Page No.# 1/20 GAHC020002662025 2026:GAU-NL:479 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : WP(C)/84/2025 MRS. Y. YIMLEI PHOM D/O A. YONGYAH PHOM, R/O PONGCHING VILLAGE, LONGLENG DISTRICT-798625, NAGALAND VERSUS STATE OF NAGALAND AND 8 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION, NAGALAND KOHIMA 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY DEPT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND SCERT NAGALAND KOHIMA 3:THE PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR DEPT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION NAGALAND KOHIMA 4:THE DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE OF SCHOOL EDUCATION NAGALAND KOHIMA 5:THE DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER DEPT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION LONGLENG NAGALAND 6:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY P AND AR DEPT. ADMINISTRATIVCE REFORMS BRANCH 7:THE SR. SUB DIVISIONAL EDUCATION OFFICER LONGLENG-798625 Page No.# 2/20 NAGALAND 8:SMTI CHONGVAI D/O SHRI VANGKAP PHOM MULTI-TASKING STAFF OFFICE OF THE SR. SDEO LONGLENG NAGALAND. 9:MR. Y. KAMNYEI CHAIRMAN ORANGKONG VILLAGE COUNCIL DIST LONGLENG PIN-798625 NAGALAND BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pakinrichapbo, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Ms. S. Mere, Govt. Advocate Mr. I. Limatoshi, Advocate Mr. T. Pongener, Advocate · Date on which Judgment was reserved : NA · Date of Pronouncement of Judgment : 17.09.2026 · Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative Part of the Judgment : NA · Whether the full Judgment has been Pronounced : Yes JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL) Page No.# 3/20 Heard Mr. Pakinrichapbo, the learned counsel for the Petitioner. Ms. S. Mere, the learned Government Advocate appears on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7; Mr. I. Limatoshi, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the Respondent No. 8 and Mr. T. Pongener, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the Respondent No. 9. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner assailing the Administrative Approval dated 10.03.2025 whereby the Petitioner's service was to be terminated; the impugned order dated 17.03.2025 whereby the Petitioner's services were terminated; as well as the impugned order dated 24.03.2025 whereby the Respondent No. 8 was appointed; and further seeking a direction that the Petitioner be reinstated in service with all consequential service benefits. 3. On 10.05.2022, one Smti. Mannyu Phom was released from duty on retirement after completion of 35 years of service. The Petitioner submitted an application along with all educational documents for consideration for appointment to the said post. On 21.11.2022, the Petitioner's application was forwarded by the Respondent No. 7 to the Principal Director, School Education, Nagaland, Kohima. Page No.# 4/20 4. After due consideration, the Government of Nagaland vide communication dated 10.04.2023 granted Administrative Approval for appointment of the Petitioner to the post of Multi-Tasking Staff (MTS), Grade-IV, Longleng, Nagaland under the School Education Department. 5. The Petitioner thereupon was appointed on 27.04.2023 to the post of Multi-Tasking Staff (MTS), Grade-IV at the Office of the Senior Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Longleng, Nagaland under the Department of School Education. The Petitioner, upon receipt of the said appointment letter joined on 01.05.2023. The Petitioner thereafter continued to render her services. 6. On 17.03.2025, all of a sudden, the Petitioner's services were terminated. The Petitioner made enquiries and came to learn that on the basis of an Administrative Approval granted on 24.01.2025 for appointment of the private Respondent No. 8 and a subsequent Administrative Approval issued by the Government of Nagaland to the Principal Director, School Education on 10.03.2025 for termination of the Petitioner's services, the termination order dated 17.03.2025 was issued thereby terminating the services of the Petitioner and the Page No.# 5/20 Respondent No. 8 was appointed vide the order dated 24.03.2025. The Petitioner, being aggrieved, approached this Court by filing the present writ petition on 14.05.2025. 7. The record reveals that the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 16.05.2025 issued notice and further observed that the appointment of the Respondent No. 8 shall be subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 8. The State Respondents collectively filed an affidavit-in- opposition on 15.09.2025 wherein it was mentioned that the application of the Petitioner was considered as a stop-gap arrangement for a period of two years. It was further mentioned that a complaint was received from the Orangkong Village Council, Longleng dated 11.05.2023 against the appointment of the Petitioner. In the said complaint, it was mentioned that there existed a Deed of Agreement dated 06.08.2010 executed between the landowners/owners and the Deputy Inspector of Schools and on the basis thereof, the Department was requested to cancel the appointment of the Petitioner and recommend the appointment of the private Respondent No. 8 in her place on joint land ownership basis. Page No.# 6/20 9. It was further mentioned in the said affidavit-in- opposition that in view of the Notification dated 05.03.2018, the State Respondents had no alternative but to terminate the services of the Petitioner who was appointed only on a stop- gap arrangement without any selection process and appoint the private Respondent No. 8 as per the Deed of Agreement. The Deed of Agreement dated 06.08.2010 was enclosed as Annexure-A to the said affidavit-in-opposition, wherein there were stipulations contained in Clause Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of granting appointment on land ownership basis. 10. It is also apparent from the records that an additional affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the State Respondents on 26.03.2026 wherein the stand taken in the original affidavit- in-opposition that the Petitioner was appointed as a stop-gap arrangement was withdrawn. In the subsequent affidavit, the stand taken was that the Petitioner's appointment was not a regular appointment but an appointment on probation and subject to confirmation. It was further mentioned at paragraph No. 5 that the Petitioner was appointed without undergoing any selection process as per the laid down norms and procedure and the appointment was also not made on land ownership basis, as the Petitioner was not a landowner. Page No.# 7/20 The State Respondents further referred to a communication issued by the Under Secretary, School Education to the Director of School Education dated 05.08.1991 to support their contention that in spite of the mandate of the Notification dated 05.03.2018, the Respondent No. 8 could have been appointed on land ownership basis in view of the written agreement entered into in the year 2010. 11. This Court has also taken note of the affidavit-in- opposition filed by the private Respondent as well as the Respondent No. 9 and the tenor of their affidavits appears to be the same stands which was taken by the State Respondents and as such, in view of the similarity of the stand taken, this Court, for the sake of brevity is not repeating the same. 12. The Petitioner has also filed affidavits-in-reply thereby reiterating and reaffirming the stand made in the writ petition and further stating that the Respondent No. 8 could not have been appointed on land ownership basis in view of the Notification dated 05.03.2018. 13. In the backdrop of the pleadings, this Court has heard Page No.# 8/20 the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. The submissions are based on their pleadings and as such, for the sake of brevity, this Court is not repeating the same. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 14. From the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, two points for determination arises: (i) Whether the termination of the Petitioner in the manner in which it has been done, is permissible in law? (ii) Whether the Respondent No. 8 could have been appointed on land ownership basis taking into account, the Deed of Agreement dated 06.08.2010, more particularly in the context of the Notification dated 05.03.2018? FIRST POINT FOR DETERMINATION 15. The materials on record show that pursuant to the post of Sweeper/MTS being vacated on account of the retirement of one Smti. Mannyu Phom, the Petitioner was appointed vide Page No.# 9/20 Notification dated 27.04.2023. The said appointment of the Petitioner was preceded by an Administrative Approval issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, School Education Department to the Principal Director, School Education. It is also necessary to take note of that in the very Administrative Approval dated 10.04.2023, it is mentioned that the said appointment had the approval of the Chief Minister, Minister-in-charge, School Education Department. The Petitioner thereupon joined on 01.05.2023 and continued to render her services. 16. A further perusal of the Notification dated 27.04.2023 whereby the Petitioner was appointed makes it clear that the appointment of the Petitioner was on probation for a period of two years and upon completion of the probation period, the Petitioner shall be considered for service confirmation subject to fulfilment of conditions prescribed in the Service Rules/Rules in force. 17. All of a sudden, on 17.03.2025, just at the brink of completion of the period of two years, the Petitioner's services were terminated without assigning any reason. There is also no finding that the Petitioner had misconducted herself Page No.# 10/20 during the period of her service as a probationer. 18. The records further reveal that the reason why the Petitioner's service was terminated was to accommodate the Respondent No. 8, for whom there was also an Administrative Approval granted by the Respondents on 24.01.2025 for being appointed on land ownership basis. In other words, the Petitioner was removed from service in order to accommodate the Respondent No. 8. The question arises as to whether the Respondent Authorities can do so. 19. It is the opinion of this Court that upon the Notification dated 27.04.2023 having been issued thereby appointing the Petitioner, a right accrued upon the Petitioner to be considered for confirmation after the period of two years. This is a valuable right. This valuable right has been taken away by the Respondent Authorities without even providing the Petitioner an opportunity to explain. 20. The principles of natural justice are engraved in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and violation of the principles of natural justice amounts to violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The present case is a classic example Page No.# 11/20 wherein the Petitioner's rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution have been infringed. 21. At this stage, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the rights of a probationer. The Supreme Court in the case of Manager, S.M.U.P School & Others Vs. M. Noushad & Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3249 observed that a probationer though is a temporary Government servant but his appointment cannot be terminated arbitrarily and without following the principles of natural justice. Paragraph No. 7 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced hereinbelow: “7. The law regarding the termination of services of a probationer is well-settled now. The Courts can interfere with the decision to terminate services of employee during probation if the same is based on allegations of misconduct etc. without a proper inquiry having been conducted, and the opportunity of hearing being given to the probationer. A Division Bench of this Court in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab, (2000) 3 SCC 239 held that a probationer also has certain rights, and cannot be subjected to punitive termination without compliance with principles of natural justice. It was held as follows: “7. A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice." Page No.# 12/20 Another Division Bench of this Court in SBI v. Palak Modi (2013) 3 SCC 607, after taking note of a long line of judgments of this Court on this point, summarized the legal position as follows. In that judgment, the Court noted as follows: "25. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice." (Emphasis added) The sequence of events narrated above proves without doubt that the foundation of the action taken by the Management and then by the State is the alleged misconduct of the teacher/Respondent No. 1, who was on probation. This has never been proved. A Departmental proceeding was absolutely essential. Not holding a departmental proceeding clearly violates the principles of natural justice and fair play.” 22. A perusal of the order of termination dated 17.03.2025 would show that the Petitioner’s services was terminated on Page No.# 13/20 the basis of an Administrative Approval granted on 10.03.2025. A perusal of the Administrative Approval dated 10.03.2025 would show that the Administrative Approval was granted to terminate the Petitioner and to make way for the appointment of the Respondent No. 8 inasmuch as there was an Administrative Approval dated 24.01.2025 to appoint the Respondent No. 8. In other words, the Petitioner service was terminated solely for the reason to accommodate the Respondent No. 8. 23. The above actions were taken behind the back of the Petitioner without affording any opportunity. This Court finds it relevant at this stage to observe that after granting a public employment and thereupon snatching away the public employment to accommodate another as was done in the instant case would show that the State of Nagaland has not merely erred in the exercise of discretion but had acted in a manner that is capricious, irrational and devoid of any discernible reasoning process which is a hallmark of arbitrariness as understood right from the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3. Such actions impugned in the present proceedings if measured against the Page No.# 14/20 decides of constitutional exposition on the subject cannot be dismissed as a mere administrative lapse but it constitutes in substance and in degree an extreme manifestation of arbitrary State action that offends the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. 24. This Court also takes note of that the State Respondents in their affidavit takes a stand that the appointment of the Petitioner was without following the selection process. While taking the said stand, the Respondent Authorities tried to wash their hands including those persons who granted the approval, which is duly noted in the Administrative Approval dated 10.04.2023. Be that as it may, from the materials on record, there is nothing which shows that the reason for termination was illegal appointment of the Petitioner. In this perspective, it is appropriate at this stage to take note of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 wherein the Supreme Court observed that public orders are not like old wine which becomes better as they grow older. Paragraph No. 8 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced hereinunder: Page No.# 15/20 “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji: Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” Under such circumstances, the State of Nagaland cannot be permitted to take the stand of illegal appointment in the present proceedings. 25. Considering the above, this Court therefore decides the first point of determination, holding inter alia that the impugned order granting the Administrative Approval for termination of the Petitioner dated 10.03.2025 as well as the termination of the Petitioner vide order dated 17.03.2025 are Page No.# 16/20 in violation to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and cannot be sustained in law. SECOND POINT FOR DETERMINATION 26. The second point for determination arises as to whether the appointment of the Respondent No. 8 can be justified in the extant facts. 27. A perusal of the Notification dated 05.03.2018 makes it clear as a noon day that no Department shall enter into an Agreement with the landowners in deviation of the laid-down policy on or after 26.07.2005, i.e., no condition for employment in service or contractual work should be entertained on the ground that land has been acquired free of cost. It is the mandate of the Notification dated 05.03.2018, more particularly Clause 1(a) of the said Notification that if such conditions are contained in such agreement pursuant to 26.07.2005, such conditions shall be treated as null and void. 28. In the instant case, the Agreement entered into between Shri B. Chaujei Phom and Shri Ephen Phom of Orangkong Village with the School Education Department is dated 06.08.2010. The said Agreement contained various Clauses Page No.# 17/20 including Clauses 1, 2 and 3 which stipulated that there shall be appointment of one post each of Grade-IV in favour of Shri B. Chaujei Phom and Shri Ephen Phom of Orangkong Village and the first Grade-IV vacancy would be offered to Shri B. Chaujei Phom and the next vacancy shall be offered to Shri Ephen Phom for appointment on land ownership basis. 29. It is very pertinent to take note that this Agreement was entered into on 06.08.2010, at a time when there was already a policy laid down vide Notification dated 26.07.2005 that no land shall be acquired free of cost and all land shall be acquired on payment of full compensation as determined by law. 30. It is also pertinent to mention that the Notification dated 05.03.2018 is a Notification issued by the Governor of Nagaland in exercise of powers under Article 162 of the Constitution. The Notification is binding on all Departments of the State of Nagaland including the School Education Department. Therefore, till the Notification dated 05.03.2018 remains in the present form, no condition of employment inserted in any Agreement entered into after 26.07.2005 can be a basis for appointing on land ownership basis. Page No.# 18/20 31. The appointment on land ownership basis is an exception to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Under such circumstances, as the Notification dated 05.03.2018 is the policy of the Government to grant employment on land ownership basis, the terms of the Notification has to be adhered to strictly. 32. In view of the above analysis, it is the opinion of this Court that Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the Agreement dated 06.08.2010 have been rendered redundant in view of the Notification dated 05.03.2018. 33. The second point for determination is accordingly decided that the Respondent No. 8 could not have been appointed on the basis of the Deed of Agreement dated 06.08.2010 on land ownership basis. CONCLUSIONS 34. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands disposed of with the following observations and directions: (i) The impugned letter bearing No. DSE/ESTT-APPT/1- 33/2022 dated 10.03.2025 granting Administrative Page No.# 19/20 Approval for termination of the services of the Petitioner is set aside and quashed. (ii) The impugned order bearing No. ED/EST/GR- IV/SDEO-LLG/2022/298 dated 17.03.2025 terminating the Petitioner's services is set aside and quashed. (iii) The impugned letter bearing No. DSE/ESTT-APPT/1- 33/2022/604 dated 24.01.2025 conveying the Administrative Approval for appointment of the private Respondent No. 8 is set aside and quashed. (iv) The impugned order bearing No. ED/EST/GR- IV/SDEO-LLG/2022/457 dated 24.03.2025 appointing the private Respondent No. 8 is set aside and quashed. (v) The Petitioner is reinstated in service w.e.f. 17.03.2025. However, taking into account the extant facts, this Court is not inclined to direct payment of any back wages to the Petitioner. Be that as it may, the Petitioner would be entitled to other service benefits and the period from 17.03.2025 till the date of the present judgment shall be regularized. Page No.# 20/20 (vi) No costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant