2026:JHHC:4264 1 C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025 Smt. Megha Singh, aged about 25 years, wife of Anikt Kumar Singh and daughter of Rajesh Kumar Singh, resident of Abhishek Enclave, Flat No. 302, Hesag, near Devi Mandir, P.O. Hatia, P.S. Jagannathpur, District Ranchi, Jharkhand-834003, Hatia, presently residing at Village Dumri Bujurg, P.O. & P.S. Nayagaon, District - Saran (Bihar). …....... Petitioner(s) Vrs. Sri Ankit Kumar Singh, son of Anil Kumar Singh resident of Abhishek Enclave, Flat No. 302, Hesag, Hatia, near Devi Mandir, P.O.- Hatia, P.S.- Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand-834003 .......... Opposite Party(s) ….... CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Anurag Kashyap, Advocate For the Opposite Party(s) : Mr. Rohit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Vijay Shankar, Advocate Mr. Paritosh Rai, Advocate Mr. M.I. Hassan, Advocate Mr. Andai Brahma, Advocate Mrs. Neha Priya, Advocate 04/16.02.2026 Learned counsel for the opposite party at the outset has made objection regarding maintainability of the present C.M.P. and submitted that in view of the issue involved a first appeal is maintainable and not a C.M.P. 2. In support of his contention he has relied upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vimlendu Kumar Jha Vrs. Minal Bhatnagar passed in Special Leave to Appeal(C) Nos. 28174- 28175/2025 dated 09.10.2025, which is quoted hereunder: Leave granted. Learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondent(s) submitted that CM(M) No.2800 of 2024 was filed prior to the pronouncement of the judgment of the full bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr. Geetanjali Aggarwal vs. Dr.Manoj Aggarwal (2024 SCC Online Del 7220}. On the day this CM(M) NO.2800 of 2014 was filed, there was no bar to file a Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as such a bar, if any 2026:JHHC:4264 2 C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025 created by the pronouncement of the Full Bench, had not yet come into existence. In the circumstances, the question of maintainability of the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner herein does not arise in the instant case. Consequently, we set aside the impugned order dated 11.09.2025. We request the High Court to consider CM(M) No.2800 of 2024 on merits and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the order dated 30.05.2025 need not be gone into on merits, as the said order pertains to visitation rights during the summer vacation and owing to passage of time, the issue has been rendered infructuous for the present. His submission is placed on record. The Appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 3. Learned counsel for the opposite party has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in the Dr. Geetanjali Aggarwal Vrs. Dr. Manoj Aggarwal reported in 2024 SCC Online Del 7220, the relevant para nos. 15, 19 to 24, 26, 27, 28, 30 and 34 are quoted hereunder: 15. From the aforesaid submissions of the parties, we find that to decide the question as to whether an order passed under Section 12 of the GW Act would be appealable under Section 19 of the FC Act, it would be necessary to decided two issues ; the first being as to whether the provisions of Section 19(1) of the FC Act can be read independently of the provisions of the GW Act. Depending upon the answer to this issue, the next issue which is required to be determined would be as to whether, taking into account the nature of the order passed by the learned Family Court under Section12 of the GW Act, the said order, which is as an interlocutory order under the GW Act, has to be tread as an interlocutory order for the purposes of the FC Act as well, thereby rendering it unappealable." 19. From a cumulative reading of Sections 7, 19 and 20 of the FC Act, it clearly emerges that the Act provides for a composite jurisdiction by laying down a complete procedural Code for filing of appeals in respect of orders passed under various enactments dealing with marriage and family affairs. This includes appeals against orders passed under the GW Act. It, thus, becomes evident that the FC Act bestows the Family Courts with multifarious jurisdictions arising out of marriage and family affairs and matters connected therewith, and was clearly intended to consolidate the jurisdictions which were available with different courts/tribunals under the relevant statutes, in one specialised court i.e. the Family 2026:JHHC:4264 3 C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025 Court. It is, for this reason, that while introducing one single appellate provision under the FC Act, a non-obstante clause has been used to avoid the confusion which was earlier arising from multiple appellate provisions spread over various pre-existing statutes. 20. We may also note that in order to emphasise that the scope of the appellate and revisional provisions under the FC Act was always intended to be very wide, the learned amicus curiae has painstakingly drawn our attention to the Family Courts (Amendment) Bill, 1991. He has contended that though initially even an interim maintenance order passed under Section 125 CrPC was appealable under Section 19 of the FC Act, it was only when it was realised that some States had not adopted the FC Act and, therefore, an interim maintenance order was only revisable in those States, that Section 19 was amended to make the said order revisable under the FC Act as well. This amendment, he has urged, clearly shows that the provisions of Section 19 of the FC Act was always meant to be much wider and extensive, vis-à-vis the limited appellate/revisable jurisdictions provided for under other statutes. 21. In order to appreciate this plea of the learned amicus curiae, even though it is not necessary to refer to the amendment to Section 19 of the FC Act, as introduced in 1991, it would still be useful to refer to the relevant extracts of the opening remarks made by the Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs while introducing the bill for amendment, which throw light on the reasons as to why an order passed under Section 125 CrPC, though initially appealable, was made revisable. We are, therefore, reproducing hereinbelow the relevant extracts of these remarks: "After the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984, a proceeding relating to the maintenance of wife, children and parents under Chapter IX (which includes Section 125) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts. An anomalous situation has arisen inasmuch as the States where the Family Courts Act has not been extended, there will be no appeal against the maintenance order passed by the Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC and only the general provisions in CrPC regarding filing of revision petition would apply, while in those States where the Family Courts Act has been extended, an appeal under Section 19 of that Act would lie to a Division Bench of a High Court against the maintenance order passed by the Family Court under Section 125 CrPC.". 22. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid, it is evident that when the FC Act was enacted in 1984, the legislature intended to make all those orders passed by the Family Court as appealable as were affecting the vital rights of the parties, including orders pertaining to interim maintenance passed under Section 125 CrPC. Even though through a conscious 2026:JHHC:4264 4 C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025 under Section 125 CrPC. Even though through a conscious amendment introduced in 1991, the interim/interlocutory maintenance orders passed under Section 125 CrPC were excluded from the ambit of Section 19(1), they were simultaneously included under the revisional powers of the High Court by way of Section 19(4) of the FC Act, clearly indicating that the scope of the appellate/revisional jurisdiction under the FC Act was always envisaged to be very wide. 23. What, therefore, emerges is that while enacting the FC Act, the legislature had consciously introduced a provision providing for appeals to the High Court against orders passed under different statutes relating to marriage and family affairs. The purpose of this appellate provision by way of Section 19(1) of the FC Act was, therefore, meant to provide for an appeal against all orders passed by the learned Family Court, irrespective of the fact as to whether the said order is appealable or not under the parent statute, the only rider being that the order should not be an interlocutory order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the ambit and scope of this wide provision under the FC Act which streamlines the appellate provisions pertaining to marital and family matters by providing for an appeal to the High Court, cannot be controlled or curtailed in any manner by the mechanism available under other statutes. 24. In the light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that the appellate jurisdiction under the FC Act was always envisaged to be exercised independently of the appellate/revisional powers under specific statutes relating to marriage and family affairs. Once the provisions of the FC Act, especially Sections 7 and 20 clearly indicate that the Act will have an overriding effect on all other statutes relating to marital and family matters, the effect and ambit of the provisions of the FC Act, including that of the appellate provision under Section 19 (1), which conceptualises a common appellate forum, cannot be controlled by the provisions of the parent statute, including the GW Act which was enacted about 94 years before the FC Act. We are, therefore, in agreement with the learned Amicus Curaie as also the appellant, that the provisions of the GW Act could not curtail the right of appeal available to the appellant under Section 19 of the FC Act. 26. From a perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Family Court while exercising powers under Section 12 of the GW Act, cannot only direct that the minor child be produced before court but can also direct that the minor child be produced before any person as the court deems appropriate; this may include a counsellor or a psychologist. In fact, the court may also direct that the temporary custody of the minor child be handed over to any party as it deems appropriate. Taking into account the far-reaching effects that directions issued under 2026:JHHC:4264 5 C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025 Section 12 of the GW Act can have, it is evident that the orders passed under Section 12 of the said Act not only impact the rights of the parties, but also have a huge impact on the minor child. Furthermore, these orders can be passed by the Family Court only after examining the merits of the rival submissions of the parties and are, therefore, necessarily adjudicatory in nature. 27. However, despite the far-reaching effects which orders passed under Section 12 of the GW Act can have on the parties as also on the minor child, this provision describes such orders as interlocutory orders. Learned counsel for the respondent has, therefore, urged that even if the provisions of the FC Act are treated as being overriding in nature, once an order passed under Section 12 of the GW Act has been described as an interlocutory order under the GW Act, the said order must be treated as an interlocutory order under the FC Act as well. Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, urged that taking into account the impact orders passed under Section 12 of the GW Act can have, they, despite being interim in nature, cannot be treated as mere interlocutory orders from which no appeal would lie. 28. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions of the parties as also the erudite submissions made by the learned amicus curiae, we are unable to agree with the respondent. Once we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of the FC Act cannot be controlled by the provisions of the GW Act, the description of an order as an interlocutory order under the GW Act, cannot, in our view, be a ground to treat the said order as an interlocutory order for the purposes of the FC Act as well. In our opinion, an order like the order impugned in the present appeal, which undoubtedly impinges on the substantive rights of the parties and can also have an effect on the final determination of their rights as also the welfare of the child, cannot be treated as merely being interlocutory in nature. It is necessarily an order touching upon matters of moment and certainly has the trappings of a final order. 30. In the light of the aforesaid, we are inclined to agree with the appellant that the nomenclature of an order in itself cannot be determinative of the nature of that order. Merely because an order, despite affecting the vital rights of the parties, is labelled as an Interlocutory order under a particular statute, cannot imply that the same must always be treated as an interlocutory order. In the present case, the FC Act which provides for this appellate provision, neither defines the expression "interlocutory order" nor contains any ouster provision as contained in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and therefore, it would be against the very object and spirit of the said Act to exclude orders that pertain to matters of moment from the ambit of the appellate provision under Section 19(1) of the FC Act. It is only those orders which are 2026:JHHC:4264 6 C.M.P. No. 1205 of 2025 merely procedural and do not have trappings of finality which can be treated as interlocutory orders and would, therefore, not be amenable to appeal under the FC Act. 34. As we have already held hereinabove that the powers exercisable under the FC Act, could not be controlled by the provisions of other statutes, we are of the view that the criteria prescribed under the GW Act, could not be applied to test whether an order should be treated as an interlocutory order for the purposes of the FC Act. The mere fact that an order under Section 12 of the GW Act has been labelled as an interlocutory order under the said Act, cannot, therefore, be a ground to hold the same as an interlocutory order under the FC Act, which Act was enacted 94 years later and was intended to provide a much wider window for appeal. In our view, in every case, when an order passed by the Family Court, is taken in appeal before the High Court, it would be incumbent upon the court to examine the nature of the impugned order in its entirety to determine whether the same is in the nature of an adjudicatory order which decides valuable rights of the parties. Whenever the court finds that an order touches upon the vital rights of the parties in contradistinction to an order which is merely a procedural order, an appeal ought to be entertained, irrespective of the fact that the order was passed during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Family Court. 3. In view of the legal position, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to withdrawn the present C.M.P. with a liberty to file first appeal. 4. With the aforesaid liberty, the present CMP is hereby disposed of as withdrawn. Needless to say, the certified copy annexed in the present CMP may be utilized by the petitioner while filing appropriate appeal. (Rajesh Kumar, J.) 16.02.2026 A. Mohanty Uploaded ____/____/2026