IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) PRINCIPAL SEAT AT GUWAHATI CRL.REV.P. NO. 230/2014 DIRECTOR, C.B.I REP. BY THE D.I.G.(P), HEAD OF BRANCH, SPECIAL CRIMES, HAVING ITS OFFICE AT 2ND FLOOR, A WING, DF BLOCK, SALT LAKE, KOLKATA-700064, WEST BENGAL. ……Petitioner VERSUS 1. RIPUN BORA, S/O LT. DAMBARUDHAR BORA R/O HOUSE NO. 3, AMARNATH TEMPLE PATH, BHAGADATTAPUR, BELTOLA, GUWAHATI, PIN- 781028, DIST. KAMRUP, ASSAM. 2. SHRI PULIN PHUKAN S/O SHRI TILAK PHUKAN R/O BORIGAON P.S. GOHPUR, PIN- 784168, DIST. SONITPUR, ASSAM. 3. SRI MANIL DHAR (INFORMANT) S/O LT. RAMU DHAR R/O NATUN CHATRANG P.O. and P.S. GOHPUR, PIN- 784168 GAHC010185412014 2026:GAU-AS:14006 DIST. SONITPUR, ASSAM (INFORMANT). ……Respondents - BEFORE - HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN Advocate for the petitioner : Ms. M. Kumar, S.C CBI Advocate for the respondent No.1 : Mr. A.M Bora, Sr. Adv Mr. D. Gogoi Advocate for the respondent No.2 : Mr. D. Talukdar, Sr. dv. Mr. N. Borah Advocate for the respondent No.3 : Mr. D. Bora Date on which judgment is reserved : 21.07.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 22.09.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the : No operative part of the judgment ? Whether the full judgment has been : Yes pronounced? JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) Heard Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. A.M Bora, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. D. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, Mr. D. Talukdar, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. N. Borah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. D. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent No, 3/informant. 2. In this petition, under Section 397/401, read with Section 482 of the Code of0020Criminal Procedure, 1973 (as amended) read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order, dated 10/02/2014, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup at Guwahati, in Sessions Case No. 60 (K-G) of 2010. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, dated 10/02/2014, the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup District, Guwahati has discharged the respondent No. 1, namely, Ripun Bora of the offence under Section 120B/302 IPC and respondent No.2, namely, Pulin Phukan, of the offence under Section 302 IPC by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Background Facts:- 4. The background facts leading to filing of the present petition is briefly stated as under: “Late Daniel Topno was a popular tea tribe leader of Gohpur, under Sonitpur District, who was murdered on 27/09/2000, by some unknown persons, while he was returning home on his bicycle. Then one of his relatives, namely, Manik Dhara, had lodged one FIR in connection with the said occurrence, with the Officer-in-Charge, Gohpur Police Station, upon which Gohpur Police Station Case No. 183 of 2000, under Section 302 IPC was registered. Though initially, the case was investigated by Assam Police, subsequently, the case was handed over to C.I.D Assam, and after investigation, C.I.D. had submitted charge-sheet before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Biswanath Chariali, against two persons, namely, Narayan Gour and Uma Kanta Mizar alias Kale Mizar, showing Kale Mizar as absconder in the charge- sheet. Thereafter, one Santosh Topno, (brother of the deceased) Daniel Topno, had filed one writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 6198 of 2000, before this Court with a prayer to hand over investigation of the case to CBI. Then, vide order dated 17/05/2005, the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court, directing the CBI to investigate the case. However, the State of Assam had filed one review petition, being Review Petition No. 82 of 2005, before this Court for recalling the order, on the ground that C.I.D. had already completed investigation and submitted charge-sheet against two persons on 30/10/2004. But, the same was dismissed by this Court vide order, dated 26/08/2005. Thereafter, on the strength of the order being passed by this Court, CBI has registered one FIR, being FIR No. RC-5/S-2005-Kolkata, and after completion of investigation, submitted charge-sheet, being C.S. No. 04 of 2008, dated 30/12/2008, against accused/Ripun Bora - (A-1), under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC and against accused Kamal Nath @ Ankur Nath -(A-2) and Pulin Phukan -(A-3), under Section 302 IPC. Upon the aforementioned charge-sheet, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, to whom the case was made over for disposal, had framed charges under Section 120(B)/302 IPC against all the three accused, vide order dated 01/09/2012. The said order dated 01/09/2012, came to be challenged before this Court by accused/Ripun Bora and Pulin Phukan, vide Criminal Petition No. 579 of 2012 and Criminal Petition No. 828 of 2012, respectively. Both the petitions were disposed of by this Court, vide order dated 11/06/2013, by which the impugned order, dated 01/09/2012, was interfered with and the matter was remanded to the learned Court below for fresh consideration. And while interfering with the impugned order, this Court was also pleased to direct to transfer the case from the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, so that the case can be examined with an open mind. Then, the learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties and also considering the record of GR Case No. 458 of 2000, which was pending before the Court of learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Biswanath Chariali, vide impugned order, dated 10/02/2014, had discharged accused Ripun Bora of the offences under Section 120B/302 IPC, and Pulin Phukan, of the offence under Section 302 IPC, by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. Being aggrieved, the CBI has preferred the present revision petition challenging the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order, dated 10/02/2014, on several grounds. 6. However, during the course of hearing, this Court was pleased to direct Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel, CBI for the petitioner, to confine her argument to the main grounds and to file one brief written note upon the same. And accordingly, she has filed the brief written note stating the main grounds of assailing the impugned order, dated 10.02.2014, so passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Submission of learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner:- 7. Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the roles of accused/Ripun Bora and Pulin Phukan were brought to the light by the disclosure statement made by co-accused Kamal Nath, who subsequently gave his confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, on 29/05/2007. 7.1. Ms. Kumari also submits that Kamal Nath, in his confessional statement, stated that about two months before the murder, he along with Sri Krishna Hazarika, Sri Bishnu Saikia and other Congress workers, attended a meeting at Chilarai Hotel, Paltan Bazar, Guwahati, in which Senior Congress leaders, such as Mani Kumar Subba and Ripun Borah(respondent No.1) were also present and Kamal Nath claimed that in the said meeting, Mani Kumar Subba had offered Rs. 12 lakhs to Sri Krishna Hazarika for killing Daniel Topno, and Ripun Bora further assured that if he won the election, he would give another Rs.13 lakhs, and in the event of loosing, he would give Rs. 5 lakhs. 7.2. Ms. Kumari further submits that the subsequent act, by which the victim/Daniel Topno was killed, has been described in detail and in sequence, in his statement by accused Kamal Nath, which demonstrate the active participation of the respondents No.1 along with that of Pulin Phukan (respondent No.2), Krishna Hazarika, and Bishnu Saikia. However, Krishna Hazarika and Bishnu Saikia have already passed away. And in the charge-sheet this has been described in detail. 7.3. She also pointed it out that once the role of Ripun Bora (respondent No.1) in the crime has been made clear from the statement of accused/Kamal Nath, the motive behind such crime may also be considered. According to her the investigation has gone into electoral dynamics of the Gohpur constituency, and it was found that the deceased, Daniel Topno, was a popular local leader and that he had contested the last two Assembly elections and though, he did not win either of them, he had secured substantial number of votes, that is 16,000 in 1991 and 12,600 in 1996 Assembly Elections, wherein the margin between winning candidate and the runner-up was 3,000 votes in the 1996 Assembly Elections. This shows him to be an important player and capable of tilting the scale in the upcoming 2001 Assembly Election as well, in which he had decided to contest. 7.4. Ms. Kumari, further pointed out that the deceased Daniel Topno was offered membership of Congress party by Ripun Bora(respondent No.1, as well as by Mani Kumar Subba, but, Topno had refused to join the party, however, he was in touch with AGP party as well, and these are the factors that impacted the political ambition of Ripun Bora(respondent No.1), and this attributed the motive upon Ripun Bora (respondent No.1), to eliminate Daniel Topno. Page 9 of 47 7.5. Ms. Kumari has also pointed it out that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have taken note of both the charge-sheets, i.e., the charge-sheet filed by the CBI and also the charge-sheet submitted by the C.I.D. and the statement of accused Kale Mizar, made before a police officer, namely, Mr. N. Singh before framing of charge, but the same were not taken note of and considered. 7.6. Ms. Kumari has further pointed it out that at the relevant point of time, Kamal Nath was a juvenile, and as such, his case was directed to be put up before the concerned Juvenile Justice Board, vide order dated 18/12/2013, and the confession made by the said juvenile was not taken note of by the learned Sessions Judge while discharging the accused. Ms. Kumari also submits that at the time of consideration of framing of charge, the Court has to consider the existence of a prima facie case and grave suspicion, and not to conduct a mini-trial, and on aforesaid counts the impugned order of discharge, so passed by the learned Sessions Judge suffers from manifest irregularity, and it requires interference of this Court. 7.7. In support of her submissions, she has also referred to the following decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court: (i) Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela –vs.- The State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No. 212 of 2012, (2026 INSC 469) (ii) State of Madhya Pradesh –vs.- Balveer Singh, 2025 INSC 261. (iii) Vijaya Singh and Another –vs.- State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 2013, (2024 INSC 905) (iv) Shakiluddin alias Babloo –vs.- The State, Criminal Revision Petition No.150 of 2020 of Delhi High Court. (v) Dr. Anand Rai –vs- State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, reported in Criminal Appeal No. [.....] of 2026 (arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 10711 of 2025). Submissions of learned counsel for the respondent No.1 8. Per contra, Mr. A.M Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No. 1, taking this Court through the charge-sheet filed by the C.I.D, submits that the C.I.D had found no material to submit charge-sheet against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein. However, the CBI has submitted charge-sheet against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kamrup (M), to whom the case was originally made over for disposal, had framed charge against both of them, and when challenged before this Court, the order of framing charges was set aside by this Court, vide order dated 11/06/2013. 8.1. Mr. Bora has also pointed it out that in paragraph-36 of the order, dated 11/06/2013, this Court was pleased to direct the learned Sessions Judge to consider both the charge-sheets before framing of charge. He further submits that Kamal Nath, who allegedly made confession, was a juvenile, and his case was splitted up and referred to the Juvenile Board, and he also submits that barring the confession of the juvenile Kamal Nath, there was no prima facie material against the present petitioners. 8.2. He also pointed it out that the confession of juvenile Kamal Nath was recorded after 6 years of the occurrence and the CBI had apprehended Kamal Nath on the basis of one report published in a local daily Newspaper, namely, „Ei Saptaha‟, on 28.06.2006, but, interestingly, the said newspaper was not seized by CBI. He also submits that, in fact, no such newspaper was published in Assam. 8.3. It is the further submission of Mr. Bora that even if it is accepted that the said juvenile had made a confession, the said confession is a confession of a co-accused, and the said co- accused was not tried along with the present respondent No.1. He also pointed it out that when the confession of a co-accused can be relied upon is provided in Section 30 of the Evidence Act and in view of said provision confession of juvenile Kamal Nath cannot be relied upon. Page 12 of 47 8.4. Further, Mr. Bora has pointed it out that the confessional statement of juvenile Kamal Nath is exculpatory in nature, and nowhere in the said statement, he had implicated himself being part of the conspiracy and commission of the crime and on this count also, his confessional statement is not admissible. 8.5. He also submits that in the confessional statement, juvenile Kamal Nath had implicated one member of Parliament, namely, Mani Kumar Subba, but he was exonerated and the CBI has only presumed involvement of the present respondent No. 1 and the said presumption is based upon another presumption, i.e. the electoral dynamic, that has no value in the eye of law. 8.6. Mr. Bora, also pointed it out that while recording confession under Section 164 of accused/ Kamal Nath, the learned Magistrate had not followed the prescribed procedure and under such circumstances, the impugned order, so passed by the learned Sessions Judge, acquitting the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, suffers from no material irregularity or illegality, requiring any interference of this Court. 8.7. Further, Mr. Bora submits that the prosecution in the instant case has also relied upon one purported statement of one Kale Mizar @ Umakanta Mizar to frame charges against the respondents and said Kale Mizar is an accused charge sheeted by the CID in connection with Gohpur P.S case No.183/2000 and he has not been facing the trial in the instant case as he was declared absconder by Court. On the same principle of section 30 of Evidence Act, the statement of Kale Mizar cannot be used as against the other co accused. In support of his submission, Mr. Bora has also referred to one decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Suresh Budharmal Kalani Vs. Sate of Maharastra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 337, and also referred another decision in Esher Singh Vs. State of A.P., reported in (2004) 11 SCC 585. 8.8. Notably, in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani(supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "Under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872, a confession of an accused is relevant and admissible against a co-accused if both are jointly facing trial for the same offence". At the time of framing of charge, "the court is required to confine its attention to only those materials collected during investigation which can be legally translated into evidence and not upon further evidence (dehors those materials) that the prosecution may adduce in the trial which would commence only after the charges are framed and the accused denies the charges". 8.9. And in the case of Esher Singh (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that use of confession of an accused against co- accused is permissible when the co-accused after being charged faces trial along with other co-accused. Otherwise if he is not facing the same trial his confession has no evidentiary value against the co-accused. 8.10. Mr. Bora has also relied upon following decisions: (i) Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel –vs.- State of Gujarat and Another, reported in (2019) 16 SCC 547, to contend that co-accused must be charged and tried together to rely upon his confession against the accused. (ii) Kashmira Singh –vs.- State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1952 SC 159, to contend that Court cannot start with confessional statement. (iii) Palvinder Kaur –vs.- State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1952 SC 354 and Aghnoo Nagesia –Versus- State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1966 SC 119, to contend that self-exculpatory statement of co-accused cannot be treated as confession. 8.11. Referring to another decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani (Supra) Mr. Bora submits that presumption of fact on the basis of another presumption is impermissible and under the given facts and circumstances Mr. Bora has contended to dismiss this petition. Page 15 of 47 Submissions of learned counsel for the respondent No.2 9. On the other hand, Mr. D. Talukdar, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No. 2, has subscribed the submission of Mr. A.M Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No. 1. Submissions of learned counsel for the informant/ respondent No.3 10. Per contra, Mr. D. Bora, learned counsel for the informant/ respondent No. 3 submits that the impugned order suffers from material irregularity as the learned Trial court has conducted a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge, which is not permissible in view of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu –vs- N. Suresh Ranjan and Others, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709. At this stage, according to Mr. Bora, the Court is required only to examine whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses a prima-facie case/sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is not required to evaluate whether the material would ultimately warrant a conviction. 10.1. Mr. D. Bora has also pointed it out that the materials, so collected by the CBI, are sufficient to show the complicity of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 with the offence alleged in the FIR. He also submits that, in view of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Wati (Smt) and Another –vs.- State through Delhi Administration and Others, reported in (2001) 4 SCC 333, the Courts have to see whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not, and whether a strong prima facie case is made out or not, at the stage of consideration of charge and that Court can discharge the accused only when accepting the prosecution evidence fully, before being challenged in cross-examination, or rebutted by defence evidence, cannot show commission of crime by the accused. 10.2. His further submission is that generally, High Court would allow Trial Court to proceed and that evaluation of evidence including evidentiary value of witnesses, is not permissible at the stage of consideration of charge. In support of his said contention, he has referred to a decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar –vs.- Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368. And under such circumstances, Mr. Bora has contended to set aside the impugned order and to remand the matter to the learned Trial Court for trial after framing charges against the respondent Nos.1 and 2. Discussion and Analysis:- 11. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the petition, the grounds mentioned therein and the documents placed on record and also the note submitted by Ms. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel, CBI and also the written submission of Mr. A. M. Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and the decision referred to by learned counsel for all the parties. 12. Before a discussion is directed to the points raised by learned counsel for all the parties, it would be pertinent to discuss the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court, in dealing with an order of discharge, passed under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12.1. In that case of Sudershan Singh Wazir -Versus- State (NCT of Delhi) & Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 461, while dealing with the issue, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an order of discharge, under Section 227 Cr.P.C., means the person ceases to be an accused. Discharge stands on a higher pedestal than an order of acquittal after a full trial. Dealing with the scope of revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the discharge order is very limited and this jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly. It has also been held that the High Court examines the legality, correctness, or propriety of the order, but it does not conduct a mini-trial or re-appreciation of evidence as if deciding the case on merits. It has also been held that interference is justified only where the discharge order is grossly erroneous and suffers from non-compliance with law and is based on no evidence, and ignores material evidence, or reflects an arbitrary/perverse exercise of judicial discretion. 12.2. Relevant paragraphs are extracted herein below for ready reference:- “11. Under Section 226 of the CrPC, after the order of commitment, when the accused appears or is brought before the Court of Sessions, the prosecutor has to open his case by describing the charge levelled against the accused by stating what evidence is proposed to prove the guilt of the accused. At that stage, the Sessions Court has to consider the record of the case. The record of the case will be the charge sheets. The Sessions Court is under an obligation to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution as provided in Section 227 of the CrPC. After hearing the parties, if the Sessions Court is of the opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it may proceed to frame a charge in writing against the accused. The charge can be framed only after the Court comes to a conclusion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. 12. After considering the material on the charge sheet and the submissions of parties, if the Court concludes that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the Court must discharge the accused for the reasons recorded. Thus, an order of discharge is passed when there is no sufficient material to proceed against the accused. When a discharge order is passed, the person discharged ceases to be an accused. The position of a discharged accused is on a higher pedestal than that of an accused who is acquitted after a full trial. The reason is that a charge can be framed, and an accused can be tried only when there is sufficient material in the charge sheet to proceed against him. An order of discharge is passed when the charge sheet does not contain sufficient material to proceed against the accused. Therefore, he is discharged at the threshold. After an accused is discharged under Section 227 of the CrPC, he is set at liberty as he ceases to be an accused.” 12.3. In the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala & Anr. reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has laid down following propositions:- (i) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. (ii) The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. Page 20 of 47 (iii) The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court. (iv) If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”. (v) It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. (vi) The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. (vii) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. Page 21 of 47 (viii) There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. 12.4. The aforesaid propositions have subsequently, been followed in the case of M.E Shivalingamurthy vs. Central Bureau Of Investigation, Bengaluru, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768. Besides, in this case Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Cr.PC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the Trial Court to discharge the accused.” 12.5. In the case of Amit Kapoor –vs.- Ramesh Chander and another, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, also Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Section 227 Cr.P.C. and relying upon its earlier decision in Union of India –vs.- Prafulla Kumar Samal and another, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 4, and an earlier decisions in State of Bihar –vs.- Ramesh Singh, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 39, held that the Judge has the power to sift and weigh the evidence only for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. It is not a mini-trial or a stage for detailed evaluation of evidence as if deciding guilt or innocence. 12.6. It has also been held in the said case that if the material discloses grave suspicion against the accused that has not been properly explained, the court is justified in framing a charge and proceed for trial. And if two views are possible, one giving rise only to suspicion, the court may discharge the accused. At that stage, the Judge is not to see whether the trial is ultimately going to end in conviction or acquittal. The Judge has to exercise judicial mind on the facts to determine whether a case for trial has been made out. The provision aims to prevent wasting of public time on cases that do not disclose a prima facie case and to protect the accused from avoidable harassment. A strong suspicion may be enough to frame a charge, even though it would not take the place of proof at the trial stage. In the said case, it has also been held that the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to correctness, legality, and propriety of the order and it is not entitled to re-appreciate the evidence. Page 23 of 47 12.7. Further, in the said case, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of revisional jurisdiction, has held that the revisional jurisdiction is very limited and cannot be exercised routinely or as a matter of course. It is meant to correct a patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or law, or to prevent abuse of the process/gross injustice, and it is not an appeal in disguise. It is also held that one built-in restriction is that revision is generally not available against interlocutory orders [Section 397(2)]. Framing of charge is treated as an intermediate/final stage in many contexts, but interference remains highly restricted. At the stage of framing of charge, the Court looks only to the strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence. Meticulous evaluation or appreciation of evidence, as if conducting a mini- trial, is impermissible. The High Court should be reluctant to interfere with an order of framing charges in revision unless the case falls into exceptional categories. Revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised on a question of law. Where factual appreciation is involved, interference is justified only if the finding is perverse. The power must be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of the process of the Court. Mere suspicion or possibility of a different view is not enough. Inherent powers under Section 482 are wider than pure revisional power under Section 397, but even then, it must be used sparingly, with circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases, especially to quash a charge. Section 482 does not completely oust the limitation of Section 397, but nothing in the Code can affect the amplitude of inherent power where an extraordinary situation demand intervention to prevent abuse of the process. 12.8. It is also to be noted here that in the case of Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:- (i) The Judge must take the material produced by the prosecution (which indicates oral statements and documents) at face value, without cross-examination, and assume everything in favor of the prosecution. (ii) If, even on that basis, no offence is made out, the accused is entitled to discharge. (iii) The Trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame a charge at the instance of the prosecution; he must sift the evidence to determine whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding. (iv) If two views are possible and one view gives rise to suspicion as opposed to grave suspicion, the Judge may discharge the accused. (v) If the evidence the prosecution proposes to adduce, even if fully accepted before being challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by defense evidence, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, there is no sufficient ground for trial. The defense of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage of discharge under Section 227. (vi) The expression "record of the case" refers to the documents and articles produced by the prosecution. (vii) The accused cannot rely on his own material to seek discharge. (viii)Grave suspicion based on prosecution material is sufficient to frame a charge and proceed to trial. 13. In the instant case, the learned Sessions Judge has held that, going through the statement of the witnesses examined by the CBI, it is found that none has said anything against accused/Ripun Bora or Pulin Phukan to indicate that they were involved in the conspiracy and murder of Daniel Topno. Only Police Officer, Mr. N. Singh has stated before the Investigating Officer that accused/Kale Mizar was picked up by him during investigation of the case relating to murder of Daniel Topno, and during his interrogation, Kale Mizar reportedly stated before Mr. Singh that Ripun Bora had instructed him to eliminate Daniel Topno, since he did not accept the proposal to join Congress or to refrain from contesting the Assembly Election. The further version of this Police Officer is that, under political pressure, the statement of Kale Mizar was not recorded, and he was allowed to abscond. Page 26 of 47 13.1. The learned Sessions Judge has also held that the above statement of the Police Officer cannot be accepted to be a strong material against accused/Ripun Bora, mainly for two reasons:- (i) The prime being that the confessional statement made before Police Officer is inadmissible. (ii) Secondly, it appears from the record that during the relevant time, the said Police Officer was posted as Sub-Divisional Police Officer of Biswanath Chariali, and he was supervising the investigation of the case regarding murder of Daniel Topno. 13.2. The learned Sessions Judge has further held that from the record of the Case Diary of the said case, Gohpur PS Case No. 183 of 2000, it appears that nowhere in the Case Diary or his inspection note, it has been mentioned by the said supervising Police Officer about this purported disclosure made by accused Kale Mizar. Rather, if the said statement is believed, it lends credence to the charge-sheet filed by the C.I.D. against accused Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar. 13.3. Further, the learned Sessions Judge has held that it is revealed that during the investigation of the case by Assam Police, the statement of Kale Mizar was recorded, but in his said statement, he did not mention anything that he was instructed by accused/Ripun Bora to eliminate Daniel Topno. It may be mentioned here that Kale Mizar, who was charge-sheeted by C.I.D, was not examined as witness by CBI. The CBI has mentioned in its charge-sheet that allegations made against Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar in the charge-sheet filed by C.I.D could not be substantiated by the investigation of CBI. 13.4. The learned Sessions Judge further held that it is well- settled principle of law that, at the stage of framing of charge, if there is no evidence except the confession of a co-accused, a charge cannot be framed on the mere probability of the prosecution that at some future date, the prosecution might produce further evidence supplementing its case. A trial cannot be allowed to proceed on contingent, hyper-technical, and anticipatory evidence. In arriving at such a finding, it has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Das and another –vs.- State of Meghalaya, reported in MANU/GH/0026/1971: 1971 SCC OnLine Gau 5. 13.5. Notably, in the said case, this Court has held that Magistrate can frame a charge against an accused only if the documents furnished under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, discloses prima-facie legal evidence sufficient for a reasonable opinion that there are grounds for presuming the accused has committed an offence triable under the Cr.P.C. In the absence of such material, the charge cannot stand and is liable to be quashed. The said decision also refers to a decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1964) 6 SCR 623, where it has been held that confession made by a co-accused is not substantive evidence against another co-accused. It can be used only under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, to lend assurance to other independent evidence, that is already sufficient to sustain a conviction. It cannot form the sole or primary basis of conviction. 13.6. The learned Sessions Judge also held that the statement of co-accused is inadmissible except under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. 13.7. It is the further observation of the learned Sessions Judge that if it is kept in mind that accused Kamal Nath, being now declared as juvenile, is not tried jointly with accused/Ripun Bora and Pulin Phukan, and therefore, his confessional statement cannot obviously be used under Section 30 of the Evidence Act against the other two co-accused above named, and if the statement of Kamal Nath is excluded, then there is absolutely no material on record to set up accusation against the accused Ripun Bora and Pulin Phukan. The said confessional statement of accused Kamal Nath, therefore, cannot be called in aid to frame charge against the accused Ripun Bora and Pulin Phukan in absence of any other material to endorse. Page 29 of 47 13.8. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge relied upon following two decisions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of: (i) Satish Mehra –vs.- Delhi Administration and another, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 766, and (ii) Soma Chakravorty –vs.- State through Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 403, And thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge has held that suspicion alone, without anything more, cannot be the basis, or held to be sufficient for framing charge. It has also held that there are no materials against Ripun Borah and Pulin Phukan, except the statement of witness N.K. Singh, and ultimately discharged both of them under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13.9. Notably, in the case of Satish Mehra(supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge under Section 227/228 Cr.P.C. the Sessions Judge must determine whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. This is lower standard than proof beyond reasonable doubt, required for conviction, but, it still requires a real and bonafide prospect that the case would end in conviction. The Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial, yet it is entitled to and in appropriate cases obliged to look beyond the prosecution material alone and take note of materials produced by the accused if the materials clinched the issue and show that a trial would be futile. 13.9.1. It has also been held in the said case that where the available material, viewed as a whole, discloses no reasonable prospect of conviction, for example, because of the core evidence is inherently incredible, appears tutored, is contradicted by the contemporaneous independent investigation or medical findings or is shown to be motivated by personnel animosity, the Court should discharge the accused, under Section 227 Cr.P.C. rather than frame a charge and for full trial. 13.9.2. In the case of Soma Chakravorty (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “10. ………………..if on the basis of material on record the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of the offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial.” 14. The finding of learned Sessions Judge, while examined in the light of the submissions, so advanced by Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel for the CBI, and also in the light of the submission advanced by Mr. A.M Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No. 1, and Mr. D. Talukdar, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No.2, and Mr. D. Bora, learned counsel for the informant/respondent No.3, this Court finds that the finding, so recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, cannot be said to be suffered from any irregularity or illegality or impropriety, requiring exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 14.1. This Court finds that there is nothing wrong in the finding so recorded by the learned Sessions Judge that none of witnesses examined by CBI had stated anything against respondent No.1 and 2, to indicate that they were involved in the conspiracy and murder of Daniel Topno, except however, the statement of Mr. N. Singh, the Police Officer, who had stated before the Investigating Officer that accused/Kale Mizar was picked up by him during investigation, and during his interrogation, Kale Mizar stated before him that respondent No.1 had instructed him to eliminate Daniel Topno, since he did not accept the proposal to join Congress or to refrain from contesting the Assembly Election. Further version of Mr. N. Singh is that, under political pressure, the statement of accused Kale Mizar was not recorded, and he was allowed to abscond. 14.2. However, the learned Sessions Judge had declined to accept the statement of Mr. N. Singh, and that too very rightly, firstly, the confessional statement made before a Police Officer is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and secondly, Mr. N. Singh, was the supervising Officer of the case of murder of Daniel Topno, being Gohpur P.S. Case No.183/2000 and he was posted as Sub-Divisional Police Officer of Biswanath Chariali at the relevant point of time and in the Case Diary of Gohpur PS Case No. 183 of 2000, he had mentioned nothing about this purported disclosure of accused Kale Mizar. 14.3. Moreover, during investigation of the case by Assam Police, the statement of Kale Mizar was recorded and nowhere in his said statement he had mentioned that he was instructed by respondent No.1 to eliminate Daniel Topno. Over and above, Kale Mizar, was charge-sheeted by C.I.D as an accused, but he was never examined as witness by CBI. Rather, in the charge sheet submitted by CBI it had mentioned about absence of materials to substantiate the allegations against Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar, who were charge sheeted by C.I.D. 14.4. This Court finds that the finding above, so recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, suffers from no illegality as the learned Sessions Judge had assigned cogent reasons and the petitioner CBI has measurably failed to demonstrate from the record any perversity in the same. 15. It is well settled proposition of law that, on the date of consideration of charge, incriminating material must be on the record and case diary has to show existence of prima-facie case against the accused. Merely on the probability that the prosecution might produce further evidence, supplementing its case, at some future date, a charge cannot be framed. Criminal trial cannot be allowed to proceed on contingent, hyper-technical, and anticipatory evidence. The learned Sessions Judge had rightly recorded a finding in this regard and Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent has rightly argued that there is no infirmity in the finding above. 16. This Court has also considered the submission of Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel, CBI is that the confessional statement of co-accused Kamal Nath, who was admittedly not being tried along with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, for being juvenile at the time of commission of the offence and his case was referred to Juvenile Justice Board, could have been used against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by the learned Sessions Judge. 16.1. To appreciate the said submission of Ms. Kumari, this Court deems it necessary to refer Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which reads as under: "30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and other jointly under trial for same offence. --When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. [Explanation.--"Offence", as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit the offence]" 16.2. While dealing with this provision in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani(supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that under Section 30 of Evidence Act, a confession by one co- accused is relevant against a co-accused only if both are jointly tried for the same offence. Once an accused has been discharged and is no longer facing trial with others his confessional statement cannot be used against the remaining accused. Page 35 of 47 16.3. In the case of Kashmira Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1952 SC 159, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that a confession of co-accused containing incriminating materials against another person has only weak evidentiary value. In absence of any other independent evidence, such a confession cannot by itself form the basis of framing of charges under Sections 227/228 Cr.P.C. 16.4. In the case of Hardeep Singh Sohal & others vs. State of Punjab through CBI, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 612, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that confession cannot be admitted in evidence against the co- accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, since, the accused who made the confession was not tried along with the other accused. 16.5. In the instant case, admittedly accused Kamal Nath, who made the confessional statement, implicating the respondent Nos.1 and 2, have not been jointly tried with respondent Nos.1 and 2, as he was a juvenile and his case was referred to Juvenile Justice Board. In that view of the matter, and also in view of the propositions laid down in the case of (i) Suresh Budharmal Kalani(supra), (ii) Kashmira Singh (supra), (iii) Hardeep Singh Sohal(supra), this Court is unable to record concurrence with the submissions of Ms. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel for the CBI. Page 36 of 47 16.6. For another reason also, the submission of Ms. Kumari could not be accepted is that the alleged confessional statement of accused Kamal Nath is exculpatory in nature. Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has rightly pointed it out during the course of hearing. And this Court finds substance in the same. 16.7. Having carefully gone through the alleged confessional statement of accused Kamal Nath, this Court finds that the said confessional statement is exculpatory in nature. Nowhere in the said statement, Kamal Nath had implicated himself with the offence alleged in the FIR. It is well settled in the case of Palvinder Kaur (supra), a statement containing self- exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory part, if true, would negative the offence. A confession must either admit the offence in terms or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. The court cannot accept only the inculpatory portion while rejecting the exculpatory portion as inherently incredible. The value of exculpatory statements against co-accused is completely unreliable. An accused who absolves himself while implicating others has a strong motive to shift blame. 16.8. In the case of Kanda Pandyachi @ Kandaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1971) 2 SCC 641, Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as under:- “A confession has to be a direct acknowledgment of guilt of the offence in question and such as would be sufficient by itself for conviction. If it falls short of such a plenary acknowledgment of guilt it would not be a confession even though the statement is of some incriminating fact which taken with other evidence tend to prove his guilt.” 16.9. Very recently Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa & Anr. v. The State of Meghalaya reported in (2026 INSC 85), decided on 27 January 2026, reaffirmed the aforesaid proposition as under:- “28. Yet again, as we found, the confession of A1 is purely exculpatory and accuse A2 of having strangulated his friend, leading to his death. The exculpatory statements made by A1 to absolve himself from the liability and accuse A2 of having caused the death, cannot at all be relied on against A2. Insofar as A2 is concerned, he does not speak of the murder having been committed and merely admits that the deceased took his last breath in A2’s lap, which is not a confession as such……” 16.10. In the instant case, from a careful perusal of the said confessional statement of Kamal Nath reveals that he was arrested by CBI on 27.04.2007 and detained at Guwahati Jail from 27.04.2007 till 03.05.2007. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate had put the preliminary questions to ascertain the voluntariness of the confession to be made by the accused. Thereafter, he was remanded to jail hazoot for reflection from 17.05.2007, till 29.05.2007. He was produced before the learned Magistrate on 29.05.2007, at 1 pm and then the Magistrate again explained the particulars of Section 164 Cr.P.C. and then being satisfied the learned magistrate has recorded the alleged confessional statement. 16.11. Thus, it becomes apparent that when the accused was again produced from judicial custody on 29.05.2007, he was never given time for reflection again while, since he was produced before the Magistrate by the CBI. Over and above, it cannot be said that at that time the accused was free from influence of the CBI, as he was produced by CBI on 29.05.2007, and immediately his statement was recorded. 16.12. Thus, for failing to give time for reflection again on 29.07.2007, and to record satisfaction that the accused was completely out of influence of police (CBI) and that the statement of the accused is not on account of any extraneous influence on him, it cannot be said that procedural safeguard was maintained by the learned Magistrate. 16.13. It is well settled that procedural defects undermined voluntariness and reliability. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shivappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 76, wherein it has been held that full and adequate compliance with Section 164 Cr.P.C., and related High Court rules/guidelines, is required not merely in form, but in essence. Non-compliance goes to the root of the Magistrate‟s jurisdiction to record the confession and renders it unworthy of credence. It has been stressed that the Magistrate must make a searching inquiry to ascertain voluntariness, e.g., questions about custody, treatment in custody, police influence, reasons for confessing against self- interest, and assurances of protection if the accused declines. Failure to do so materially detract from the evidentiary value of the confession, making it unsafe to act upon, as voluntariness is foundational. 16.14. This proposition has been reiterated in later decisions, including Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh v. Republic of India reported in (2011) 2 SCC 490, wherein Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as under:- “64. The following principles emerge with regard to Section 164 CrPC: (i) The provisions of Section 164 CrPC must be complied with not only in form, but in essence. (ii) Before proceeding to record the confessional statement, a searching enquiry must be made from the accused as to the custody from which he was produced and the treatment he had been receiving in such custody in order to ensure that there is no scope for doubt of any sort of extraneous influence proceeding from a source interested in the prosecution. (iii) A Magistrate should ask the accused as to why he wants to make a statement which surely shall go against his interest in the trial. (iv) The maker should be granted sufficient time for reflection. (v) He should be assured of protection from any sort of apprehended torture or pressure from the police in case he declines to make a confessional statement. (vi) A judicial confession not given voluntarily is unreliable, more so, when such a confession is retracted, the conviction cannot be based on such retracted judicial confession. (vii) Non-compliance with Section 164 CrPC goes to the root of the Magistrate's jurisdiction to record the confession and renders the confession unworthy of credence. (viii) During the time of reflection, the accused should be completely out of police influence. The judicial officer, who is entrusted with the duty of recording confession, must apply his judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his conscience that the statement of the accused is not on account of any extraneous influence on him. (ix) At the time of recording the statement of the accused, no police or police official shall be present in the open court. (x) Confession of a co-accused is a weak type of evidence. (xi) Usually the court requires some corroboration from the confessional statement before convicting the accused person on such a statement. 17. Though, Ms. M. Kumari, learned counsel for the CBI, has attributed some motive for killing Daniel Topno by the accused/respondent No. 1, yet, it is nothing but a presumption based upon the presumable fact that in the election held in the year 1991 and 1996, Daniel Topno had secured a sizable section of the vote of Gohpur Legislative Assembly Constituency, leading to defeat of respondent No. 1. 17.1. Notably, in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani @ Papu Kalani (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that presumption can be drawn only from facts not from other presumption, by a process of probable and logical reasoning. In the instant case, though Ms. Kumari submits that in view of the vote secured by deceased Denial Topno, in the past elections held in the year 1991 and 1996, who becomes a popular leader in the meantime, would have been a factor in the election to be held in the year 2001, to the respondent No.1, and therefore, the respondent No.1 has a strong motive to eliminate the deceased Denial Topno, is only a presumption. 17.2. Thus, the electoral dynamics, which Ms. Kumari has projected, is a presumption, based upon another presumption. And in view of the proposition laid down in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani @ Papu Kalani (supra), this Court is unable to record concurrence to her submission. 18. This Court has carefully gone through the decisions referred to and relied upon by Ms. Kumari, in support of her submission. (i) In the case of Mitesh @ T.V. Vagela (supra), Hon‟ble Supreme Court has dealt with dying declaration and held that reliable dying declaration can be sole basis of conviction under Section 302 IPC, without need of corroboration. (ii) In the case of Balbeer Singh(supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has primarily dealt with reliability of child witness testimony and the cautious application of child witness testimony and cautious application of Section 106 of Evidence Act. (i) In the case of Vijaya Singh (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has dealt with principle governing circumstantial evidence and reiterated the Panchasheel Principle from Sharda Birdhichand Sarad vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1984 AIR 1622, and held that evidence must be examined as a whole not in isolation. (ii) In the case of Sakiluddin(supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has restated the settled principle laid down in the case of Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra). (iii) In the case of Dr. Anand Rai (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that protective statute like SC/ST Act cannot be invoked mechanically. The specific statutory requirement, particularly the element of knowledge must be prima-facie satisfied on the face of prosecution material. 18.1. However, in the given factual scenario, this Court afraid, the aforementioned decisions, so referred by Ms. Kumari would not come into her assistance. 19. This Court has also considered the submission of Mr. D. Bora, learned counsel for the informant-respondent No.3 and has also gone through the decisions relied upon by him. But, in view of the aforementioned discussion and findings, this Court is unable to accept his submission and the decisions referred to by him to the considered opinion of this Court also would not come to his assistance. 20. To recapitulate, on the following grounds, the impugned order of discharge warrants no interference of this Court:- (i) None of the witnesses examined by the CBI had stated anything against respondent Nos.1 and 2 to indicate that they were involved in the conspiracy and murder of Daniel Topno. (ii) Though Mr. N. Singh, a Police Officer, had stated before the Investigating Officer that accused/Kale Mizar was picked up by him during investigation, and during his interrogation, Kale Mizar stated before him that respondent No.1 had instructed him to eliminate Daniel Topno, since he did not accept the proposal to join Congress or to refrain from contesting the Assembly Election and that, under political pressure, statement of said Kale Mizar was not recorded, yet, statement made to Mr. N. Singh, is inadmissible for the same being a Police Officer, and that he was the supervising officer of the case of murder of Daniel Topno and was posted as Sub-Divisional Police Officer of Biswanath Chariali, and he had mentioned nothing about this purported disclosure of accused Kale Mizar, in the Case Diary of Gohpur PS Case No. 183 of 2000. Page 45 of 47 (iii) During investigation of the case by Assam Police, the statement of Kale Mizar was recorded and nowhere in his said statement he had mentioned that he was instructed by respondent No.1 to eliminate Daniel Topno. (iv) Though said Kale Mizar, was charge-sheeted by C.I.D as an accused, the CBI has not examined him as witness, instead in the charge sheet, CBI had mentioned about absence of materials to substantiate the allegations against Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar, who were charge sheeted by C.I.D. (v) The alleged confessional statement of co-accused Kamal Nath, is inadmissible in view of the fact that he was admittedly not being jointly tried along with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, for being juvenile at the time of commission of the offence, in view of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, and also in view of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Suresh Budharmal Kalani(supra), and in the case of Kashmira Singh (supra) and also in Hardeep Singh Sohal(supra). (vi) Moreover, as held in the case of Kashmira Singh(supra) Court cannot start with confession, much less on the confession of co-accused, which has only weak evidentiary value. In absence of any other independent evidence, such a confession cannot by itself form the basis of framing of charges under Sections 227/228 Cr.P.C. (vii) The alleged confessional statement of Kamal Nath, is exculpatory in nature and nowhere in the said statement, Kamal Nath had implicated himself with the offence alleged in the FIR. As held in the case of Palvinder Kaur (supra), Pandyachi @ Kandaswamy (supra), and in Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa & Anr.(supra) a statement containing self-exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession. (viii) Moreover, procedural safeguard while recording confession of accused Kamal Nath was not maintained by the learned Magistrate. Non-compliance goes to the root of the Magistrate‟s jurisdiction to record the confession and renders it unworthy of credence, as held in the case of Shivappa (supra), and also in Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh (supra) (ix) The motive of crime attributed by Ms. M. Kumari, learned counsel for the CBI, for killing Daniel Topno by the respondent No. 1, on the basis of electoral dynamics, is a presumption based upon the presumable fact and in view of decision in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani @ Papu Kalani (supra), the same cannot be a basis for framing of charge in absence of other materials. 21. In the result, this Court finds this revision petition devoid of merit and accordingly, the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 22. Registry shall return the concerned file to the learned Court below with the copy of this judgment & order. JUDGE Comparing Assistant observed as under: 'In our view, once the finding of the concealment and subsequent levy of penalties