2026:JHHC:15305 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 4975 of 2018 Mukesh Prasad, aged about 48 years son of late Parmeshwar Prasad, resident of Rasulpur Dahla, P.O, P.S & Dist. Sahebganj. …… Petitioner Versus 1. The Jharkhand State Agricultural Marketing Board, Ranchi, Itaki Road, P.O Hehal, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, Dist. Ranchi through its Managing Director. 2. The Parsadiya Up- Samittee (The Sub-Committee of J.S.A.M., Board) Ranchi, Itaki Road, Ranchi, P.O. Hehal, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, Dist. Ranchi through its Chairman. 3. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Sahebganj, P.O, P.S. and Dist. Sahebganj, through its Secretary. 4. The Secretary, Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Sahebganj, at P.O, P.S. and Dist. Sahebganj. … … Respondents ------- CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ------- For the Petitioner : Mr. V. P. Singh, Sr. Adv. : Mrs Bandana Kumari Sinha, Adv. : Mrs. Ragini Kumari, Adv. For the Respondents : Dr. Ashok Kr. Singh, Adv. ------- 17/27.04.2026 The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for the following relief:- (i) For quashing/ cancelling/ rescinding the order of the respondent Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Sahebganj (hereinafter to be referred as APMC, Sahebganj" or "the Market Committee only) issued under the signature of the Secretary of the Market Committee & contained in Letter No. 286 dated 25.09.2017 Memo No. 286 dated 25.09.2017 (Annexure-4), (ii) For issuance of a writ of Mandamus or in nature thereof commanding/ directing the Respondents to produce the decision/resolution of Parsadiya Up- Samittee (Board's Sub Committee) and also to produce the copy of the Order No.173 dated 22.09.2017 of the Jharkhand State Agricultural Marketing Board, Ranchi (hereinafter to be referred as the JSAM Board", or "the Board" only) and on such production of above 2026:JHHC:15305 2 resolution/decision of Board's Sub-Committee and Board's Order No.173 dated 22-09-2017 be pleased to quash/cancel/rescind them by issuance of writ(s) of certiorari or in nature thereof, (iii) For issuance of a writ of mandamus or in nature thereof commanding/ directing the Respondents to confirm/regularize the services of the petitioner in view of the decision dated 25.08.1995 passed by Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Patna in CWJC No. 11651 of 1994 (Annexure-1) and Resolution dated 29.06.2000 of the Market Committee (Annexure 2 & 2/A) with effect from 29.06.2000 with all consequential benefits; 2. At the outset, Ld. Sr. Counsel for the petitioner draws attention of this Court towards Annexure-4 which is the impugned order; whereby the engagement of this petitioner has been discharged abruptly. He further submits that the only point which has been written in the impugned order (Annexure-4), is that on the instruction of Agricultural Produce Marketing Board, the service of the petitioner has been disengaged. He further draws attention towards Annexure- 2, which is the minutes of the meeting of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee held on 29.06.2000, which dealt with the case of several other employees including the case of the petitioner and his name was duly recommended. 3. From pleadings it does not appear that any decision has been taken on that recommendation of the Committee. However, from Annexure-3, it is evident that the petitioner has been granted 6th pay revision. 4. At this stage, it is necessary to indicate that Annexure-4 only indicates about the direction of the apex body known as Jharkhand Agricultural Marketing Board (herein after to be referred as Board). However, there is no document/order either in the writ application or in 2026:JHHC:15305 3 the counter affidavit that on what ground, the Board has taken its decision. It is true that it was a general decision; however, the ground for discharging the services of this petitioner is not apparent. 5. The stand of the respondent is that initially the engagement of the petitioner was on daily wage basis and was without any sanctioned post and without any public advertisement. However, at this stage it is pertinent to note that the Board itself has given 6th pay revision to the petitioner. The next stand of the Board is that in view of the amendment in the Jharkhand State Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 2000 deleting the provision for imposition of market fee @ 1% of sale value; the market committee has practically no source of income. As such, the Board has decided to dispense with the services of all such employees including the petitioner. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the documents available on records and the averments made in the respective affidavits, it is evident that though the petitioner was appointed in the year 1982 and continued till 2017, when his job was abruptly terminated vide Annexure-4 which indicates that the Agricultural Produce Marketing Board has directed the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, to disengage the service of the petitioner. So far as the stand of the respondent with regard to non-advertisement and non-sanctioned post is concerned; in the case of Jaggo Vs. Union of India reported in 2024 SCC Online 3826 (refer para-10) & with regard to limits on perpetual contractual engagement, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhola Nath Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 129 has held in para 13.2 to 13.10 as under:- 2026:JHHC:15305 4 “Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements: 13.2. In the present case, the respondent-State had engaged the services of the appellants on sanctioned posts since the year 2012. It was only towards the end of the year 2022 that the respondents communicated that no further extension of the appellants’ engagement was likely to be granted. 13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in clear derogation of the equality principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State initially engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge public duties and functions. Having rendered long and dedicated service, the appellants cannot now be left to fend for themselves, particularly when the employment opportunities that may have been available to them a decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age constraints. 13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis for the respondent-State’s decision to discontinue the appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service. We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship between the appellants and the respondent- State was mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of the appellants’ experience and institutional familiarity, while the appellants remained in public service. In such circumstances, any departure from a long-standing practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking order. 13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years and has been granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is contractual or regular. 13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of “part-time”, “contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India10, this Court underscored that government-departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the organization. 13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam11 and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India12, this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions. 13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P.13, this Court strongly deprecated the culture of “ ad-hocism” adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such measures 2026:JHHC:15305 5 perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practices. 13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time employees, such as the appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of the State continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the system, but form essential components thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the careers and livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are guided by fairness and reason. 13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State’s contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having availed of the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.” 7. So far as the ground of non-availability of “Sanctioned post” is concerned; in LPA No.176 of 2023 it has been observed that “The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo v. Union of India and Others (Supra) and Shripal & Another v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad (Supa) has taken into consideration that merely on the ground of non- availability of sanctioned post and if one or the other employee has been allowed to continue in service fairly for a long period herein more than two decades, then by taking plea of appointment having not been made against sanctioned post will amount to unfair level practice and on the aforesaid premise the direction has been passed for regularization.” 8. In the factual background of this case, there is no dispute that the case of this petitioner was considered by the Committee and was also referred to the Apex Board in the year 2000 itself. Further, there is no denial that the petitioner had also received 6th pay revision; therefore, no decision on the recommendation by the Committee to the Board and getting 6th PRC; 2026:JHHC:15305 6 emphatically, created a legitimate expectation in the petitioner. As such, the abrupt termination of service of the petitioner when he continued to work for almost 35 years continuously, the action of the respondents of disengaging the services of the petitioner abruptly; is certainly bad in law and cannot be sustained. 9. So far as the ground of the respondents that in view of the decision of the Board, that practically there is no source of income which is apparent from para-13 of the counter affidavit dated 24.07.2019 is concerned; this ground cannot be appreciated by this Court that due to lack of fund or paucity of fund, the discharge of any employee can be defended. 10. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, Letter No. 286 dated 25.09.2017 issued under Memo No. 286 dated 25.09.2017 (Annexure-4), and Board's Order No.173 dated 22-09-2017, are hereby, quashed and set aside. 11. It goes without saying that impugned order, as stated herein above, only suggest that the decision of the Board was to disengage the petitioner; however, on what ground the Board has taken that decision, no document has been annexed in the counter affidavits in that regard. Since the impugned order does not have any valid sustainable reason to terminate the petitioner; the same does not have any legs to stand in the eye of law and has been quashed accordingly. 12. Therefore, the respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Further, the Respondents are also directed to take a formal decision w.r.t. regularization of this petitioner in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and our own High 2026:JHHC:15305 7 Court coupled with the fact that the petitioner had given almost 35 years of his life in the services of the Respondents. The said decision shall be taken by the Respondents within a further period of 8 weeks. 10. As a result, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A.s if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) April 27, 2026 NAFR/AFR Uploaded on 21/05/2026 Fahim/-