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2026 DAILYLAW 14973 (HP)

RAJIV NEGI v. THE CHIEF ENGINEER (SZ) AND ANOTHER

ARB.C/128/2026 · 2026-07-09

Virender Singh

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:HHC:27969 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Arb. Case No. : 128 of 2026 Decided on : 09 .07.2026 Rajiv Negi …Applicant Versus The Chief Engineer (SZ) & Another …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicant : Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, Senior Advocate with Mr. Abhijeet Singh Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Mohinder Zharaick, Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Rohit Sharma and Ms. Ranjna Patial, Deputy Advocates General. Virender Singh, Judge. (Oral) Applicant has filed the present application, under Section 29-A (4) and (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), seeking indulgence of this Court to extend the time to conclude the arbitration proceedings in Ref. Arbitration Case No. 513 of 2024, titled as Rajiv Negi versus The Chief 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:27969 Engineer (South Zone), HPPWD, Shimla & Another, pending adjudication before the Justice B.S. Walia (Retd.), Former Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court, Sole Arbitrator (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Arbitrator’). 2. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present application, before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 2.1. The respondent-department had floated a tender for ‘Construction of 5/7 metre wide road from Kharela to Krangla 0/000 to 7/500 (SH: formation cutting of 5/7 metre wide road, construction so retaining walls/breast walls, cross drainage works, construction of catch water drain, essential parapets, providing and laying Kharanja stone soling at various RDs, and construction of dumping structures from Km 0/000 to 7/500), under NABARD RIDF-XXV, Agreement No.76 of 2020-21. 2.2. During the extended time, for completion of the work, the respondents closed Agreement No.76 of 2020-21, by invoking clauses 3(ii), 3(iii) and 3(iv). Thereafter, the claimant issued legal notice requesting the respondent- department to appoint Arbitrator, in terms of Clause 25 of 3 2026:HHC:27969 the agreement, however, no action was taken on the request of the petitioner. As such, petition, registered as Arbitration Case No.513 of 2024, under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, was filed before this Court, and vide order dated 20.09.2024, Justice B.S. Walia (Retd.), Former Judge, Punjab and Haryana High Court, was appointed as sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. 2.3. The proceedings were initiated by the learned Arbitrator, by issuing notice to the parties for 04.11.2024, for preliminary hearing through Video Conferencing. 3. Since, the period of twelve months, as provided under Section 29-A(1) of the Act to pass the Arbitral Award has expired, as also the extended period of six months, as provided, under Section 29-A(3) of the Act, is going to expire on 13.07.2026, the present petition has been filed seeking indulgence of this Court to extend the time, for a further period of six months. 4. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to extend the time, by six months, for 4 2026:HHC:27969 completion of the arbitral proceedings, before the learned Arbitrator. 5. The factual position, as asserted in the application, has not been disputed, by the learned Additional Advocate General. 6. As per the averments, made in the application, though arguments, in the proceedings have been heard, however, the case is now ordered to be listed for clarification on 09.07.2026. 7. From the above facts, it is crystal clear that the case was listed on 09.07.2026, before the learned Arbitrator, for clarification, however, the award could not be passed only on account of the fact that the statutory period has already elapsed. 8. The applicant is before this Court, under Section 29A (4) (5) of the Act. The relevant provisions of Section 29A of the Act, are reproduced, as under: “29A. Time limit for arbitral award. — (1) The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23. Provided that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration may be 5 2026:HHC:27969 made as expeditiously as possible and endeavor may be made to dispose of the matter within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub- section (4) of section 23. (2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties may agree. (3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six months. (4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period: Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for each month of such delay: Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said application: Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced. (5) The extension of period referred to in sub- section (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for 6 2026:HHC:27969 sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court. (6) While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material. (7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal. (8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this section. (9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party.” 9. The bare perusal of sub-clause (4) of Section 29-A of the Act demonstrates that the period can be extended either prior to or after the expiry of the period, so specified. Meaning thereby, the time limit for passing the arbitral award can be extended by this Court, even after the expiry of the period, so specified, in Section 29-A (1) and (3) of the Act. 7 2026:HHC:27969 10. The provisions of Section 29-A (4) and (5) have elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited versus Berger Paints India Limited, reported in (2025) 10 Supreme Court Cases 802. Relevant paras-19 to 23 of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under: “19. Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2645, highlights that an interpretation allowing an extension application post the expiry period would encourage rogue litigants and render the timeline for making the award inconsequential. However, it is apposite to note that under Section 29-A(5), the power of the court to extend the time is to be exercised only in cases where there is sufficient cause for such extension. Such extension is not granted mechanically on filing of the application. The judicial discretion of the court in terms of the enactment acts as a deterrent against any party abusing the process of law or espousing a frivolous or vexatious application. Further, the court can impose terms and conditions while granting an extension. Delay, even on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal, is not countenanced {H.P. Singh v. Northern Railways, 2023 SCC OnLine J&K 1255}. The first proviso to Section 29-A(4) permits a fee reduction of up to five per cent for each month of delay attributable to the Arbitral Tribunal. 20. Lastly, Section 29-A(6) does not support the narrow interpretation while deciding an of the expression "terminate". It states that the court extension application under Section 29-A(4) - may substitute one or all the arbitrators. Section 29-A(7) states that if a new arbitrator(s) is appointed, the reconstituted Arbitral Tribunal shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed Arbitral Tribunal. This obliterates the need to file a fresh application 8 2026:HHC:27969 under Section 11 of the A&C Act for the appointment of an arbitrator. In the event of substitution of arbitrator(s), the arbitral proceedings will commence from the stage already reached. Evidence or material already on record is deemed to be received by the newly constituted tribunal. The aforesaid deeming provisions underscore the legislative intent to effectuate efficiency and expediency in the arbitral process. This intent is also demonstrated in Sections 29-A(8) and 29-A(9). The court in terms of Section 29-A(8) has the power to impose actual or exemplary costs upon the parties. Lastly, Section 29-A(9) stipulates that an application for extension under sub-section (5) must be disposed of expeditiously, with the endeavour of doing so within sixty days from the date of filing. 21. As per the second proviso to Section 29-A(4), the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal continues where an application under sub-section (5) is pending. However, an application for extension of period of the Arbitral Tribunal is to be decided by the court in terms of sub-section (5), and sub- sections (6) to (8) may be invoked. The power to extend time period for making of the award vests with the court, and not with the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal may not pronounce the award till an application under d Section 29-A(5) of the A&C Act is sub judice before the court. In a given case, where an award is pronounced during the pendency of an application for extension of period of the Arbitral Tribunal, the court must still decide the application under sub-section (5), and may even, where an award has been pronounced, invoke, when required and justified, sub-sections (6) to (8), or the first and third proviso to Section 29- A(4) of the A&C Act. 22. While interpreting a statute, we must strive to give meaningful life to an enactment or rule and avoid cadaveric consequences that result in unworkable or impracticable scenarios. 26 An interpretation which produces an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is 9 2026:HHC:27969 some other equally possible construction which is acceptable, practical and pragmatic. 23. In view of the above discussion, we hold that an application for extension of the time period for passing an arbitral award under Section 29-A(4) read with Section 29-A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period, as the case may be. The court while adjudicating such extension applications will be guided by the principle of sufficient cause and our observations in para 19 of the judgment.” 11. If, the facts and circumstances of the present case, are seen, in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohan Builders’ case (supra), there is no hesitation for this Court to hold that the award, in the present case, could not be passed, by the learned Arbitrator, on account of the fact that the mandate of the learned Arbitrator has already expired. 12. As per the stand taken by the parties, the proceedings could not be completed, due to the circumstances, which are beyond the ordinary control of the parties. As per the order dated 29.06.2026, passed by the learned Arbitrator, the respondents sought time to file affidavit, in terms of order dated 23.03.2026. Bare reading of order dated 29.06.2026, makes out a case to extend the time to conclude the arbitral proceedings. 10 2026:HHC:27969 13. Consequently, the application is allowed and the learned Arbitrator is directed to culminate the proceedings by or before 31st December, 2026. 14. The application stands disposed of, in above terms. ( Virender Singh ) Judge July 09, 2026( ps )