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2026 DAILYLAW 15078 (CHH)

HATENDRA PAL SINGH v. ALANKAR SINGH

SA/213/2018 · 2026-01-11

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:1572 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 213 of 2018 1 - Hatendra Pal Singh Late Shri Pyara Singh, Aged About 51 Years R/o Infront Of Gupta Provision Stores, Jeevan Bima Marg, Pandri, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Surinder Kaur, W/o W/o Late Shri Pyara Singh, R/o Infront Of Gupta Provision Stores, Jeevan Bima Marg, Pandri, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Rajnish Kaur, D/o Late Shri Pyara Singh, R/o Infront Of Gupta Provision Stores, Jeevan Bima Marg, Pandri, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Smt. Indrajit Kaur, D/o Late Shri Pyara Singh, R/o Infront Of Gupta Provision Stores, Jeevan Bima Marg, Pandri, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - Alankar Singh Shri Alok Singh Parihar, Aged About 46 Years Legal Heir Of Deceased Urmila Parihar, And R/o D3, Housing Society, SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.01.15 16:42:06 +0530 2 Amar Jyoti, Hadpasa, Puna, Maharastra., District : Pune, Maharashtra 2 - Smt. Akanksha Singh, W/o Shri Alok Singh Parihar, W/o Shri Savyasachi Singh, The Legal Heirs Of Deceased Urmila Parihar, And R/o D3, Housing Society, Amar Jyoti, Hadpasa, Puna, Maharastra., District : Pune, Maharashtra 3 - Abhisek Parihar, W/o Abhisek Parihar, Aged About 42 Years R/o D2, Rajiv Nagar, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, C. G., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Rohit Singh Baghel, W/o Shri Rajmani Singh Baghel, Aged About 38 Years R/o M 19, Rajiv Nagar, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, C. G., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Smt. Hema Thakur, W/o Shri Rajmani Singh Baghel, R/o M 19, Rajiv Nagar, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 6 - Harpal Singh, W/o Late Shri Pyara Singh, R/o Lodhi Para Chowk, Jeevan Bima Marg, Raipur, Dist. Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellants : Shri Sanjay Patel, Advocate For Respondent(s) : None, despite service of notice. 3 Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board 12.01.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/plaintiffs challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 19.01.2018 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, Raipur, Distt- Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 11A/2006 (Hatendra Pal Singh & Ors Vs. Alankar Singh & Ors) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 14.09.2006 passed by the learned 6th Civil Judge, Class- I, Raipur District Raipur, in Civil Suit No. 15A/2005. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking declaration to the effect that the defendants have no right, title, or interest over the suit land, along with a relief of permanent injunction. It was alleged, inter alia, that the suit land originally belonged to one Payara Singh. After the death of Payara Singh, the step- brother of the plaintiff fraudulently got his name mutated in the revenue records. Subsequently, by order dated 16.07.1997, it was directed that the names of the plaintiffs be 4 recorded in the revenue records along with that of his step- brother Harpal Singh. It was further alleged that defendant No. 1 is trying to raise construction over the disputed land, thereby interfering with the lawful possession of the plaintiffs. 3. The defendants filed their written statement and denied the allegations made in the plaint. It was specifically contended that Harpal Singh had validly sold the suit land by way of registered sale deeds, pursuant to which the defendants have lawfully got their names mutated in the revenue records, and thus claimed ownership and possession over the suit land. 4. After appreciating the evidence avilable on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 14.09.2006 dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Thereagainst, the Civil Appeal preferred by the plaintiffs has been dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court. Thus, this appeal. 5. While dismissing the suit by the learned trial Court as well as the First Appeal by the learned First Appellate Court, it has categorically been observed that the plaintiffs have been aware from the outset that possession of the disputed property was transferred by defendant no. 5 to defendants 1 5 to 4 through a sale deed and the said fact was well within the knowledge of the plaintiffs, yet they did not seek relief of possession of the property, despite not being in possession at the time of filing the suit. It was also observed that no court shall grant a declaration where the plaintiffs, being entitled to seek relief other than a mere declaration of title, fails to do so. According to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, it would have been appropriate for them to seek the relief of possession along with the declaration of title, failing to do so, they have disregarded the legal provisions. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 7. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 8. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of 6 evidence available on record, that the appellants/plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufÏcient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 9. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 11. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any 7 provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 12. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 13. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib