2026:HHC:28001 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1187 of 2026 Reserved on: 3.7.2026 Date of Decision: 10.7.2026. Sahil @ Sonu …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s Munish Dhatwalia and Ram Kumar, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed a present petition to seek pre- arrest bail in FIR No. 72 of 2026 dated 12.06.2026, registered at Police Station, Parwanoo, District, Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 331(4) and 305(a) read with Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:28001 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a permanent resident of District Patiala and belongs to a respectable family. He is employed as a salesman and earns his livelihood by lawful means. He has deep roots in society, and there is no chance of his absconding. The petitioner is under a genuine and reasonable apprehension of his arrest. The petitioner had approached the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, who granted interim protection to the petitioner. The petitioner adhered to the conditions imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge; however, the petitioner's bail application was subsequently dismissed on the ground that the recovery of the stolen articles was to be effected and the custodial interrogation of the petitioner was required. The FIR does not mention the petitioner's name. The CCTV footage relied upon by the police showed some unidentified persons. The petitioner is being implicated based on the statement made by the co-accused Suraj Bhan, which is not sufficient to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3 2026:HHC:28001 3. The copy of FIR No. 72 of 2026 mentions that the informant used to keep his stock in his godown. He returned on 11.06.2026 and found that the articles were stolen. He checked the CCTV Footage and found that some persons had broken the lock and removed the articles lying inside the store. These articles were transported in the vehicle bearing registration No. PB-11BK-3982. The police registered the FIR, investigated the matter, and found that the payment of the toll for the truck bearing registration No. PB-11BK-3982 was made by using the UPI linked to the Mobile No. xxx732 owned by Suraj Bhan’s wife. Another payment was made by using the mobile number. xxx704, which was traced to the co-accused Amit Kumar. The police found the truck and some of the stolen articles inside it. The police arrested Suraj Bhan, who revealed the names of his friends Amit, Deepak, Sahil (the present petitioner), Rajinder Pal and Sanjeev Kumar as his associates in the commission of the theft. Some of the stolen goods were recovered from Deepak’s house. 4. I have heard M/s Manish Dhatwalia and Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State. 4 2026:HHC:28001 5. Mr Manish Dhatwalia, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime except the statement made by the co-accused Suraj Bhan, which is not sufficient to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of the theft from the informant's godown. The stolen articles are yet to be recovered, and the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is required. There is sufficient material to justify the further interrogation of the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 5 2026:HHC:28001 8. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the jurisdiction to grant pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be sparingly exercised. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, an arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre- arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice, and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes with the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 9. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of 6 2026:HHC:28001 the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 10. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 7 2026:HHC:28001 11. It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that pre-arrest bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant pre-arrest bail. It was observed at page 501: “21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution. 22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563], wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34) “34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable 8 2026:HHC:28001 grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations that the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over- solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 12. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. It was submitted that the petitioner is being involved based on the statement made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC (1). The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered this judgment in Union of India vs Khaliludeen 2022 Supreme SC 1247 and denied bail to the accused, who was named by the co- accused. It was observed: - “8. The answer to said question could be the statement recorded by Md. Nizam Uddin. The statement of Md. Jakir 9 2026:HHC:28001 Hussain, recorded under Section 67 of the act, has also named his owner Abdul Hai. We are conscious of the fact that the validity and scope of such statements under Section 67 have been pronounced upon by this Court in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. In State by (NCB) Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta and Another, 2022 Live Law (SC) 69, the rigour of law laid down by this Court in Tofan Singh was held to be applicable even at the stage of grant of bail. 9. However, going by the circumstances on record, at this stage, on the strength of the statement of Md. Nizam Uddin, though allegedly retracted later, the matter stands on a different footing. In our considered view, in the face of the mandate of Section 37 of the Act, the High Court could not and ought not to have released the accused on bail. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the view taken by the High Court and direct that both the appellants be taken in custody forthwith”. 14. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346, wherein it was held: “11. The information revealed by the above two accused persons indicated that both of them knew the respondent- accused and that they had connived with him to transport the illicit ganja, and that they were in direct contact with the respondent-accused all through his mobile number. The facts as unfurled from the complaint/FIR and the statements of the above two accused persons recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act reveal that the respondent-accused is the kingpin and the organiser of the illicit trade in ganja xxxx 17. The quantity of “ganja” recovered is admittedly of commercial quantity. The High Court has not recorded any finding that the respondent-accused is not prima facie guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to 10 2026:HHC:28001 commit the same offence when enlarged on bail; rather, his antecedents are indicative that he is a regular offender. In the absence of a recording of such satisfaction by the court, we are of the opinion that the High Court manifestly erred in enlarging the respondent-accused on bail. 15. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2087, that the accused cannot be released on pre-arrest bail relying upon the judgment in Tofan Singh (supra). It was observed: “4. The High Court decided to grant pre-arrest bail to the respondents on the only ground that no recovery was effected from the respondents and that they had been implicated only on the basis of the disclosure statement of the main accused, Dinesh Kumar. Therefore, reliance was placed by the High Court in the majority judgment of this Court in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. xxxxx 8. In cases of this nature, the respondents may be able to take advantage of the decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), perhaps at the time of arguing the regular bail application or at the time of final hearing after the conclusion of the trial. 9. To grant anticipatory bail in a case of this nature is not really warranted. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court fell into an error in granting anticipatory bail to the respondents.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. These judgments were followed by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 458 of 2025, decided on 25.3.2025, and it was held that the pre-arrest bail can be denied to a person named by the co-accused to enable the police to 11 2026:HHC:28001 interrogate the petitioner. An SLP No. 55547 of 2025 titled Rajesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. against this order was withdrawn on 21.4.2025. It was held by this Court in Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP 2025:HHC:20446 that a person named by the co-accused is not entitled to pre-arrest bail. This order was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 9629/2025 decided on 10.07.2025. 17. Thus, the submission that the statement made by the co-accused is inadmissible and the petitioner is entitled to pre- arrest bail cannot be accepted. 18. The police had seized the CCTV footage in which the thieves were visible. Therefore, it cannot be said at this stage that there is no material against the petitioner except the statement made by the co-accused. The order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, H.P., shows that the investigation is continuing, the recoveries are yet to be effected, and the petitioner’s custodial interrogation is required. These circumstances justify the pre-trial detention of the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus Anil 12 2026:HHC:28001 Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed:- “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation- oriented than questioning a suspect who is well- ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offender” 19. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: - “13. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective for questioning a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must also be kept in mind that while interrogation of a 13 2026:HHC:28001 suspect is one of the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.” 20. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed: “83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 21. It was submitted that the petitioner has a right to silence and he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. There can be no dispute with this proposition of law; however, the recovery of an article in the custody of the police pursuant to the disclosure statement made by a person does not violate the right of self-incrimination as was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 74 : (1962) 3 SCR 10 : (1963) 1 SCJ 195: AIR 1961 SC 1808 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 856 wherein it was observed: 14 2026:HHC:28001 “15. In order to bring the evidence within the inhibitions of clause (3) of Article 20, it must be shown not only that the person making the statement was an accused at the time he made it and that it had a material bearing on the criminality of the maker of the statement, but also that he was compelled to make that statement. “Compulsion” in the context must mean what in law is called “duress”. In the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt, “duress” is explained as follows: “Duress is where a man is compelled to do an act by injury, beating or unlawful imprisonment (sometimes called duress in the strict sense) or by the threat of being killed, suffering some grievous bodily harm, or being unlawfully imprisoned (sometimes called menace, or duress per minas). Duress also includes threatening, beating or imprisonment of the wife, parent or child of a person.” The compulsion in this sense is a physical objective act and not the state of mind of the person making the statement, except where the mind has been so conditioned by some extraneous process as to render the making of the statement involuntary and, therefore, extorted. Hence, the mere asking by a police officer investigating a crime against a certain individual to do a certain thing is not compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). Hence, the mere fact that the accused person, when he made the statement in question, was in police custody would not, by itself, be the foundation for an inference of law that the accused was compelled to make the statement. Of course, it is open to an accused person to show that while he was in police custody at the relevant time, he was subjected to treatment which, in the circumstances of the case, would lend itself to the inference that compulsion was in fact exercised. In other words, it will be a question of fact in each case to be determined by the court on weighing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence before it. 15 2026:HHC:28001 22. Thus, the submission related to Article 20 will not help the petitioner. 23. In the present case, the theft of articles worth ₹10,00,000/- was committed from the informant’s godown. The investigation is continuing, and the stolen articles have not been recovered. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on pre- arrest bail. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 26. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th July, 2026 (Chander)