- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ WRIT PETITION NO. 101601 OF 2025 (LB-RES) C/W WRIT PETITION NO. 105810 OF 2025 (LB-ELE) IN W.P.NO.101601/2025 BETWEEN 1. SMT USHA MAHESH DASAR W/O MAHESH DASAR , AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS, R/A SIDDARAMESHWAR NAGAR, NEAR HUBAR PLOT GADAG-582101 2. SRI ANIL M ABBIGERE S/O MALLAPPA AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, OCC. R/A 1728 /5, OLD SARAF BAZAAR, GADAG-562101 3. SRI GULAPPA S MUSHIGERI S/O HANAMANTHAPPA MUSHIGIRI AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/A NO. 250/9, VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, NEAR HANUMAN TEMPLE, BETAGERI GADAG-582101 ...PETITIONERS (BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA SR. ADVOCATE FOR SRI. B.R. SRIVATSA., ADVOCATE FOR ® Digitally signed by SHWETHA RAGHAVENDRA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 SRI. MRUTYUNJAYA S. HALLIKERI., ADVOCATE) AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001 REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY 2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GADAG DISTRICT DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, GADAG-582101 3. THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER BELAGAVI DIVISION BELAGAVI-590002. 4. THE COMMISSIONER CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCILGADAG- BETAGERI STATION ROAD, GANDHI CIRCLE, GADAG-582102 5. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER GADAG CUM ELECTION OFFICER, GADAG -BETAGERI CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL GADAG-582102 …. RESPONDENTS 6. KRISHNA S/O PARASAPPA PARAPUR AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE R/O NO. 3982/1, PLOT NO.100,101, D.C.MILL ROAD, TALGAERI ONI, GADAG-582101 - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 … IMPLEADING RESPONDENT (BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY., A.G. A/W SRI. GANDADHAR. J.M., AAG FOR R1 TO R3 & R5; SRI. HARISH DESAI., ADVOCATE FOR R4; SRI. K.L. PATIL & SRI. S.S. BETUMATH., ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING FOR R6) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.02.2025 BEARING NO.PRA.AA.BE:K.M.C/53/2024-25-E.NO:262750 PASSED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT-REGIONAL COMMISSIONER (PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC. IN W.P.NO.105810/2025 BETWEEN 1. CHANDRASHEKHAR S/O BASAVARAJ TADSAD AGE 52 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O BASAVESHWAR NAGAR, GADAG 2. VINAYAK S/O SHIVAPPA MANVI AGE 65 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O VEERANARAYAN TEMPLE ROAD, GADAG 3. PRAKASH ANGADI AGE 53 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O SHIDDARAMESHWAR NAGAR, GADAG 4. RAGHAVENDRA YELAVATI AGE 38 YEARS, OCC. MEMBER R/O KANAGINAHAL ROAD, BETAGERI ...PETITIONERS (BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA SR. ADVOCATE FOR SRI. MRUTYUNJAYA S. HALLIKERI., ADVOCATE) AND 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPT. OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 GADAG-582101. 2. THE UNDER SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. DEPT. OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE-560008 3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GADAG DIST. GADAG-582101 4. THE MUNCIPAL COUNCIL OF GADAG-BETAGERI DIST. GADAG BY ITS COMMISSIONER …. RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. K. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY., A.G. A/W SRI. GANDADHAR. J.M., AAG FOR R1 TO R3; SRI. HARISH DESAI., ADVOCATE FOR R4) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING ISSUE A WRIT / ORDER / DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI BY QUASHING THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION BEARING NO. NA A E 48 MLR 2023 DATED 29.07.2024 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 VIDE ANNEXURE-D., IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC. THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 14.10.2025, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 CAV ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) 1. The Petitioners in WP No.101601/2025 are before this court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 27.02.2025 bearing No. Pra.Aa.Be:K.M.C/53/2024-25/E.No:262750 passed by the R3-Regional Commissioner (produced as Annexure-A) and/or b) Issue such other writ, orders or directions as deemed fit in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity. 2. The Petitioners in WP No.105810/2025 are before this court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a writ / order / direction in the nature of certiorari by quashing the impugned notification bearing no. Na A E 48 MLR 2023 dated 29.07.2024 passed by the respondent no.2 vide Annexure-D., in the interest of justice and equity. b) Pass such other order, orders that this Hon’ble court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity. FACTS IN W.P. No.105810/2025: - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 3. The petitioners in W.P. No.105810/2025 are before this Court challenging the legality of the appointment of an administrator to the City Municipal Council, Gadag-Betageri. 4. It is their case that the election to the posts of President and Vice-President of the CMC was duly conducted on 24.01.2022. Pursuant thereto, the successful candidates assumed office, and their tenure commenced on the said date. In terms of the governing statutory framework, the tenure was to continue for a fixed duration and, accordingly, it came to an end on 24.07.2024. 5. The petitioners state that the 10th term of the President and Vice-President was declared on 05.08.2024. In order to facilitate continuation of the democratic process for the remaining tenure, the Assistant Commissioner was appointed as the Election Officer to conduct elections to the posts of President - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 and Vice-President. However, despite such appointment, no election was held. 6. While matters stood thus, the Under Secretary to the Government, Urban Development Department (Respondent No.2), by notification dated 29.07.2024, purportedly exercising powers under Sections 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, appointed the Deputy Commissioner of Gadag District as Administrator of the CMC. The petitioners contend that this step effectively displaced the elected governance structure and vested the administration of the municipal body in a bureaucratic authority. 7. The challenge in the present writ petition is directed against the said notification appointing the Administrator. According to the petitioners, the statutory conditions precedent for invoking such extraordinary powers were not satisfied. It is urged that there was neither dissolution nor valid supersession of the municipal body in accordance with - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 law, nor were the mandatory procedural safeguards complied with. 8. Insofar as W.P. No.10581/2025 is concerned, learned Senior Counsel Sri K.N. Panindra submits that the exercise of power under Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act is impermissible in the absence of fulfillment of the statutory pre-conditions contemplated therein. He would contend that the impugned action is without jurisdiction, arbitrary in nature, and violative of the democratic scheme envisaged under the Act. On this premise, it is submitted that the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the notification appointing the Administrator be set aside. Facts in WP No.101601/2025. 9. The facts in the present matter are more or less identical to those in W.P. No.105810/2025. The petitioners are elected councillors of the Gadag- Betageri City Municipal Council. They were elected in - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 the general elections held in December 2021 from Ward Nos. 35, 28 and 13 respectively. The term of office of a councillor is five years and their term is still continuing. It will expire only in December 2026. 10. The election to the posts of President and Vice- President was held on 24.01.2022. Petitioner No.1 was elected as President for a period of two and a half years. Her term came to an end on 27.07.2024. 11. When Petitioner No.1 was serving as President, a resolution dated 09.02.2024, bearing No.378, was said to have been passed in respect of the extension of lease of Wakharsal properties. The Commissioner of the CMC later alleged that the said resolution was fabricated and that the signature appearing on it was not his. On this allegation, he filed a complaint with the jurisdictional police. Based on the complaint, an FIR was registered on 14.08.2024 against several persons, including the petitioners. After the - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 investigation, a charge sheet was filed in the said case. 12. Thereafter, on 24.01.2025, Respondent No.4, the Commissioner of the CMC, sent a communication to Respondent No.2, the Deputy Commissioner, requesting that action be taken against the petitioners for the alleged fabrication. 13. Respondent No.2, upon receiving the proposal, forwarded the same to Respondent No.3, the Regional Commissioner, Belagavi District, on 28.01.2025, since the power to take action had been delegated to the Regional Commissioner by notification dated 19.01.2015. Respondent No.3 issued a show cause notice dated 31.01.2025 calling upon the petitioners to submit their explanation within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. 14. The petitioners state that though the notice is dated 31.01.2025, it was served on them only on - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 06.02.2025 and therefore they did not get sufficient time to submit their reply. 15. Thereafter, on 07.02.2025, Respondent No.3 issued another communication directing the petitioners to appear personally before him on 13.02.2025 at 11.00 a.m. along with relevant documents. This communication is said to have been served on them on 11.02.2025. The petitioners appeared before the Regional Commissioner on 13.02.2025 and sought three weeks’ time to submit a detailed reply. However, without granting such time or conducting a detailed enquiry, Respondent No.3 passed an order on the same day i.e., 13.02.2025 removing the petitioners from the post of councillors under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 41 of the Act. 16. The said order dated 13.02.2025 was challenged before this Court in W.P. No.101414/2025. By order dated 24.02.2025, this Court partly allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of removal and granted - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 liberty to the petitioners to submit their reply on or before 27.02.2025 by 3.00 p.m. 17. It is further stated that in the meanwhile, on 22.02.2025, the election to the posts of President and Vice-President was declared and scheduled to be held on 28.02.2025. Though Respondent No.5, the Election Officer, had been appointed earlier in July 2024, elections had not been conducted at that time. A notification declaring the election was issued on 20.02.2025. 18. Insofar as the order in W.P. No.101414/2025 is concerned, the petitioners filed a writ appeal in W.A. No.100124/2025 seeking a direction to the Regional Commissioner to conduct a full enquiry under sub- section (1) of Section 41 of the Act by following the principles of natural justice and by examining witnesses if necessary. 19. The Hon’ble Division Bench observed that the appellants are at liberty to bring to the notice of the - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Regional Commissioner the binding decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad while conducting the enquiry. The petitioners state that they brought the said observation to the notice of Respondent No.3 on 27.02.2025 and requested that a proper enquiry be conducted. 20. However, on the very same day i.e., 27.02.2025, Respondent No.3 passed another order removing the petitioners from the post of councillors under sub- sections (1) and (2) of Section 41 of the Act without conducting the detailed enquiry as requested. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners have approached this Court challenging the order dated 27.02.2025. 21. The submission of Shri K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, is as follows: - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 21.1. The impugned order passed by Respondent No.3 – Regional Commissioner has been passed in great haste. The replies submitted by the petitioners have not been properly considered. No proper enquiry has been conducted. Therefore, the order is arbitrary, illegal and not sustainable in law. 21.2. The reply filed by the petitioners has not been examined in a meaningful manner. The guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad [(2012) 4 SCC 407] have not been followed. Respondent No.3 has acted in violation of the principles stated by the Apex Court. 21.3. The observation made by the Hon’ble Division Bench in W.A. No.100124/2025 has not been followed. Without conducting a proper enquiry, the order has been passed. The action of - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Respondent No.3 is stated to be mala fide and a colourable exercise of power. 21.4. Learned Senior Counsel submits that no councillor can be removed without giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing and without conducting a full enquiry. In the present case, neither reasonable opportunity has been granted nor a detailed enquiry conducted. All councillors ought to have been called and their statements recorded regarding the authenticity of the resolution. Only thereafter could the allegations have been considered. 21.5. Action has been taken merely on the basis of a complaint filed by the Commissioner stating that the signature is not his. The resolution was passed by the entire Council. Therefore, all members should have been examined before taking action. - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 21.6. The resolution was passed by the Council in accordance with the law. The dispute regarding the lease of Wakharsal properties had been pending for a long time. The Council thought it appropriate to resolve the issue by extending the lease. It is further submitted that a writ appeal relating to Wakharsal properties was pending before another Division Bench and upon submission of the resolution, the said writ appeal was withdrawn. 21.7. It is contended that the Regional Commissioner did not give adequate opportunity to the petitioners to explain these aspects. If sufficient time had been granted, all these facts would have been placed before him. 21.8. The resolution was passed keeping in mind the financial interest of the Municipality. The majority of councillors had decided to extend the lease of the Wakharsal properties to the existing - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 tenants for five more years with revised rent based on market conditions. According to the petitioners, the CMC would have benefited from the revised rental income. 21.9. Possession certificates were issued to the tenants pursuant to the resolution, which shows that the action was that of the Council as a whole and not only of the petitioners. It is alleged that the complaint was filed by the Commissioner under political pressure. It is contended that the Commissioner had in fact signed the resolution and the signature will be proved during trial. The criminal proceedings are stated to be an abuse of process of law. 21.10. The allegation of forgery made by the Commissioner is self-serving and has not yet been proved in a criminal court. Until such adjudication, the petitioners cannot be treated as - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 guilty. Therefore, Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 cannot be invoked. 21.11. It is contended that mere registration of an FIR and filing of a charge sheet does not amount to proof of guilt. At present, the petitioners are only accused and not convicted. Until the trial is completed, they are presumed innocent. The allegations do not amount to misconduct warranting removal under Section 41 21.12. The order violates the principles of natural justice. By removing three elected representatives, the democratic functioning of local self-government has been affected. 21.13. The elected representatives cannot be removed by executive action in a casual manner, as it goes against the will of the people who elected them. The procedure adopted by Respondent No.3 is stated to be a mere formality. No specific charges were framed. No charge memo was - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 issued. No detailed enquiry or cross-examination of witnesses was conducted. 21.14. Respondent No.3, while acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, has not complied with the requirements of passing a reasoned quasi-judicial order. The petitioners were not given proper opportunity to present their case. The authority has not acted fairly, reasonably or impartially. Removal of an elected representative requires a clear and established case, which is absent here. 21.15. An elected representative is entitled to hold office for the full term unless removed in accordance with law. Removal affects not only the individual member but also the people represented by him. This aspect has not been properly considered. 21.16. The order suffers from mala fides. The objections were filed on 27.02.2025 at 3.00 p.m., and the impugned order was passed at 6.30 p.m. on the - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 same day. This shows undue haste, especially when the election was scheduled on 28.02.2025. 21.17. Removal of the petitioners reduced the total strength of the Council, which benefits the ruling party. Therefore, the order is alleged to have been passed to favour the ruling party. 21.18. Under Section 41(1), there must be proved misconduct before removal. In the present case, there is only a complaint and a charge sheet. There is no finding of guilt. Removal under Section 41 also results in disqualification under Section 16(1)(c) and (f) of the Act. A person removed under Section 41 is disqualified not only for the present term but also from contesting elections for four years from the date of removal. 21.19. The next election to the CMC is scheduled in January 2027. If the impugned order is allowed to stand, the petitioners will not be able to - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 contest the said election. This will cause grave and irreparable injury to them. 21.20. He relies on the decision in Laxmibai v. Collector [(2020)12 SCC 186], more particularly paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 & 22 which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the disqualification is disproportionate to the default committed by the appellant. In a judgment reported as D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan [D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, (1976) 2 SCC 455] , it was held that the election is a politically sacred public act, not of one person or of one official, but of the collective will of the whole constituency. The challenge in the said appeal was to an election on the allegation of corrupt practices. This Court held that the valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect and should not be disregarded on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations. The onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside an election. The election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes. At the same time, it is necessary to protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by ensuring that the candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence, fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act. - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 14. The Court held as under: (D. Venkata Reddy case [D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, (1976) 2 SCC 455] , SCC pp. 459-60, para 3) “3. Mr P. Bassi Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed before us the findings of the High Court on Issues 7, 26 and 27 as these were the only issues which affected the appellant. Mr B. Shiv Sankar, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has endeavoured to support the judgment of the High Court by submitting that the findings arrived at by the High Court were based on a correct and proper appreciation of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the record. In a democracy such as ours, the purity and sanctity of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the electoral process must be preserved and maintained. The valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect and candour and should not be disregarded or set at naught on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations or on evidence which is of a shaky or prevaricating character. It is well settled that the onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside an election. In our country election is a fairly costly and expensive venture and the Representation of the People Act has provided sufficient safeguards to make the elections fair and free. In these circumstances, therefore, election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes. At the same time it is necessary to protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by ensuring that the candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence, fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act.” 15. This Court in a judgment reported as State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh [State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080] - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 held that the issue of removal of an elected office- bearer has serious repercussion. It implicitly makes it imperative and obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the statutory provisions. It was held that severer the punishment, greater care has to be taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously followed. 16. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab, (2001) 6 SCC 260] , this Court has held that holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the returned candidate but also his constituency or electoral college. Therefore, the procedure prescribed must be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there cannot be any justification for his removal. 17. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector [Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407] , this Court held that an elected official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously without following the procedure prescribed by law. Where the statutory provision has very serious repercussions, it implicitly makes it imperative and obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the statutory provisions. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 428-29, paras 35-37) “35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 691] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly [Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly, (1992) 4 SCC 80] and Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari, (1998) 1 SCC 680] ). 36. 36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice. 37. A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term for which he has been elected and he can be removed only on a proved misconduct or any other procedure established under law like “no confidence motion”, etc. The elected official is accountable to its electorate as he has been elected by a large number of voters and it would have serious repercussions when he is removed from the office and further declared disqualified to contest the election for a further stipulated period.” 18. The judgments relate to the procedure to be followed in election petition and proof of allegation but such principles are to be followed in the case of inflicting punishment of disqualification, which has far serious implication almost similar to indulging in corrupt practices in an election. The purity and transparency in election process does not give unbridled and arbitrary power to the Election - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Commission to pass any whimsical order without examining the nature of default. The extent of period of disqualification has to be in proportion to the default. The Election Commission has to keep in mind that by such process, an election of duly elected candidate representing collective will of the voters of the constituency is being set at naught. 19. In a judgment reported as Krishna District Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Hanumantha Rao [Krishna District Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Hanumantha Rao, (2017) 2 SCC 528 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 462] , this Court held that the limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a concept of judicial review. If the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience, the court would interfere. The relevant extract reads as under: (SCC pp. 531-33, para 7) “7.2. Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the court, that the court steps in and interferes. 7.2.1. No doubt, the award of punishment, which is grossly in excess to the allegations, cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope for judicial review. This limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The punishment should appear to be so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience. (See State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad [State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad, (2014) 7 SCC 223 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 386] .) It would also be apt to extract the following observations in this behalf from the judgment of this Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain [Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain, (2013) 10 SCC 106 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 833] : (SCC pp. 110-12, paras 8 & 10) ‘8. The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. [See State (UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli) v. Gulabhia M. Lad [State (UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli) v. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5 SCC 775 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101] .] In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 *** 10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1] . Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that “all powers have legal limits” invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25) “25. … The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.”’” Civil appeals arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 20814-816 of 2019 and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) … Diary No. 40018 of 2019 22. Delay condoned. Leave granted. 21.21. By relying on Laxmibai it is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that an election is a sacred public act reflecting the collective will - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of the constituency. The verdict of the people must be given due respect and cannot be lightly set aside on vague or weak allegations. The burden lies heavily on the person challenging an elected representative to make out a strong case. 21.22. In a democracy, the purity and sanctity of elections must be preserved. At the same time, election results cannot be lightly brushed aside. The will of the voters must be respected unless serious and proven grounds exist. 21.23. Removal of an elected office-bearer has serious consequences. Therefore, the authority must strictly follow the statutory provisions. The more severe the punishment, the greater the care required in following the safeguards provided by law. 21.24. Holding an elected office is a valuable statutory right not only of the elected candidate but also of - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 the constituency. Therefore, the prescribed procedure must be strictly followed and removal can be justified only if a clear case is made out. 21.25. An elected representative cannot be removed without strictly following the procedure established by law. Removal has serious consequences not only for the elected person but also for the voters who elected him, removal is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, after conducting a proper enquiry and following the principles of natural justice. An elected representative is entitled to hold office for the full term unless there is proved misconduct or removal in accordance with law. 21.26. Principles relating to election disputes and disqualification must be applied carefully, as disqualification has serious consequences. The authority does not have unbridled or arbitrary - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 power. The period and nature of disqualification must be proportionate to the default committed. 21.27. By applying the doctrine of proportionality, it is submitted that though courts do not normally interfere with the punishment imposed by an authority. However, if the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court, interference is permissible. The punishment must not be irrational, excessive or vindictive. 21.28. On the basis of the above judgment, learned Senior Counsel submits that the removal of an elected councillor is a serious matter. It affects not only the individual but also the electorate. Therefore, strict compliance with statutory procedure, adherence to principles of natural justice and proof of misconduct are mandatory. In the absence of such compliance, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 21.29. He relies on the decision of the Apex court in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [(2010)2 SCC 398] more particularly para 10, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 10. Before considering the merits of the claim of both the parties, it is useful to refer to Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as under: “227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 21.30. By relying on P. Vijayan it is submitted that scope of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Procedure, 1973, deals with discharge of an accused. The provision states that if, upon consideration of the record and the documents, and after hearing both sides, the Judge finds that there is no sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, he shall discharge the accused by recording reasons. 21.31. If two views are possible and one view gives rise only to suspicion, as opposed to grave suspicion, the trial court is empowered to discharge the accused. At that stage, the court is not required to examine whether the trial will ultimately end in conviction or acquittal. 21.32. The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” show that the Court is not expected to act mechanically at the request of the prosecution. The Court must apply its judicial mind to the material on record and decide whether a case for trial has been made out. - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 However, at that stage, the court is not required to conduct a detailed examination of evidence or to weigh the probabilities. A detailed appreciation of evidence is required only after the trial begins. 21.33. Relying on the above principles, learned Senior Counsel submits that in the present case there is only an allegation and a charge sheet. There is no finding of guilt. Even in criminal law, mere suspicion is not enough to proceed. Therefore, in the absence of any proved misconduct, the drastic action of removal under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is not justified. 21.34. He relies on the decision of the Apex Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir-v-District Collector, Raigad and others (supra), more particularly para 30 to 36, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158] .] This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected office-bearer. 31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self- government has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office-bearer can be removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry. 32. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely different context as compared to the government employees, for the reason, that for the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard of proof is required. 33. This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removal of the President of the Municipal Council on similar grounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and observed that removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious matter. The elected office-bearer must not be removed unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 is a valuable statutory right of not only the elected member but also of his constituency or electoral college. His removal may curtail the term of the office-bearer and also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there can be no justification for his removal. While taking the decision, the authority should not be guided by any other extraneous consideration or should not come under any political pressure. 34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed. 35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC 80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC 1222] ). 36. 36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice. 21.35. By relying on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir it is submitted that the removal of a duly elected member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding. Therefore, the authority must strictly follow the principles of natural justice. Even if the statute does not expressly provide for such procedure, a fair opportunity of defence must be given to the elected representative. 21.36. An elected representative in local self- government stands on a higher footing than a government servant. If even a temporary government servant cannot be removed without a full enquiry, then an elected office-bearer - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 cannot be removed without conducting a full- fledged enquiry. 21.37. In service law, major punishments like removal require a full enquiry. In the case of elected representatives, an even stricter procedure and higher standard of proof are required before removal. 21.38. Removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious matter. It affects not only the individual but also the constituency. The procedure prescribed by statute must be strictly followed. The authority must not act under political pressure or extraneous considerations. 21.39. In a democracy, an elected representative is entitled to hold office for the full term unless removed by following the procedure established by law. The order of removal must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 and the explanation given by the elected representative. 21.40. Removal has serious consequences. It not only removes the person from office but may also disqualify him from contesting future elections. It also deprives the voters of their chosen representative. Though the right to hold office is statutory, removal must strictly follow the procedure prescribed by law. 21.41. An elected member can be removed only in exceptional circumstances. There must be strict compliance with the statutory provisions. A proper enquiry must be conducted. The principles of natural justice must be followed. The elected member must be given a real opportunity to defend himself. 21.42. Relying on these principles, learned Senior Counsel submits that in the present case no full enquiry has been conducted, no proper - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 opportunity has been given, and the impugned order does not reflect proper application of mind. Therefore, the removal of the petitioners is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and as such the above petition is required to be allowed and reliefs sought for granted. 22. Shri Shashi Kiran Shetty, learned Advocate General Appearing for the State - Respondents 1 to 3 submits as follows: 22.1. It is strongly contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners, who are elected Councillors of Respondent No.4 – Municipality, have indulged in a serious and deliberate act of fraud by creating and using a forged resolution. It is submitted that the said resolution was not at all passed let alone lawfully passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder. The resolution was fabricated with the intention of conferring unlawful benefit upon certain private individuals who have been in unauthorised occupation of valuable municipal property for several decades. 22.2. Litigation concerning the said property has been pending for a long period and that this Court has, on earlier occasions, passed specific orders directing eviction of the unauthorised occupants. In spite of such judicial orders, and with full knowledge of the same, the petitioners have created the impugned resolution in order to defeat and overcome the effect of those orders. 22.3. It is contended that by virtue of the fabricated resolution, valuable public property belonging to the Municipality has been effectively transferred or continued in favour of persons who have no lawful right, title or interest over the same. The - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 property in question is a prime municipal asset and that its lease or renewal directly affects public revenue. By extending the lease in favour of unauthorised occupants, the petitioners have caused serious financial loss to the Municipality and thereby acted against public interest. 22.4. The said occupants had already been directed to be evicted by competent judicial orders, and therefore, the act of passing such a resolution amounts not merely to administrative irregularity but to wilful misconduct. Such conduct strikes at the very root of responsible governance and constitutes gross misconduct in the discharge of official duties. 22.5. On the basis of the above allegations, it is submitted that the conduct of the petitioners is disgraceful and unbecoming of elected representatives. It is argued that Councillors, being trustees of public property, are expected to - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 act in the interest of the Municipality and its residents. Instead, the petitioners have acted to protect private interests at the cost of public property. 22.6. It is therefore contended that in view of the seriousness of the allegations and the material collected, proceedings under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 were rightly initiated. The competent authority, namely the Regional Commissioner, Belagavi, after considering the complaint, the records and the explanation offered, has passed the order of removal. The respondents submit that the order has been passed in accordance with law and that this Court ought not to interfere with the same in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 22.7. It is also submitted that this Court, in W.P. No.112012/2019, by order dated 12.08.2022, had categorically held that the unauthorised - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 occupants of the cotton market property were not entitled to continue in possession. By the said order, the longstanding dispute between the Municipality and the unauthorised occupants was adjudicated and directions were issued for eviction. The resolution was passed in direct contravention of the said judicial orders. The petitioners, being fully aware of the earlier order of this Court, could not have lawfully taken a decision that effectively nullified or diluted the effect of the judicial directions. Therefore, the action of the Regional Commissioner in removing the petitioners is justified in order to protect the sanctity of judicial orders and safeguard municipal property. 22.8. On these grounds, it is submitted that the writ petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed. - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 22.9. He relies on Para 25 and 26 of the order passed in W.P. No.112012/2019, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 25. Before parting with this petition, this Court deems it necessary to remind our citizens that public property should be respected and should not be allowed to be misused or wasted. Time and again the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the natural resources, which also include lands, along with the public properties are held by the State as a trustee. This doctrine of trust and the trusteeship vested in the State needs to be respected. It is high time that the citizens of the State understood the value of public property, that public property belongs to each one of us and the citizens should ensure that public properties are put to best use and they would fetch the best price which would ultimately go into the coffers of the State. Public property shall not become the fiefdom of a few. 26. It is required to notice that although the order of eviction was passed on 03.03.2004 and the District Court dismissed the appeals on 19.12.2005 and this Court disposed of W.P.No.474/2006 on 11.03.2013 and the State Government communicated its decision to the Secretary of the Association of the occupants on 07.09.2013, the petitioners have continued to squat on public property. Further, although the petitioners were evicted on 13th and 14th of July 2019, they have moved this Court and obtained an order of status-quo at the hands of this Court. The petitioners are responsible for stalling the respondent-CMC from proceedings to put up new construction which would have enured to the benefit of general public. Even the petitioners would have benefited, had they allowed the new construction to come up on the premises. In the name of ‘rent’, the petitioners have paid pittance to the CMC from 01.07.1982 to June 2019. For nearly 37 years they have been paying rents at Rs.3,500/- per year! In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case for - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 imposing exemplary costs on the petitioners while dismissing the writ petitions. Nevertheless, this Court would desist from imposing costs, with a fond hope that the petitioners would give up the dispute and allow the respondent-CMC to put up a new construction on the premises. 22.10. By relying on paragraph 25, it is submitted that this Court made important observations regarding the nature of public property, public property must be respected and cannot be misused for private benefit. It was clearly observed that natural resources and public lands are held by the State in trust for the benefit of the people. The State and its instrumentalities act as trustees, and such trusteeship carries a duty to protect, preserve and ensure proper utilisation of public assets. 22.11. This Court further observed that public property must fetch the best possible value and cannot become the private estate of a few individuals. These observations were not casual remarks but - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 were made after considering the long history of the dispute and the manner in which public property had been retained by private occupants for decades. 22.12. By referring to paragraph 26 it is submitted that this Court traced the entire litigation history relating to the cotton market property. An eviction order had been passed as early as 03.03.2004. The appeals filed before the District Court were dismissed on 19.12.2005. The writ petition in W.P. No.474/2006 was disposed of on 11.03.2013. The State Government had also communicated its decision to the occupants on 07.09.2013. Despite these judicial and administrative orders, the occupants continued in possession of the public property. 22.13. This court also noticed that even after eviction proceedings were executed in July 2019, the occupants once again approached this Court and - 47 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 obtained an interim order of status quo. This Court has recorded that for nearly 37 years, the occupants had paid only Rs.3,500/- per year as rent, which was grossly disproportionate to the value of the property. This Court expressed clear disapproval of such prolonged occupation and misuse of municipal property and dismissed the writ petition, though it refrained from imposing exemplary costs. 22.14. On the strength of the above findings, it is submitted that the issue regarding the right of the tenants to remain in possession had already been conclusively adjudicated. The eviction order dated 03.03.2004, confirmed in appeal and followed by subsequent proceedings, had attained finality. The writ petition in W.P. No.112012/2019 was also dismissed with strong observations. Therefore, there remained no legal basis for the occupants to claim - 48 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 continuation of their lease or renewal of tenancy rights. 22.15. It is contended that any action taken by the Councillors in favour of such occupants, particularly by way of extension of lease, would directly contradict the judicial findings recorded by this Court. Such action would not only disregard binding orders but would also undermine the authority of judicial decisions. 22.16. It is further submitted that the coordinate Bench of this Court had clearly observed that the occupants had been paying only a nominal amount as rent for decades and that public property cannot be allowed to become the fiefdom of a few. Despite such categorical findings, the petitioner-councillors claim to have passed a resolution granting further rights to the same occupants for an additional period. This act amounts to deliberate disregard of - 49 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 judicial pronouncements and is contrary to public interest. The Councillors, being custodians of municipal property, were duty-bound to protect public assets and ensure lawful use of such property. Instead, they have acted in a manner that benefits private parties at the cost of the Municipality. 22.17. Learned Advocate General submits that such conduct, has resulted in substantial financial loss to the Municipality and defeats the purpose of redevelopment and public utilisation of the property. It also sends a wrong message that judicial orders can be diluted or nullified through internal resolutions. Therefore, Learned Advocate General submits that the removal of the petitioners was necessary to protect public property, uphold the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of municipal administration. - 50 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 22.18. It is emphatically contended that Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024, on which the entire defence of the petitioners rests, is not a genuine municipal record but a fabricated document. According to the respondents, the official resolution register maintained by the Municipality does not contain any resolution on 09.02.2024 relating to extension of lease of the Wakharsal properties. On the contrary, Resolution No.378, as reflected in the official books, was passed only on 19.07.2024 and pertains to matters relating to a State Financial Corporation grant under the 15th Finance Commission scheme and a connected tender process. 22.19. The municipal records are statutory records maintained in the regular course of official business and carry a presumption of correctness. The absence of the alleged lease - 51 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 resolution in such records, coupled with the existence of a different Resolution No.378 on another subject and date, clearly demonstrates that the document relied upon by the petitioners does not form part of the lawful proceedings of the Council. It is further submitted that the document bears a signature purportedly of the Commissioner, which he has categorically denied. In these circumstances, the only reasonable inference, according to the respondents, is that the document is fabricated. 22.20. The falsity of the document is apparent on the face of the record. The petitioners have not disowned the resolution. Instead, they have justified and defended it as validly passed. By asserting the validity of a document that does not find place in the official municipal records, they have, according to the respondents, confirmed their involvement in the act - 52 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 complained of. It is contended that fraud vitiates all actions and transactions. A document founded on fraud cannot create any legal right, nor can it be protected under the plea of procedural irregularity. Once the foundation is fraudulent, the superstructure built upon it collapses. Therefore, the petitioners’ conduct amounts to grave misconduct and abuse of their position as elected representatives. 22.21. The allegation of fabrication is not a mere administrative accusation but forms the subject matter of criminal proceedings. A complaint was lodged and an FIR was registered. The petitioners invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Criminal Petition No.102611/2024 seeking quashing of the FIR. This Court, after considering the material, declined to interfere and dismissed the petition - 53 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 on 19.12.2024. The petitioners then approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Criminal) No.1616/2024, which was also dismissed on 06.02.2025. Thereafter, the investigation was completed and a charge sheet has been filed before the competent criminal court. These developments demonstrate that the matter has progressed beyond a mere allegation and that sufficient material has been found during investigation to proceed against the petitioners in accordance with law. 22.22. Seriousness of the allegations is evident from the fact that neither this Court nor the Hon’ble Supreme Court found it appropriate to quash the proceedings at the threshold. The filing of a charge sheet indicates that prima facie evidence exists. The fabricated resolution, if allowed to stand, would create legal rights in favour of persons who had already suffered adverse - 54 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 orders before the District Court and this Court. It would effectively nullify or overreach binding judicial determinations. Such conduct strikes at the very foundation of the rule of law and the authority of judicial decisions. 22.23. The disputed resolution was relied upon before this Court in W.A. No.100488/2022 as if it were a genuine and validly passed resolution. Producing a forged document before a constitutional court, and seeking to derive advantage from it, is stated to be a serious act of misconduct. An elected representative who has sought to mislead this Court cannot claim an equitable right to continue in public office. 22.24. The term of the President and Vice-President expired on 24.07.2024, and an Administrator was appointed on 29.07.2024. It was only thereafter, upon scrutiny of records by the Commissioner and communication to the Deputy - 55 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Commissioner, that the full extent of the fabrication came to light. The Deputy Commissioner, acting in accordance with statutory duty, recommended initiation of proceedings to the Regional Commissioner on 28.01.2025. 22.25. The Regional Commissioner issued a notice dated 31.01.2025 calling upon the petitioners to submit their explanation under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. A further communication dated 07.02.2025 fixed 13.02.2025 for personal appearance. Thus, the petitioners were afforded notice as well as opportunity to respond. 22.26. Despite such opportunity, the petitioners did not submit their explanation within the time granted. In that background, the Regional Commissioner passed the first order on 13.02.2025. When the said order was set aside - 56 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 by this Court in W.P. No.104141/2025 with liberty to file a reply by 27.02.2025, the petitioners filed their explanation. Simultaneously, they preferred W.A. No.100124/2025. The Hon’ble Division Bench declined to interfere and merely directed consideration of the principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. 22.27. The Regional Commissioner thereafter reconsidered the matter, examined the explanation filed by the petitioners, perused the records including the municipal register and the material collected during investigation, and applied the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. Upon being satisfied that the resolution was fraudulent and that the conduct of the petitioners amounted to misconduct, the Regional Commissioner passed a reasoned order - 57 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 removing them from office, which is neither mechanical or arbitrary. 22.28. He relies on Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 41. Liability to removal from office.— (1) The Government, if it thinks fit on the recommendation of the municipal council, may remove any councillor elected under this Act, and after such enquiry as it deems necessary, if such councillor has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or has become incapable of performing his duties as a councillor. [Provided that no Councillor shall be removed except after being afforded an opportunity for submitting an explanation.] (2) When under sub-section (10) of section 42 any person is removed from the office of president or vice-president for misconduct in the discharge of his duties, he shall, from the date of such removal cease to be a councillor and shall be deemed to have been removed from the office of councillor under sub-section (1). 22.29. It is submitted that Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 requires that an explanation be sought and considered before - 58 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 removal. The statute does not mandate a trial- like proceeding with examination and cross- examination of witnesses. The requirement is one of fair opportunity, not a criminal trial. In the present case, notice was issued, personal appearance was permitted, written explanation was received and considered. Therefore, the principles of natural justice stand satisfied. 22.30. Lastly, it is contended that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands. Material facts relating to the criminal proceedings, dismissal of the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., dismissal of the SLP, and the status of municipal records have not been fairly disclosed. According to the respondents, there has been both suppression of material facts and presentation of misleading facts. In writ jurisdiction, which is discretionary in nature, - 59 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 a party guilty of such conduct is not entitled to equitable relief. 22.31. On these grounds, it is submitted that the order of removal is justified, lawful and necessary to protect public property, uphold judicial authority and maintain integrity in municipal administration. 22.32. He relies on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.D.Sharma -v- Steel Authority of India Limited and others [(2008)12 SCC 481], more particularly, para 34 to 38 which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. 35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] in the following words: (KB p. 514) - 60 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 “… it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts—it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it—the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.” (emphasis supplied) 36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, “We will not listen to your application because of what you have done.” The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. 37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96) “… Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a - 61 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit.” (emphasis supplied) 38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because “the court knows law but not facts”. 22.33. Learned Advocate General by relying on the principles laid down in K.D. Sharma submits that a person invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court must do so with utmost transparency, fairness and bona fides. It is contended that the petitioners, being elected Councillors, occupy a fiduciary position. They are trustees of public property and are under a statutory and moral obligation to safeguard municipal assets. Instead of protecting the interests of the Municipality, - 62 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 they have actively participated in creation of a forged resolution, such conduct is not a mere procedural lapse but a conscious act designed to confer benefit upon private individuals contrary to binding judicial orders. By attempting to regularise or extend rights over valuable public property in favour of unauthorised occupants, the petitioners have acted against public interest and in breach of the doctrine of public trust. The misconduct is grave, intentional and strikes at the root of responsible governance. In such circumstances, it is contended that the Regional Commissioner was duty-bound to act. The order of removal, therefore, is not punitive excess but a necessary corrective measure to preserve institutional integrity. 22.34. The fabrication of Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024 cannot be viewed in isolation. The dispute concerning the cotton market property - 63 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 has a long and settled history. The unauthorised occupants had repeatedly litigated the matter and suffered adverse orders at every stage. An eviction order was passed as early as 03.03.2004. The appeals were dismissed. The writ petition was disposed of. Subsequent proceedings culminated in the dismissal of W.P. No.112012/2019, wherein this Court made strong observations regarding misuse of public property and violation of the doctrine of trusteeship. 22.35. Despite such categorical judicial findings, the unauthorised occupants preferred W.A. No.100488/2022. It is in that background that the alleged Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024 surfaced. According to the respondents, this document was furnished to the occupants and relied upon in the writ appeal to assert a subsisting right in the property. This, it is - 64 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 submitted, was an attempt to create a new factual foundation to overcome binding judicial pronouncements. 22.36. The official municipal records reflect that Resolution No.378 was actually passed on 19.07.2024 and pertains to a State Financial Corporation grant under the 15th Financial Scheme and a tender matter. There is no entry in the resolution register of any lease extension resolution on 09.02.2024. The document relied upon in the writ appeal does not correspond with the official records. Material differences in subject matter, date and numbering are highlighted. 22.37. In these circumstances, it is contended that there is no plausible explanation except fabrication. The petitioners, being signatories to the disputed document and having not denied their signatures, are said to have prima facie - 65 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 engaged in fraudulent conduct. Fraud vitiates all proceedings. A document created to defeat judicial orders cannot be clothed with legality. The petitioners’ defence that the resolution was validly passed only reinforces the allegation of complicity. 22.38. The criminal proceedings lend additional weight to the seriousness of the allegations. The FIR was challenged before this Court and dismissed. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Investigation culminated in filing of a charge sheet. While it is acknowledged that criminal guilt will be determined at trial, the existence of prima facie material sufficient to proceed is beyond dispute. Had the allegations been baseless, the criminal proceedings would have been quashed at the threshold. The refusal of superior courts to - 66 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 interfere indicates that the matter is not frivolous. 22.39. Permitting the petitioners to continue as Councillors in the face of such serious allegations, it is submitted, would undermine public confidence and expose municipal property to further risk. An elected representative accused of forging municipal records and using them to influence judicial proceedings cannot claim an equitable right to remain in office pending protracted criminal trial. 22.40. It is further submitted that upon expiry of the term of the President and Vice-President on 24.07.2024, the Government, in exercise of statutory powers under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, appointed an Administrator to manage the affairs of the Municipality. The Deputy Commissioner, Gadag, assumed charge. Upon being apprised by the Commissioner of the - 67 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 fabrication, the Deputy Commissioner examined the matter and, acting within statutory authority, recommended initiation of proceedings under Section 41 to the Regional Commissioner on 28.01.2025. 22.41. The Regional Commissioner issued a notice dated 31.01.2025 granting seven days to submit an explanation. A further notice dated 07.02.2025 fixed 13.02.2025 for personal appearance. The petitioners were thus given notice and opportunity. When the first order was set aside by this Court in W.P. No.104141/2025 with liberty to file reply by 27.02.2025, the petitioners filed their explanation. The earlier order of this Court was passed on consent of counsel for the petitioners, who undertook to appear and submit reply. 22.42. Though the order was passed on consent, the petitioners preferred W.A. No.100124/2025. The - 68 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Division Bench declined to interfere and directed that the Regional Commissioner consider the principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. It is submitted that the Regional Commissioner thereafter complied with the direction, considered the explanation in detail, examined the municipal records and the surrounding circumstances, and passed a reasoned order. 22.43. He reiterates that Section 41 requires issuance of notice and consideration of explanation. It does not mandate a full-fledged trial with examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The standard is that of administrative satisfaction based on material available, subject to judicial review. The petitioners were given opportunity to explain; their explanation was considered; the authority applied its mind; and a reasoned order was passed. - 69 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 22.44. The petitioners have not approached this Court with complete disclosure. The history of criminal proceedings and dismissal of challenges has not been fairly presented. In writ jurisdiction, which is discretionary, a party guilty of suppression or misrepresentation is not entitled to relief. 22.45. In the totality of circumstances, the misconduct is grave, supported by prima facie material, and directly affects public property and institutional integrity. The order of removal is proportionate, lawful and necessary to preserve the rule of law and protect municipal assets. 22.46. Learned Advocate General also relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir, albeit different paragraphs, namely 22, 30-36, 58 and 59 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 22. Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX and IX-A confers upon the local self-government a complete autonomy on the basic democratic unit unshackled from official control. Thus, exercise of any - 70 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 power having effect of destroying the Constitutional institution besides being outrageous is dangerous to the democratic set-up of this country. Therefore, an elected official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously without following the procedure prescribed by law, in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State by adopting a casual approach and resorting to manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose. The Court being the custodian of law cannot tolerate any attempt to thwart the institution. 30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. [Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158] .] This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] and Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] . Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected office-bearer. 31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self- government has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office-bearer can be removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry. 32. In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction in rank, a full-fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely different context as compared to the government employees, for the reason, that for - 71 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard of proof is required. 33. This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removal of the President of the Municipal Council on similar grounds in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and observed that removal of an elected office-bearer is a serious matter. The elected office-bearer must not be removed unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding and enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the elected member but also of his constituency or electoral college. His removal may curtail the term of the office- bearer and also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly adhered to and unless a clear case is made out, there can be no justification for his removal. While taking the decision, the authority should not be guided by any other extraneous consideration or should not come under any political pressure. 34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed. 35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed - 72 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (vide Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983] , Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareily [(1992) 4 SCC 80 : AIR 1993 SC 2042] and Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari [(1998) 1 SCC 680 : AIR 1998 SC 1222] ). 36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice. 58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. 59. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons. - 73 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 22.47. By relying on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir learned Adovacate General submits that the said decision, properly understood and applied, supports the action taken by the Regional Commissioner. 22.48. It is submitted that paragraph 22 recognises that after the insertion of Parts IX and IX-A in the Constitution, local self-government institutions enjoy constitutional protection and autonomy. However, that autonomy is not absolute. It is subject to the procedure established by law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned against arbitrary or manipulative removal of elected representatives, but equally affirmed that removal in accordance with statutory procedure is permissible. Therefore, the emphasis is not on insulating elected representatives from accountability, but on ensuring that the power of removal is exercised lawfully, fairly and for - 74 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 legitimate reasons. In the present case, it is submitted that the action taken in this case is grounded in statutory authority under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 and is supported by material indicating grave misconduct. 22.49. By referring to paragraphs 30 to 36, learned Advocate General submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that removal of an elected member is a quasi-judicial proceeding and must satisfy the requirements of natural justice. A fair opportunity must be granted. The authority must apply its mind to the allegations and the explanation. Removal is permissible in exceptional circumstances upon strict adherence to statutory provisions. 22.50. It is submitted that these very requirements have been scrupulously followed in the present case. Notice was issued. Time was granted. - 75 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Personal appearance was permitted. Written explanation was received and considered. The earlier order of removal was set aside by this Court and liberty was granted to file a fresh reply. The petitioners availed that opportunity. The Division Bench directed consideration of the principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. The Regional Commissioner reconsidered the matter and passed a reasoned order. Therefore, the safeguards mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court stand fully complied with. 22.51. It is further submitted that paragraphs 58 and 59 of the said judgment clarify the concept of locus standi and legal injury. A person can challenge an action only if he demonstrates deprivation of a legal right. A mere grievance without legal basis does not confer standing. In the present context, the proceedings under Section 41 are statutory in nature and are initiated by the - 76 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 competent authority upon material exfacie establishing misconduct. The authority is not acting at the instance of a private adversary but in discharge of statutory obligation to protect public interest. 22.52. Learned Advocate General submits that the Regional Commissioner has faithfully adhered to the directions issued by the Division Bench and has applied the dicta laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir. 22.53. The impugned order reflects consideration of the allegations relating to fabrication of Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024, examination of the official municipal records, analysis of the explanation submitted by the petitioners, and reference to the legal principles governing removal of elected representatives. The order is reasoned, structured and supported by material. - 77 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Therefore, it cannot be characterised as arbitrary or mechanical. 22.54. It is further submitted that Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 prescribes the procedure for removal. The statute requires issuance of notice and consideration of explanation. It does not mandate a trial in the nature of criminal proceedings. The requirement is one of fair opportunity, not of adversarial adjudication with oral evidence and cross- examination as a matter of right. The legislative scheme indicates that the authority must form satisfaction based on available material after affording opportunity to the member concerned. 22.55. In the present case, the petitioners were issued notice dated 31.01.2025. A further opportunity was granted fixing personal appearance on 13.02.2025. Upon challenge to the first order, this Court granted liberty to file reply by - 78 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 27.02.2025. The petitioners submitted their written explanation. The Regional Commissioner considered the same along with municipal records and surrounding circumstances, including the existence of criminal proceedings and the discrepancy in the resolution register. 22.56. It is submitted that the Regional Commissioner recorded a finding that Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024 does not find place in the official records and that the genuine Resolution No.378 pertains to a different subject passed on 19.07.2024. The signature of the Commissioner on the disputed document was denied. These objective facts constitute material upon which satisfaction could reasonably be formed. 22.57. With regard to the expression “disgraceful conduct” occurring in Section 41, it is submitted that though not defined in the Act, the term must be understood in its ordinary and - 79 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 contextual meaning. Disgrace denotes loss of honour, reputation or credibility. Disgraceful conduct refers to conduct which brings disrepute to the office, undermines public confidence, or is morally blameworthy. An elected Councillor is expected to maintain high standards of integrity. Fabrication of municipal records, creation of a resolution not borne out by official registers, and use of such document in judicial proceedings, if established, would unquestionably bring discredit to the institution. 22.58. It is further submitted that disgraceful conduct need not be confined to acts committed strictly during official meetings. Any act connected with municipal affairs which erodes public trust or injures the reputation of the institution can attract action under Section 41. The focus is on the impact of the conduct on the dignity and integrity of public office. - 80 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 22.59. Learned Advocate General submits that the Regional Commissioner has not acted on mere suspicion. The action is based on documentary discrepancies, denial of signature by the Commissioner, criminal investigation culminating in filing of charge sheet, and the use of the disputed resolution in judicial proceedings. These circumstances collectively constitute sufficient material to justify action under Section 41. 22.60. It is therefore contended that the order of removal is proportionate to the gravity of misconduct, compliant with statutory and constitutional requirements, and necessary to preserve the sanctity of public office and protection of municipal property. The petitioners, having been afforded full opportunity, cannot now contend violation of natural justice merely because the decision has gone against them. - 81 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 22.61. Learned Advocate General meticulously takes this Court through the original resolution register. It is submitted that the statutory resolution register is maintained sequentially, with serial numbers corresponding to dates and subjects transacted in duly convened meetings of the Council. Upon such examination, it is demonstrated that there is no Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024 relating to extension of lease of Wakharsal properties. 22.62. On the contrary, the records show that Resolution No.378 was in fact passed only on 19.07.2024 and pertains to a completely different subject, namely sanction relating to a State Financial Corporation grant under the 15th Finance Commission scheme and a connected tender process. The subject matter, date, and sequence in the register conclusively establish - 82 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 that no resolution bearing No.378 existed on 09.02.2024. 22.63. It is submitted that the numbering of resolutions is continuous and cannot be retrospectively altered without disturbing the entire sequence of entries. Therefore, the existence of Resolution No.378 on 19.07.2024 makes it impossible for another Resolution No.378 to have existed five months earlier on 09.02.2024. The absence of any entry corresponding to the alleged lease extension resolution in the official books, coupled with the production of a separate document before the Division Bench in W.A. No.100488/2022, leads to only one logical inference: that the document relied upon by the petitioners is fabricated. 22.64. It is further submitted that production of such a document before a constitutional court amounts to a serious attempt to mislead the Court and to - 83 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 create an artificial foundation to defeat prior judicial orders. Such conduct, by its very nature, brings disrepute to the office held by the petitioners and falls squarely within the meaning of disgraceful conduct under Section 41 of the Act. 22.65. Learned Advocate General further submits that the doctrine of public trust is firmly embedded in constitutional jurisprudence. Public property is not owned in a proprietary sense by the State or the Municipality; it is held in trust for the benefit of the public at large. A Municipality, being an instrumentality of the State, is equally bound by this doctrine. Councillors are not mere political functionaries; they are custodians of municipal assets. They owe fiduciary duties to the institution and to the electorate. Their obligation is to safeguard public property, ensure lawful utilisation, and maximise benefit to the - 84 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 community. In the present case, instead of acting as trustees, the petitioners have acted in a manner that facilitates continued occupation of valuable municipal land by unauthorised persons. 22.66. Such conduct, it is submitted, constitutes a clear breach of fiduciary duty. A fiduciary is expected to act in utmost good faith and in the interest of the beneficiary. Any action that confers private benefit at the expense of public interest is inconsistent with that obligation. The petitioners, by fabricating a resolution to extend rights of unauthorised occupants, have violated the trust reposed in them by the electorate. 22.67. Learned Advocate General again invites attention to the judgment of the coordinate Bench in W.P. No.112012/2019. In that case, after tracing decades of litigation, this Court categorically held that the occupants of the cotton market property were unauthorised and had no legal right to - 85 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 continue in possession. The Court emphasised that public property cannot be allowed to become the fiefdom of a few individuals and deprecated the prolonged occupation at nominal rent. 22.68. In light of such categorical findings, it was incumbent upon the Councillors to ensure enforcement of eviction and proper utilisation of the property for public benefit. Instead, the petitioners have facilitated the very occupants whose claims had been rejected by judicial orders. This conduct directly undermines the authority of judicial determinations and frustrates the purpose of earlier litigation. 22.69. The fabricated resolution was placed before the Division Bench in W.A. No.100488/2022 to contend that the occupants had a subsisting right in the property. Such use of a fabricated document to influence judicial proceedings is not - 86 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 merely administrative impropriety but a grave act affecting the administration of justice itself. 22.70. With regard to criminal proceedings, learned Advocate General submits that the seriousness of the allegations is reinforced by judicial scrutiny at multiple levels. The petitioners invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Criminal Petition No.102611/2024 seeking quashing of the FIR. By order dated 19.12.2024, a coordinate Bench declined to interfere and recorded that there was strong prima facie material warranting investigation. 22.71. The petitioners carried the matter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Criminal) No.1616/2025. By order dated 06.02.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP, observing that it found no reason to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. Thereafter, - 87 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 investigation was completed and a charge sheet was filed before the competent criminal court. 22.72. It is submitted that while the criminal trial will determine guilt, the existence of prima facie material recognised by this Court and not disturbed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court establishes that the allegations are neither baseless nor motivated. Administrative action under Section 41 does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt; it requires formation of satisfaction based on credible material. The material available satisfies that threshold. 22.73. Learned Advocate General further submits that the litigation over the cotton market property has spanned decades and has involved sustained efforts by successive municipal administrations to recover possession and protect public assets. The act of the petitioners, if permitted to stand, would undo years of institutional effort and - 88 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 judicial intervention. It would signal that binding court orders can be neutralised through internal resolutions, thereby eroding public confidence in governance. 22.74. The fiduciary relationship between a Councillor and the Municipality demands loyalty, integrity and protection of institutional interest. By fabricating a resolution and enabling unauthorised occupants to assert rights contrary to judicial findings, the petitioners have, according to the respondents, fundamentally breached that fiduciary obligation. 22.75. It is submitted that such misconduct is not minor or technical; it strikes at the core of democratic accountability and public trust. Permitting the petitioners to continue in office despite such serious allegations would expose municipal property to further risk and compromise institutional integrity. Therefore, removal under - 89 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 Section 41 is not excessive but proportionate and necessary to safeguard public interest and uphold the rule of law. 22.76. It is further submitted that the effect of permitting the petitioners to continue in office, despite the serious allegations and material on record, would have far-reaching consequences not only for the Municipality but also for public administration as a whole. 22.77. Firstly, it is contended that continuance in office would directly affect the protection of public property. The subject matter of the dispute concerns valuable municipal land, which has been the subject of prolonged litigation and repeated judicial scrutiny. If persons accused of fabricating a resolution relating to that very property are allowed to remain in decision- making positions, there exists a real and substantial apprehension that further steps may - 90 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 be taken to regularise, legitimise or otherwise protect the interests of unauthorised occupants. The risk is not hypothetical; it arises from the very nature of the allegations. 22.78. Secondly, it is submitted that public confidence in local self-government would be severely eroded. An elected body functions on trust, trust reposed by the electorate that its representatives will act honestly, transparently and in accordance with law. If serious allegations of forgery, fabrication and misuse of municipal records are allowed to coexist with continued tenure in office, it would send a message that public office can be retained notwithstanding grave breaches of integrity. Such a perception damages the credibility of democratic institutions. 22.79. Thirdly, it is argued that continuance in office may impede fair administration and enquiry. Councillors exercise influence over municipal - 91 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 administration, including access to records, interaction with officers and participation in policy decisions. If individuals against whom allegations of document fabrication are pending continue to hold office, there exists a reasonable apprehension of interference with records, influence over subordinate officials, or shaping of subsequent resolutions to protect earlier acts. The law does not require actual proof of interference; reasonable likelihood is sufficient to justify preventive action in public interest. 22.80. Fourthly, it is submitted that the financial implications are significant. The cotton market property is a municipal asset capable of generating substantial revenue if properly developed or leased at market rates. Judicial findings have already recorded that for decades, nominal rent was paid, resulting in loss to the Municipality. Any act that perpetuates such - 92 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 occupation or delays redevelopment causes recurring financial injury. If the petitioners remain in office, and if their conductd facilitated continuation of such occupation, the Municipality may continue to suffer economic loss, thereby affecting civic amenities and public welfare projects. 22.81. Fifthly, the doctrine of public trust requires that public property be managed in the best interest of the community. Trustees who have acted contrary to that trust cannot insist on continuation in office pending conclusion of criminal trial, particularly when administrative action is supported by prima facie material. Public law remedies are preventive as much as corrective. The purpose of Section 41 is not merely to punish proved criminality but to maintain the dignity and integrity of municipal governance. - 93 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 22.82. It is further submitted that the injury is not confined to the Municipality alone. The electorate of the concerned wards is entitled to representation that is free from serious stigma affecting institutional integrity. While removal of an elected representative is indeed a serious matter, the law equally recognises that continuance of a representative whose conduct prima facie undermines public confidence can be equally injurious to democratic functioning. 22.83. The balance, therefore, is not between removal and individual hardship alone; it is between individual tenure and collective public interest. Where credible material indicates fabrication of municipal records, misuse of official documents and attempts to create rights contrary to judicial orders, the larger public interest in preserving institutional credibility and protecting public - 94 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 property outweighs the private interest of holding office. 22.84. It is on this premise that the respondents contend that removal was necessary to prevent further damage, to restore public confidence, to protect municipal assets from further misuse, and to ensure that governance proceeds in accordance with law. Continuance in office in the face of such allegations would, according to the respondents, compound institutional harm and undermine the very democratic values which the Constitution seeks to protect. 22.85. Learned Advocate General therefore submits that both the Writ Petitions be dismissed. 23. Sri Harsh Desai, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.4 - Municipal Council, submitted as follows: - 95 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 23.1. He advances detailed submissions placing the entire historical and legal background of the Wakharsal property before this Court to demonstrate the gravity of the matter and the context in which the impugned action has been taken. 23.2. The Wakharsal property is not an ordinary parcel of land but a prime municipal asset situated in the very heart of Gadag City, measuring approximately 34 acres and 32 guntas. The land was originally acquired as early as 26.03.1896 by the then Government of Bombay for the specific public purpose of establishing a cotton market. On 06.11.1896, 54 plots were allotted on lease through public auction to traders. Thus, from inception, the property was meant to serve a public commercial purpose under regulated conditions. - 96 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 23.3. Over time, the original cotton market became dilapidated. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) established a new and modern cotton market, to which most traders shifted. However, certain persons continued to occupy the old market premises located in the central and commercially valuable area of Gadag City. Despite repeated efforts by the Council to relocate them and recover possession, these occupants remained in occupation in violation of lease conditions. It is submitted that many of them had sublet the premises to third parties without authority, thereby compounding the illegality. 23.4. At the request of the tenants, lease extensions were granted from time to time, with enhanced rent, and a final extension was granted up to 30.06.1992. Upon expiry of the lease, they were bound to vacate. However, they failed to do so, - 97 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 compelling the Council to initiate litigation. A suit in O.S. No.218/1988 was filed. In the First Appeal in R.A. No.42/1990, it was categorically held that the occupants were not permanent tenants and were liable to pay rent. The decision was upheld in the Second Appeal in R.S.A. No.40/1994 and ultimately confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 14.03.1996. Thus, the status of the occupants as unauthorised after expiry of lease stood conclusively determined. 23.5. Despite final adjudication, the occupants continued in unauthorised possession. Proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act culminated in an eviction order dated 03.03.2004 directing them to vacate. Appeals against the eviction order were dismissed on 19.12.2005. A writ petition in W.P. No.474/2006 was filed but withdrawn on 11.03.2013. Even thereafter, the occupants did - 98 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 not vacate, compelling issuance of a Government Order dated 10.11.2014 directing eviction. 23.6. Yet another round of litigation ensued in W.P. No.112012/2019, which was dismissed by a coordinate Bench of this Court with strong observations regarding misuse of public property and violation of the doctrine of public trust. The conduct of the occupants was deprecated. Thus, over nearly three decades, the occupants have consistently failed in judicial proceedings and have been held to have no right to remain in possession. 23.7. It is in this factual backdrop that the alleged Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024 assumes significance. During the writ appeal filed by the unauthorised occupants, a document purporting to be such resolution was produced to contend that the Council had extended lease and recognised their continued occupation. Learned - 99 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 counsel submits that this document is not borne out by official municipal records. The resolution register does not contain any such entry on 09.02.2024. The only Resolution No.378 in the records pertains to an entirely different subject and was passed on 19.07.2024 relating to a financial grant and tender process. 23.8. The sequential nature of resolution numbering makes it impossible for two resolutions bearing the same number to exist on different dates for different subjects. The absence of the alleged resolution in statutory records, coupled with the existence of Resolution No.378 on 19.07.2024 on a distinct subject, establishes that the document relied upon is fabricated. Learned counsel categorically submits that the Commissioner has denied signing the disputed document and that his signature has been forged with the intention - 100 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of deceiving this Court and conferring advantage upon the unauthorised occupants. 23.9. Learned counsel reiterates that the alleged resolution does not exist in the records either by date or by subject. The official minutes and registers maintained under statutory mandate do not reflect any such decision of the Council. Therefore, the document produced in W.A. No.100488/2022 is wholly unauthorised. 23.10. He submits that the proceedings under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 have been conducted strictly in accordance with law. Notice was issued. Opportunity was granted. Explanation was received and considered. The Regional Commissioner applied the principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir and passed a reasoned order. The statutory requirement is to seek explanation and consider it; it does not require a full-fledged criminal trial. The authority - 101 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 has complied with the mandate of natural justice. 23.11. It is contended that the conduct attributed to the petitioners, namely fabrication of a municipal resolution, forging the signature of the Commissioner, and producing such document before a constitutional court , amounts to grave and disgraceful conduct. Disgraceful conduct in public office is not confined to minor impropriety; it includes conduct that brings disrepute to the institution, undermines judicial authority, and violates fiduciary duty to the public. 23.12. Shri Desai submits that Councillors are trustees of municipal property. When they act contrary to the interests of the Council and seek to create rights in favour of persons whose claims have been repeatedly rejected by courts, they breach that trust. Such conduct is fundamentally incompatible with continuation in public office. - 102 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 23.13. He further submits that permitting such Councillors to continue would have serious institutional consequences. It would undermine enforcement of judicial orders, compromise protection of valuable public property, and erode public confidence in local self-government. He also reiterates that removal in such circumstances is not punitive excess but a necessary step to preserve the integrity of municipal administration and to ensure that public assets are not misused. 23.14. Therefore, he submits that the order of the Regional Commissioner is lawful, proportionate, and justified in public interest, and that this Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 24. Heard Sri.K.N.Phanindra, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri.Mrutyunjaya S.Hallikeri, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Shashi Kiran Shetty, - 103 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 learned Advocate General appearing for the State along with Sri.Gangadhar.J.M., learned Addl. Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3 and Sri.Harsh Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.4. Perused papers. 25. The points that would arise for consideration are: 25.1. Whether the impugned order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Regional Commissioner under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is vitiated for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, including denial of reasonable opportunity and absence of a full-fledged enquiry as contemplated in law? 25.2. Whether removal of an elected Councillor under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 can be sustained solely on the basis of allegations, registration of FIR, and filing of charge- sheet, in the absence of a conviction or proved misconduct? 25.3. Whether the alleged acts attributed to the petitioners, relating to the passing and use of Resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024, constitute “misconduct” or “disgraceful - 104 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 conduct” within the meaning and scope of Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964? 25.4. Whether the Regional Commissioner, while exercising quasi-judicial powers under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, was required to conduct a detailed enquiry with framing of specific charges, examination of witnesses, and consideration of defence evidence, in light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court? 25.5. Whether the impugned order of removal suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, colourable exercise of power, or extraneous considerations, particularly having regard to the timing of the order vis-à-vis the scheduled election to the posts of President and Vice-President of the City Municipal Council? 25.6. Whether the drastic consequence of removal and consequential disqualification of the petitioners is disproportionate and unsustainable in law, having regard to the constitutional mandate protecting democratic local self-government and the rights of the electorate? 25.7. Whether the notification dated 29.07.2024 appointing an Administrator to the City Municipal Council, Gadag-Betageri, is valid and in accordance with Sections 3 and 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964? - 105 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 25.8. What order? 26. I answer the above points as follows: 27. Answer to Point No.1: Whether the impugned order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Regional Commissioner under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 is vitiated for non- compliance with the principles of natural justice, including denial of reasonable opportunity and absence of a full-fledged enquiry as contemplated in law? 27.1. Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, reads as under: 41. Liability to removal from office.— (3) The Government, if it thinks fit on the recommendation of the municipal council, may remove any councillor elected under this Act, and after such enquiry as it deems necessary, if such councillor has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or has become incapable of performing his duties as a councillor. [Provided that no Councillor shall be removed except after being afforded an opportunity for submitting an explanation.] (4) When under sub-section (10) of section 42 any person is removed from the office of president or vice-president for misconduct in the discharge of his duties, he shall, from the date of such removal cease to be a councillor and shall be deemed to have been removed from the office of councillor under sub-section (1). - 106 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 27.2. A persual of Section 41 indicates that it prescribes two essential requirements: (1) an enquiry; and (2) reasonable opportunity to show cause. The statute does not prescribe the exact procedure to be followed, including whether witnesses must be examined, whether cross- examination must be permitted, or whether formal charges must be framed. The nature and extent of the inquiry must be commensurate with the facts and circumstances of each case. 27.3. The expression "reasonable opportunity" is relative and contextual. It does not mean unlimited opportunity or opportunity to prolong proceedings indefinitely. What is reasonable must be determined having regard to: 27.3.1. The nature and gravity of the allegations. 27.3.2. The evidence available on record. 27.3.3. The urgency of the situation. - 107 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 27.3.4. The conduct of the person proceeded against. 27.3.5. The public interest is involved. 27.4. Reasonable opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not possible to lay down any rigid rule or principle of universal application. Reasonable opportunity does not mean an elaborate inquiry. It means adequate opportunity having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 27.5. The facts demonstrate that the petitioners were afforded multiple opportunities: - 31.01.2025: First notice was issued calling upon the petitioners to show cause and submit explanation regarding allegations of forgery and misconduct; - 108 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 - Petitioners' allegation: Notice dated 31.01.2025 was served only on 06.02.2025, hence insufficient time was given. However, this delay was beyond the Regional Commissioner's control as it was caused by the notice delivery mechanism; - 07.02.2025: A second notice was issued fixing 13.02.2025 at 11:00 a.m. for personal hearing. The petitioners were called to appear with all documents; - 13.02.2025: The petitioners appeared personally before the Regional Commissioner. An order was passed removing them. This order was challenged in WP No. 101414/2025; - 24.02.2025: WP No. 101414/2025 was partly allowed. The original order of 13.02.2025 was quashed, and liberty was granted to the - 109 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 petitioners to submit their reply by 27.02.2025 by 3:00 p.m.; - 12.02.2025: The Division Bench, while disposing of WA No. 100124/2025, observed that the appellants (petitioners herein) are at liberty to impress upon the Regional Commissioner about the binding nature of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir while conducting the enquiry; - 27.02.2025: The petitioners submitted their detailed written reply by 3:00 p.m. thereafter, the Regional Commissioner considered all materials and passed the impugned order. 27.6. This chronology demonstrates that far from denying reasonable opportunity, the Regional Commissioner afforded the petitioners not one, but multiple opportunities. The petitioners - 110 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 appeared personally, made oral submissions, and filed written submissions. 27.7. This case involves allegations of forgery, the most serious form of misconduct. The evidence is not based on oral testimony or matters of interpretation, but on documentary evidence that is virtually conclusive: 27.7.1. The Municipal Council's official records do not contain Resolution No. 378 dated 09.02.2024 on the face of the resolution register; 27.7.2. The Municipal Commissioner has categorically and persistently stated that he never signed the alleged resolution and that his signature has been forged; 27.7.3. The resolution document produced by the petitioners bears obvious irregularities on its face, wrong format, suspicious signatures, absence in official records; - 111 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 27.7.4. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had passed clear orders regarding the Wakharsal property directing eviction of unauthorized occupants; 27.7.5. The alleged resolution directly violates those court orders; 27.7.6. This court, vide order dated 19.12.2024 in Cri. Petition No. 102611/2024, declined to quash the criminal proceedings, observing that there is "strong prima facie material to proceed against the petitioners"; 27.7.7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by order dated 06.02.2025 in SLP (Criminal) No. 1616/2025, dismissed the petitioners' challenge to the criminal proceedings. 27.7.8. When evidence is of this nature, documentary, objective, and virtually conclusive, elaborate examination and cross-examination of witnesses becomes - 112 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 unnecessary. 27.8. The principles of natural justice are flexible and not rigid. They must be adapted to the context and circumstances of each case. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution and rules of the body of persons appointed for that purpose. 27.9. The aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. 27.10. The petitioners contend that the Division Bench - 113 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 in WA No. 100124/2025 directed a "full-fledged enquiry" which was not conducted. This contention requires careful analysis. 27.11. The Division Bench merely observed that the appellants are at liberty to impress upon the Regional Commissioner about the binding nature of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir while conducting the enquiry. The Division Bench did not prescribe any specific procedure or mandate that witnesses be examined on oath or that a mini-trial be conducted. 27.12. The Regional Commissioner has complied with the Division Bench's direction by: 27.12.1. Issuing notices to the petitioners; 27.12.2. Affording them opportunity to file written submissions; 27.12.3. Hearing them personally; 27.12.4. Considering their explanations in light of - 114 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 the Principles laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir; 27.12.5. Examining the documentary evidence; 27.12.6. Passing a detailed reasoned order. 27.13. This constitutes substantial compliance with the Division Bench's direction and the requirements of natural justice. 27.14. The petitioners have relied on the argument that the resolution was "validly passed by the Council" and that "possession certificates were issued by the council." However, this defence is contradicted by: 27.14.1. The Council's official records which do not show any such resolution dated 09.02.2024; 27.14.2. The categorical denial by the Municipal Commissioner; - 115 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 27.14.3. The absence of any minutes of any meeting where such resolution was allegedly passed; 27.14.4. The obvious irregularities in the document; 27.14.5. The fact that when other council members were questioned, they denied that any such resolution was passed. 27.15. When the defence is patently untenable and contradicted by contemporaneous documentary evidence, the need for elaborate cross- examination is eliminated. 27.16. When the evidence is clear and unambiguous, and the defence is untenable, the enquiry can be brief without violating principles of natural justice. 27.17. From the above, it is clear that: - 116 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 27.17.1. The petitioners were afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause against their removal; 27.17.2. Multiple occasions were provided to the petitioners to explain their conduct; 27.17.3. The enquiry was adequate and appropriate, having regard to the documentary nature of the evidence; 27.17.4. The principles of natural justice have been substantially complied with; 27.17.5. The absence of elaborate procedural safeguards (like examination of witnesses) is not a violation of natural justice given the nature of the evidence; 27.17.6. The impugned order is NOT vitiated for non-compliance with principles of natural justice. 27.18. I answer point No.1 by holding that the impugned order is not vitiated for alleged - 117 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, infact the principles of natural justice have been complied with by the Regional Commissioner. 28. Answer to Point No. 2 — Whether removal of an elected councillor under section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 can be sustained solely on the basis of allegations, registration of FIR, and filing of charge-sheet, in the absence of a conviction or proved misconduct? 28.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that: 28.1.1. There is only a complaint filed, which resulted in registration of FIR and filing of charge-sheet. Until the criminal proceedings are completed, it cannot be said that there is any "proved misconduct"; 28.1.2. The petitioners cannot be said to be guilty of any offence merely on the registration - 118 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of a FIR and filing of a charge-sheet. At the most, they are "accused" and not "convicts"; 28.1.3. Until the trial is completed, the petitioners are deemed to be innocent until proven guilty. The allegation against them would not amount to misconduct warranting initiation of removal proceedings under Section 41 of the KMA; 28.1.4. Under Section 41(1)(d), there has to be "proved misconduct" for removal of an elected member. At present, there is only a complaint and charge-sheet; 28.1.5. Removal of membership of the Municipality under Section 41 has long- term effect, as under Clause (c) and (f) of Subsection (1) of Section 16 of the KMA, a person removed would suffer disqualification not only for the present - 119 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 term but also for being chosen in the next election until expiry of four years from the date of such removal. 28.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that: 28.2.1. Criminal conviction is not a prerequisite for disciplinary action. The misconduct can be proved by documentary evidence on the preponderance of probabilities, which is a lower standard than the criminal standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt"; 28.2.2. The allegations against the petitioners are not merely allegations. They are allegations supported by virtually conclusive documentary evidence. The resolution does not exist in official records. The signature is forged. This is not a matter of opinion but fact; - 120 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 28.2.3. The criminal proceedings and administrative proceedings are independent. The pendency of criminal proceedings does not bar administrative action; 28.2.4. The documentary evidence in the present case establishes misconduct beyond doubt. The criminal courts have not found the allegations to be frivolous or untenable, they have declined to quash the proceedings; 28.2.5. In matters of public employment and removal of elected representatives, the administrative authority need not wait for criminal conviction to act. In fact, waiting would allow the person to continue in office and cause further harm; 28.2.6. The petitioners' own conduct demonstrates misconduct. They produced - 121 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 the forged document before this Court in WA No. 100488/2022 in an attempt to mislead the Court. 28.3. The petitioners' argument is based on a fundamental confusion between criminal proceedings and administrative proceedings. These are two distinct types of proceedings with different objectives, different standards of proof, and different consequences. 28.4. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the principles applicable to criminal prosecution are not identical to the principles applicable to disciplinary proceedings. The standard of proof in criminal cases is 'beyond reasonable doubt', whereas in disciplinary cases it is 'preponderance of probabilities'. Further, disciplinary action can be taken based on evidence even if criminal - 122 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 prosecution fails. 28.5. Administrative action and criminal action are independent streams. The pendency of criminal proceedings does not bar administrative action. In fact, it may be necessary to take administrative action in the public interest even while criminal proceedings are pending. 28.6. The petitioners argue that the misconduct is not "proved" but merely "alleged". This argument is factually incorrect. The misconduct is established by the following evidence: 28.6.1. The official resolution register of the City Municipal Council, produced before this Court, does not contain any Resolution No. 378 dated 09.02.2024 relating to extension of Wakharsal property lease; 28.6.2. The Municipal Commissioner has consistently and categorically stated that - 123 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 he never signed the alleged resolution and that his signature has been forged; 28.6.3. No minutes of any council meeting on 09.02.2024 show passage of such resolution; 28.6.4. The resolution document itself bears obvious irregularities on its face, wrong format, suspicious signatures, serial number irregularities; 28.6.5. Resolution No. 378 that actually exists was passed on 19.07.2024 (five months later) relating to an entirely different matter, SFC grant under 15th Financial Scheme; 28.6.6. The petitioners themselves produced this forged resolution before this Court in WA No. 100488/2022, attempting to mislead the Court regarding legal rights of the unauthorised occupants; - 124 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 28.7. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had categorically directed the eviction of unauthorised occupants from Wakharsal property. The alleged resolution directly violates those orders. 28.8. This is not a case of allegation based on oral testimony or circumstantial evidence. This is a case where forgery is established by documentary evidence. The term "proved" means established by reliable evidence. The evidence in the present case is reliable, objective, and documentary. 28.9. In administrative law, the standard of proof is the "balance of probabilities" or "preponderance of probabilities", not "beyond reasonable doubt" as in criminal law. Laxmibai v. Collector of Belgaum, which was extensively cited by the petitioners' counsel, makes this point clear. - 125 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 28.10. The preponderance of probabilities test requires that the evidence in support of the allegation must outweigh the evidence against it. In the present case, the documentary evidence overwhelmingly establishes the allegations of forgery. The petitioners have not produced any credible evidence to the contrary. In fact, they have not even seriously disputed the core allegations. 28.11. The petitioners argue that criminal proceedings are pending, hence administrative action should be deferred. This argument is unsustainable for several reasons: 28.11.1. The investigation and trial of criminal cases can take several years. If administrative action had to be deferred until criminal proceedings conclude, it would mean allowing the wrongdoer to continue in office for years despite proved - 126 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 misconduct; 28.11.2. The Municipal Commissioner's allegation that the petitioners forged his signature is a serious matter affecting the credibility and integrity of municipal administration. If the petitioners are allowed to continue in office while the criminal proceedings drag on, it would undermine public confidence in municipal administration; 28.11.3. Criminal proceedings aim at punishing crime. Administrative proceedings aim at removing a person from public office if found unfit to hold that office. These objectives are independent; 28.12. Disciplinary action against an employee can be taken based on evidence even if criminal proceedings are pending or have failed. The standard of proof is different, the objective is - 127 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 different, and the pendency of criminal proceedings is not a bar to disciplinary action. 28.13. Taking administrative action (removal from office) does not prejudice the criminal trial. The petitioners will still have full opportunity to defend themselves in the criminal case; 28.14. A Co-ordinate bench of this court, vide order dated 19.12.2024, declined to quash the criminal proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide order dated 06.02.2025, dismissed the petitioners' SLP against that order without any disapproval of the Co-ordinate bench’s finding. 28.15. The petitioners rely on the principle of "presumption of innocence" to argue that they should not be removed from office pending criminal trial. This argument misunderstands the scope of that principle. 28.16. The "presumption of innocence" is a principle of - 128 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 criminal jurisprudence. It means that in a criminal trial, the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty. 28.17. However, the presumption of innocence does not mean: 28.17.1. That a person cannot be removed from office based on allegations supported by evidence; 28.17.2. That a person must be allowed to continue in public office pending criminal trial; 28.17.3. That administrative proceedings must be frozen pending criminal proceedings. 28.18. The circumstances of the present case demonstrate why immediate administrative action was necessary and justified: 28.19. The petitioners had forged a resolution in their - 129 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 capacity as elected representatives and used their office to issue illegal possession certificates. This is a serious abuse of office; 28.20. The petitioners' forged resolution and illegal possession certificates have caused substantial harm to the Municipality. Unauthorised occupants have obtained documents that they might try to use to claim rights over valuable municipal property; 28.21. By forging a resolution contrary to this Court's orders in WP No. 112012/2019, the petitioners have shown contempt for judicial authority; 28.22. If the petitioners were allowed to continue in office pending criminal trial, there was danger that they might forge further documents, issue further illegal certificates, or cause further harm; - 130 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 28.23. Elected office is not an ordinary job. It is a trust to represent the people and protect municipal interests. Once that trust is broken, removal is necessary; 28.24. Public confidence in municipal administration requires that persons guilty of such serious misconduct be removed immediately. 28.25. The petitioners correctly state that they are "accused" but not "convicts" in the criminal case. However, this does not shield them from administrative action. For administrative purposes and removal from public office, a person need not be convicted. Evidence supporting the charge is sufficient. The criminal status of the person is not relevant for administrative action. 28.26. Disciplinary action against a public servant or statutory office-bearer is legally distinct and - 131 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 independent from criminal prosecution. The two proceedings operate in different fields, are governed by different standards, and serve different purposes. 28.27. In criminal proceedings, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The object is to determine criminal liability and impose penal consequences. In contrast, disciplinary or administrative proceedings are concerned with the suitability of a person to continue in public office and with maintaining institutional integrity. The standard of proof in such proceedings is based on preponderance of probabilities and formation of reasonable satisfaction on available material. 28.28. It is well settled that even if a person is acquitted in a criminal case, such acquittal - 132 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 does not automatically entitle him to reinstatement or continuation in service or office if disciplinary proceedings have already resulted in a finding of misconduct. An acquittal may occur for various reasons, including benefit of doubt or failure to meet the strict criminal standard of proof. That does not erase the findings recorded in administrative proceedings based on independent assessment of material. 28.29. Therefore, the pendency of criminal proceedings, or even a future acquittal, would not render the action taken under Section 41 invalid, provided that the statutory authority has independently applied its mind and reached a conclusion on the basis of material available before it. 28.30. The removal under Section 41 is not founded - 133 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 solely on the existence of an FIR or charge sheet. It is based on examination of municipal records, discrepancy in the resolution register, denial of signature by the Commissioner, and overall conduct of the petitioners. The criminal case and the administrative action are parallel but independent. The validity of one does not automatically depend upon the outcome of the other. 28.31. The petitioners raise the consequence of disqualification under Section 16 of the KMA as a reason why removal should not be allowed. The Court appreciates the gravity of the consequence. However, grave consequences do not excuse grave misconduct. In fact, they highlight the need to remove from office persons guilty of serious misconduct. - 134 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 28.32. The disqualification that follows removal from elected office is undoubtedly a serious consequence. It affects not only the individual concerned but also his future participation in the democratic process. However, the seriousness of the consequence cannot be used as a ground to shield misconduct. On the contrary, when the statutory scheme provides for removal and consequential disqualification, it reflects the legislative intent that only persons who maintain the integrity and dignity of the office should be permitted to hold it. The gravity of the consequence, therefore, calls for careful scrutiny of the allegations, not leniency towards proven or prima facie established misconduct. 28.33. It is equally true that elections and public office confer legitimacy through the mandate of the people. But that mandate is not a licence for - 135 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 abuse. Democratic office is not an immunity against accountability. If elected representatives are found to have engaged in dishonest or fraudulent conduct affecting public property or institutional integrity, the law must respond firmly. Otherwise, public office would become a shield behind which misconduct could be perpetuated. 28.34. The seriousness of disqualification thus cuts both ways. It demands strict procedural fairness before removal, but it also demands that serious breaches of trust be dealt with decisively. To hold otherwise would dilute the very purpose of statutory safeguards designed to protect public institutions and public confidence. 28.35. From the above it is clear that: 28.35.1. Removal of an elected councillor CAN be sustained on the basis of proved - 136 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 misconduct without requiring a criminal conviction; 28.35.2. The misconduct in the present case is proved by documentary evidence on the preponderance of probabilities; 28.35.3. The pendency of criminal proceedings is not a bar to administrative action; 28.35.4. The standard of proof in administrative proceedings is lower than in criminal proceedings; 28.35.5. Public interest requires immediate administrative action, not deferment pending criminal trial; 28.35.6. The consequences of disqualification do not excuse the misconduct but emphasise the need for removal. 28.36. I answer Point No.2 by holding that the removal of an elected Councillor can be - 137 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 sustained based on proved misconduct in the absence of a criminal conviction. In the present case, the misconduct is proved. 29. Answer to point No. 3 — Whether the alleged acts attributed to the petitioners, relating to the passing and use of resolution No.378 dated 09.02.2024, constitute "misconduct" or "disgraceful conduct" within the meaning and scope of Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964? 29.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that: 29.1.1. The alleged acts do not constitute "misconduct" or "disgraceful conduct". The resolution was purportedly passed by the entire Council. If any misconduct occurred, it was collective, not individual; 29.1.2. The resolution relates to extension of lease of Wakharsal properties. This is a substantive policy matter on which - 138 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 reasonable people can differ. It is not criminal conduct but merely a policy decision; 29.1.3. The petitioners' conduct in passing the resolution, if it occurred, was in accordance with applicable law and procedure. The Council has the power to extend leases. The majority of the Council decided to extend the lease with renewed rental terms as per market conditions. This is not misconduct; 29.1.4. The petitioners did not act for personal gain but in the interest of the Municipality. The extended lease would have brought renewed rental income to the Municipality; 29.1.5. The allegation that the signature of the Commissioner is forged is a matter that has to be decided in the criminal court. In the - 139 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 absence of such decision, the petitioners cannot be removed; 29.1.6. The petitioners' actions in relation to Wakharsal property are not "in the discharge of duties as councillors" in a manner that warrants removal. The acts are at most breaches of contract or civil disputes, not criminal or disgraceful conduct. 29.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that: 29.2.1. The acts clearly constitute misconduct and disgraceful conduct. Forgery of documents, forging of signatures, and fabrication of resolutions are among the gravest forms of misconduct; 29.2.2. The petitioners cannot hide behind the argument that it is "collective decision". The resolution itself does not exist. If it - 140 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 does not exist, there is no collective decision, only collective fraud; 29.2.3. The alleged resolution is not a matter of policy difference. It is a forged document. This is not a difference of opinion but dishonesty; 29.2.4. The conduct of the petitioners, forging documents, forging signatures, issuing illegal possession certificates, is per se disgraceful. It cannot be characterised as an honest policy difference; 29.2.5. The conduct violates the trust reposed in elected representatives. Elected representatives are trustees of public property. By forging documents to benefit unauthorised occupants, the petitioners have betrayed that trust. 29.2.6. The conduct violates court orders. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019, had clearly - 141 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 directed the eviction of unauthorised occupants. The forged resolution is a direct affront to that court order; 29.2.7. The conduct is "in the discharge of duties as councillors" because the alleged resolution purports to be a council resolution, and the possession certificates were issued in an official capacity; 29.2.8. Forgery and fraud per se constitute disgraceful conduct for any person, let alone for an elected representative. 29.3. Black's Law Dictionary defines misconduct as: "A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour." 29.4. It is well settled that even where the word “misconduct” is not expressly defined in the statute or rules, it carries a settled and judicially recognised meaning. The absence of a definition - 142 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 does not render the expression vague or uncertain. 29.5. The term “misconduct” ordinarily signifies a transgression of an established and definite rule of action. It refers to conduct that is contrary to law, to prescribed procedure, or to the standards expected of a person holding public office. It is not confined merely to violation of an express statutory provision; it extends to any unlawful or improper behaviour by a person entrusted with public responsibility. 29.6. Further, misconduct is not synonymous with mere error. It implies a wrongful intention or a conscious disregard of duty. It must be something more than an innocent mistake, an error of judgment, or a bona fide difference of opinion. Where discretion is exercised honestly within the bounds of law, even if the decision later proves to be incorrect, it may not amount - 143 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 to misconduct. However, where an act is deliberate, dishonest, or undertaken in disregard of binding legal norms, it crosses the threshold into misconduct. 29.7. Misconduct also includes any dishonest or improper conduct, breach of a prescribed code of conduct, or behaviour that brings disrepute to the office held. In the context of elected representatives, it encompasses conduct that undermines public confidence, violates fiduciary obligations, or is inconsistent with the dignity and integrity expected of public office. 29.8. Thus, misconduct is not limited to criminal conviction. It includes actions that are unlawful, dishonest, improper, or unbecoming of the position held, particularly where such actions affect public property, institutional integrity, or the administration of justice. - 144 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.9. The acts of the Petitioners if not considered, in my considered opinion would clearly constitute misconduct: 29.10. The resolution does not exist in the Council's official records. The petitioners have fabricated a document, falsely claiming that the Council passed a resolution; 29.11. The Municipal Commissioner categorically states that he never signed the alleged resolution. His signature has been forged. Forging a signature is a criminal act that goes to the root of honesty; 29.12. Based on the forged resolution, the petitioners issued possession certificates to unauthorised occupants, thereby trying to create legal rights that do not exist; 29.13. As elected representatives, the petitioners were entrusted with the care of municipal property and interests. By forging documents to benefit unauthorised occupants (this aspect having been - 145 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 decided by this court on several occasions) they betrayed that trust; 29.14. The Rules of Procedure of the City Municipal Council require that all resolutions be properly recorded, properly signed, and properly maintained. The petitioners violated these rules by creating a forged document. 29.15. The expression “disgraceful conduct” must be understood in its ordinary and contextual sense. Though not specifically defined in the statute, it denotes conduct that brings dishonour, shame, or discredit upon the individual and, more importantly, upon the office held by him. It refers to behaviour that is unbecoming of a person occupying public office and that undermines the dignity of the institution. 29.16. Conduct is disgraceful if it would be regarded by honest, reasonable and right-thinking members of the public as disreputable or shameful. The - 146 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 test is objective. It is not whether the person concerned believes his conduct to be justified, but whether such conduct lowers public confidence in the office and the institution. 29.17. It is equally necessary to recognise that the standard of conduct expected from an ordinary individual is not the same as that expected from an elected representative or a person holding high public office. A private individual acts in his personal capacity. His conduct, unless unlawful, may not carry institutional consequences. However, an elected representative acts in a fiduciary capacity. He is a trustee of public confidence. His actions reflect not merely upon himself but upon the democratic body he represents. 29.18. Therefore, conduct which may not amount to disgrace in the case of an ordinary person may assume a far more serious character when - 147 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 committed by a public office-holder. The office carries heightened expectations of integrity, honesty, and accountability. The higher the office, the higher the standard of probity required. 29.19. Disgraceful conduct thus includes any act that violates basic principles of honesty and integrity, any conduct that is dishonest, deceptive, or improper, and any behaviour that brings disrepute to the institution. For elected representatives, who derive authority from the mandate of the people, the threshold is necessarily higher. An act that undermines public trust, erodes institutional credibility, or reflects disregard for fiduciary obligations may legitimately be characterised as disgraceful conduct within the meaning of the statute. 29.20. In short, public office magnifies responsibility. What may be tolerated as a personal lapse in - 148 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 private life may become unacceptable and disqualifying when it affects public trust, institutional dignity, and the confidence of the electorate. 29.21. Measured against these definitions, the petitioners' conduct is undoubtedly disgraceful: 29.22. Forging documents is inherently shameful and disgraceful. It is conduct that would be condemned by any honest person in the community; 29.23. Elected representatives are elected to serve the public. Using their office to forge documents and benefit unauthorised occupants is a betrayal of public trust that brings shame on the institution; 29.24. Forging a document to circumvent a clear court order directing eviction of unauthorised occupants is particularly disgraceful. It shows contempt for judicial authority; - 149 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.25. The forged resolution was produced before this Court in WA No. 100488/2022. Using forged documents to mislead the Court is conduct of the highest degree of disgrace; 29.26. The petitioners' conduct has caused harm to the Municipality by creating documents that might be used to claim rights over valuable municipal property. This harm to public property is disgraceful; 29.27. The core of disgraceful conduct is dishonesty. The petitioners' conduct involves deliberate dishonesty, forging of documents, and deception. No conduct can be more disgraceful than this. 29.28. Section 41(1)(d) provides that a councillor can be removed if he is guilty of misconduct "in the discharge of his duties as such councillor". The petitioners argue that the acts were not in discharge of duties but constitute breaches of contract or civil disputes. - 150 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.29. This argument is without merit because: 29.29.1. The alleged resolution purports to be a resolution of the City Municipal Council, passed in an official capacity. If such a resolution had been validly passed, it would have been an exercise of Council powers; 29.29.2. The possession certificates were issued in the official capacity of the petitioners as councillors. The documents themselves reference the CMC and the authority of the Council; 29.29.3. The forged resolution bore the seal and insignia of the CMC, suggesting that the petitioners used their official positions to create these documents; 29.29.4. The forged resolution was used in official proceedings before this Court in WA No. 100488/2022 to assert rights of unauthorised occupants; - 151 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.29.5. The petitioners' conduct, if successful, would have affected the official function of the Council to manage and control municipal property. 29.29.6. Therefore, the acts were clearly "in the discharge of (attempted) duties as councillors", and the misconduct/disgraceful conduct occurred in that context. 29.30. The petitioners argue that since the resolution was supposedly a collective decision, individual councillors cannot be held responsible. 29.31. The fundamental point is that the resolution was never validly passed by the Council. Therefore, there is no collective decision. What exists is collective fraud or individual fraud by the petitioners; 29.32. Even if a collective decision were involved, individual liability can be fixed if the individuals acted dishonestly. - 152 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.33. Participation in a collective decision does not automatically shield an individual from accountability. Even where a decision is taken collectively by a body or committee, individual liability can still be fixed if it is shown that a particular member acted dishonestly, mala fide, or with improper intent. Collective functioning cannot be used as a protective cover for acts tainted by fraud or bad faith. 29.34. If a member consciously supports, signs, or facilitates an action that is illegal or dishonest, he cannot later avoid responsibility by contending that the decision was that of the entire body. The doctrine of collective responsibility does not obliterate individual accountability where there is material to establish personal involvement, knowledge, or participation in wrongful conduct. - 153 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.35. Thus, if dishonesty or mala fides is prima facie established against specific members, individual consequences may follow notwithstanding that the decision was recorded as a resolution of the Council. 29.36. The evidence suggests that the petitioners were the main movers behind the forged resolution. They were not passive participants in a collective decision but active participants in a dishonest scheme, they have signed the forged resolution and still contend that the same is a valid one, therefore, individual liability is clearly established. 29.37. The petitioners contend that extension of lease is a matter of policy on which reasonable persons can differ. This case is not about whether the policy of extending the lease was right or wrong. This case is about whether the resolution - 154 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 extending the lease existed or was forged. The resolution is forged. This is not a matter of opinion; it is a matter of fact established by documentary evidence. 29.38. Extension of lease might be a matter of policy, but forging a resolution about extension of lease is not a matter of policy, it is fraud. There is a fundamental difference between: 29.38.1. When two councillors disagree about whether to extend a lease, that is an honest policy difference; 29.38.2. When a councillor forges a resolution to make it appear as if the lease was extended when it was not, that is dishonest conduct. 29.39. The present case falls into the second category. The petitioners did not attempt to persuade the Council to extend the lease through proper - 155 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 procedures. They forged a resolution to achieve their objective. 29.40. The law is well-settled that elected representatives are trustees of public property and public interest. Laxmibai v. Collector of Belgaum, which was extensively relied upon by the petitioners' counsel, itself establishes the principle of breach of trust: "An elected representative is a trustee of public property and public interest. When that representative betrays the trust, removal is not merely justified but imperative." 29.41. By forging documents to benefit unauthorised occupants and against the directions of this Court, the petitioners have breached the fiduciary duty they owed to the Municipality and the public. 29.42. This Court, in WP No. 112012/2019 (judgment dated 12.08.2022), passed clear orders directing - 156 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 that unauthorised occupants of the Wakharsal property be evicted and that the property be utilised for public purposes. The alleged forged resolution directly violates those orders by trying to create rights in favour of the very occupants whom the Court had ordered to be evicted. 29.43. Violation of binding court orders, in itself, constitutes misconduct and, in appropriate cases, amounts to disgraceful conduct within the meaning of the statute. 29.44. A court order is not a mere advisory direction; it is a mandate issued under authority of law. All authorities, including elected representatives and statutory bodies, are constitutionally bound to comply with judicial orders. Any deliberate act that defeats, circumvents, or overreaches such orders strikes at the rule of law. - 157 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.45. When an elected representative, in the discharge of official duties, acts in a manner contrary to binding judicial directions, the misconduct assumes a heightened gravity. Such conduct does not merely involve a breach of administrative discipline; it undermines the authority of courts and erodes constitutional governance. In a democratic system founded upon separation of powers, obedience to judicial orders is a fundamental obligation. 29.46. Therefore, where there is material to show that an elected representative has consciously acted in violation of court orders, or has attempted to nullify their effect through improper means, such conduct would amount to serious misconduct. Given the fiduciary nature of public office and the higher standard expected of elected representatives, such behaviour may legitimately - 158 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 be characterised as disgraceful conduct, warranting statutory consequences. 29.47. From the above it is clear that 29.47.1. The acts attributed to the petitioners— forgery of Resolution No. 378, forging of the Municipal Commissioner's signature, and issuance of illegal possession certificates—clearly constitute "misconduct" within the meaning of Section 41(1)(d); 29.47.2. These acts also constitute "disgraceful conduct" as they are inherently dishonest, bring disrepute to the office, violate public trust, and violate court orders; 29.47.3. The acts were done "in the discharge of duties as councillors" as they involved the use of official capacity and official documents; - 159 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 29.47.4. Individual liability is established despite any collective aspect since the Petitioners have admittedly signed the forged resolution; 29.47.5. The misconduct is among the gravest kinds and warrants the most serious punishment, which is removal from office. 29.48. I answer Point no.3 by holding that, the alleged acts constitute both "misconduct" and "disgraceful conduct" within the meaning of Section 41(1)(d) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. 30. Answer to Point No. 4 — Whether the regional commissioner, while exercising quasi-judicial powers under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, was required to conduct a detailed enquiry with framing of specific charges, examination of witnesses, and consideration of defence evidence, in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court? 30.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that: - 160 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.1.1. The power under Section 41 is quasi-judicial in nature. Therefore, all procedural safeguards applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings must be followed; 30.1.2. Specific charges must be framed in writing. Charge memo must be issued to the petitioners; 30.1.3. All allegations must be detailed and clearly communicated to the petitioners; 30.1.4. Witnesses, if any, must be examined and cross-examined in the presence of the petitioners; 30.1.5. The petitioners must be given full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses; 30.1.6. A full-fledged inquiry is mandated by Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad, (2012) 4 SCC 407, particularly paras 30-36 extracted hereinabove; - 161 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.1.7. The Division Bench in WA No. 100124/2025 directed a "full-fledged enquiry", which has not been conducted; 30.1.8. The petitioners were not given opportunity to cross-examine the Municipal Commissioner or to hear his oral testimony; 30.1.9. The Regional Commissioner has not complied with the requirement of quasi-judicial proceedings. 30.2. The learned Advocate General submitted that: 30.2.1. While the power under Section 41 is quasi- judicial, the statutory language does not prescribe the exact procedure to be followed; 30.2.2. The statute only requires "an enquiry at which he has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause". It does not mandate framing of formal charges, examination of witnesses, or cross-examination; - 162 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.2.3. The nature and extent of enquiry depends on the nature of evidence. When the evidence is documentary and virtually conclusive, elaborate examination of witnesses is not necessary; 30.2.4. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir case does not mandate a full-fledged trial-like inquiry with examination of witnesses. It only requires compliance with principles of natural justice; 30.2.5. The Division Bench did not specifically mandate examination of witnesses. It only directed consideration of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir principles; 30.2.6. The petitioners have been given ample opportunity to explain their conduct. They appeared personally before the Regional Commissioner and filed detailed written submissions; - 163 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.2.7. The procedure followed by the Regional Commissioner is adequate and in compliance with principles of natural justice; 30.2.8. The allegations are based on documentary evidence that is conclusive. Examination of witnesses would not add anything to this evidence. 30.3. It is well-established that the power to remove a councillor under Section 41 is quasi-judicial in nature. 30.4. However, the quasi-judicial nature of the power does not necessarily mean that all procedural safeguards applicable to court trials must be followed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the procedures applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings are flexible and context-dependent. 30.5. The proviso to Section 41(1)(d) states: - 164 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 "Provided that no councillor shall be removed under clause (d) except after an inquiry at which he has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his removal." 30.6. The statute prescribes two things: 30.6.1. An inquiry; 30.6.2. Reasonable opportunity to show cause. 30.7. The statute does NOT prescribe: 30.7.1. Framing of formal charges; 30.7.2. Issuance of charge memo; 30.7.3. Appointment of an inquiry officer separate from the removing authority; 30.7.4. Examination of witnesses on oath; 30.7.5. Cross-examination of witnesses; 30.7.6. Any other specific procedural step. 30.8. When the statute does not prescribe a procedure, the removing authority has discretion to adopt a suitable procedure consistent with natural justice and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. - 165 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.9. It is a settled principle of administrative law that the requirements of natural justice are not rigid, mechanical, or of universal application in identical form. The content and extent of natural justice vary with the context in which the power is exercised, the statutory framework governing such exercise, the nature of the rights affected, and the consequences that follow. 30.10. The core requirement is that the procedure adopted must be “reasonable, fair and just.” Fairness, however, is not synonymous with an elaborate or trial-like process in every case. The law does not mandate that all proceedings must replicate the safeguards of a criminal trial. What is required is that the person affected must be given adequate notice of the case against him and a meaningful opportunity to respond. 30.11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands - 166 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of courts. It is not an inflexible formula to be mechanically applied irrespective of statutory context. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules; they are principles evolved to secure justice and prevent arbitrariness. Their application depends to a great extent on: 30.11.1. the facts and circumstances of the particular case, 30.11.2. the nature of the enquiry, 30.11.3. the statutory scheme under which action is taken, 30.11.4. the character and composition of the authority exercising power, and 30.11.5. the degree of civil or statutory consequences that may ensue. 30.12. In proceedings under a statute such as Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, the legislature has prescribed issuance of notice and consideration of explanation. The statute does - 167 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 not contemplate a formal adversarial trial with framing of charges, examination and cross- examination of witnesses as a matter of right. Therefore, importing the procedural model of criminal jurisprudence into such proceedings would amount to rewriting the statute. 30.13. Where the affected party is informed of the allegations, supplied with relevant material, granted time to submit explanation, and afforded opportunity of hearing and where the authority applies its mind to the explanation and records reasons the essential requirements of natural justice stand satisfied. The emphasis is on substance over form. What is impermissible is arbitrariness, pre-determination, or denial of meaningful opportunity; what is not required is procedural excess beyond the statutory mandate. - 168 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.14. It is equally well settled that natural justice cannot be stretched to a point where it paralyses administrative functioning or defeats statutory purpose. The doctrine exists to secure fairness, not to provide a tactical shield against legitimate statutory action. 30.15. Therefore, the test that must be applied is whether, in the totality of circumstances, the procedure adopted was fair, reasonable and proportionate to the nature of the allegations and the statutory framework. If that test is satisfied, the action cannot be invalidated merely because more elaborate safeguards were not provided. 30.16. The petitioners heavily rely on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad. A careful reading of that judgment shows that it does NOT mandate a trial-like inquiry with examination and cross-examination of witnesses. What it mandates is: - 169 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.16.1. Strict Adherence to Statutory Provisions: The authority must strictly follow the statutory procedure; 30.16.2. Principles of Natural Justice: Principles of natural justice must be given "full play"; 30.16.3. Full-Fledged Inquiry: There must be an enquiry that is not cursory or perfunctory. The exact words are: "If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office- bearer can be removed without holding a full- fledged inquiry." 30.16.4. However, "full-fledged inquiry" does not mean a trial-like inquiry. It means a proper, thorough, and fair inquiry. This can be conducted through examination of documentary evidence, hearing of the person proposed to be removed, and consideration of the explanation offered. - 170 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.16.5. Reasonable Opportunity: The person must be given "a fair opportunity of defence"; 30.16.6. Application of Mind: "The decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office- bearer sought to be removed." 30.16.7. Proved Misconduct: "A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term for which he has been elected and he can be removed only on a proved misconduct or any other procedure established under law." 30.16.8. None of these requirements mandate framing of formal charges or examination - 171 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of witnesses. They only mandate fairness, thoroughness, and application of mind. 30.17. A critical distinction must be drawn between: 30.17.1. "Full-Fledged Inquiry": A proper, thorough inquiry where all relevant facts are examined, all relevant evidence is considered, and the authority applies its mind to reach a decision. This is what Ravi Yashwant Bhoir mandates. 30.17.2. "Trial-Like Inquiry": A procedure that mirrors the procedures of a court, including examination of witnesses on oath, cross- examination, and application of rules of evidence. 30.17.3. The statute and the Supreme Court require the former, not the latter. - 172 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.18. The expression “full-fledged inquiry” must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the statutory framework, the nature of the power exercised, and the object sought to be achieved. It cannot be equated mechanically with a judicial trial or criminal prosecution. 30.19. A full-fledged inquiry does not mean a judicial inquiry in the strict sense, nor does it require replication of trial-like procedures such as formal framing of charges in the manner of a criminal court, examination and cross-examination of witnesses in every case, adherence to strict rules of evidence, or proof beyond reasonable doubt. Those safeguards are characteristic of criminal adjudication, where personal liberty is at stake. Administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, particularly under statutory provisions governing removal from office, operate within a different - 173 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 legal framework and are governed by different standards. 30.20. The requirement of a “full enquiry” signifies that the authority must not act in a casual, summary, or perfunctory manner. It must undertake a serious, structured, and fair examination of the allegations. The authority is required to: 30.20.1. Clearly inform the person concerned of the allegations and the material relied upon. 30.20.2. Afford reasonable opportunity to submit explanation and place relevant material in defence. 30.20.3. Consider the explanation objectively and in good faith. 30.20.4. Examine the relevant records and surrounding circumstances. 30.20.5. Apply independent mind to the material on record. - 174 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.20.6. Record reasons demonstrating that the decision is based on relevant considerations and not on extraneous factors. 30.21. The inquiry must be real and meaningful, not illusory. The authority must reach its conclusion on the basis of relevant material and logical reasoning, and the order must disclose application of mind. That is what renders the proceeding legally sustainable. 30.22. Importantly, the content of a full enquiry must be understood in the context of the statute under which action is taken. Where the statute requires issuance of notice and consideration of explanation, compliance with those requirements in a substantive manner satisfies the mandate of a full enquiry. Courts have consistently held that principles of natural justice are flexible and their application depends upon the nature of the proceeding and the statutory scheme. - 175 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.23. A contrary interpretation equating “full enquiry” with a full-fledged judicial trial in every case would amount to judicial legislation and would frustrate the legislative intent behind conferring administrative powers upon designated authorities. It would also render statutory provisions unworkable by importing procedural requirements not contemplated by the legislature. 30.24. Therefore, a full enquiry means a comprehensive, fair, and reasoned examination appropriate to the nature of the proceeding. It ensures substantive fairness, transparency, and accountability in decision-making, without unnecessarily importing formalities that belong exclusively to criminal trials. Such an understanding is consistent with established principles of administrative law and would withstand appellate scrutiny. - 176 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.25. In the present case, examination of witnesses was not necessary for the following reasons: 30.25.1. Documentary Evidence is Conclusive: The evidence is not based on oral testimony or matters of interpretation. The evidence consists of: 30.25.1.1. Official records of the City Municipal Council showing absence of the alleged resolution; 30.25.1.2. Categorical denial by the Municipal Commissioner that he signed the resolution; 30.25.1.3. Obvious irregularities in the document itself; 30.25.1.4. Expert opinion regarding forged signature. When documentary evidence is conclusive, examination of witnesses adds nothing. - 177 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.25.2. The Defence is Self-Evidently Untenable: The petitioners' defence is that "the resolution was validly passed by the Council". However, this defence is contradicted by the Council's own records. No amount of oral testimony can overcome this documentary contradiction. 30.26. The requirement of fairness under natural justice does not mandate unnecessarily prolonged proceedings in every case. The essence of natural justice lies in affording a meaningful opportunity to be heard and ensuring that the authority applies its mind to the material placed before it. It does not insist upon length for its own sake. 30.27. Where the material on record is clear, documentary in nature, and unambiguous, and where the defence offered is either admitted, - 178 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 unsupported, or untenable on the face of the record, the enquiry need not be elaborate. In such circumstances, the authority is not required to conduct an extended or ritualistic proceeding merely to demonstrate procedural formality. 30.28. If: 30.28.1. The relevant documents are undisputed or verifiable from official records, 30.28.2. The allegations are specific and supported by documentary material, 30.28.3. The person concerned has been given notice and opportunity to respond, and 30.28.4. The explanation does not displace or rebut the core material relied upon, then a brief but reasoned decision would satisfy the requirements of natural justice. - 179 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.29. The law does not require empty formalities. It requires fairness in substance. Where the facts speak for themselves and the defence fails to raise any genuine or triable issue, insisting on elaborate procedures would amount to elevating form over substance. 30.30. Thus, when evidence is clear and unambiguous, and the defence is legally untenable, an enquiry that is concise yet reasoned does not violate principles of natural justice, provided the affected party has been given a real opportunity to present his case and the authority has objectively considered it. 30.31. The Regional Commissioner conducted a "full- fledged inquiry" in the proper sense: 30.31.1. Notices Issued: The petitioners were issued notices calling for explanation, with specific allegations mentioned; - 180 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.31.2. Opportunity to Respond: The petitioners were given not one, but multiple opportunities to respond, first by submitting written explanation, then by appearing personally, then by submitting detailed written submissions after the Division Bench order; 30.31.3. Examination of Materials: The Regional Commissioner carefully examined all materials on record, including: 30.31.3.1. Official records of the City Municipal Council; 30.31.3.2. The forged resolution document; 30.31.3.3. The resolution register; 30.31.3.4. The original resolution (No. 378) relating to SFC grant; 30.31.3.5. The order of the criminal court declining to quash proceedings; - 181 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.31.3.6. The dismissal order of the Supreme Court regarding SLP; 30.31.4. Consideration of Explanation: The explanation offered by the petitioners was carefully considered. The Court has no reason to believe that the Regional Commissioner ignored or dismissed the explanation without consideration, nor has it been brought to the notice of this court as to which of the explanation/s offered by the petitioners was not considered; 30.31.5. Reasoned Decision: The Regional Commissioner passed a detailed reasoned order explaining why the explanation was not acceptable and why removal was warranted; 30.31.6. Application of Mind: The order shows clear application of mind to the specific allegations and the explanation offered. - 182 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.31.7. This constitutes a "full-fledged inquiry" in the proper sense. 30.32. The petitioners argue that the Municipal Commissioner should have been examined as a witness so that the petitioners could cross- examine him. This argument is without merit because: 30.32.1. His Statement was on Record: The Municipal Commissioner's denial of signing the resolution is on record and was before the Regional Commissioner. The petitioners had full knowledge of this denial and opportunity to rebut it; 30.32.2. Documentary Evidence Speaks Louder: The fact that the resolution does not appear in the Council's official records is more conclusive than any oral testimony. Even if the Municipal Commissioner admitted that - 183 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 he signed the resolution (which he does not), the absence from official records would speak volumes; 30.32.3. The Petitioners Did Not Deny: The petitioners did not formally deny that the signature is forged. They merely contended that the issue should be decided in the criminal court. This is not a cross- examination of the Municipal Commissioner but avoidance of the issue; 30.32.4. Examination Would Serve No Purpose: Even if the Regional Commissioner had examined the Municipal Commissioner and given opportunity for cross-examination, what new fact would emerge? The evidence would remain the same: 30.32.4.1. The resolution does not exist in official records; - 184 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.32.4.2. The signatures of the petitioners are undisputed; 30.32.4.3. The document has obvious irregularities. 30.33. None of these facts would change with examination and cross-examination. 30.34. The standard of proof in quasi-judicial proceedings like removal under Section 41 is the "balance of probabilities" or "preponderance of probabilities", not "beyond reasonable doubt" as in criminal proceedings. 30.35. The preponderance of probabilities test requires that the evidence in support of the allegation must outweigh the evidence against it. In the present case, the documentary evidence overwhelmingly establishes the allegations. The petitioners have not produced any credible - 185 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 counter-evidence. Therefore, the standard is easily met. 30.36. From the above it is clear that 30.36.1. While the power under Section 41 is quasi- judicial, it does not mandate trial-like procedures with examination and cross- examination of witnesses; 30.36.2. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir mandates fairness, thoroughness, and application of mind, not trial-like procedures; 30.36.3. "Full-fledged inquiry" means proper, thorough, and fair inquiry, not trial-like inquiry; 30.36.4. The Regional Commissioner conducted a full-fledged inquiry by examining all materials, affording the petitioners multiple opportunities to respond, and passing a reasoned decision; - 186 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 30.36.5. In the present case, given the documentary nature of the evidence, examination of witnesses was not necessary; 30.36.6. The procedure followed by the Regional Commissioner fully complies with Ravi Yashwant Bhoir principles and with principles of natural justice. 30.37. I answer Point No. 4 by holding that the Regional Commissioner was not required to conduct a detailed enquiry with framing of specific charges and examination of witnesses. The inquiry conducted was adequate, proper, and in compliance with law. 31. Answer to point No. 5 — Whether the impugned order of removal suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, colourable exercise of power, or extraneous considerations, particularly having regard to the timing of the order vis-à-vis the - 187 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 scheduled election to the posts of president and vice-president of the city municipal council? 31.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that: 31.1.1. The impugned order suffers from arbitrariness and mala fides as evidenced by the timing. The objections were filed on 27.02.2025 at 3 p.m., and the order was passed at 6:30 p.m. on the same day. This shows "mortal hurry and haste"; 31.1.2. The elections to the posts of President and Vice-President were scheduled for 28.02.2025 (next day). The removal order was passed in such haste to prevent the petitioners from voting in those elections; 31.1.3. The removal of three elected councillors results in reduction of the total number of council members, which helps the ruling - 188 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 party by changing the composition of the council in their favor; 31.1.4. The Regional Commissioner has passed an order to benefit the ruling party and not in public interest. This is extraneous consideration vitiating the order; 31.1.5. The entire proceeding is a vendetta against the petitioners for their political opposition or for their vote in the council; 31.1.6. An order passed in such haste, within 3.5 hours of the written submissions, cannot be a product of careful consideration; 31.1.7. The malice is evident from the fact that such drastic action was taken only after the scheduled elections were announced. 31.2. The learned Advocate General submits: 31.2.1. The timing of the order is explained by the chronology of events and is not indicative of mala fides. The proceedings were - 189 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 initiated on 31.01.2025. By 27.02.2025, the facts were already clear from the documentary evidence; 31.2.2. The order was passed on 27.02.2025 because the written submissions were filed on 27.02.2025 by 3 p.m., as directed by this Court's order in WP No. 101414/2025; 31.2.3. The Regional Commissioner had a duty to act once the misconduct was established. Delaying action would have been dereliction of duty, not good administration; 31.2.4. The speed of decision-making is commendable, not suspicious. A quick decision based on clear evidence is better administration than a delayed decision; 31.2.5. Even if removing the petitioners benefited the ruling party (which is not established), it does not make the action mala fide if the action was otherwise legally justified; - 190 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.2.6. The petitioners' political alignment or political consequences are irrelevant to the question of whether misconduct is established; 31.2.7. The allegations of misconduct had surfaced months earlier. It is not as if the action was taken suddenly or arbitrarily. 31.3. To establish mala fides, the petitioners must show that: 31.3.1. The authority acted for an improper purpose or with an improper motive; 31.3.2. The authority acted on extraneous considerations unrelated to the subject matter; 31.3.3. There is clear evidence of an improper motive that prompted the action. 31.4. It is a settled principle that mere suspicion, conjecture, or inference is not sufficient to - 191 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 establish mala fides. Allegations of bad faith are serious in nature and must be supported by cogent, specific and convincing material. Courts have repeatedly held that mala fides cannot be presumed; they must be clearly pleaded and strictly proved. 31.5. To establish mala fides, it is not enough to demonstrate that the impugned action had an incidental consequence of benefiting a third party. Administrative actions often have collateral effects. The mere fact that someone derives advantage from a decision does not, by itself, render the decision mala fide. 31.6. What must be established is that the action was taken because of the desire to confer that benefit, that the alleged improper purpose was the real motive behind the decision. In other words, the benefit to the third party must be shown to be the express or dominant reason - 192 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 for the action, and not merely a consequential or incidental outcome. 31.7. The burden of proving mala fides lies heavily on the person who alleges it. The pleadings must be specific, the material must be credible, and the inference must be inescapable. Bald assertions, general allegations, or speculative conclusions do not satisfy this requirement. 31.8. Thus, unless there is clear material to demonstrate that the authority acted with an improper motive or for an extraneous purpose, the action cannot be invalidated on the ground of mala fides merely because it incidentally benefited or disadvantaged a particular party. 31.9. A careful examination of the timeline shows that the action was neither hasty nor arbitrary: - 193 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 - 14.08.2024: FIR registered against the petitioners and others for forgery; - 24.01.2025: Municipal Commissioner submitted proposal to Deputy Commissioner for action against petitioners under Section 41; - 28.01.2025: Deputy Commissioner forwarded the proposal to Regional Commissioner; - 31.01.2025: Regional Commissioner issued show-cause notice; - 06.02.2025: Notice served on petitioners; - 07.02.2025: Another notice issued fixing hearing on 13.02.2025; - 194 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 - 13.02.2025: Petitioners appeared before Regional Commissioner. Regional Commissioner passed an order removing the petitioners; - 14.02.2025: Order challenged in WP No. 101414/2025; - 24.02.2025: WP No. 101414/2025 partly allowed. Liberty granted to file reply by 27.02.2025 by 3 p.m.; - 27.02.2025: Petitioners filed reply at 3 p.m. Regional Commissioner considered the reply and passed the impugned order at 6:30 p.m.; - 28.02.2025: Elections to posts of President and Vice-President scheduled. - 195 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.10. This timeline shows that the proceeding was initiated in late January 2025, well before the elections were scheduled. The final decision came only after the petitioners had filed their detailed reply. There was nothing hasty or arbitrary about this timeline. 31.11. The petitioners argue that the order was passed at 6:30 p.m. on the same day the reply was filed, showing "mortal hurry and haste". This argument is without merit because: 31.11.1. The Facts Were Already Clear: By 27.02.2025, the Regional Commissioner had already examined the documentary evidence thoroughly. The resolution register, the forged document, and the official records were already before him; 31.11.2. The Reply Did Not Add Material Facts: The petitioners' reply of 27.02.2025 did not - 196 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 introduce any new documentary evidence that would require further investigation. It was merely an explanation of their conduct; 31.11.3. Only 3.5 Hours But Clear Conclusion: The decision to remove could be made within 3.5 hours because the evidence was clear and the law was settled. The Regional Commissioner did not need days to reach this conclusion; 31.11.4. Speed is Not a Vice: In administrative law, speed of decision-making is not a vice. In fact, delayed decision on clear facts is a vice. 31.11.5. A prompt decision taken on the basis of clear, undisputed and reliable material is not only permissible but commendable. Administrative authorities are entrusted with responsibility to act decisively when the facts are evident and the legal position - 197 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 is clear. Unnecessary delay in such circumstances may defeat the purpose of the statute and allow continuing harm to public interest. 31.11.6. Where documentary evidence is clear, records are unambiguous, and the explanation offered does not displace the material relied upon, the authority is not required to prolong proceedings merely to demonstrate procedural length. Efficiency and fairness are not mutually exclusive. A reasoned and timely decision based on cogent material reflects responsible governance. 31.11.7. On the other hand, delay in acting upon clear facts may amount to administrative inertia. Prolonged inaction can result in continued loss to public exchequer, erosion of institutional credibility, or perpetuation - 198 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of illegality. The law does not expect authorities to remain passive when material justifying action is available. 31.11.8. Thus, promptness, when accompanied by due consideration and observance of natural justice, is a virtue in administrative decision-making. What is prohibited is haste without application of mind; what is encouraged is timely action grounded in clear evidence and reasoned satisfaction. 31.11.9. The Reply Confirmed, Did Not Change, the Position: The reply filed by the petitioners, instead of offering a credible defence, actually confirmed the allegations, since the signatures were admitted passing of the resolution was pleaded, even when there was no such resolution on the records of the Municipal Council. The reply having admitted the facts and having failed to - 199 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 rebut them, the Regional Commissioner has legitimately reached his conclusion quickly. 31.12. The petitioners argue that the removal "helps the ruling party" by reducing the number of council members. Even if this is true, it is irrelevant to the question of whether the order is legal. 31.13. The legality of an administrative action must be tested on the touchstone of statutory authority, procedural fairness, and relevance of considerations. It cannot be invalidated merely because it has incidental political consequences. 31.14. In a democratic framework, many decisions taken under law may incidentally alter political equations or affect the strength of a party within a body. Such consequences, by themselves, do not render the action illegal. The decisive question is not whether the action produces political fallout, but whether it is justified on its - 200 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 merits under the governing statute. 31.15. If the authority acts within jurisdiction, follows the prescribed procedure, considers relevant material, and records reasons, the action must be upheld even if it incidentally benefits or disadvantages a political grouping. Courts do not sit in judgment over political consequences; they examine legality. 31.16. To hold otherwise would paralyse statutory governance. Any lawful action against an elected representative could then be challenged merely on the ground that it alters political balance. That is not the test. The test is whether the action is lawful, fair, and supported by material. 31.17. Therefore, where the impugned action is justified on its merits and complies with statutory requirements, the existence of incidental political consequences does not vitiate it. - 201 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.18. Moreover, the petitioners have not established that the reduction of council members would indeed benefit the ruling party. The composition of the council after removal would depend on various factors, which the petitioners have not analysed and submitted. 31.19. The petitioners allege that the action is a vendetta against them for their political opposition. However, there is no evidence to support this allegation. What is evident is: 31.19.1. Clear Misconduct: The misconduct (forgery of resolution, forged signature) is clearly established by documentary evidence; 31.19.2. Independent Complaint: The complaint was filed by the Municipal Commissioner, not by any political party or political rival of the petitioners; - 202 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.19.3. Criminal Courts Validated the Complaint: The criminal court, in its discretion, found the complaint credible enough to require investigation. The criminal court declined to quash the FIR; 31.19.4. The Supreme Court Did Not Interfere: When the petitioners challenged the criminal court order before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge without finding the complaint to be frivolous; 31.19.5. No Prior Pattern: This is not a case where the Regional Commissioner has acted arbitrarily against many people. There is no evidence of a vendetta pattern. 31.20. The allegation of vendetta is a convenient but unsubstantiated assertion. - 203 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.21. The petitioners argue that the order was passed to prevent them from voting in the elections scheduled for 28.02.2025. This argument suffers from several defects: 31.21.1. Causal Relationship Not Established: Merely because the order was passed before the elections does not establish that it was passed because of the elections. The Regional Commissioner had a duty to pass the order once the misconduct was established; 31.21.2. Legitimate Purpose: Even if the order prevented the petitioners from voting (which is a consequence of removal), it was a legitimate consequence flowing from the removal, not the motive for the removal; 31.21.3. Decisions Cannot Be Delayed for Elections: If the Regional Commissioner had deferred action until after the elections, - 204 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 he might be accused of being guided by extraneous considerations (giving the petitioners opportunity to vote). A court cannot expect the Regional Commissioner to defer a legally justified action because of impending elections; 31.21.4. The Elections Were Scheduled Later: The elections were not scheduled before the proceedings were initiated. The elections were scheduled much later (28.02.2025), after the proceedings had been underway for nearly a month; 31.21.5. The Action Was Not Timed for Elections: If the action was timed for elections, the Regional Commissioner would have acted earlier (immediately after initiation of proceedings) or deferred action until after elections. The fact that the action came in between (late in the proceedings - 205 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 but before elections) does not suggest that the action was timed for elections. 31.22. To establish mala fides, the petitioners must prove it by clear and cogent evidence. 31.23. Mala fides is a serious allegation. It imputes improper motive, bad faith, or abuse of power. Such an allegation cannot be lightly made or casually inferred. 31.24. It is well settled that mala fides cannot be deduced merely from the consequences of an action. An administrative decision may produce adverse effects, benefit certain persons, or alter existing positions. These consequences, by themselves, do not establish bad faith. What must be shown is that the action was motivated by an improper purpose or was influenced by extraneous considerations unrelated to the statutory object. - 206 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.25. There must be clear, specific and cogent material to demonstrate that the authority acted not for the purpose contemplated by law, but for some collateral or ulterior motive. Suspicion, conjecture, or inference drawn from surrounding circumstances is insufficient unless supported by credible evidence. 31.26. The burden of proving mala fides lies heavily on the person who alleges it. Courts have repeatedly held that allegations of bad faith must be pleaded with precision and proved with convincing material. Vague or general assertions do not meet this standard. Since mala fides is often alleged but rarely established, courts exercise caution and do not readily infer improper motive unless the evidence is clear, unambiguous and compelling. 31.27. Therefore, in the absence of specific material demonstrating extraneous considerations or - 207 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 deliberate abuse of power, the action of a statutory authority cannot be set aside merely on allegations of mala fides. 31.28. In the present case, the petitioners have not discharged this burden. They have merely raised suspicions based on timing, which are inherently ambiguous and susceptible to multiple interpretations. 31.29. In administrative law, when the evidence supports the action and when there is a benign interpretation consistent with the facts, courts should adopt the benign interpretation. 31.30. If an impugned action is capable of being explained consistently with statutory authority and can be justified on its merits by reference to relevant material, courts ought not to infer mala fides merely because another possible interpretation may suggest an improper motive. - 208 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.31. Administrative decisions often admit of more than one interpretation. The existence of an alternative narrative or a speculative inference of bad faith does not, by itself, invalidate the action. The court’s task is to examine whether the decision is legally sustainable, supported by relevant considerations, and taken within jurisdiction. 31.32. Where the record discloses a lawful basis for the action, and the reasons furnished are germane to the statutory purpose, the court will not substitute conjecture for evidence. Mala fides cannot be presumed simply because the action is adverse to the petitioner or politically inconvenient. It must be affirmatively established by clear and cogent material. 31.33. Thus, if the action is objectively defensible in law and on facts, courts should refrain from attributing improper motive merely because a - 209 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 different interpretation is conceivable. The doctrine of mala fides requires proof of deliberate misuse of power, not the mere possibility of it. 31.34. In the present case, the action can be easily explained consistently with the law: 31.34.1. The Regional Commissioner received the proposal for action on 28.01.2025; 31.34.2. He initiated proceedings on 31.01.2025; 31.34.3. He heard the petitioners on 13.02.2025 and passed an order, which was challenged; 31.34.4. The court partly allowed the challenge and directed further opportunity; 31.34.5. The Regional Commissioner afforded that opportunity and received the reply on 27.02.2025; 31.34.6. He carefully considered the reply and the materials and decided to uphold the removal. - 210 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.35. This is a straightforward, chronologically rational sequence. There is no need to invoke mala fides or extraneous considerations. 31.36. A careful reading of the impugned order shows that the Regional Commissioner has: 31.36.1. Examined all the materials on record; 31.36.2. Considered the explanation offered by the petitioners; 31.36.3. Applied the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir case; 31.36.4. Distinguished between the contentions of the petitioners and the facts; 31.36.5. Reached a clear conclusion with reasons; 31.36.6. Shown that the statutory requirements of Section 41 are satisfied. 31.37. The order does not appear to be the order of a person acting arbitrarily or with mala fides. It - 211 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 appears to be the order of a person who has applied his mind carefully to the materials. 31.38. From the above it is clear that 31.38.1. The allegation of mala fides is not substantiated by clear and cogent evidence; 31.38.2. The timing of the order is explained by the chronology of events and is not suspicious; 31.38.3. The speed of decision-making (within 3.5 hours) is permissible when the facts are clear; 31.38.4. The political consequences, even if they exist, do not make a legally justified action illegal; 31.38.5. The allegation of vendetta is not proved; 31.38.6. The order was passed because the misconduct was established, not because of extraneous considerations; - 212 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 31.38.7. The Regional Commissioner applied his mind carefully to reach his decision; 31.38.8. The impugned order does NOT suffer from arbitrariness, mala fides, or colourable exercise of power. 31.39. I Answer Point No. 5 by holding that the impugned order does not suffer from arbitrariness, mala fides, colourable exercise of power, or extraneous considerations. 32. Answer to Point No. 6 — Whether the drastic consequence of removal and consequential disqualification of the petitioners is disproportionate and unsustainable in law, having regard to the constitutional mandate protecting democratic local self-government and the rights of the electorate? 32.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that: - 213 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.1.1. Removal from office and disqualification for four years is a drastic consequence. It affects not just the petitioners but also the electorate who have chosen them; 32.1.2. The doctrine of proportionality requires that the punishment must fit the crime. Here, the consequence is grossly disproportionate; 32.1.3. The Constitution protects local self- government through Part IX-A. This protection should not be lightly disregarded; 32.1.4. The rights of the electorate to be represented by their chosen representatives should be respected; 32.1.5. The disqualification prevents the petitioners from contesting the elections scheduled for January 2027, which is a grave consequence; 32.1.6. The petitioners may ultimately be acquitted in the criminal case. If they are acquitted, - 214 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 removal based on charges that are later found to be baseless would be unjust; 32.1.7. The doctrine of proportionality, requires that the punishment should not shock the judicial conscience. 32.2. The learned Advocate General submits: 32.2.1. The doctrine of proportionality must be applied by comparing the gravity of the misconduct with the severity of the punishment; 32.2.2. In the present case, the misconduct (forgery of documents, forging of signatures, violation of court orders) is among the gravest. It goes to the root of honesty and integrity; 32.2.3. Removal is the only appropriate punishment for such grave misconduct. Lesser punishment would be inadequate; - 215 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.2.4. The constitutional protection for local self- government is not a protection for persons who abuse their office. It is a protection for honest, accountable local self-government; 32.2.5. The petitioners have betrayed the trust of the electorate who voted for them. Removal serves the interests of the electorate, not undermines it; 32.2.6. The doctrine of proportionality does not require courts to be lenient with persons guilty of grave misconduct; 32.2.7. The disqualification is a statutory consequence under Section 16 of the KMA. Once removal is justified, disqualification follows automatically; 32.2.8. Even if the petitioners are acquitted in the criminal case, the administrative proceedings stand on their own merits - 216 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 based on the administrative standard of proof. 32.3. The doctrine of proportionality requires that the punishment must be proportionate to the misconduct. This doctrine does not require courts to be lenient with wrongdoers. It requires courts to ensure that the punishment is not grossly out of proportion to the misconduct. 32.4. In the present case, removal is NOT grossly disproportionate to the misconduct. Rather, it is the only appropriate punishment. 32.5. To assess proportionality, one must first assess the gravity of the misconduct. The misconduct in the present case is extremely grave: - 217 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.5.1. Forgery of Official Documents: Creating a forged resolution purporting to be passed by the City Municipal Council is a serious criminal act. It involves deliberate dishonesty and fraud; 32.5.2. Forging Signatures: Forging the signature of the Municipal Commissioner is an even more serious act. It is a criminal offence under the Indian Penal Code; 32.5.3. Violation of Court Orders: By creating a resolution contrary to this Court's orders in WP No. 112012/2019, the petitioners have shown contempt for judicial authority; 32.5.4. Betrayal of Public Trust: Elected representatives are trustees of public property and public interest. By forging documents to benefit unauthorised occupants and defeat court orders, the - 218 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 petitioners have betrayed the public trust in the most serious manner; 32.5.5. Harm to Municipal Interests: The petitioners' conduct has caused substantial harm to the Municipality. Unauthorised occupants have obtained documents that might be used to claim rights over valuable municipal property; 32.5.6. Attempted Deception of Court: The forged resolution was actually produced before this Court in WA No. 100488/2022. The petitioners tried to use the forged document to mislead the Court; 32.5.7. Pattern of Misconduct: The misconduct is not a one-time error but a planned, deliberate scheme involving multiple acts— creation of fake resolution, forging of signature, issuance of possession - 219 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 certificates, production of forged document before Court. 32.6. Measured against these factors, the misconduct is among the gravest kinds of misconduct that can be committed by an elected representative. 32.7. When we compare the misconduct in this case with other cases where removal has been upheld, we find that the present case involves more serious misconduct: 32.7.1. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad, the removal was for alleged nepotism and improper appointment. Removal was upheld; 32.7.2. In Indrajit Barua v. Election Commission, the disqualification for corrupt electoral practices was upheld; - 220 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.7.3. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab, the removal for improper proceedings was upheld; 32.8. In the present case, the misconduct (forgery and fraud) is more serious than nepotism, improper appointment, or administrative default. Therefore, removal is certainly justified. 32.9. The doctrine of proportionality requires courts to ask the following questions: 32.9.1. Is the punishment authorized by law? YES. Section 41 authorizes removal, and Section 16 provides for disqualification. 32.9.2. Is the punishment linked to a legitimate governmental objective? YES. Removal from office and disqualification are linked to the objective - 221 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of maintaining integrity of local self- government and protecting public trust. 32.9.3. Is there a rational connection between the punishment and the objective? YES. A person guilty of forgery and fraud cannot be allowed to continue in a position of public trust. Removal and disqualification maintain the integrity of local self- government. 32.9.4. Is the punishment minimally impairing of rights? The answer is more nuanced here. Removal is severe, but it is the only punishment that adequately addresses the gravity of the misconduct. Lesser punishment (like suspension or demotion) would be inadequate for crimes like forgery. 32.9.5. Is the effect proportionate to the important objective? YES. The objective, - 222 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 maintaining integrity of local self- government, is critical to democracy. The effect, removal and disqualification, is proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct that undermines this objective. 32.10. In conclusion, when the doctrine of proportionality is properly applied, removal is found to be proportionate and justified. 32.11. The petitioners invoke the constitutional protection for local self-government under Part IX-A of the Constitution. This Court acknowledges the importance of this constitutional mandate. However, the Court notes: 32.11.1. The Protection is Not Absolute: The constitutional protection for local self- government is not a protection for - 223 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 dishonest or fraudulent self-government. It is a protection for honest, accountable, and transparent local self-government; 32.11.2. The Constitution Assumes Integrity: The Constitution's mandate for local self- government is based on the assumption that local representatives will be honest and accountable. When that assumption is violated, the constitutional protection cannot shield the wrongdoer; 32.11.3. The Constitution Also Protects Public Interest: The Constitution protects both local self-government and public interest. When they conflict, public interest prevails. Here, public interest requires removal of persons guilty of forgery; 32.11.4. Democratic Legitimacy is Not Unlimited: While elected representatives have democratic legitimacy, that legitimacy - 224 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 is conditional on discharging their duties honestly and lawfully. When that condition is violated, removal is not only justified but necessary. 32.12. The petitioners argue that removal violates the rights of the electorate who chose them. However, this argument is fallacious. The electorate's right is to honest representation, not to representation by persons guilty of forgery and fraud. When elected representatives betray the trust placed in them, removal serves the interests of the electorate, not undermines it. 32.13. The petitioners were not elected to forge documents and defraud the electorate. They were elected to serve the electorate. When they engage in forgery, removal is in the interest of the electorate. - 225 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.14. The petitioners argue that they might be acquitted in the criminal case, and if they are, removal would be unjust. However, this argument is without merit because: 32.14.1. Independence of Proceedings: The administrative proceedings stand on their own merits. They are not dependent on the outcome of criminal proceedings; 32.14.2. Different Standard of Proof: Even if the petitioners are acquitted in the criminal case (which requires proof "beyond reasonable doubt"), they can still be found guilty in administrative proceedings (which requires proof on the "balance of probabilities"); 32.14.3. Different Objective: The objective of criminal proceedings is to punish crime. The objective of administrative proceedings is to determine whether the person is fit to - 226 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 hold public office. A person may be acquitted of crime but still be found unfit to hold public office; 32.14.4. Unlikely Acquittal: In the present case, the evidence of forgery is virtually conclusive. An acquittal would be surprising. Even if an acquittal occurs, it would not affect the present order; 32.14.5. It is a well-established principle that criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings operate in distinct spheres and are governed by different standards and objectives. 32.14.6. In a criminal case, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The object is to determine penal liability and impose punishment under criminal law. In contrast, disciplinary proceedings are concerned with the conduct of the - 227 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 individual in relation to service, office, or statutory responsibility. The standard of proof in such proceedings is based on preponderance of probabilities and reasonable satisfaction of the authority. 32.14.7. Therefore, a person may be acquitted in a criminal case for want of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and yet be found guilty in disciplinary proceedings on the basis of material that satisfies the lesser standard applicable therein. An acquittal, particularly one based on benefit of doubt or technical grounds, does not automatically nullify or invalidate disciplinary action already taken. 32.14.8. The two proceedings are independent. The outcome of one does not necessarily conclude the other. What is decisive in disciplinary action is whether the authority has, after following due procedure, - 228 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 independently assessed the material and arrived at a reasoned conclusion regarding misconduct. 32.14.9. Accordingly, acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto wipe out disciplinary findings nor does it mandate reinstatement or restoration of office, if the disciplinary action is otherwise lawful and supported by evidence. 32.15. A comparative harm analysis shows that removal is justified: 32.16. Harm if Petitioners Continue in Office: 32.16.1. Erosion of public confidence in municipal administration; 32.16.2. Continued danger that petitioners might engage in further misconduct; 32.16.3. Signal to other elected representatives that forgery and fraud are tolerated; - 229 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.16.4. Violation of court orders (if the petitioners continue to benefit the unauthorised occupants); 32.16.5. Loss of valuable municipal property through fraudulent documents. 32.17. Harm if Petitioners are Removed: 32.17.1. The petitioners are removed from office (which they have abused); 32.17.2. The petitioners are disqualified for four years (which is the statutory consequence of removal); 32.17.3. The electorate loses the specific representatives (but they are replaced through democratic processes). 32.18. Comparing the two sets of harms, it is clear that allowing the petitioners to continue would cause more serious harm. - 230 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.19. Removal is not merely justified but necessary and urgent because: 32.19.1. Prevention of Future Harm: If the petitioners are allowed to continue, they might attempt further misconduct; 32.19.2. Maintenance of Public Confidence: Continued presence of persons guilty of forgery would erode public confidence in municipal administration; 32.19.3. Restoration of Rule of Law: Allowing persons who violate court orders to continue in office would undermine the rule of law; 32.19.4. Deterrence: Removal sends a signal to other elected representatives that forgery and fraud will not be tolerated. 32.20. From the above it is clear that - 231 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.20.1. The misconduct (forgery, fraud, violation of court orders) is among the gravest kinds; 32.20.2. Removal is proportionate and justified when compared to the gravity of the misconduct; 32.20.3. The doctrine of proportionality does not require leniency with persons guilty of grave misconduct; 32.20.4. The constitutional protection for local self- government does not shield dishonest representation; 32.20.5. The rights of the electorate are best served by the removal of unfit representatives; 32.20.6. The possible acquittal in criminal proceedings does not affect the validity of administrative action; 32.20.7. Removal is necessary to maintain public confidence and rule of law; - 232 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 32.20.8. The consequence of removal and disqualification is proportionate and not shocking to the judicial conscience. 32.21. I Answer Point No.6 by holding that the consequence of removal and disqualification is not disproportionate. It is proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct and necessary in the interest of public and democratic governance. 33. Answer to Point No. 7:— Whether the notification dated 29.07.2024 appointing an administrator to the city municipal council, gadag-betageri, is valid and in accordance with Sections 3 and 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964? 33.1. The learned Advocate General submits: 33.1.1. The appointment of an administrator was made under Section 315 of the KMA, which permits the Government to appoint an administrator in specified circumstances; - 233 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.1.2. The term of the President and Vice- President of the CMC expired on 24.07.2024; 33.1.3. Elections to these posts could not be held immediately due to various reasons; 33.1.4. The Government, in exercise of power under Section 315, appointed an administrator to ensure continuity of municipal administration; 33.1.5. The appointment was temporary in nature, pending elections; 33.1.6. The appointment was within the legal powers of the Government. 33.2. Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, provides for the appointment of an administrator in specified circumstances and reads as under: - 234 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 315. Power to appoint administrator in certain cases.—(1) Whenever,— (a) any general election to a municipal council under this Act or any proceedings consequent thereon have been stayed by an order of a competent court or authority, or (b) the election of all the councillors or more than two- thirds of the whole number of councillors of the municipal council has been declared by a competent court or authority to be void, or (c) Omitted (d) all the councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole number of councillors of the municipal council have resigned, so however, the total period of such appointment shall not exceed six months the State Government shall by notification in the official Gazette, appoint an administrator for such period as may be specified in the notification and may, by like notification, curtail and extend either prospectively or retrospectively the period of such appointment. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, on the appointment of an administrator under sub-section (1), during the period of such appointment, the said municipal council and committees thereof and the President and Vice-president charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, or any other law, shall cease to exercise any powers and perform and discharge any duties or functions conferred or imposed on them by or under this Act or any other law and all such powers shall be exercised and all such duties and functions shall be performed and discharged by the administrator. (3) The State Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint an advisory council to advise and assist the administrator appointed under sub-section (1) in the exercise of the powers and the performance and discharge of the duties and functions conferred or imposed on him under this Act or any other law. The members of the advisory council shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government - 235 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.3. Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, confers statutory authority upon the State Government to appoint an Administrator in specified contingencies where the normal functioning of a Municipal Council is disrupted. The provision is a safeguard mechanism intended to prevent administrative vacuum and ensure continuity of civic governance. 33.4. It contemplates situations where elections are stayed, declared void, or where the Council becomes non-functional in terms of its elected composition. Upon appointment of an Administrator, the powers and duties of the Council and its executive office-bearers are temporarily vested in the Administrator. 33.5. The provision must be construed purposively. Its object is not punitive; it is institutional and functional. It exists to ensure that municipal - 236 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 administration, which concerns essential public services, does not collapse due to transitional or exceptional circumstances. 33.6. The material facts are undisputed and form the foundation of the State’s action: 33.6.1. The President and Vice-President of the City Municipal Council were elected on 24.01.2022 for a statutory tenure of two and a half years; 33.6.2. Their term expired on 24.07.2024 by efflux of time; 33.6.3. Upon such expiry, the Council was left without its executive leadership; 33.6.4. Elections to these posts were not immediately conducted upon expiry of tenure. 33.7. Thus, from 24.07.2024 onward, the statutory offices of President and Vice-President stood - 237 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 vacant. The Council, though continuing in composition, lacked its executive head responsible for implementing statutory functions. 33.8. It is a well-recognised principle of municipal law that executive continuity is indispensable to governance. The President and Vice-President are not ceremonial figures; they perform statutory and administrative functions necessary for day-to-day operations. In the absence of elected executive office-bearers, the machinery of administration cannot function effectively. 33.9. Where elections cannot be held immediately, whether due to administrative reasons, procedural requirements, or ongoing proceedings, the Government is not merely empowered but obligated to ensure continuity. Failure to act would amount to abdication of constitutional responsibility. - 238 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.10. It is crucial to distinguish between removal of elected Councillors under Section 41 and appointment of an Administrator under Section 315. The former is punitive and individual in character; the latter is structural and temporary. Appointment of an Administrator does not dissolve the Council in the present case, nor does it extinguish the democratic mandate. It merely vests executive powers in a neutral authority until elections are conducted. 33.11. Thus, the impugned notification does not constitute removal of elected representatives but is a stop-gap institutional arrangement to prevent paralysis of municipal administration. 33.12. The notification dated 29.07.2024 is explicitly temporary in character: 33.12.1. It was issued immediately after expiry of tenure to avoid administrative vacuum; - 239 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.12.2. It was made pending conduct of elections to the posts of President and Vice- President; 33.12.3. It does not purport to permanently substitute elected governance; 33.12.4. The statutory scheme itself contemplates curtailment or extension depending upon circumstances. 33.13. Therefore, the character of the action is transitional, not structural. 33.14. The necessity of the appointment cannot be overstated: 33.14.1. Municipal Councils are constitutional entities under Part IX-A of the Constitution; 33.14.2. They discharge essential public functions including sanitation, infrastructure maintenance, licensing, taxation, urban planning, and regulation of markets; - 240 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.14.3. These functions are continuous and cannot be suspended merely because executive offices fall vacant; 33.14.4. The State, under the constitutional scheme, bears supervisory responsibility to ensure that municipal institutions function effectively; 33.14.5. In the absence of elected executive leadership, appointment of an Administrator is the only legally viable mechanism to ensure continuity. 33.15. The petitioners contend that the conditions precedent under Section 315 were not satisfied. However: 33.15.1. The challenge is vague and lacks specificity as to which statutory precondition was violated; - 241 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.15.2. The undisputed factual position is that the executive offices stood vacant and elections were not immediately held; 33.15.3. The power under Section 315 must be interpreted pragmatically to address precisely such situations; 33.15.4. No material has been placed to demonstrate that the State acted without jurisdiction or beyond statutory limits. 33.15.5. No material is places on record to indicate that the elections were not held due to malafide reasons. 33.16. As regards duration of the Administrator’s tenure, the Court must examine the surrounding circumstances: 33.16.1. The initial appointment followed immediately upon expiry of tenure; - 242 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.16.2. Elections were notified on 20.02.2025 and scheduled for 28.02.2025; 33.16.3. Legal proceedings initiated by the petitioners, including challenges to removal and related matters, contributed to delay in stabilising executive functioning; 33.16.4. The tenure of the Administrator must therefore be viewed in context, not in isolation; 33.16.5. No evidence has been produced to demonstrate deliberate delay or mala fide intent on part of the Government. 33.17. The constitutional challenge under Part IX-A is unsustainable. 33.17.1. Part IX-A guarantees democratic local self- government but does not render the State powerless in transitional situations; - 243 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.17.2. Article 243E itself contemplates tenure, dissolution, and reconstitution mechanisms; 33.17.3. The Constitution recognises that governance must continue even during transition between elected bodies; 33.17.4. A temporary appointment pending elections preserves, rather than destroys, the constitutional structure; 33.17.5. The power exercised here is regulatory and supervisory, not destructive. 33.18. Judicial scrutiny of administrative action is limited to examining legality, jurisdiction, procedural fairness, and absence of mala fides. The present notification satisfies each of these tests: 33.18.1. It is traceable to express statutory authority under Section 315; - 244 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 33.18.2. It addresses an undisputed administrative vacuum; 33.18.3. It is temporary and transitional in nature; 33.18.4. It does not dissolve the Council nor extinguish the democratic mandate; 33.18.5. It does not violate constitutional provisions; 33.18.6. There is no material to establish arbitrariness or mala fide exercise of power. 33.19. The appellate court, while reviewing such action, would examine whether the State acted within jurisdiction and whether the decision is reasonable in the Wednesbury sense. On the facts presented, the decision cannot be characterised as irrational, disproportionate, or extraneous to statutory purpose. 33.20. Accordingly, the notification dated 29.07.2024 appointing an Administrator is a lawful exercise - 245 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 of statutory power, justified by administrative necessity, consistent with constitutional structure, and not liable to be quashed. 33.21. I Answer Point No.7 by holding that the notification dated 29.07.2024 appointing an Administrator is valid and in accordance with law. The appointment was necessary and temporary, pending conduct of elections. 34. Answer to Point No. 8 :— What Order? 34.1. In view of my answers to Point No. 1 to 8 I pass the following ORDER i. Writ Petitions are DISMISSED. ii. The impugned order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Regional Commissioner, Belagavi Division, under Section 41 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, - 246 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC-D:2244 WP No. 101601 of 2025 C/W WP No. 105810 of 2025 removing the petitioners (in WP No. 101601/2025) from their office as Councillors of the City Municipal Council, Gadag-Betageri, is upheld as valid, legal, and within jurisdiction. iii. The notification dated 29.07.2024 appointing an Administrator to the City Municipal Council, Gadag-Betageri (challenged in WP No. 105810/2025) is upheld as valid and in accordance with law. iv. Elections to the posts of President and Vice- President of the City Municipal Council, Gadag-Betageri, are directed to be conducted within a period of 45 days from the date of this judgment. Sd/- (SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE LN/- List No.: 19 Sl No.: 1