Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2026:CGHC:20833 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No.107 of 2008 1 - Naresh Kumar, S/o Mehtu Sahu, aged 27 years, R/o Village Parsadbod, Police Station Dhamdha, District Durg (C.G.) 2 - Pappu, alias Pawan Kumar, S/o Kapil Sahu, aged 19 years, R/o Village Parsabod, Police Station Dhamdha, District Durg (C.G.) Appellant (s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through S.O. Dhamdha, Durg, C.G.
Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Kanhaiya Ram Yadav, PL Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
Judgment on Board 05/05/2026
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.12.2007 passed by the learned 7th Additional Session Judge (FTC), Durg (C.G.) in Session Trial No.275/2005, whereby the appellants have been convicted under Section 307 of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI Digitally signed by R NIRALA
2 for 7 years with fine of Rs.2000/- with default stipulation.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 20.09.2005, the complainant Sudhir Tamrakar was assaulted by the appellants when he was on the way to his home on a motorcycle, as a result of which he sustained severe injuries, thereafter he was admitted to hospital and report was lodged against the appellants. Thereafter a case was registered against the accused and they were arrested. After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the appellants before the Magistrate concerned.
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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and material available on record. The learned Trial Court did not appreciate the oral and documentary evidence properly and did not consider omissions and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The complainants did not receive any grievous injuries and only received simple injuries despite that the appellants have been convicted under Section 307 of IPC. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
Alternatively, He submits that the incident took place in the year 2005, this appeal is pending since 2008, presently the appellants are aged more than 40 years and they remained in jail for about 15 months and have never misused the liberty granted by this Court, therefore, the appellants may be sentenced to the period already undergone by them.
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4. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned
judgment and submits that the learned Trial Court has minutely appreciated the evidence available on record and has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants, as such no interference is called for. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court framed charges under Section 307 of IPC against all the appellants. After appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 307 of IPC, as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. 7. As per prosecution, both the accused persons assaulted the complainant Sudhir Tamrakar by a club, as a result of which he sustained grievous injuries which were dangerous to their life. 8. PW-2 Sudhir Tamrakar the complainant stated that on the date of incident, when he was returning to his shop from the house of Balwant, the accused persons assaulted him by club, as a result of which he sustained injuries on his head, hands, legs, back, eyes and ear. In his cross-examination, he remained firm. 9. PW-1 Baldau, PW-3 Jagatram Maihar, PW-4 Thailendra Kumar and PW-5 Balwant have all stated that on the date of incident, the appellants assaulted the complainant Sudhir Tamrakar. 4
10. Dr. S. K. Jamgade (PW-6) examined the complainant Sudhir Tamrakar and found 14 injuries on his head and forehead and abrasion and swelling was also found. He immediately referred the complainant to District Hospital. He gave his report (Ex-P/12). He also stated that if treatment would not have been given on time to the complainant, then he could have died. 11. DW-2 Dr. Rajeev Kumar Pal stated that he conducted CT scan and x-ray of the complainant vide Ex-D/2 & D/3. He did not find any fracture and bones were found normal in the examination. 12. DW-3 Dr. Lata Dewangan, who was radiologist, stated that she did not find any fracture on the body of complainant. 13. No other medical evidence or document was filed by the prosecution to prove this fact that the injured was admitted in hospital for more than 20 days and any grievous injury was sustained by him. 14.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Sivamani and another vs State represented by Inspector of Police, passed in CRA No.3619/2023, decided on 28.11.2023, held in paras 9, 10, 11 & 12 as under:-
“9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that ‘…The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.’ The position
5 that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life-threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, ‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.’
10. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is convinced that the Impugned
Judgment of the High Court requires to be interfered with. Admittedly, there is no allegation of repeated or severe blows having been inflicted. Even the injuries on PW1 and PW2 have been found to be simple in nature, which is an additional point in the appellants’ favour. 11. We are further inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that from the materials on record, only offences under Sections 3232 and 3243 of the IPC can be made out. As such, the conviction under Section 307, IPC is unsustainable. 12. In the background of the discussions made hereinabove and on taking an overall view, the Impugned Judgment is varied only to the extent that the conviction of the appellants stands modified to that under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC and the sentence imposed is also reduced to the period already undergone. The fine imposed is maintained. The appellants stand discharged of the liabilities of their bail bonds, if any.”
15. In light of above and looking to the statement of Medical Officers, it is clear that offence under Section 307 of IPC is not made out against the appellants so they are convicted under Section 324 of IPC instead of Section 307 of IPC. 6
16. As regards sentence, it is clear that the incident took place in the year 2005, this appeal is pending since 2008, presently the appellants are aged more than 40 years and they remained in jail for about 15 months and have never misused the liberty granted by this Court, therefore, ends of justice would be served if the appellants are sentenced to the period already undergone by them. Accordingly, the appellants are sentenced to the period already undergone by them. 17. The appeal is partly allowed. 18. The appellants are reported to be on bail. 19. Keeping in view the provisions of section 481 of BNSS 2023, the appellants are directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- each before the Court concerned forthwith, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 20.
The Trial Court’s record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/-
Rajani Dubey
Judge Nirala