Page No.# 1/27 GAHC020003932026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/112/2026 THE STATE OF NAGALAND AND 3 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE CHISF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND 2: THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF POWER NAGALAND KOHIMA 3: THE ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF DEPARTMENT OF POWER NAGALAND KOHIMA 4: THE CHIEF ENGINEER DEPARTMENT OF POWER NAGALAND KOHIM VERSUS SMTI. SUNGJEMNUNGLA @ ANUNGLA W/O LATE TOSHIMEREN, R/O OAK APARTMENT, NEAR URA VILLAGE GATE, DIMAPUR Advocate for the Petitioner : GOVT ADV NL, Advocate for the Respondent : , Page No.# 2/27 BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER ORDER Date : 17.09.2026 (R. Phukan, J.) Heard Mr. I. Imsong, learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. T.O. Longkumer, learned counsel for the counsel for the opposite party. 2. In this application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the applicants, namely, State of Nagaland, represented by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland; Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Power, Government of Nagaland; Engineer-In-Chief, Department of Power, Government of Nagaland; and Chief Engineer, Department of Power, Government of Nagaland, have prayed for condoning the delay of 226 days in preferring the accompanying appeal, against the judgment and order dated 21.08.2025, passed in W.P.(C) No. 108/2024, by the learned Single Judge of this Court. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order dated 21.08.2025, learned Single Judge had directed the applicants herein, to regularize the services of the husband of the opposite party herein, one day before the date of his expiry, for the purpose of giving pensionary benefits, including family pension, to the opposite party herein and her children and if found necessary, Government may create a supernumerary post for facilitating the same and on the question of entitlement of arrears of family Page No.# 3/27 pension, the same shall be calculated and paid to the petitioner w.e.f. three years prior to the filing of the writ petition, i.e. from 18.06.2021. 4. Mr. Imsong, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the applicants, submits that the applicants have intended to file one writ appeal, against the judgment and order, dated 21.08.2025, passed in W.P.(C) No. 108/2024, by the learned Single Judge and in the process, 226 days of delay have been occurred in preferring the same. He further submits that the ground for delay is explained in paragraph Nos. 5, 6 & 8 of the interlocutory application and that after the judgment and order being passed in W.P.(C) No. 108/2024, the impugned judgment and order was processed by the applicants for legal advice and in that process due to observance of ponderous administrative procedure, sufficient time has been spent. 4.1. Mr. Imsong further submits that inherent administrative process was not deliberate, but in view of ponderous bureaucratic procedures, involving several departments, nearly 1 year time have been elapsed in seeking legal opinion and that there was long communication gap between the applicants and their counsel, for which the appeal could not be filed within the limitation period. 4.2. Mr. Imsong also submits that after completion of the administrative procedures, applicants had handed over the matter to their counsel for filing an appeal, but the record was inadvertently misplaced and later on, the same was traced out from the disposed of record room of the applicants’ counsel and that the said delay was beyond the control of the applicants, which prevented them from filing the appeal within the prescribed time limit and that the Page No.# 4/27 delay was not due to negligence or indifference on the part of the applicants, rather it was result of a complex multi-layered system. 4.3. Mr. Imsong also submits that while the matter was listed before this Court, this Court, vide order dated 24.06.2026, had directed the applicants to file an additional affidavit supplementing the grounds for delay, in the interlocutory application, and accordingly, an additional affidavit was filed on 29.07.2026. He further submits that the impugned judgment and order, dated 21.08.2025, came to the knowledge of the applicants in the last week of August, 2025 and after examining the copy of the judgment and order, along with the relevant documents, the same were put up before the higher authority for directions/advices. Thereafter, the same was put up before the Department of Law and Justice for further examination and advice, as to whether further steps could be taken or not by way of review or appeal against the impugned judgment and order, dated 21.08.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge and thereafter, dealing counsel for the case was contacted. However, due to her pre-engaged activities/works, she had expressed her inability to take up the appeal, for which, matter was assigned to the present counsel for filing an appeal against the aforesaid impugned judgment and order. And the aforesaid delay is beyond the control of the applicants and under such circumstances Mr. Imsong submits that the delay of 226 days may be condoned and the accompanying appeal may be admitted for hearing and there is arguable point in the appeal. 5. Per-contra, Mr. Longkumer, learned counsel for the opposite party, has opposed the application. He submits that the applicants Page No.# 5/27 herein have failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for condoning delay of 226 days in preferring the connected appeal and that the applicants, being the State, are not entitled to any special leniency and as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969. Referring to another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh & Another vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 495, he submits that no event or circumstance has been shown which prevented the State from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. 5.1. Mr. Longkumer has pointed it out that there is delay in every step of the way in preferring the appeal. The series of communication that has been annexed to the additional affidavit, filed by the applicants, dated 27.08.2025; 29.08.2025; 07.09.2025; and 19.09.2025, are merely communications in pursuance of the judgment and order, not in pursuance of preferring an appeal. It was only after the lapse of the prescribed period of limitation, a communication was made on 22.09.2025, to the State counsel to prefer an appeal and there is no explanation as to the period after that, till the filing of the present application on 08.05.2026. 5.2. Mr. Longkumer also submits that there is lack of bona fides and due diligence on the part of the applicants and that the applicants at paragraph No. 6 of the interlocutory application have simply stated that due to ponderous bureaucratic procedures involving several departments the appeal could not be preferred within the limitation period. Page No.# 6/27 5.3. Referring to another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, Mr. Longkumer submits that the intra-departmental communication and decision making process does not constitute sufficient cause and that in paragraph Nos. 26 – 29 of the aforementioned decision, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the useful explanation of the bureaucratic methodology or processes of the Government cannot be accepted as sufficient cause to warrant condonation of delay and condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government departments. 5.4. Further, referring to another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Tata Yodogawa Limited and Another, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 102, Mr. Longkumer submits that Hon’ble Supreme Court had dismissed the application for condonation delay of 51 days on the ground that even after giving further opportunity to file additional affidavit to explain the delay, no attempt was made to explain the said delay or show sufficient cause. He further submits that the applicants herein have not only miserably failed to show sufficient cause for the delay of 226 days in preferring the appeal, but have demonstrated indifference, lethargy and laxity in pursuing the matter and as such, condoning delay would amount to legitimizing that effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities, and therefore, he submits that this application may be dismissed with costs. 6. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the application as well Page No.# 7/27 as the documents placed on record and also gone through the decisions relied upon by Mr. Longkumer, learned counsel for the opposite party. 7. Before a discussion is directed to the points, referred to by the learned counsel for both the parties, it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of condonation of delay, presently holding the field, so as to deal with the issue in present application, with greater precision. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, has observed as under:- “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy, and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in Page No.# 8/27 a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party Page No.# 9/27 was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing- on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even- handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits…..” 8.1. Again in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy; reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further and made the following observations:- “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is Page No.# 10/27 no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. Page No.# 11/27 It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 8.2. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by Lrs. vs. Exe. Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project & Another, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- Page No.# 12/27 “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning Page No.# 13/27 inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.” 8.3. However, the aforesaid position of affording a degree of latitude to the State, and its instrumentalities, has considerably been shifted after the landmark decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster (supra). In this Hon’ble Supreme Court held that claims of the Government and its functionaries being an impersonal machinery and inherited with bureaucratic methodology can no Page No.# 14/27 longer be accepted to excuse delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in view of the modern technologies being used and available. Further, it has been held that it was high time that the practice of condoning delay merely because the litigant is a government entity has been done away with, and that delay should be condoned only where there is a reasonable and acceptable explanation for such delay and was accompanied by a bona fide effort. It has further been observed that the usual explanation of bureaucratic inefficiency and of procedural red tapism can no longer be accepted. Further, it has been held that condonation of delay is a matter of exception and cannot be treated as an anticipated privilege accruing to governmental bodies by reason of their hierarchical structure or bureaucratic methodology. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Thus, the plea of public interest cannot by any stretch be used as a carte blanche for official inaction. It observed that Government departments, far from being entitled to presumptive indulgence, are in fact under a higher obligation to discharge their functions with diligence, vigilance, and scrupulous regard to limitation. 8.4. Relevant para in the said decision are extracted herein below for ready reference:- “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Page No.# 15/27 Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be Page No.# 16/27 swirled for the benefit of a few.” 8.5. Thereafter, in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to earlier authorities, broadly culled out the principles of condonation of delay as under:- i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public Page No.# 17/27 justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be Page No.# 18/27 carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 8.6. To the aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case. They are:- a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 8.7. Thereafter, in the case of State of Madhya Page No.# 19/27 Pradesh vs. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that any delay as a result of unavailability of the documents or the process of arranging for them through bureaucratic process works is no longer an acceptable reason or excuse to condone such delay. Relevant para are extracted herein below:- “2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our counselling to the Government and government authorities has fallen on deaf ears i.e. the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have raised the issue that if the government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the statutes prescribed. 3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. […] Page No.# 20/27 4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only “due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents”. In para 4, a reference has been made to “bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs”. ………… …………………………………… 6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that Page No.# 21/27 he must first address us on the question of limitation. 8.8. In the aforementioned case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned that where any public authority persists in approaching the Courts for condonation of delay on such feeble and untenable grounds would not only be denied the indulgence of condonation, but would also be imposed with costs for wastage of judicial time. The relevant observations read as under:- “7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.” 8.9. In the case of Sheo Raj Singh (supra), however, while testing an order of Delhi High Court, allowing an application filed by the Central Government, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in appeal, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision to condone the delay on account of the first respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State." Page No.# 22/27 8.10. In the case of Inder Singh vs. The State Of Madhya Pradesh; reported in [2025 INSC 382]; Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation.” 8.11. Again in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Others; reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be Page No.# 23/27 permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.” 9. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decisions and discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize injustice, but are obliged to remove injustice. Therefore, a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented and non- pedantic approach has to be adopted while dealing with an application for condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ is shown. The term ‘sufficient cause’ should be understood in it’s proper spirit, philosophy and purpose and having regard to the fact that this item is basically elastic and is to be applied in a proper perspective to the obtaining factual situation. The paramount and pivotal consideration is substantial justice; the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. In respect of deliberate causation of delay, the presumption is not available but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of, besides lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay, which is a significant and relevant fact. The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but are required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice. The approach of the court must be liberal, but at the same time, it must be reasonable also. In case of inordinate delay, strict approach is required to be taken, while in case of delay of a short duration, a liberal delineation is required. The fundamental principle, being weighing the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. While condoning delay, the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In the case of Page No.# 24/27 the explanation, being offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. The entire gamut of facts is to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion, which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. The State or a public body or an entity, representing a collective cause, should be given some acceptable latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. 10. Now, adverting to the facts of the present application, we find from the application and the additional affidavit filed by the applicants and also from the submission of Mr. Imsong, learned Addl. A.G. that the grounds for delay of 226 days in preferring the connected Writ Appeal against the judgment and order, dated 21.08.2025, passed in W.P.(C) No. 108/2024, by the learned Single Judge of this Court is that the said judgment and order was processed by the applicants for legal advice and in that process, it had observed ponderous administrative procedure and sufficient time has been spent in that process and the same has been stated in paragraph Nos. 5, 6 & 8 of the application. It is also the contention of Mr. Imsong that the inherent administrative process was not deliberate, but in view of ponderous bureaucratic procedures involving several departments, nearly 1 year time have been elapsed in seeking legal opinion and that there was long communication gap between the applicants and their counsel, for which the appeal could not be filed within the limitation period. It is also the contention of Mr. Imsong that after completion of the administrative procedures, applicants had handed over the matter to Page No.# 25/27 their counsel for filing an appeal, but the record was inadvertently misplaced and later on, the same was traced out from the disposed of record room of the applicants’ counsel and that the said delay in beyond the control of the applicants which prevented them from filing the appeal within the prescribed time limit and that the delay was not due to negligence or indifference on the part of the applicants, rather it was result of complex multi-layered system. 10.1. In the additional affidavit filed on 29.07.2026, as per direction of this Court, it is stated that the impugned judgment and order dated 21.08.2025, came to the knowledge of the applicants in the last week of August, 2025 and after examining the copy of the judgment and order along with the relevant documents, the same were put up before the higher authority for directions/advices. Thereafter, the same was put up before the Department of Law and Justice for further examination and advice, and having obtained the same the dealing counsel for the case was contacted who due to her pre-engaged activities/works expressed her inability to take up the appeal, for which, matter was assigned to the present counsel for filing an appeal against the aforesaid impugned judgment and order. And the said delay is beyond the control of the applicants. 10.2. This explanation for delay of 226 days, so forthcoming from the applicants, to our considered opinion left us unimpressed. As pointed out by Mr. Longkumar, the learned counsel for the respondent/opposite party, the applicants only after elapse of the limitation period made a communication on 22.09.2025 to the State Counsel for filing an appeal. The applicants slept over the entire limitation period. After the communication dated 22.09.2025, till Page No.# 26/27 filing of the present application on 08.05.2026 there is no explanation. This demonstrate not only lack of bona-fide, but also lack of due diligence on their part. 10.3. Thus, the aforesaid explanation, so forthcoming from the applicants, for the delay of 226 days, while examined in the light of the ratios laid down in the cases discussed herein above, we are of the considered opinion that the applicants had miserably failed to explain the delay, let alone sufficiently. Whatever, explanation is put forwarded by the applicants is no longer a ‘sufficient cause’ in the view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Post Master General (supra), and also in the case of Bherulal(supra), where it has been held that the intra- departmental communication and decision making process, and that the useful explanation of the bureaucratic methodology or processes of the Government do not constitute ‘sufficient cause’, and are no longer an acceptable reason or excuse to condone such delay. 10.4. Even though the applicants were granted an opportunity to file an additional affidavit by this Court vide order, dated 24.06.2026, to supplement the reasons for delay, they had failed to assign ‘sufficient reason’. Mr. Longkumar, learned counsel for the respondent/opposite party had rightly pointed this out during the course of hearing. Notably in the case of Tata Yodogawa Limited(supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court had dismissed the application for condonation of 51 days, on the ground that even after giving further opportunity to file additional affidavit to explain the delay, no attempt was made to explain the said delay or show sufficient cause. Page No.# 27/27 10.5. It is well settled in the case of Inder Singh(supra) that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause. Further it is well settled in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that no litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law and that it is the obligation of the courts to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice by reopening the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. It is also well settled that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. 11. Under the given factual and legal matrix we find the present application devoid of merit and accordingly we are constrained to dismiss that same leaving the parties to bear their own costs. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant