1 2026:HHC:27640 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MP(M) No. : 61 8 of 2026 Reserved on : 08.07.2026 Decided on : 09.07.2026 Uploaded on : 09.07.2026 Nishant Sareen .......Applicant Versus Directorate of Enforcement ...Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicant : Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Swati Sharma, Advocate For the respondent : Mr. Ajeet Singh Saklani, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge Applicant Nishant Sareen, has filed the present application, under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BNSS), for releasing him on bail, during the pendency of the trial, arising out of ECIR No.SHSZO/03/2023 7303-7307, dated 31.03.2023, registered under Sections 3 and 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (hereinafter referred to 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:27640 as ‘the PMLA’), with Sub-Zonal Office Directorate of Enforcement, Shimla. 2. According to the applicant, the above ECIR has been registered, under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA, on the basis of the source information, as contained, in case FIR No.004/2019, registered under Section 11 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2018, at SV & ACB, Solan, as well as, the charge sheet filed by the investigating agency, which is pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, Solan, H.P. 3. As per the allegations levelled, the applicant took undue advantage to the tune of Rs.43,07,641/-, by misusing his official position as Drugs Inspector and Assistant Drugs Controller, whereas, case FIR No.215/2022, dated 29.10.2022, registered by Haryana Police at Police Station, Sector-20, Panchkula against the applicant, by one Komal Khanna, Vinay Aggarwal and others, under Sections 177, 195, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’), in which, according to the applicant, the police, after investigation, has submitted cancellation report. 3 2026:HHC:27640 4. It is the further case of the applicant that in case FIR No.004/2019, the investigating agency, after completion of the investigation, filed the challan against the applicant and Dr. Komal Khanna, for committing the offence punishable, under Sections 11 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, however, till the date of filing the application, charges have not been framed. 5. As per the applicant that there is a reference of another FIR, registered with Police Station SV&ACB, Shimla, in the applications filed, from time to time, by the respondent- department for ED custody, bearing FIR No.08/2025, dated 23.09.2025, under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, against the applicant. When the applicant came to know about the registration of the said FIR, he, in order to know, about the allegations, levelled therein, has sought the information under the Right to Information Act, including the copy of the FIR, but, the same has been refused. As such, the applicant is not aware about the exact allegations, which have been levelled, against him. 6. According to the applicant, FIR No.008 of 2025, dated 23.09.2025, registered, under Section 13 of the 4 2026:HHC:27640 Prevention of Corruption Act, after six years of previous FIR No.004/2019 and the matter is stated to be under investigation. Neither the applicant has been summoned in that FIR, nor, any substantial progress, in the said case, has been made. 7. It is the further case of the applicant, during investigation of the case, FIR No.004/2019, the search was conducted by the investigating agency, in the residential houses and other places and an amount of Rs.7,50,000/- was recovered and seized from the house search of the applicant. Out of the said amount a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was returned to Kalpana Sareen, wife of the applicant, and remaining amount of Rs.6,50,000/- was seized. 8. On the basis of FIR No.215/2022, and FIR No.004/2019, the present ECIR was registered by the respondent-department. 9. According the applicant, the police authorities of SV & ACB arrested the applicant during the investigation in case FIR No.004/2019 and subsequently, he was released on bail, by this Court, vide order dated 24.10.2019, while deciding Cr.MP (M) No.1794 of 2019. 5 2026:HHC:27640 10. It is the further case of the applicant that after registration of the ECIR, the Enforcement Department, has conducted the searches, under Section 17 of the PMLA, on 22.06.2025, at a various premises of the applicant, his in- laws and the residential premises of his mother and took into possession the numerous documents in connection with the present ECIR. Thereafter, the applicant was summoned by the investigating agency and he had cooperated with the on going investigation. He has also submitted the documents, as required, by the investigating agencies. 10. All these facts have been pleaded to demonstrate that the applicant is cooperating with the investigation. His statement, under Section 50 of the PMLA, was also recorded and when he was summoned on 09.10.2025, he was arrested by the ED. 11. Thereafter, he was produced before the Court, from where, he was remanded to the ED custody. Thereafter, he was remanded to judicial custody. ED has completed the investigation and filed the complaint, which is pending before the Court of learned Special Judge (PMLA), Shimla. 6 2026:HHC:27640 12. All these facts have been pleaded to show that his custodial interrogation of the applicant is no longer required, in the present case. 13. It is the further case of the applicant that the trial arising out of FIR No.04/2019, is still pending adjudication before the learned Special Judge, Solan and charges have not yet been framed and in FIR No.08/2025, investigation is still, at the initial stage. This fact has been pleaded to demonstrate that the complaint filed, against the applicant, by the ED, cannot be decided, unless the cases pertaining to the scheduled offence are decided. 14. In the bulky bail application, the applicant has given the details/explanation of the allegations, which have been levelled against him, which are not liable to be considered, at the time of deciding the bail application, as the same are based upon his defence. 15. In a nut shell, the applicant has submitted the details of the property, held by him, by explaining the source of the same. 16. The applicant had earlier tried his luck by moving similar application before learned Special Judge, Shimla, 7 2026:HHC:27640 however, his application has been dismissed by learned Special Judge, Shimla, on 29.11.2025. Thereafter, he has filed Cr.MP(M) No.2976 of 2025, before this Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 05.01.2026. Thereafter, he has filed another Cr.MP(M) No. 224 of 2026, before this Court, which was also dismissed as withdrawn, on 24.03.2026. 17. The relief of bail has also been sought on the ground that the co-accused Dr. Komal Khanna, has also filed Cr.MP(M) No.2898 of 2025, in which, initially, interim protection was given and subsequently, the same was allowed, by this Court. 18. It has also been pleaded that Cr.MP(M) No.224 of 2026 has been withdrawn as during the pendency of the said application, cancellation report has been filed in FIR No.215/2022, registered with Police Station, Sector-20, Panchkula. 19. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Swati Sharma, Advocate, has prayed that during the pendency of the above ECIR, the applicant may kindly be released on bail, for which, he is ready to abide by any conditions imposed by this Court. 8 2026:HHC:27640 20. When put to notice, the prayer for bail, as made, in the application, has been contested, by taking the preliminary objections that during the investigation of the case, active and conscious role, in the commission of the offences, against the applicant has been established. 20.1. The prayer, as made, in the application, has been opposed on the ground that the applicant has miserably failed to make out a case to satisfy the mandatory twin conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA, in his favour. 20.2. On merits, the application has been contested on the ground that FIR No.0004/2019 dated 21.08.2019 was registered by the State Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (SV&ACB), Himachal Pradesh, under Section 11 of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988 against the applicant and after investigation Charge-sheet/Challan was filed on 09.11.2021, before the learned Special Judge Solan, against the applicant, under Section 11 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 201 of the IPC and against co-accused Komal Khanna under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 9 2026:HHC:27640 20.3. As per the ED, from the said charge-sheet, it has been revealed that the applicant remain posted as a Drugs Inspector, Nahan during 10.03.2014 to 25.02.2016, as Assistant Drugs Controller, Nahan from 18.03.2018 to 07.06.2019 and as Assistant Drugs Controller, Baddi from June to August 2019. While posted, as such, he had taken undue advantages from the owners/partners/directors of different pharmaceutical firms/units, for himself and for his friends, in the form of hotel bookings, in JW Marriott/Taj etc., air tickets, household material and had received cash from the owners/directors of pharmaceutical firms/units. Further, he had also used the debit card of one Jagbir Singh for shopping worth Rs.3,45,000/- and cash withdrawals amounting to Rs.7,20,000/- during the years 2018 and 2019. 20.4. Thereafter, the SV&ACB, Himachal Pradesh had conducted search operations at various residential and office premises relating to the applicant and his associates, in August 2019, which resulted into the recovery and seizure of many properties related documents, seizure of digital devices including laptops and hard disks etc. In addition to this, a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- was also recovered and seized from 10 2026:HHC:27640 House No.1514, Sector 38-B Chandigarh which was registered in the name of Ms. Kalpna Sareen wife of the applicant. The search operations were conducted by SV&ACB at the following premises:  House No. 1514, Sector 38-B, Chandigarh registered in the name of Kalpna Sareen (Wife of Mr. Nishant Sareen);  Premises of Mr. Nishant Sareen at Diara Sector near bus stand Bilaspur, H.P;  Premises of Zhenia Pharmaceuticals (partnership firm of Komal Khanna and Jagbir Singh) at Plot No. 456, Phase-1, Industrial Area, Panchkula, Haryana;  Premises of Komal Khanna at Flat no. 404, C-2, Maya Garden City situated at Zirakpur-Ambala Highway;  Premises of Komal Khanna at Flat no. 1203, Tower No. 7A, Suncity Sector 20, Panchkula;  Premises of Mr. Nishant Sareen near Tenzin Hospital at Panthagathi, Shimla *(this premise was searched post arrest of Mr. Nishant Sareen since he was not found at any search premises during search in August 2019);  Office of Assistant Drug Controller, Baddi, Distt. Solan, HP where Mr. Nishant Sareen was posted as ADC in August 2019. 11 2026:HHC:27640 20.5. As per the charge-sheet filed by SV&ACB, the applicant has taken undue advantages to the tune of Rs.43,07,641/-. In addition to this, the factual position involved in FIR No.215/2022, dated 29.10.2022, was also reiterated, however, the said details are not required to be reproduced here, as it is admitted case of the parties that the police had filed cancellation report, in the said case. It has been pleaded that the filing of a closure report, in said FIR does not ipso facto negate the existence of proceeds of crime, particularly when other scheduled offences subsist and remain under investigation. 20.6. It is the further case of the ED that the FIR No.008/2025 dated 23.09.2025 has been registered, under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by SV&ACB, Shimla, against the applicant. As per the allegations, the applicant has accumulated disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs.1,66,05,470/- during the check period 01.04.2002 to 21.08.2019 . 20.7. It is the further case of the ED that in the aforementioned FIR the disproportionate assets are likely to substantially increase, as he has also acquired huge assets 12 2026:HHC:27640 after year 2019, including properties such at Omaxe Cassia, New Chandigarh and others. The charge-sheet, in this FIR, has not yet been filed. 20.8. It is the further case of the ED that in the present ECIR, summons, under Section 50 of PMLA, 2002, were issued to the applicant and his co-accused Ms. Komal Khanna, Owners/Managers of pharmaceutical firms/entities, who, as per the charge-sheet filed by SV&ACB, had given favours to the applicant, including Mr. Jagbir Singh. 20.9. It is the further case of the ED that the searches, under Section 17 of the PMLA, were conducted on 22.06.2025 and 23.06.2025 at the residential, official and business premises of applicant Nishant Sareen and Ms. Komal Khanna (accomplice of Mr. Nishant Sareen). During the said search operations, various incriminating materials were recovered and bank accounts/fixed deposits aggregating to 2.53 crore ₹ were frozen. In addition to this, two vehicles, namely a Kia Seltos and a Mahindra Scorpio-N, along with several digital devices, were seized. 20.10. Not only this, searches, under Section 17 of the PMLA, were conducted on 01.07.2025 and 04.07.2025, in 13 2026:HHC:27640 respect of bank lockers, held in the names of Mrs. Saroj Sareen (mother of applicant Nishant Sareen) and Mrs. Kalpna Sareen (wife of applicant Nishant Sareen). During the said search operations, gold ornaments valued of approximately 65 lakh were recovered and seized. ₹ 20.11. As per the investigation, it has been revealed that applicant, while functioning as Drugs Inspector/Assistant Drugs Controller in Himachal Pradesh, has abused his official position to extort illegal gratification from pharmaceutical companies, by threatening adverse regulatory action, such as, suspension of licences, false objections and delay in approvals, thereby generating proceeds of crime. 20.12. According to the ED, the applicant had received unlawful benefits amounting to Rs.1,01,81,608/- from various Pharma entities. Thereafter, as per the Provisional Attachment Order No. 06/2025 dated 02.12.2025 passed under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, 2002, his immovable properties have provisionally been attached, as “value thereof”, of the proceeds of crime (POC); namely (i) Flat No. 1203, Tower 7A, Suncity Parikarma, Panchkula, owned by Ms. Komal Khanna, attached to the extent of 2,36,99,390/-, ₹ 14 2026:HHC:27640 and (ii) land with construction at Sareen House, Panthaghati, Shimla, owned by applicant Nishant Sareen, attached to the extent of 21,04,703/-, aggregating to a total provisional ₹ attachment of 2,58,04,093/-. ₹ 20.13. It is the further case of the ED that the ECIR is not based solely on FIR No.215/2022, but, the same has been founded upon FIR No.004/2019, as well as FIR No.008/2025. It has been admitted that the charge sheet, in FIR No.004/2019, dated 21.08.2019, registered with SV & ACB, has been filed before the Court of learned Special Judge, Solan. Reiterating the fact that FIR No.008/2025, dated 23.09.2025, registered with SV&ACB, Himachal Pradesh, under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is a validly registered scheduled offence and forms an integral part of the investigation, under the PMLA. The arrest of the applicant was effected strictly, in accordance with the provisions of Section 19 of PMLA, after formation of a reason to believe based on material evidence. 20.14. The relief, as claimed, in the present application, has been opposed on the ground that merely joining the investigation does not amount to true and complete 15 2026:HHC:27640 cooperation, as the applicant has not disclosed full and correct facts and has attempted to conceal material information regarding financial transactions and assets. The investigation, qua the applicant is stated to be not completed and still going on. 20.15. In reply to para 17 of the application, it has been submitted that the complaint filed by the ED is based on concrete evidence including bank records, statements recorded under Section 50 PMLA, documentary evidence seized during search operations, and not on assumptions. Reasserting the fact that proceedings under the PMLA can continue simultaneously with predicate offences, and the stage of trial, in the scheduled offence, does not bar prosecution under PMLA. The applicant has miserably failed to satisfy the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. 21. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 22. The applicant, in the present case, was arrested on 09.10.2025. Almost ten months have been elapsed. As per the stand taken by the applicant, complaint against him 16 2026:HHC:27640 has been filed before the Court of learned Special Judge PMLA, Shimla. This fact has been pleaded in para 19 of the application, which has been admitted by pleading that the allegations against the applicant are supported by the substantial documentary evidence and witness statements. Even in reply to para 31, it is submitted that the prosecution complaint has been filed after a detailed and thorough investigation based on documentary evidence, financial records, statements under Section 50 of the PMLA and other corroborative material. 23. Another fact, which has also not been disputed, in the present case, is that investigation in FIR No.004/2019, has been completed and the charge-sheet has been filed before the learned Special Judge, Solan. The charges, in the said case, have not yet been framed, whereas, investigation in the case FIR NO.08/2025, is still going on. The third case FIR No.215 of 2022, the police has filed the cancellation report, which admittedly has not been accepted by the competent Court. 24. On the basis of the above admitted factual position, it has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel 17 2026:HHC:27640 appearing for the applicant that in the absence of the decision in the above cases, the present ECIR cannot be decided. 25. To buttress his contentions, learned Senior counsel has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Senthil Balaji versus Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626. Relevant para 21, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “21. Hence, the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for alleging the existence of proceeds of crime. A property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by a person as a result of the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence constitutes proceeds of crime. The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the offence under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence. Therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences concludes. In the facts of the case, there is no possibility of the trial of the scheduled offences commencing in the near future. Therefore, we see no possibility of both trials concluding within a few years. 26. Admittedly, the investigation in FIR No. 08/2025, registered with SV & CB, Shimla is still going on. In para 16 of the bail application, the applicant has specifically pleaded the fact that in FIR No. 08/2025, the applicant has neither 18 2026:HHC:27640 been called, nor, any record has been supplied to him, despite best efforts made by him. The specific allegations, as levelled in para 16 have not been dealt with by the ED. 27. Learned counsel appearing for the ED could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court as unless or until predicate offence has not been proved, how the trial under PMLA can be decided. 28. At the cost of repetition, charges, in FIR No.004/2019, have not yet been framed. The investigation in FIR No.008/2025 has not yet been completed. From the above facts, a judicial notice can be taken, by this Court that the chances of conclusion of trial, in near future, against he applicant, in the present case, are not so bright. He has also spent about ten months in judicial custody. 29. The applicant, in this case, has been booked, under Section 3 of the PMLA and the punishment has been provided, under Section 4 of the PMLA. Section 4 of the PMLA is reproduced, as under: “4. Punishment for money-laundering. - Whoever commits the offence of money-laundering shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 19 2026:HHC:27640 Provided that where the proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering relates to any offence specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule, the provisions of this section shall have effect as if for the words “which may extend to seven years”, the words “which may extend to ten years” had been substituted.” 30. It is not in dispute that before releasing the accused on bail, in a case, registered under PMLA, it is incumbent upon the Court to record the findings with regard to the satisfaction of the twin conditions, as per Section 45 of the PMLA, which are pari materia to provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 31. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, reported as (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713, has elaborately discussed the statutory restrictions, provided under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA. Relevant paras-10 to 19, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “10. It is a fact that the High Court in the instant case has not determined the likelihood of the respondent being guilty or not, or whether rigours of Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA are alien to him. The High Court instead of incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime appears to have exercised its power to grant bail owing to the long period in the near future. The reasons assigned by the High Court are 20 2026:HHC:27640 apparently traceable back to Article 21 of our Constitution, of course without addressing the statutory embargo created by Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA. 11. The High Court's view draws support from a batch of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616, laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622, para 10) "10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21." (emphasis supplied) 12. Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ("the NDPS Act") which too have somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1999) 9 SCC 252, Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC 569 and Umarmia v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 2 SCC 731, enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special 21 2026:HHC:27640 enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians. 13. We may also refer to the orders enlarging similarly-situated accused under UAPA passed by this Court in Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 3 SCC 723. That was also a case under Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 18-A, 18-B, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of the UAPA. This Court in its earnest effort to draw balance between the seriousness of the charges with the period of custody suffered and the likely period within which the trial could be expected to be completed took note of the five years' incarceration and over 200 witnesses left to be examined, and thus granted bail to the accused notwithstanding Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA. Similarly, in Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 3 SCC 725, an accused under UAPA was enlarged for he had been in jail for four years and there were over 147 witnesses still unexamined. 14. The facts of the instant case are more egregious than these two abovecited instances. Not only has the respondent been in jail for much more than five years, but there are 276 witnesses left to be examined. Charges have been framed only on 27-11-2020. Still further, two opportunities were given to the appellant NIA who has shown no inclination to screen its endless list of witnesses. It also deserves mention that of the thirteen co-accused who have been convicted, none have been given a sentence of more than eight years' rigorous imprisonment. It can, therefore, be legitimately expected that if found guilty, the respondent too would receive a sentence within the same ballpark. Given that two-third of such incarceration is already complete, it appears that the respondent has already paid heavily for his acts of fleeing from justice. 15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III 22 2026:HHC:27640 of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731, it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. 16. As regards the judgment in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1, cited by the learned ASG, we find that it dealt with an entirely different factual matrix. In that case, the High Court had reappreciated the entire evidence on record to overturn the Special Court's conclusion of their being a prima facie case of conviction and concomitant rejection of bail. The High Court had practically conducted a mini-trial and determined admissibility of certain evidence, which exceeded the limited scope of a bail petition. This not only was beyond the statutory mandate of a prima facie assessment under Section 43-D(5), but it was premature and possibly would have prejudiced the trial itself. It was in these b circumstances that this Court intervened and cancelled the bail. 17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, 23 2026:HHC:27640 both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial. 18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected. 19. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the respondent on bail is that Section 43- D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS Act where the competent court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA merely provides another 9 possible ground for the 24 2026:HHC:27640 competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion, etc.” (self emphasis supplied) 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 3205 of 2024, titled as Ramkripal Meena versus Directorate of Enforcement, vide order, dated 30th July, 2024, has held that the rigors of Section 45 of the PMLA can be suitably relaxed to afford conditional liberty to the accused, who has spent considerable time in custody and there being no likelihood of the trial being concluded, in the short span. Relevant paras-6 and 7, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “6. The only scheduled offence against the petitioner is the one under Section 420 IPC, which is in relation to the leakage of REET question paper, and in which the petitioner has already been enlarged on regular bail by this Court. 7. Adverting to the prayer for grant of bail in the instant case, it is pointed out by learned counsel for ED that the complaint case is at the stage of framing of charges and 24 witnesses are proposed to be examined. The conclusion proceedings, thus, will take some reasonable time. The petitioner has already been in custody for more than a year. Taking into consideration the period spent in custody and there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a short span, coupled with the fact that the petitioner is 25 2026:HHC:27640 already on bail in the predicate offence, and keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it seems to us that the rigours of Section 45 of the Act can be suitably relaxed to afford conditional liberty to the petitioner. Ordered accordingly. 33. Considering the stage of the trial, in case FIR No.004/2019 and the stage of investigation, in FIR No.008/2025, this Court can foresee the fact that in near future, chances of conclusion of the trial, against the applicant, are not so bright. 34. The said findings can be recorded, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case titled as Mahesh Joshi versus Directorate of Enforcement, Neutral Citation No. 2025 INSC 1377. Relevant paras-10 to 14, of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under: 10. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the documentary nature of the case, wherein large number of pages, witnesses and documents are cited by the prosecution, and that the matter remains at the stage of supply of copy of the police report and other documents under Section 207, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, “CrPC”). It is urged that the trial is unlikely to commence in the near future, and prolonged incarceration would be inconsistent with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 11. On the contrary, the learned ASG submits that the allegations relate to serious economic offences. He refers to what the agency describes as a financial trail involving movement of funds 26 2026:HHC:27640 through M/s Mugdog Packaging India LLP, M/s Maxclenz Retail Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Jay The Victory, before reaching the firm of the Appellant’s son, M/s Sumangalam LLP. According to the respondent, the layering of transactions is consistent with money-laundering methods. 12. Reliance is placed on statements of certain co-accused recorded during the investigation, with the submission that the later retractions are belated. It is contended that the Rs. 50 lakh entry is not isolated and forms part of a larger financial pattern which, according to the agency, totals Rs. 2.01 crore. The learned ASG submits that the Appellant, being a senior political figure, may influence witnesses who were departmental officials or contractors. Continued custody is therefore sought. 13. In V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, of which, one of us was a member (Augustine George Masih, J.,), this Court, particularly in para 27, held that where a trial cannot be reasonably concluded and incarceration becomes prolonged, constitutional courts must intervene to safeguard the right to personal liberty under Article 21. The Court further emphasised that Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite detention in cases involving voluminous, document-heavy material where trial is unlikely to begin promptly. The present case, in our view, stands on a similar footing. Para 27 of V. Senthil Balaji (supra) reads as follows: “27. Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum sentence is three years, and the maximum is seven years. The minimum sentence is higher when the scheduled offence is under the NDPS Act. When the trial of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond reasonable limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider exercising their powers to grant bail. The reason 27 2026:HHC:27640 is that Section 45(1)(ii) does not confer power on the State to detain an accused for an unreasonably long time, especially when there is no possibility of trial concluding within a reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will depend on the provisions under which the accused is being tried and other factors. One of the most relevant factor is the duration of the minimum and maximum sentence for the offence. Another important consideration is the higher threshold or stringent conditions which a statute provides for the grant of bail. Even an outer limit provided by the relevant law for the completion of the trial, if any, is also a factor to be considered. The extraordinary powers, as held in the case of K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], can only be exercised by the Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the Constitutional Courts have vast experience. Based on the facts on record, if the Judges conclude that there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time, the power of granting bail can always be exercised by the Constitutional Courts on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the statutory provisions. The Constitutional Courts can always exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226, as the case may be. The Constitutional Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the cases under the PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases, the maximum sentence can be of seven years. The Constitutional Courts cannot allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments in the hands of the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when there is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of the undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be defeated. In a given case, if an undue delay in the disposal of the trial of scheduled offences or disposal of trial under the PMLA can be substantially attributed to the accused, the Constitutional Courts can always 28 2026:HHC:27640 decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs. An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 14. Upon considering the material placed before us, we find that several co-accused, whose alleged roles will ultimately be evaluated at trial, have already been granted bail. The Appellant has remained in custody for over seven months. The record is entirely documentary, as of now there are 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and more than 14,600 pages are involved, and the proceedings are still at the stage of supply of copy of the police report and other documents under Section 207, CrPC. In our view, these circumstances indicate that the commencement of trial is not imminent and that the trial itself is not likely to conclude once started in the near future. The continued detention of the Appellant requires closer scrutiny in light of constitutional considerations. (self emphasis supplied) 35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia versus Directorate of Enforcement, reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920, has elaborately discussed the provisions of PMLA, viz-a-viz, offences, which are punishable for death, imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnapping for ransom, mass violence, 29 2026:HHC:27640 etc. Relevant paras-28 and 49 to 57 of the judgment, are reproduced, as follows: “28. Before considering the submissions of the learned ASG with regard to maintainability of the present appeals on account of the second order of this Court, it will be apposite to refer to certain observations made by this Court in its first order, which read thus: “26. However, we are also concerned about the prolonged period of incarceration suffered by the appellant – Manish Sisodia. In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791, the appellant therein was granted bail after being kept in custody for around 49 days [P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2020) 13 SCC 337], relying on the Constitution Bench in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, and Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40, that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case. Ultimately, the consideration has to be made on a case to case basis, on the facts. The primary object is to secure the presence of the accused to stand trial. The argument that the appellant therein was a flight risk or that there was a possibility of tampering with the evidence or influencing the witnesses, was rejected by the Court. Again, in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51, this Court referred to Surinder Singh Alias Shingara Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 7 SCC 387 and Kashmira Singh versus State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291, to emphasise that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right within the broad scope of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Vijay Mandanlal Choudhary (supra), this Court while highlighting the evil of economic 30 2026:HHC:27640 offences like money laundering, and its adverse impact on the society and citizens, observed that arrest infringes the fundamental right to life. This Court referred to Section 19 of the PML Act, for the in-built safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised officers to ensure fairness, objectivity and accountability. (See also Pankaj Bansal v Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244] Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), also held that Section 436A of the Code can apply to offences under the PML Act, as it effectuates the right to speedy trial, a facet of the right to life, except for a valid ground such as where the trial is delayed at the instance of the accused himself. In our opinion, Section 436A should not be construed as a mandate that an accused should not be granted bail under the PML Act till he has suffered incarceration for the specified period. This Court, in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427, held that while ensuring proper enforcement of criminal law on one hand, the court must be conscious that liberty across human eras is as tenacious as tenacious can be. 27. The appellant - Manish Sisodia has argued that given the number of witnesses, 294 in the prosecution filed by the CBI and 162 in the prosecution filed by the DoE, and the documents 31,000 pages and 25,000 pages respectively, the fact that the CBI has filed multiple charge sheets, the arguments of charge have not commenced. The trial court has allowed application of the accused for furnishing of additional documents, which order has been challenged by the prosecution that the said petition under Section 482 will be withdrawn. It was also stated at the Bar, by the prosecution that the trial would be concluded within next six to eight months. 31 2026:HHC:27640 28. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not become punishment without trial. If the trial gets protracted despite assurances of the prosecution, and it is clear that case will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to an economic offence, yet it may not be proper to equate these cases with those punishable with death, imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnapping for ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where 100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded. The allegations have to be established and proven. The right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the Code and Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to the accused, the court, unless there are good reasons, may well be guided to exercise the power to grant bail. This would be truer where the trial would take years. 29. In view of the assurance given at the Bar on behalf of the prosecution that they shall conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps within next six to eight months, we give liberty to the appellant Manish Sisodia to move a fresh application for bail in case of change in circumstances, or in case the trial is protracted and proceeds at a snail's pace in next three months. If any application for bail is filed in the above circumstances, the same would be considered by the trial court on merits without being influenced by the 32 2026:HHC:27640 dismissal of the earlier bail application, including the present Judgment. Observations made above, re. right to speedy trial, will, however, be taken into consideration. The appellant Manish Sisodia may also file an application for interim bail in case of ill health and medical emergency due to illness of his wife. Such application would be also examined on its own merits." xxx xxx xxx 49. We find that, on account of a long period of incarceration running for around 17 months and the trial even not having been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial. 50. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial of these rights, the trial court as well as the High Court ought to have given due weightage to this factor. 51. Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider an application for bail in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693, wherein the accused was prosecuted under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court surveyed the entire law right from the judgment of this Court in the cases of Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240, Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81, Union of India v. K.A Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, and Satender Kumar Antil v Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51. The Court observed thus: 33 2026:HHC:27640 "19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime." 52. The Court also reproduced the observations made in Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), which read thus: 10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240. We quote: "What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal, Lord Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]: "I observe that in this case bail was refused for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the, magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial."" 53. The Court further observed that, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Court attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that 34 2026:HHC:27640 bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach on account of non-grant of bail even in straightforward open and shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial court ad the High Courts should recognize the principle that “ bail is rule and jail is exception”. 54. In the present case, in the ED matter as well as the CBI matter, 493 witnesses have been named. The case involves thousands of pages of documents and over a lakh pages of digitized documents. It is thus clear that there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time in the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. As observed time and again, the prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be permitted to become punishment without trial. 55. As observed by this Court in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), the objective to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal is to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial. 56. In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots in the society. There is no possibility of him fleeing away from the country and not being available for facing the trial. In any case, conditions can be imposed to address the concern of the State. 57. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned ASG regarding the possibility of tampering the evidence is concerned, it is to be noted that the case largely depends on documentary evidence which is already 35 2026:HHC:27640 seized by the prosecution. As such, there is no possibility of tampering with the evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard to influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said concern can be addressed by imposing stringent conditions upon the appellant.” (self emphasis supplied) 37. Mr. Ajeet Singh Saklani, learned counsel appearing for the ED has argued that the period of custody, in the present case, is only ten months, as such, the applicant cannot take the benefit of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia’s case supra. The said arguments are devoid of merits, as it is the stage of the trial, which has to be considered for determining the fact whether there are chances of commencement and conclusion of the trial, within a reasonable period. The said fact can be foreseen by this Court, on the basis of the stage of trial/ investigation in cases/FIRs, pertaining to predicate offence and compelling the applicant to undergo a particular period of the custody to seek relief of bail, would be nothing, but, fallacy of law. 36 2026:HHC:27640 38. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. 39. Consequently, the applicant is ordered to be released on bail, during the pendency of the trial, in case No. ECIR No.SHSZO/03/2023 7303-7307, dated 31.03.2023, registered with the Enforcement Directorate Office (ED), Sub-Zonal Office, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, on his furnishing personal bail bond, in the sum of 2,00,000/-, ₹ with two sureties of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court. This order, however, shall be subject to the following conditions: a) The applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; b) The applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; c) The applicant shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer; 37 2026:HHC:27640 d) The applicant shall not leave the territory of India without the prior permission of the Court; and e) The applicant shall furnish an affidavit by tenth day of every month, before the learned trial Court, disclosing therein that he has not been named, as accused, in any other case, during that period. 40. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations, are confined, only, to the disposal of the present bail application. 41. It is made clear that the respondent-ED is at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions, is found to be violated by the applicant. 42. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of Jail, District Jail Solan, through e-mail, with a direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prison software. 43. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of Jail, District Jail, Solan, is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Solan. The Superintendent of Jail, District Jail, Solan, is further directed 38 2026:HHC:27640 that if the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as per the order passed by this Court, within a period of one month from today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court. ( Virender Singh ) Judge July 09, 2026 (ps)