Page No.# 1/24 GAHC020005592024 2026:GAU-NL:472-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : WA/22/2024 TOKAVI CHOPHY NO.G/105160Y, RFN/GD 10TH ASSAM RIFLES PERMANENT R/O MITHIHE VILLAGE WOKHA NAGALAND-7085874416 VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA AND 2 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS NEW DELHI 2:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ASSAM RIFLES HQ DGAR SHILLONG MEGHALAYA 3:THE COMMANDANT 10TH ASSAM RIFLES C/O 99 AP Page No.# 2/24 - B e f o r e- HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN Hon’ble mrs. Justice yarenjungla longkumer Advocates for the petitioner : Mr. I. Imti Longchar Advocate for the respondents : Mr. Yangerwati, CGC, Assisted by Major Pooja Goyal, for the respondent Nos. 1-3. Date of which Judgment is reserved : 02.09.2026 Date of pronouncement of Judgment : 17.09.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the : N/A operative part of the Judgment? Whether the full judgment has been : Yes pronounced? JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) Heard Mr. I. Imti Longchar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGC, assisted by Major Pooja Goyal, for the respondent Nos. 1-3. 2. This intra-court appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order, dated 20.05.2024, passed by learned Single Judge, in WP(C) No. 72/2021; and also for issuing direction to the respondent authorities to reinstate the appellant in service. Page No.# 3/24 Background facts: 3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, are briefly described as under ꟷ “The appellant herein was enrolled as Rifleman/GD in the 10th Assam Rifles, with Regimental No. G/105160Y, on 17-05-2001. While serving in the said post, he had received an Office Warning letter, written by the Commandant, 10th Assam Rifles, dated 07-10-2006, wherein, it was stated that during the tenure of 05 years 04 months and 17 days, he had incurred 3 (three) red ink entries in his service record. Thereafter, on 14.12.2007, a show-cause notice was served upon the appellant by the Commandant, 10th Assam Rifles, stating therein that the appellant had incurred 4 (four) red ink entries in his dossier, and vide Discharge Certificate, dated 17.01.2008, with effect from forenoon of 18.01.2008, the appellant was illegally discharged from his service, without holding any enquiry/trial. Thereafter, being aggrieved by the arbitrary and discriminatory action of the respondents, the appellant had preferred one writ petition, being W.P. (Civil) No. 72 of 2021, before this Court. But, the same came to be dismissed vide impugned Judgment & Order, dated 20-05-2024. And being aggrieved, the appellant has approached this Court by filing the present appeal, seeking the reliefs as aforesaid. The contentions of the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge: Page No.# 4/24 4. That, the appellant/writ petitioner has contended that while serving in the Assam Rifles, he had received impugned office warning letter from the Commandant, 10th Assam Rifles, dated 07-10-2006, which stated that during his tenure of 05 years, 04 months and 17 days, he had incurred three red ink entries in his record of service and that action would be taken against him and he will be discharged from service if he incurred a fourth red ink entry. 4.1. That, the appellant/writ petitioner was served with a show cause notice on 14-12-2007, by the Commandant 10th Assam Rifles stating that he had incurred four red ink entries as on 30-11-2007, and was directed to reply to the show cause notice, within a period of 7 days. 4.2. That, the so-called reply filed by the appellant/writ petitioner to the respondents, vide letter, dated -Nil, Jan 2008, is totally false as the letter was written in Hindi and the writ petitioner qualification being only Class 8th pass, he could neither read nor write in Hindi and also had no knowledge about the alleged reply letter, which clearly shows that the document had been fabricated/manufactured/manipulated by the respondents. 4.3. That, vide impugned discharge order, dated 16-01-2008, passed by the Commandant 10th Assam Rifles, the appellant/writ petitioner was discharged from service, w.e.f. 18-01-2008 (FN), on the ground of being an incorrigible offender, as per the provisions of Sec 4 (a) of the Assam Rifles Act, read with Para 24, Chapter VIII of the Assam Rifles Manual and Para 5 of ROI1/2004, and discharge certificate dated 17-01-2008 was issued to him. 4.4. That, the respondents neither conduct any enquiry, nor any proceeding or trial under any provision of law, and no procedure was followed and had Page No.# 5/24 passed the discharge order illegally without even giving the writ petitioner an opportunity of being heard. Moreover, when the writ petitioner had filed an RTI application on 14-06-2017, to the PIO of the 10th Assam Rifles seeking documents relating to his disciplinary proceedings, the respondents, vide reply dated, 24-07-2017, denied to provide information stating that the Assam Rifles is exempted from forwarding the information that was sought. 4.5. That, the red ink entries, which were given in the impugned show cause notice, dated 14-12-2007, were all under the Army Act, 1950, but the writ petitioner was discharged from service as per the Assam Rifles Act/ Regulations/Manual/Record Office Instructions, which clearly shows that the action of the respondents is totally illegal and not sustainable on facts and in the eye of law, as the discharge order was passed without following due procedure and/or rules. 4.6. That, the respondents acted without any application of mind as the writ petitioner cannot be punished under the Army Act when he is subjected to the Assam Rifles Act, 1941, and thus, the impugned office warning letter, the impugned show cause notice and the impugned discharge order, are not sustainable both on facts and in the eye of law and are liable to be quashed and set aside. Contentions of the respondent Nos. 1-3 before the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 72/2021: 5. That, the respondents had filed Affidavit-in-Opposition in the case stating that the petitioner was an incorrigible offender, as he had incurred four red entries, even after repeated warnings to improve his conduct, and that Page No.# 6/24 further retention in service would be detrimental to the other soldiers in the Force. Therefore, action to terminate him from service was initiated, which led to the petitioner’s discharge from service w.e.f. 18-01-2008 (FN) by the Commandant, 10th Assam Rifles, under the provisions of Section 4 of the Assam Rifles Act 1941, r/w Para No. 24 Chapter VIII of Assam Rifles Manual and Para 5 of the record of Office Instruction 01/2004. 5.1. That, the writ petitioner had approached this Hon'ble Court after a delay of more than 13 years, after his discharge from service and hence the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 5.2. That, summary trial proceedings were initiated by the Commandant and on being found guilty of the charges, the punishment to the petitioner was rightly awarded, and thus, the action of discharging the petitioner after incurring four red ink entries in his service dossier is just and legal and not liable to any interference. 5.3. That, all due procedure as per the statutory provisions of the Assam Rifles Rules had been adhered to in letter and in spirit, while issuing the discharge order, and thus, the claims of the petitioner that power was not exercised in a fair and reasonable manner is false and baseless. 5.4. That, against the contentions raised by the respondents, the petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply on 14-02-2024, stating that the four red ink entries in the impugned show cause notice were all awarded under the Army Act, 1950. The petitioner was not under the operational control of the Army at any given point of time and therefore the Army Act could not be applicable to him, as he was subject to the Assam Rifles Act, 1941. Page No.# 7/24 Points that arose for consideration before the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 72/2021: 6. The issues, that arose for consideration of the learned Single Judge are:- (i) Whether the petitioner, who is Assam Rifles personnel, can be punished under the Army/Navy/Air Force Act when the Assam Rifles have their own Act known as the Assam Rifles Act, 1941? (ii) Whether the writ petition filed by the petitioner fails on the ground of delay and laches or not? Conclusion and decision of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 72/2021: 7. That, the Learned Single Judge, vide impugned Judgment & Order, dated 20-05-2024, in W.P. (C) No 72/2021, rejected the writ petition observing as under:- "9. The writ petition has been structured, as indicated above on the ground that the show cause notice which is submitted to be a basis of the impugned Order mentions the Army Act and not the provisions of the Assam Rifles Act. The aforesaid contention has been replied on behalf of the respondents by submitting that the earlier four punishments inflicted on the petitioner was at a time when he was under the operational control of the unit of Army. Page No.# 8/24 10. To examine the said issue this Court has carefully scrutinized the show cause notice. Though it is true that the earlier punishments were inflicted in terms of certain provisions of the Army Act, the present show cause notice was issued on 14.12.2007 under Section 4(a) of the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 read with ROI 4/99 and para 24 of Chapter VIII of Assam Rifles Manual. The Discharge Order is mainly on the aspect of there being four red ink entries in the service of the petitioner. The point which is required to be noted is that the action of putting four red ink entries in the service of the petitioner was never the subject matter of challenge in any proceedings. The present impugned Order is on culmination of the show cause notice which was indeed issued under the provisions of the Assam Rifles Act, 1941. In the considered opinion of this Court, the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and the challenge projected do not appear to be a sustainable and tenable. The reply to the show cause notice also indicates an admission. Nonetheless, the discharge is on the ground of having four red ink entries in the Service Book and is not on any subjective specification of the Disciplinary Authority wherein there could be any element of bias or procedural impropriety. The discharge is based on objective materials, namely, the four red entries in the Service Book which is an admitted fact. 11. With regard to the aspect of delay, though it is submitted that this is the second writ petition which had to be filed on coming to know about the impugned Discharge Order dated 16.01.2008 in the earlier proceeding, namely WP (C)/188/2018, this Court is of the opinion that the conduct of a writ petitioner approaching the Court is of paramount importance as this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Page No.# 9/24 exercises equitable jurisdiction. Though an explanation has been tried to be given that information was sought under the RTI Act, such application for RTI information is also of the year 2017. As regards the submission that orders were based in I.A. (Civil)/53/2021, a perusal of the Order dated 01.08.2023 would, however, show that the application was closed, as such, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not maintainable in a writ proceeding. …………………. ………………………… 13. In the instant case, even assuming that the period is to be construed not from filing of this case but of the previous case which was of the year 2018, then also, there us a delay of almost a decade which is not explained in the writ petition. As observed above, though there is no requirement under the law to file any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a writ petition, there should be sufficient pleadings in the petition itself, in case there is any delay in approaching this Court with any cause of action, which is not there. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that no relief can be granted to the petitioner in this case and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed." Grounds on which the judgment and order passed by the learned single judge is assailed: Page No.# 10/24 8. Then being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order, dated 20-05-2024, the appellant/writ petitioner has preferred this appeal, amongst others, on the following grounds:- (a) The learned Single Judge committed grave error in law as well as on facts in passing the Judgment and Order dated 20-05-2024 and as such the impugned judgment and order is bad in law and liable to be set aside. (b) The learned Single Judge committed grave error on facts as the Appellant/Petitioner, an Assam Rifles personnel who was subject to the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 was shown to have been punished 4 (four) times under the Army Act, 1950 when the Appellant/Petitioner was never under the control of the Army at any point of time and thus the punishment under the Army Act is illegal and without jurisdiction and is non-est and void ab initio. (c) The learned Single Judge erred on facts as well as in law for holding that the impugned discharge Order passed by the respondents which discharged the appellant/petitioner from service does not suffer from any procedural impropriety. (d) For that the learned Single Judge erred on facts as well as in law for holding that the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant/Petitioner fails on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the Appellant/Petitioner and as such the impugned judgment is bad in law and liable to be set aside. The question of delay has already been addressed by I.A. (Civil) No. 53/2021 where the reasons for delay in filing the Writ Petition have been clearly explained and the Page No.# 11/24 Learned Single Judge by Order dated 01-08-2023 had closed the I.A, then only after that notice was issued in W.P(C) No. 72/2021. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant: 9. Mr. I. Imti Longchar, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the learned Single Judge had erred in holding that the writ petition filed by the appellant/petitioner fails on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the appellant/petitioner. Mr. Longchar also submits that the appellant had filed one Interlocutory Application being I.A. (Civil) No. 53/2021, explaining the reasons for delay in filing the writ petition. He further submits that only after closing of the said I.A. on 01-08-2023, notice was issued in W.P(C) No. 72/2021, and as such, the impugned judgment and order is bad in law and liable to be set aside. 9.1. Mr. Longcher also submits that this is the second petition and the earlier petition, being W.P.(C)/188/2018, was withdrawn upon production of Discharge Order, dated 16.01.2008, in the affidavit-in- opposition by the respondents. He also submits that the appellant herein, through his counsel, had filed one application under the Right to Information Act (RTI Act) sometimes in the year 2017, seeking information regarding the enquiry proceeding against him and the same was denied, and as such, the petition could not be filed in time and the delay has been explained, but the learned Single Judge failed to consider the same. 9.2. Mr. Longcher also submits that the learned Single Judge has committed a grave error in holding that the impugned discharge Order passed by the respondents does not suffer from any procedural impropriety. And as such Page No.# 12/24 the impugned Judgment and Order dated 20-05-2024, is bad in law and liable to be set aside. 9.3. Mr. Longcher also referred following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. And Another -vs- Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another And Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. And Another –vs.- Tarun Kanti Sengupta and another, reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1571; (ii) State of M.P. and another-VS- Bhola alias Bhairon Prasad Raghuvanshi, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 1; (iii) Selvi J. Jayalalithaa & Ors. –vs.-State of Karnataka & Ors. Criminal Appeal No. 154 of 2013; (iv) Veerendra Kumar Dubey –vs.-Chief of Army Staff and Others, reported in (2016)2 SCC 627; 10. Per contra, Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGC, assisted by Major Pooja Goyal, for the respondent Nos. 1-3, has supported the impugned Judgment and Order, dated 20-05-2024. Mr. Yangerwati submits that there was inordinate delay of more than 10 years in preferring the W.P(C) No. 72/2021, without there being any sufficient explanation. His further submission is that the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 came into force on 20/02/2009, when the same was published in the official Gazette of India and that on 17.12.2008, the Assam Rifles Rules, 2008 framed under the provisions of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006, also came into the force following its publication in the official Gazette of India on 24/08/2010 and prior to that the Army Act, 1941 was in force, Page No.# 13/24 whereby, the Commandant was empowered to dismiss any sub-ordinate officers, including the petitioner, as undesirable/ incorrigible soldiers. He also submits that the petitioner had incurred four red ink entries in his service dossier, for which he was discharged from service w.e.f. 18/01/2008, prior to the enactment of the Assam Rifles Act 2006. Under such circumstances, Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGC, has contended to dismiss this appeal as the impugned Judgment and Order, dated 20-05-2024, suffers from no infirmity. Discussion and analysis:- 11. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, we have carefully gone through the memo of appeal, the grounds mentioned therein and also gone through the impugned Judgment and Order, dated 20- 05-2024, and the decisions referred by Mr. Longcher, learned counsel for the appellant. 12. Notably, while dealing with the aspect of delay and laches in granting discretionary relief, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan and Another, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322, has held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction, if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. Relevant paragraphs are extracted herein below:- “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is Page No.# 14/24 such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports reported in (1969) 1 SCC 185]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd reported in (1874) LR 5 PC 221 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court reported in 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117, and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54. Sir Barnes had stated: (Lindsay Petroleum case [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , LR pp. 239-40) ‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, Page No.# 15/24 the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.’ 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India reported in (1970) 1 SCC 84] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566, that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is Page No.# 16/24 likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third- party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 12.1. Again in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others v. State of W.B. and Others, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 768, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006, Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court Page No.# 17/24 reported in AIR 1967 SC 1450, and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India reported in (1992) 3 SCC 136. This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi reported in (1969) 1 SCC 110, Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports reported in (1969) 1 SCC 185, and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India reported in (1970) 1 SCC 84. 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12.2. Again in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and Others v. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4SCC 108, in paragraph No. 16, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under ꟷ “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional d court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In Page No.# 18/24 certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis." 12.3. And, very recently Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley & Ors., reported in (2024) 15 SCC 215, has held in para No. 9 as under - “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that the writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be borne in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.” 12.4. Now, adverting to the facts of the case, we find that the appellant Page No.# 19/24 herein was enrolled as Rifleman/GD in the 10th Assam Rifles, with Regimental No. G/105160Y, on 17-05-2001. During his service period, he had received one warning letter from the Commandant, 10th Assam Rifles, dated 07-10-2006. It was stated in the said letter that during the tenure of 05 years, 04 months and 17 days, the appellant had incurred 3 (three) red ink entries in his service record. Thereafter, on 14.12.2007, a show-cause notice was served upon the appellant by the Commandant, 10th Assam Rifles, stating therein that the appellant had incurred 4 (four) red ink entries in his dossier, and thereafter, vide Discharge Certificate, dated 16.01.2008, he was discharged from service, however, without holding any enquiry. 12.5. Thereafter, for almost 10 years the appellant did nothing. Then on 24.07.2017, the counsel for the appellant had filed one application under the RTI Act seeking documents relating to disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. However, the same was denied vide reply dated 24.07.2017. Thereafter, the appellant herein had preferred one writ petition, being W.P. (Civil) No. 188(K)/2018. In the said petition, the respondents had filed an affidavit in opposition and enclosed the discharge order of the appellant, dated 16.01.2008. Then the appellant had withdrawn the said petition on 01.04.2019, with liberty to file a fresh one. 12.6. Thereafter, the appellant has preferred W.P.(C) No.72(K)/ 2021. But, the same came to be dismissed vide impugned Judgment & Order, dated 20- 05-2024. 12.7. Thus, it is apparent that while the appellant was discharged with effect from 18.01.2008, vide Discharge Certificate, dated 16.01.2008, and discharge order, dated 16.01.2008, he remained idle for almost 10 years. It is Page No.# 20/24 the categorical contention of Mr. Longcher, learned counsel for the appellant, that the appellant was never served any copy of the discharge order, yet the learned CGSC has, from the relevant file of the respondent, demonstrated before this Court that the appellant was furnished a copy of the Discharge Order, dated 16.08.2008, and perusal of the same indicates that the appellant had received the said order, on 16.01.2008, itself, by putting his signature. Though Mr. Longcher, learned counsel for the appellant had refuted receiving any copy of the Discharge Order and tried to persuade us that the said signature was taken by the respondent by calling him to the office, yet, subsequently, his submission left us unimpressed. 12.8. It is also apparent that after the discharge order being passed on 16.01.2008, with effect from 18.01.2008 (FN), the appellant, only on 24.07.2017, through his counsel had filed one application under the RTI Act seeking documents relating to disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, which was denied vide reply dated 24.07.2017. And thereafter, he preferred W.P. (Civil) No. 188(K)/2018, for his reinstatement in service, only in the year 2018. But, the same was withdrawn on 01.04.2019. Thereafter, he preferred the W.P.(C) No. 72(K)/2021, only on 08.04.2021. 12.9. And under the given factual background, the learned Single Judge had observed that even assuming the period is to be construed not from filing of this case, but from the previous case, which was of the year 2018, then also, there was delay of almost a decade which is not explained in the writ petition and that though there is no requirement under the law to file any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a writ petition, there should be sufficient pleadings in the petition itself, in case there is any delay in approaching this Court with any cause of action, which is not there. Page No.# 21/24 12.10. There is no dispute about the factual position above. And applying the ratio laid down in cases discussed herein above, to the given factual matrix, we are of the considered opinion that the finding so recorded by the learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment and order dated 20.05.2024, suffers from no infirmity requiring any interference of this Court. Even in the I.A. which is on the record, filed by the appellant herein, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, also, we find no explanation for the delay of almost a decade. 12.11. It is well settled in the case of Mrinmoy Maity(supra) that the relief(s) granted by the High Courts’ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are discretionary. The appellant herein slept over his rights for almost a decade and thereafter wakes up from his deep slumber, is not entitled to the extraordinary and discretionary relief from the writ courts. The learned Single Judge, had rightly refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers as it found laxity on the part of the appellant in asserting his right. 13. Though Mr. Longcher, learned counsel for the appellant had contended that the learned Single Judge had committed a grave error on facts, as the appellant, an Assam Rifles personnel, who was subject to the Assam Rifles Act, 1941, was shown to have been punished 4 (four) times under the Army Act, 1950, when the appellant was never under the control of the Army at any point of time and on such count, the punishment under the Army Act is illegal and without jurisdiction and is non-est and void ab initio, yet said contention also left this Court unimpressed. 13.1. It appears from the affidavit of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, dated Nil, available on the record, that the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 has come into force Page No.# 22/24 on 20/02/2009, on which date the same was published in the official Gazette of India. Thereafter, on 17/12/2008, the Assam Rifles Rules, 2008, was framed under the provisions of Assam Rifles Act, 2006 and the same also came into force, following its publication in the official Gazette of India on 24/08/2010. And prior to the publication of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006, the Army Act, 1941, (SIC-1950) was in force, whereby, the Commandant was empowered to dismiss any sub-ordinate Officers, who are undesirable/incorrigible soldiers and who had incurred four red ink entries in his service dossier, for which the appellant was discharged from service w.e.f. 18/01/2008 prior to enactment of Assam Rifles Act 2006. 13.2. The learned Single Judge had also observed that the show cause notice, which is submitted to be a basis of the impugned Order, mentions the Army Act and not the provisions of the Assam Rifles Act. The aforesaid contention has been replied on behalf of the respondents by submitting that the earlier four punishments inflicted on the petitioner were at a time when he was under the operational control of the unit of Army. Thereafter, examining the issue, the learned Single Judge has held that the earlier punishments were inflicted in terms of certain provisions of the Army Act, the present show cause notice, was issued on 14.12.2007 under Section 4(a) of the Assam Rifles Act, 1941, read with ROI 4/99 and para 24 of Chapter VIII of Assam Rifles Manual. The Discharge Order is mainly on the aspect of there being four red ink entries in the service of the petitioner and that the action of putting four red ink entries in the service of the petitioner was never the subject matter of challenge in any proceedings. The present impugned Order is on culmination of the show cause notice, which was indeed issued under the provisions of the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 and as such, the challenge Page No.# 23/24 projected does not appear to be a sustainable and tenable. And that the discharge is on the ground of having four red ink entries in the Service Book and is not on any subjective specification of the Disciplinary Authority wherein there could be any element of bias or procedural impropriety. The discharge is based on objective materials, namely, the four red entries in the Service Book which is an admitted fact. 14. Thus, in view of the above discussion, we find the contention of Mr. Longcher, learned counsel for the appellant, not at all acceptable. We have also gone through the decisions relied upon by Mr. Longcher and we find that in view of the ratios laid down in the cases discussed herein above, the decisions in (i) Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra) (ii) Bhola alias Bhairon Prasad Raghuvanshi(supra) and (iii) Selvi J. Jayalalithaa (supra) would not come into his assistance. Moreover, the decision in Selvi J. Jayalalithaa (supra) is in respect of a criminal appeal. 14.1. However, the decision in the case of Veerendra Kumar Dubey (supra) has some relevance, wherein the petitioner was discharged from service under Rule 13(III)(v) of the Army Rules, 1954, on account of four red ink entries in his service dossier. Then Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that mere award of four red ink entries to an individual does not make his discharge mandatory. This implies that four red ink entries are not some kind of Laxman rekha, which if crossed would by itself render the individual concerned undesirable or unworthy of retention in the force. Award of four red ink entries simply pushes the individual concerned into a grey area where he can be considered for discharge. But just because he qualifies for such Page No.# 24/24 discharge, does not mean that he must necessarily suffer that fate. It is one thing to qualify for consideration and an entirely different thing to be found fit for discharge. Four red ink entries in that sense take the individual closer to discharge, but do not push him over. It is axiomatic that the Commanding Officer is, even after the award of such entries, required to consider the nature of the offence, for which such entries have been awarded and other aspects made relevant by the Government in the procedure it has prescribed. And in the result, Hon’ble Supreme Court had interfered with the order of discharge passed against the appellant therein. 14.2. Even if the consequence of four red ink entries in the service dossier and its interpretation in the aforesaid case, appear to be favourable to the appellant, yet in view of the inordinate delay in approaching the Court in seeking equitable relief(s), he is not entitled to the extraordinary and discretionary relief from the writ courts. 15. In the result, we find this appeal devoid of merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant