1 2026:CGHC:4557-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 287 of 2026 Vijay Umakant Waghmare S/o Umakant Waghmare, aged about 33 years Occupation, Practicing as a Ms Orthopaedic Surgeon, R/o Sainik Colony, Temburni Road, Near M.G. College, Ahmedpur, Tal Ahmedpur, Distt. Latur, Pin Code 413515, Maharashtra. ... Petitioner versus 1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, P.S. Bhilai Nagar, Sector 6, Distt. Durg, Chhattisgarh. 2 - XYZ Nill ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Sudip Nargolkar, Advocate through video-conferencing and Ms. Bhakti Jogal and Mr. Shivam Mishra, Advocates For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 28.01.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sudip Nargolkar, learned counsel for the petitioner appearing through video-conferencing as well as Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent No.1. 2. The present petition under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short, ‘BNSS’) has been filed by the ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 petitioner seeking following prayer :- “It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this Petition and kindly set aside/quash the F.I.R./crime 0499/2018 registered on dated 15.11.2018, at police station Bhilai Nagar, District Durg (C.G.), charge sheet bearing no 391/2025 filed on 03/10/2025, under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and order of Cognizance by Judicial Magistrate First Class, District- Durg, (C.G.) in the interest of justice.” 3. The case of prosecution, in brief, is that on 05.11.2018, the complainant / respondent No.2 lodged an FIR bearing Crime No. 0499/2018 at Police Station, Bhilai Nagar, Sector-6, alleging that the petitioner, under a false promise of marriage, established sexual relations with her on two occasions, firstly, in or about March 2017 at the complainant’s residence in Bhilai, Chhattisgarh and secondly, on 12.04.2017 at a hotel in Pune, Maharashtra. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 03.10.2025 bearing No. 391/2025 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, District – Durg (C.G.), in which, cognizance has already been taken by the learned Magistrate. Being aggrieved by the same, the instant petition is filed by the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the petitioner is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in this 3 case. He submitted that the petitioner was posted as a Resident Doctor in the Department of Orthopaedics at Sassoon General Hospital, Pune during the entire period of the alleged incidents. He further submitted that the official attendance records, duly certified by the Head of Department, conclusively establish that the petitioner was physically present and on duty in Pune on all relevant dates. He further submitted that in March 2017 (exact date not specified in the FIR), when the complainant alleges that the petitioner visited her residence at Bhilai, the petitioner was present and marked on duty in the manual attendance register at Sassoon Hospital. He also submitted that similarly, on 12.04.2017, when the complainant alleges that the petitioner stayed with her in a hotel in Pune, the petitioner was again present on duty. It is further submitted that a resident surgeon is not permitted to leave the hospital until his assignments are completed, which often continue for several consecutive days. Therefore, the petitioner could not have met the complainant outside the hospital at all. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the complainant’s mother attempted to coerce the petitioner into marriage after he declined the proposal. It appears that the complainant’s mother was insistent on ensuring a matrimonial alliance with the petitioner by any means. The complainant herself, in a recorded telephonic conversation, admitted that she was in love with another person and had no intention of marrying 4 the petitioner, and that she was distressed by her mother’s conduct. He further contended that there is an inordinate delay of 19 months in lodging the FIR, without any contemporaneous complaint, medical record, or corroborative evidence. Such unexplained delay severely undermines the credibility of the allegations. The essential ingredients of the ofence of rape on the basis of a false promise to marry are not fulfilled. There was no promise, no meeting, and no physical contact between the parties. He also contended that the complainant herself admitted during telephonic conversations with the petitioner that no promise of marriage was ever made to her and that her grievance stemmed solely from her mother’s insistence on forcing the alliance. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that even assuming for the sake of argument and without admitting the same, that there was any physical intimacy between the parties (which is expressly denied), the complainant has herself admitted in the FIR that she visited the petitioner at Pune of her own volition. This clearly establishes the consensual nature of the alleged interaction, and no case under Section 376 IPC is made out. The allegations are an afterthought, motivated by personal grudge and external influence. He also argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2025 SC 2629) has held that a consensual relationship turning sour or emotional differences arising subsequently cannot form the basis 5 for prosecuting an individual for rape. Such misuse of the criminal justice system tarnishes the reputation and identity of innocent persons. Even assuming, without prejudice, that there was consensual intercourse on the basis of a promise to marry, it must still be shown that the petitioner had no intention to marry from the very beginning. In the present case, the complainant herself disclosed her romantic involvement with another person, making any alleged promise to marry inherently improbable and legally untenable. He also submitted that despite the FIR being lodged in 2018, the investigation has remained inconclusive for seven years and the charge-sheet was submitted only on 03.10.2025 and thereafter, the petitioner has already been granted anticipatory bail by this Court on 27.11.2025 in MCRCA No. 1833 of 2025, on the ground that the investigation remained inconclusive for a a period of seven years and that such inordinate delay was not attributable to the petitioner and since the fact that the petitioner resided in Pune and was discharging his duties at the Sassoon General Hospital, Pune, was mentioned in the FIR itself. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that the irrefutable alibi evidenced by certified attendance records from Sassoon General Hospital, Pune-confirming the petitioner's continuous duty presence over 1,000 km away from the alleged sites on the dates in question (March 2017 and 12.04.2017) coupled with the solitary public meeting of 15-20 minutes in a hospital cafeteria, negates any possibility of the alleged physical 6 encounters, making out an exceptional case for quashing where the prosecution's foundation is physically impossible and devoid of merit. 8. On the other hand, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent opposed this petition and submitted that the petition raises disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings for quashing. The defence of alibi based on attendance records, the petitioner’s alleged continuous presence at Sassoon General Hospital, and the claim that he could not have met the complainant, are all matters of evidence which can only be tested during trial. At this stage, the Court is required to examine only whether the FIR and charge-sheet disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The allegations in the FIR, read as a whole, clearly disclose offences punishable under Section 376 IPC, and therefore the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court ought not to be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. He further submitted that the contention regarding delay in lodging the FIR is also not fatal at the threshold. It is well settled that in offences of sexual assault, delay by itself cannot be a ground for quashing, as victims often hesitate due to social stigma, emotional trauma, and family pressure. The complainant has explained the circumstances under which the FIR came to be lodged, and such explanation is a matter for appreciation of evidence. The alleged telephonic conversations, the conduct of the complainant or her family members, and the 7 petitioner’s claim of coercion for marriage are all disputed factual issues requiring trial. He further submitted that certified attendance records cannot conclusively establish that the petitioner was incapable of meeting the complainant, particularly when the prosecution alleges interactions in Pune itself, and when such records do not rule out meetings beyond duty hours. 9. It is further submitted by learned State counsel that the plea of consent is a matter of defence and cannot be examined at the stage of quashing. Whether the consent, if any, was vitiated by deception or false representation is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined on evidence. The reliance placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amol Bhagwan Nehul (supra) is misplaced, as each case turns on its own facts, and the said decision does not lay down a blanket proposition mandating quashing in all cases involving allegations of false promise to marry. The grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner does not ipso facto justify quashing of the proceedings. He lastly submitted that in view of the seriousness of the allegations, the statements of the complainant, and the material collected during investigation culminating in the filing of the charge-sheet, it is not a case where the prosecution can be said to be inherently improbable or an abuse of the process of law. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed, leaving all defences open to the petitioner to be urged at the stage of trial. 8 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned FIR, charge-sheet, order taking cognizance and the materials placed on record. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & others, reported in AIR 2021 SC 1918, has observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. While examining an F.I.R./complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot inquire about the reliability, genuineness, or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R./complaint. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. The Apex Court has emphasized that though the Court has the power to quash the F.I.R. in suitable cases, the Court, when it exercises power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations of F.I.R. disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider the case on merit. 12. It has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, that the proceedings relating to cognizable ofences cannot be interfered except on certain grounds enumerated by the Apex Court in the said judgment. It is evident that, none of the grounds mentioned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment 9 are attracted in the present case. In State of Telangana Vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani & others reported in (2017) 2 SCC 779, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of cognizable ofence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR. Also what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses commission of a cognizable offence. 13. In the present case, the petitioner seeks quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings primarily on the grounds of alleged false implication, delay in lodging the FIR, existence of an alibi based on attendance records, and the contention that the allegations even if taken at face value do not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. 14. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings, this Court does not conduct a mini-trial or evaluate the probative value of evidence. The defence sought to be raised by the petitioner, including reliance on hospital attendance registers, alleged telephonic conversations, delay in lodging the FIR, and the plea of consent or false implication, raises disputed questions of fact which require appreciation of evidence and cross-examination, and therefore cannot be adjudicated at this stage. The plea of alibi is a matter of defence and cannot be examined in proceedings for quashing. 10 15. A plain reading of the FIR and the statements collected during investigation disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offences. The delay in lodging the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing, particularly in cases involving allegations of sexual offences, where social stigma, emotional trauma, and personal circumstances often contribute to delayed reporting. The explanation offered by the prosecution is a matter to be tested during trial. The reliance placed by the petitioner on alleged consensual conduct or subsequent conduct of the complainant also pertains to factual aspects which cannot be conclusively determined at this stage. 16. The submission that the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail or that the charge-sheet was filed after a considerable period does not, by itself, justify quashing of the proceedings. Grant of bail and quashing of criminal proceedings operate in distinct fields. The judgment relied upon by the petitioner in Amol Bhagwan Nehul (supra) does not lay down a blanket proposition for quashing in all cases involving allegations of false promise to marry, and the applicability of the said decision depends upon appreciation of facts, which is impermissible at this stage. 17. In view of the above, this Court is satisfied that the allegations cannot be said to be inherently improbable or an abuse of the process of law so as to warrant interference. The petition seeks adjudication on merits, which is beyond the scope of the present 11 proceedings, as such, this Court cannot come to a conclusion that prima facie, no case is made out against the petitioner. The petitioner will have every opportunity before the learned Trial Court to rebut the allegations levelled against him. This Court cannot examine or appreciate the evidences that may be led before the learned Trial Court and stalling the trial would be wholly unjustified. Further, in light of what has been said by the Supreme Court in Bhajanlal (supra) and Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra), there appears to be no good ground for quashing of the charge- sheet. 18. Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra