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2026:CGHC:1539-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No.165 of 2018 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station Ramanujganj, District- Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh
Appellant (s) versus 1 - Khatbun Nisha D/o Jamayat Miya W/o- Nanku @ Istak, R/o- Village Budibir, District- Palamu (Jharkhand), District : Palamu, Jharkhand Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Pithwa, Dy. GA For Respondent(s) : Mr. C. J. K. Rao, Advocate Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
Judgment on Board Per Rajani Dubey J. 12/01/2026
1. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the State/appellant against the judgment of acquittal dated 13.11.2017 passed by learned Upper Session Judge, Ramanujganj, District Sarguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh in ST No.358/1997, whereby the Digitally signed by R NIRALA
2 respondent has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 302, 201 & 318 of IPC.
2.
Brief facts of the case are that on 17.06.1997, in the morning at about 7 am, the respondent along with her husband co-accused Nanku and Kodu went on to kill an infant who belonged to the prosecutrix and was an outcome of rape being committed with her by Nanku prior to 10 months before the aforesaid date of incident. On the report of the prosecutrix, a case was registered against the accused persons. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted before the Magistrate concerned.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is bad in law and facts, hence the same is liable to be set aside. The Learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence recorded in its true and correct prospective and the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the respondent, but despite the same the accused respondents have been acquitted. He further submits that the learned Trial Court based on the evidence available on record has rightly convicted the other co-accused but has wrongly acquitted the respondent of the aforesaid charges, as the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the respondent, but despite the same he has been acquitted of the aforesaid charges. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment
3 and finding of the learned Court below is perverse and is liable to be set aside.
4.
Learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned
judgment of acquittal and submits that the learned Trial Court has minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record and has rightly acquitted the respondent of the aforesaid charges. He further submits that the learned Trial Court convicted the co-accused Kodu, against which he filed appeal bearing CRA No.246/2005 before this Court and vide
judgment dated 25.03.2025 in his conviction was affirmed and his sentence has been undergone to the period already undergone him, as such the learned Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment, hence no interference is called for by this Court. Thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court framed charges under Sections 302, 201 & 318 of IPC against the respondent, whereas against the co- accused Nanku @ Istak under Sections 376 (1), 302, 201 & 318 of IPC and against the co-accused Kodu under Sections 302, 201 & 318 of IPC. After appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent of the aforesaid charges, whereas the learned
4 Trial Court acquitted the co-accused Nanku @ Istak and Kodu for the offence under Sections 302, 201 & 376 (1) of IPC and convicted them for the offence under Section 318 of IPC. 7. PW-3 prosecutrix stated that on the date of incident, the co- accused Nanku sent her wife, the accused respondent, to her home and she told her to go for nature’s call, upon which she went along with her and near the shrub of Sirajjudin, the accused came there, whereas the respondent i.e. her wife went away and thereafter he committed rape on her, upon which she got pregnant and after 9 months, she delivered an alive male child in the house of accused Nanku and in front of her both the accused Nanku and her wife killed her son by cutting his neck by blade and threw him in mountain. At that time of incident, she was 15 years of age. Both the accused were pressurizing her to marry the accused Nanku. In cross-examination, she stated that after she got conscious, people told her that her child was born dead. 8. PW-1 Yakub & PW-5 Mohd Ali admitted their signatures on inquest memo and notice vide Ex-P/4 & Ex-P/5. They stated that the policemen told that the dead body is of unknown child and took their signatures on the documents. 9. PW-6 Nanku Ansari admitted his signature on spot map (Ex-P/5). 10.
Islam (PW-7) has stated that there was crowd in the village and the dead body of the child was thrown in the forest but he did not go there. 5
11. As per prosecution, the respondent killed the child of the prosecutrix and threw him in the forest but before learned Trial Court, no eye witness was produced by the prosecution and only witnesses of inquest notice and memo were examined. The prosecution has also failed to prove this fact that the child was the biological child of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix only admitted that she only delivered a child and the respondent and his wife the co-accused killed him but except the same no clinching or admissible evidence has been produced by the prosecution against the respondent. The learned Trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly found that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the respondent. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka has held in para 36 as under:-
“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice.
The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--inclusive of all vidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds
6 that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.”
13. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any patent illegality or perversity and looking to the limited scope of interference in an acquittal appeal, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 14. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- Rajani Dubey Radhakishan Agrawal Judge Judge Nirala