2026:HHC:27515 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 939 of 2026 Date of Decision: 08.07.2026. Tilak Raj …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Kashmir Singh, Senior Advocate, with Mr Abhinandan Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the victim : Ms Kiran Dhiman, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral) The petitioner has filed the petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 141 of 2025, dated 28.08.2025, registered at Police Station, Haroli District, Una, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64, 74 and 75 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:27515 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the petitioner was teasing the victim for a long time. She was working in the house of Ashok Kumar on 23.08.2025 at about 08.30 A.M. as a domestic help. No other person was present in the house. The petitioner visited the house and enquired from the victim about the persons present in the house. She replied that no one was present. He visited the house at about 08.30 a.m., caught hold of the victim's breasts, and tried to tear her clothes. The petitioner had raped the victim about one year before the incident when she was alone. The victim narrated the incident to the owner of the house, who made enquiries from the petitioner, but the petitioner replied that no such incident had taken place. The matter was reported to the police, and the police arrested the petitioner. The petitioner had filed a bail petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 2630 of 2025 and was dismissed on 24.11.2025. The victim’s statement has been recorded, which amounts to a change in the circumstances. The police have also filed a supplementary charge sheet, which does not connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court 3 2026:HHC:27515 may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim was working in the house of Ashok Kumar on 23.08.2025. The petitioner repeatedly came to Ashok Kumar’s house and enquired about the inmates of the house. The victim replied that there was no one in the house. The petitioner came to the house at about 8:30 AM and tried to rape the victim. The petitioner had earlier raped her. The victim narrated the incident to Ashok Kumar and also reported it to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The victim and the petitioner were medically examined. The victim produced her clothes, which were seized by the police. The police have filed the charge sheet on 26.10.2025. The result from RFSL is awaited. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. FIR No. 61 of 2019 was registered against the petitioner. The police filed the charge sheet on 18.04.2026, and the matter is listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 17.08.2026. Hence, the status report. 4 2026:HHC:27515 4. I have heard Mr Kashmir Singh Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Abhinandan Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State and Ms Kiran Dhiman, learned counsel for the victim. 5. Mr Kashmir Singh Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The report of the FSL does not connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The petitioner was arrested on 29.08.2025, and nearly one year has elapsed since his arrest. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner's right to a speedy trial. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had filed a bail petition earlier, which was rejected by this Court. A subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. The petitioner has not pleaded any change in the 5 2026:HHC:27515 circumstances, and the present petition is not maintainable. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Ms Kiran Dhiman, learned counsel for the victim, submitted that the petitioner had raped the victim about one year before the present incident. He molested the victim when she was alone, and the victim's safety would be compromised by releasing him on bail. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 2630 of 2025 and was dismissed by this Court on 24.11.2025. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that a subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. It was held in the State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling 6 2026:HHC:27515 the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 10. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 7 2026:HHC:27515 11. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 12. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 13. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 8 2026:HHC:27515 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 14. The Court had earlier held that there was sufficient material to prima facie conclude the petitioner's involvement in 9 2026:HHC:27515 the commission of the crime. The petitioner had criminal antecedents, which would disentitle him from the concession of bail. The allegations against the petitioner were grave, and the punishment that can be imposed is harsh. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to bail. These considerations have not changed. 15. It was submitted that there was a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which would make the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission was considered and rejected by the Court while deciding the earlier perpetration, and the findings recorded by the Court cannot be reviewed while deciding the subsequent bail petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070, that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676: 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. Successive bail applications are indeed permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the 10 2026:HHC:27515 circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 16. Therefore, it is impermissible to hold that the petitioner has not committed the crime in the present proceedings when the Court had earlier held that prima facie material exists against the petitioner for the commission of the crime. 17. It was submitted that the report of the analysis does not connect the petitioner to the crime. This is not correct. The report of analysis mentions that on comparison of the dental stone teeth impression of the victim, there was partial consistency with the bite mark impression found in the photograph of the bite mark on the petitioner’s arm. However, the complete correspondence could not be established. This report prima facie connects the petitioner to the commission of the crime because the tooth mark on his arm was found to be partially consistent with the victim’s tooth impression, and it is not correct to say that the report of the analysis does not establish the prosecution's case. 11 2026:HHC:27515 18. It was submitted that the Police have failed to complete the evidence despite the lapse of one year, and this violates the petitioner's right to a speedy trial. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report mentions that the prosecution case is listed on 17.08.2026 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses, which shows that the trial is progressing normally. The petitioner has not filed the copies of the order sheets to demonstrate that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and this delay is attributable to the prosecution or the Court. In the absence of the order sheets, the plea taken by the petitioner that there is a delay in the progress of the trial cannot be accepted. 19. The offence alleged against the petitioner is grave and is punishable with life imprisonment. Thus, the punishment is severe. As per the victim, the petitioner had raped her, and thereafter, he had outraged her modesty. The victim's apprehension is justified in these circumstances, that her safety would be compromised by releasing the petitioner on bail. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail. 20. No other point was raised. 12 2026:HHC:27515 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 22. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 8th July, 2026 (Chander)