1 2026:CGHC:1142-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR CRA No. 1291 of 2024 1 - Itwari Ram Yadav S/o. Bodku Ram Yadav Aged About 32 Years R/o. Village- Garda Schoolpara, Police Station- Lohandiguda, District- Bastar (C.G.) 2 - Maniram Podyami S/o. Gulodi Podyami Aged About 38 Years R/o. Village- Garda Kotwarpara, Police Station- Lohandiguda, District- Bastar (C.G.) ... Appellants versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Lohandiguda, District- Bastar (C.G.) ---- Respondent ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellants : Mr. Shivang Dubey, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, GA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 08.01.2026 1. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for both the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. The appellants have filed the instant appeal under Section 374 (2) VASANT KUMAR Digitally signed by VASANT KUMAR Date: 2026.01.12 18:08:35 +0530 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (henceforth ‘the Cr.P.C.') questioning the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.05.2024 passed in Special Sessions Case No.01/2020 by which the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.S.C.) (POCSO Act), District Bastar Place Jagdalpur (C.G.) has convicted and sentenced the appellants as under :- Conviction Sentence In Default of Payment of Fine Under Section 506(b) of the IPC RI for 02 years and fine amount of Rs.500/- Additional RI for 01 month Under Section 363 of the IPC RI for 03 years and fine amount of Rs.1,000/- Additional RI for 02 months Under Section 366(A) of the IPC RI for 05 years and fine amount of Rs.1,000/- Additional RI for 03 months Under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012 RI for 20 years and fine amount of Rs.2,000/- Additional RI for 02 years Under Section 3(2) (V) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Life imprisonment and fine amount of Rs.3,000/- Additional RI for 02 years All the sentences shall run concurrently 3. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 9.08.2019, the applicant's wife and her daughter/victim left home to get their Aadhaar cards made and go shopping in Lohandiguda. The applicant's wife stopped by the Lohandiguda Bank to get her Aadhaar card made. The victim left Lohandiguda saying she would 3 buy vegetables from the Big Dharaur market, but did not return for a long time. The applicant's wife went to the market and searched for the victim, but when she was not found, she returned home and informed the applicant. The two then searched nearby and among relatives, but were unable to find her. The applicant suspected that an unknown person had lured the victim away with the intention of committing an immoral act. 4. Based on the applicant's information, case was registered at Lohandiguda Police Station, Crime No. 59/2019, Section 363 of IPC. A case was registered against an unknown person on August 20, 2019, under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Investigation was commenced. During the investigation, the victim was recovered from Ramajipuram on September 29, 2019. During interrogation, the victim revealed that she had gone with her mother to Usribeda village to get an Aadhaar card made when accused Maniram called her. Without informing her mother, the victim took an auto-rickshaw to Lohandiguda market. Upon arriving, accused Maniram, along with his friend Itwari, took her in an auto-rickshaw to his home in Gadda, where accused Maniram locked her in a room. At around 6:00 pm, accused Maniram returned home alone. That night, accused Maniram forcibly raped her. Accused Maniram had taken her mobile phone, preventing her from calling anyone. Accused Maniram kept her locked in his 4 house for two days and raped her multiple times. Two days later, accused Maniram and Itwari took her by bus to Vijayawada, where accused Maniram forcibly raped her. Two days later, both accused took her to Ramjipuram, where accused Maniram continued to have physical relations with her. When accused Maniram learned that the victim's parents had filed a police report, he left her with accused Itwari and went away. Accused Itwari also forcibly raped her several times. Accused Maniram and Itwari, despite knowing that the victim was a minor tribal girl, forcibly took her with them and raped her against her will. 6. Statements were recorded from the applicant, the victim, and witnesses. The victim underwent medical treatment. A site map of the crime scene was prepared. Property related to the crime was seized and examined. Accused Itwari Ram Yadav was arrested. Offenses under sections 366, 376, 342, 323, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, sections 6 of the POCSO Act, and section 3 (2) (V) of the SC/ST Act were added to the case. 7. Following the completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused (in the absconding of accused Maniram Podyami) before the Court. During the trial, the absconding accused Maniram Podyami was arrested on 05.06.2020 and produced before the Court. 5 8. In order to prove the charges against the appellants, prosecution examined as many as 29 witnesses. Statement of appellants was also recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which they pleaded innocence and false implication. The appellants have not produced any evidence in their defence. 9. After completion of trial, Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants in the manner as described above. Hence, this appeal. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that the appellants have not committed any offence alleged by the prosecution albeit he has been falsely implicated in the present offence. The learned trial court has failed to appreciate that there is omission and contradiction in the statement of prosecution's witness which makes the entire prosecution story unreliable and untrustworthy. The conviction of appellants is purely based on evidence adduced by the police officials during investigation which is highly unreliable. The medical report does not support was presented to prove that victim was sexually assaulted by the Accused. He would further contend that the appellants without any basis have been falsely roped in the present case as the learned trial court has failed to consider that the prosecution could not prove any incident against the appellants. There is no eyewitness or any other evidence to establish that the appellants have committed non-consensual sexual intercourse with victim, 6 constituting rape on the victim. Learned Counsel further contended that there are material contradictions and omissions between case diary statements and Court deposition of prosecution witnesses. Prosecution failed to adduce any cogent and reliable piece of evidence to prove the guilt of appellants. Further, trial Court also failed to appreciate that medical report/evidence placed on record does not support the case of prosecution. Without there being any sufficient, cogent and clinching evidence/material available on record, the alleged offences of the IPC and the POCSO Act are not made out against the appellants, hence, they are entitled for acquittal. 11.On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants and submits that prosecutrix was minor on the date of alleged incident, which is proved by Dakhil Kharij Register (Annexure P-33-C) in which date of birth of prosecutrix is mentioned as 04.08.2004. Dakhil Kharij Register is an admissible piece of evidence to determine age of prosecutrix, therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the finding of learned trial Court and the impugned judgment of the Court below needs no interference. 12.Learned State counsel would submit that notice has been served upon father of the prosecutrix (PW-3) on 28.08.2025, but no one 7 appeared on behalf of the prosecutrix before this Court or through the concerned DLSA. 13.We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the record. 14. In order to consider the age of prosecutrix, we have to examine the evidence/material placed on record by the prosecution. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the Dakhil Kharij Register (Annexure P/33-C), wherein date of birth of prosecutrix is mentioned as 04.08.2004. Prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated in her cross-examination (Para-14) that she was 15 years of age at the time of incident. 15. Mother of prosecutrix (PW-2) in her cross-examination (Para-9) stated that she has stating the date of birth of the prosecutrix on the presumption basis that the prosecutrix was 15 years of age at the time of incident. She further stated that when the prosecutrix was born, she reported her birth to the Kotwar. Father of the prosecutrix (PW-3) also corroborated the same fact. 16. Assistant Teacher (PW-13) has stated in her examination-in-chief that on 14/10/2019, the police of Lohandiguda police station seized the school register related to the victim from her. The victim's date of birth is mentioned as 04.08.2004 in the original mutation register at serial No. 4 which is marked as Exhibit P-33, 8 and the attested copy attached to the case is marked as Exhibit P- 33 'C'. The certificate regarding the victim, in which her date of birth is mentioned as 04.08.2004. 17. In her cross-examination, this witness has stated that when she registered the name of the prosecutrix, she did not ask for any documents regarding her birth. This witness further stated that she receive the information through the Anganwadi. She further stated that there is no such column in admission/discharge register in which it is mentioned on the basis of which document the date of birth of the student has been recorded in the register. 18. There is no any documentary evidence available on record that on what basis date of birth of prosecutrix 04.08.2004 is marked and also no Kotwari registered has been produced regarding date of birth of prosecutrix. Even the ossification test of the prosecutrix has not been done. Prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the prosecutrix that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. In absence of examination of author of the School Admission and Discharge Register, the same cannot be taken into consideration to determine the age of the prosecutrix School. Admission and Discharge Register is a weak type of evidence. There is no any Kotwari Register or Ossification report, produced 9 by the prosecution to determine her actual age on the date of incident, that she was below 18 years of age. 19. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for presumption and determination of age. The same reads as under : “94. Presumption and determination of age.— (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the 10 matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person. 20. From perusal of statements of prosecutrix (PW-1), her mother (PW-2) and her father (PW-3), it appears that there is no any cogent and clinching evidence led by the prosecution to hold that on the date of incident, the prosecutrix was minor and below 18 years of age. 11 21. In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC-385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by Government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 22. In paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document 12 would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person,who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.- 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for 13 the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public 14 document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if 15 on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 23. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub- section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 16 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 17 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the courtshould lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a 18 person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 24. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution 19 could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of 20 birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available 21 that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2) (i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 25. Now, reverting to the facts of the present case and after considering the evidence collected by the prosecution and in the light of the aforesaid judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, we find that no clinching and legally admissible evidence has been brought by the prosecution to prove the fact that the prosecutrix/victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, despite the fact that the trial Court in the impugned judgment has held the prosecutrix minor. Accordingly, we set aside the findings given by the trial Court that on the date of incident, the victim was minor as the same has not been proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and clinching evidence. 26. In order to consider whether the appellants are the author of the crime, we have to examine the evidence/material placed on record by the prosecution. 22 27. Prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated in her examination-in-chief that on the date of incident, she had gone to Usriveda with her mother to get her Aadhaar card made. Maniram called her and invited her to Lohandiguda market to pay the money he had demanded. From Lohandiguda market, Maniram and Itwari Ram took her on foot to Taragaon. After that, Maniram and Itwari Ram took her in an auto to Gadhada village. In Gadhada village, Maniram took her to his house and locked her in a room for two days. There, Maniram forcibly raped her against her will. On the third day, Maniram and Itwari Ram took her from Gadhada village to Jagdalpur, saying, "Come, we will take you to our village." Then, while taking her on a bus from Jagdalpur to Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, they took her to Naraspeta, where Maniram raped her against her will. After this, they put her on a bus and took her to the Ramjipuram quarry factory, where Maniram and Itwari beaten her and threatened to kill her. Maniram stayed with her at the Ramjipuram quarry factory for a week, then left her and went away. She further stated that after Maniram left, the accused Itwari Ram Yadav, who was also raped her against her will. Police then came to the Ramjipuram mine factory in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. Her father also accompanied the police and took her to house. 28. Close scrutiny of the evidence led by the prosecution would make it clear that the prosecutrix has nowhere disclosed that at any 23 point of time, the appellants have committed rape, therefore, it appears that it is a case of elopement. 29. The version of the prosecutrix commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the Court on the veracity of the victim’s evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellants beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 30. Dr. Manisha Goyal (PW-19) who examined the prosecutrix has stated in her statement that on 02/10/2019, when the victim was brought before her for genital examination. She examined her. In the examination, she found the following:- i- She was unmarried, her menstruation was regular. ii-No injury marks were found on his physical examination. 24 iii- No injury marks were found on examination of the genitals. iv- Bleeding or discharge was not present. She opined that no signs of spontaneous intercourse were found during the examination. An X-ray was recommended to determine the age. Report given by her is Ex.P.-36. 31. The FSL report as well as MLC report does not support the case of the prosecution as human sperm was found on the vaginal slides. 32. Thus, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case particularly the evidence with regard to the age and conduct of the prosecutrix, her evidence, absence of any injury over her body, we are of the opinion that the age of the prosecutrix is not verified and it is a case of elopement, therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, offence under Sections 506(B), 363, 366(A) of IPC, Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(V) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act would not be made out against the appellants. 33. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.05.2024 is hereby set aside. Appellants stands acquitted of all the charges levelled against 25 them. 34. The appellants are reported to be in jail. They be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 35. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC, the appellants are directed to furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- each with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 36. The trial Court record (TCR) along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Vasant