department. In this case, the petitioner who was working as Auxiliary Nurse Midwife in the Ayurveda Department (Ayush) was claiming the pay scale of Male/Female Multipurpose Health Workers working in the Heath and Family Welfare Department of the State Government. The Court after noticing duties and functions performed by the Female Health Workers in the Department of Health and Family Welfare being different had not accepted the prayer made by the petitioner in the 18 2026:HHC:28346 said petition and thus, the ratio laid down in the said judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present case. But in the present case, a Mason working in the respondent- Department is performing the same duties as discharged by the Mason in the HPPWD and, thus, the petitioners cannot be denied the same pay scale as granted to the Masons working in the HPPWD, especially when there are no R&P Rules in the respondent-Department and the petitioners possessed the qualification as prescribed in the HPPWD to hold the post of Mason. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the petitioners may be held entitled to the pay scale from the initial date of their appointments, but the said contention cannot be accepted for the reason that the petitioners have approached this Court in the year 2010. As per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, the relief of pay fixation cannot be denied to an employee on the ground of delay and laches, but at the same time if the litigant does not approach the Court well within time, the Court will restrict the arrears for three years prior to the institution of 19 2026:HHC:28346 the petition. Therefore, the prayer made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners may be granted the pay scale of Rs.950-1800/- from the date of their initial appointments is rejected. 18. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the decision conveyed vide letter dated 30.07.2009 (Annexure P-5) is quashed and set aside and the petitioners are held entitled to the same pay scales as granted to the Masons of HPPWD and other Departments of the State Government and the respondents are directed to grant pay scale of Rs.950-1800/- w.e.f. the dates of their appointments and thereafter revised pay scales of Rs.3120-5160/- w.e.f. their dates of appointments on notional basis and on actual basis prior to three years from the date of filing the present petition with all consequential benefits. In case the arrears are not paid and released in favour of the petitioners within three months from today, the respondents shall also pay interest @6% per annum on the arrears from today till actual payment to them. No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 10 th July , 2026 ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) (Anurag) Judge