Page No.# 1/29 GAHC020005842026 2026:GAU-NL:474-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : W.P.(Crl.)/21/2026 MR. PAWAN KARMAKAR S/O LATE BHARAT KARMAKAR, PRESENT RESIDENT OF GARAGE COLONY, NEAR RAIL GATE, DIMAPUR, NAGALAND. PERMANENT RESIDENT OF FURKATING COLLEGE, TIN ALI, GOLAGHAT, ASSAM, REPRESENTING BY THE DETENUES FRIEND MR. BOVIKA ZHIMO (DETENUE) PRESENTLY LODGED AT DISTRICT CENTRAL JAIL, DIMAPUR, NAGALAND VERSUS THE STATE OF NAGALAND AND 3 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND, KOHIMA, NAGALAND 2:THE SPECIAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARTMENT (POLITICAL BRANCH) KOHIMA NAGALAND 3:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF JAIL CENTRAL JAIL DIMAPUR NAGALAND 4:THE UNION OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY (PITNDPS) DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE MINISTRY OF FINANCE ROOM NO. 202 JEEVAN TARA BUILDING 5 Page No.# 2/29 PARLIAMENT STREET NEW DELHI - 11000 - B e f o r e- HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN Hon’ble mrs. Justice yarenjungla longkumer Advocates for the petitioner : Mr. P. Surien Advocate for the respondents : Ms. Inaholi Wotsa, respondent Nos. 1-3. Mr. Z. N. Ngullie, CGSC, respondent No.4. Date of which Judgment is reserved : 02.09.2026 Date of pronouncement of Judgment : 17.09.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the : N/A operative part of the Judgment? Whether the full judgment has been : Yes pronounced? JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) (Robin Phukan, J) Heard Mr. P. Surien, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Inaholi Wotsa, learned Government Advocate for the State respondent Nos. 1-3. Also heard Mr. Z. N. Ngullie, learned CGC, for the respondent No. 4. 2. In this Habeas Corpus petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the Detention Order No. Page No.# 3/29 CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/37, dated 18.05.2026, passed by the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland under Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, whereby, the detenue was detained under the said Act; and the Rejection Order No. CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/51, dated 02.07.2026, passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, whereby the representation of the petitioner, dated 25.06.2026, for revocation of the said Detention Order, dated 18.05.2026, was rejected; and the Confirmation Order No. CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/53, dated 07.07.2026, passed by the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland, whereby, the detenue's Representation, dated 25.06.2026, for revocation of the said Detention Order, dated 18.05.2026, was again rejected. Background Facts:- 3. The background facts leading to filing of the present petition is briefly stated as under:- On 23.03.2026, an information was received by Sub-Urban P.S. Dimapur that one person was transporting suspected narcotic drugs near Railway Colony, Dimapur, in an auto-rickshaw. Then, one General Diary, vide G.D. Entry No. 09/2026, dated 23.03.2026, was recorded and the matter was immediately communicated to the immediate superior officer by Hav. Talirenba Ao, SOT, CP, Dimapur. Thereafter, a team of SOT and GRPS was constituted under the supervision of ACP (West). The team reached the location at about Page No.# 4/29 14:35 hrs. and intercepted one auto-rickshaw, bearing Registration No. NL-07FA-1354 (black/yellow) and conducted search, in presence of a Gazetted Officer, as per the consent given by the detenue. During search, 05 (five) numbers of plastic soap cases, containing suspected heroin (Sunflower), were recovered from the back compartment of the back seat of the said auto-rickshaw, which was concealed inside a black polythene bag. Upon weighing, approximately 55 grams of suspected contraband drugs was found. On the complaint lodged by Hav. Talirenba Ao, SOT, CP Dimapur, Sub- Urban P.S. Case No. 008/2026, under Section 21(b) NDPS Act was registered. Thereafter, the detenue was forwarded to the judicial custody and a proposal was communicated to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Dimapur, vide Letter, dated 17.07.2026, for detaining the detenue under the PITNDPS Act, 1988. And accordingly, on receipt of the said Letter, dated 17.04.2026, from the I.O. of the case, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Dimapur, wrote another letter to the Addl. Director General of Police (L&O), PHQ Kohima, Nagaland, whereby, it was again proposed for detention of the detenue under the PITNDPS Act, vide Letter dated 22.04.2026. Thereafter, the Addl. Director General of Police (L&O), PHQ Kohima, Nagaland had written a letter to the Special Secretary (Home) to the Government of Nagaland, whereby it was again proposed for detention of the detenue under the PITNDPS Act, vide Letter, dated 04.05.2026. And accordingly, the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, ordered for Page No.# 5/29 detention of the detenue for a period of 3 (three) months, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3(1) of the Prevention of PITNDPS Act, vide impugned Detention Order, dated 18.05.2026. Thereafter, the petitioner/detenue had made a Representation, dated 25.06.2026, to the Special Secretary (Home) to the Government of Nagaland, for revoking the said Detention Order, dated 18.05.2026, But the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland had rejected the said Representation, dated 25.06.2026, vide impugned Rejection Order, dated 02.07.2026, and consequently, the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland had confirmed the said impugned detention order of the detenue, vide impugned Confirmation Order, dated 07.07.2026, on the ground that the authority found no valid grounds for revocation of the said impugned detention order. Grounds of challenge:- 4. The petitioner, being aggrieved, has approached this Court, by filing the present petition, challenging the orders aforesaid on the following grounds:- (a) The mandatory provisions of the PITNDPS Act has not been complied with by the detaining authority while exercising powers under the said Act and on such count the impugned Detention Order, dated 18.05.2026 and the impugned Rejection Order, dated 02.07.2026, are liable to be set aside and quashed. Page No.# 6/29 (b) Section 3 (2) of the PITNDPS Act was violated as the detaining authority has not produced any record or communication to show that the Central Government was notified of the detention of the detenue within 10 days from date of passing of the said detention order. (c) There was violation of Section 9 (b) of the Act as the records do not show that the detaining authority referred the matter before the Advisory Board within the prescribed period of five weeks from the date of detention of the detenue. (d) The detaining authority has neither in the said impugned detention order nor in the impugned rejection order mentioned that the detenue was already under judicial custody in connection with Sub-Urban P.S. Case No. 008/2026, U/s. 21 (b) NDPS Act, 1985. (e) The detenue knows and understands Hindi and Adivasi languages only, but the grounds of detention handed over to the detenue was in English language meaning thereby the detenue was not given or properly explained in detail in the language which he understands regarding his detention. And as such the impugned detention order is vitiated and hence liable to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. (f) The detaining authority, while exercising powers under the PITNDPS Act has miserably failed to inform the detenue that he was entitled to be represented by next friend and also about the time Page No.# 7/29 bound within which period the detenue can make his representation to the detaining authority, and this violated the fundamental right of the detenue as provided under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. (g) In the impugned rejection order, dated 02.07.2026, the detaining authority did not mention any specific reason for rejecting the said representation dated 25.06.2026 of the detenue, and it simply mentioned that there are no justified grounds to revoke the order of detention which has vitiated the detention of the detenue. And as such the impugned detention order and the impugned rejection order are illegal. (h) The impugned detention order says that it has been passed against the detenue for being prejudicial to the peace and security of the State of Nagaland without specifying as to how the detenue's activities would cause prejudicial to the peace and security of the State of Nagaland. As such, the impugned detention order has been passed in a mechanical manner and without the application of judicious mind. (i) The detaining authority has vaguely invoked the preventive detention law under the PITNDPS Act against the detenue. The allegations leveled against the detenue can be tried under the ordinary or special criminal laws of the land. The alleged activity of the detenue cannot be said to disturb even the tempo of the society warranting the detention of the detenue under the preventive Page No.# 8/29 detention law. The activities alleged against the detenue are matters of law and order and not public order as concluded by the detaining authority. (j) The particulars in the said detention order, grounds of detention and the proposal for the detention of the detenue are nothing but inferential conclusions based on no cogent materials whatsoever. Such satisfaction is not a satisfaction in the eye of law. The order of detention based on the purported satisfaction is vitiated for non- application of judicious mind. (k) The order of detention indicates that the detenue is suspected to be engaged in illicit traffic in NDPS and in order to prevent the detenue from engaging in such illicit traffic in NDPS, the same necessitated to detain him. The said allegation is vague and not at all sufficient to detain the detenue under the said Act. Furthermore, there is no cogent material or compelling reasons pointing to the involvement of the detenue in illicit traffic in NDPS activities. (l) There is a blatant violation of Articles 21 and 22 (5) of the Constitution of India as due process of law was not complied with while exercising powers under the PITNDPS Act by the detaining authority. Stand of the respondents:- 5. Respondent Nos. 1-3 have filed their affidavit in opposition denying the statement and averments made in the petition and also denying Page No.# 9/29 involvement of any grounds mentioned therein. It states that the grounds of detention is clearly mentioned and that the detaining Authority was in the knowledge that the detenue is in judicial custody and that if not detained the detenue is likely to be released on bail and if out on bail/kept at large the deteneu will indulge in similar activities therefore the need for preventive detention under PTINDPS Act 1988. Its further stand is that information along with all relevant documents were forwarded to the Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India by Email on the same day i.e. 18.05.2026 and by speed Post vide transaction id no. EE487839121IN, on 20.05.2026, i.e. within the stipulated time. Further it states that records will show that in compliance of Section 9 of PITNDPS Act 1988, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board on 03.06.2026, well within the stipulated time frame prescribed under the Act. And as such, there has been no violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act, and the detention order passed by the detaining authority is just and does not call for interference. 6. The respondent No. 4 states that the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Home Department, has passed the detention order of the petitioner on 18.05.2026, under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988 and on 18.05.2026 a report u/s 3(2) of PITNDPS Act, 1988 was forwarded by State Government of Nagaland to Central Government and the same was received by the Central Government on 18.05.2026 through email. It is also stated that the detenue, Shri Pawan Karmakar, had submitted a representation dated NIL addressed to the Deputy Secretary (PITNDPS), Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, seeking Page No.# 10/29 revocation of the Detention Order dated 18.05.2026. The said representation was received in the PITNDPS Division through email on 27.06.2026 and subsequently through Speed Post on 30.06.2026 through the Jail Authorities of Central Jail, Dimapur and the said representation was promptly forwarded by the Central Government to the State Government/Detaining Authority vide email dated 27.06.2026, calling for para-wise comments on the grounds raised therein, along with the status of the Report/Opinion of the State Advisory Board, for consideration of the representation. And the State Government furnished its para-wise comments on the representation vide email dated 07.07.2026. An identical representation made by detenue Shri Pawan Karmakar Son of Lt. Shri Bharat Karmakar addressed to the Detaining Authority, State of Nagaland, had already been considered and rejected by the State Detaining Authority vide order dated 02.07.2026, which was received in the PITNDPS Division through email on 03.07.2026. Further, an identical representation addressed to the State Government was also considered and rejected by the State Government vide order dated 07.07.2026, which was received in the PITNDPS Division on the same date. During the pendency of the representation before the Central Government, the status of the proceedings before the State Advisory Board was specifically called for from the State Government. The representation, dated NIL, was kept in abeyance pending the receipt of the Report/Opinion from the State Advisory Board, Nagaland in the said matter, which was in accordance with the settled law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Ankit Ashok Jalan v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. (Criminal) No. 362 of 2019, decided on 04.03.2020. The report and Page No.# 11/29 opinion of the State Advisory Board, Nagaland dated 29.07.2026, was received vide email dated 29.07.2026. On receipt of the para-wise comments, report & opinion of the State Advisory Board, Nagaland the representation along with material and facts and record were placed before Secretary, Department of Revenue for his perusal and the same was disposed of on 08.08.2026, after reviewing all facts and records, the representation was disposed of by the Secretary and on 12.08.2026, rejection memorandum was sent to the jail authorities and State detaining authority. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner: 7. Mr. Surien, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that though he has mentioned several grounds in the petition, amongst others, his main ground of challenge is that the Detention Order, dated 18.05.2026, was for a period of 3 (three) months and the said period of three months had already elapsed on 17.08.2026, and within the aforementioned period of three months, the Extension Order of the detenue was not passed and as such, the Detention Order, dated 18.05.2026, has elapsed and the petitioner has to be released from detention. 7.1. Mr. Surien further submits that though, the respondent authorities have passed another order, extending the period of detention, the same was passed on 19.08.2026, after the lapse of three months and that being so, the said order is illegal. 7.2. It is also the submission of Mr. Surien that the grounds of detention were not communicated to the detenue in a language understood by him. He also pointed out that the detenue knows and understands Hindi and Page No.# 12/29 Adivasi languages only. Whereas, the grounds of detention handed over to the detenue were in English language. 7.3. Mr. Surien also assailed the impugned detention order on the ground that the detaining authority has neither in the said impugned detention order nor in the impugned rejection order mentioned that the detenue was already under judicial custody in connection with Sub-Urban P.S. Case No. 008/2026, U/s. 21 (b) NDPS Act, 1985. His further contention is that the offences alleged against the petitioner can be tried under the ordinary criminal law of the land and that the alleged activities of the detenue cannot be said to be against public order and under such circumstances, he has contended to release the detenue from custody, by interfering with the impugned Detention Order dated 18.05.2026 passed by the Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland as well as the impugned Rejection Order dated 02.07.2026 passed by the Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland and the impugned consequent Confirmation Order dated 07.07.2026 passed by the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland/State Government on any of the above stated grounds for the interest of justice. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondents: 8. Per contra, Ms. Inaholi Wotsa, learned Government Advocate for the State respondent Nos. 1-3, has vehemently opposed the petition. She submits that the period of three months has to be counted from the ‘date execution of the detention order’ of the detenue not from the ‘date of order’. In support of her submission, she has referred to the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Page No.# 13/29 (i) State of Gujarat vs. Adam Kasam Bhaya, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 216, paragraph Nos. 4 & 5; and (ii) Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 409, paragraph No. 9. 8.1. She further submits that in the case of the petitioner, the detention order was executed on 20.05.2026, and the extension and confirmatory order was passed on 19.08.2026, and as such the same was passed well within the period of three months. 8.2. Further submission of Ms. Inaholi is that under Section 11 of the PITNDPS Act, a person can be detained for a maximum period of one year after the same being approved by the Advisory Board and in the instant case the Advisory Board had approved detention of the petitioner on 29.07.2026, and based upon which the confirmatory order was passed on 19.08.2026, extending the period of detention from 20.08.2026 to 19.11.2026. Her further submission is that once the Advisory Board has approved the detention of the detenue and thereafter confirmatory order is passed then the period of detention will continue for one year. In support of her submission she has referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, reported in (2023) 14 SCC 641. 8.3. Referring to the affidavit of the state respondents Nos. 1-3, she submits that the grounds of arrest were communicated to the petitioner in the language understood by him and that the detention of the petitioner was communicated to the Central Government well within the prescribed period and that the matter was placed before the Advisory Board also well Page No.# 14/29 within the prescribed period and that there is no violation of any right of the petitioner and as such she has contended to dismiss this petition. 9. Mr. Z. N. Ngullie, learned CGSC for the respondent No. 4 has adopted the submission of Ms. Inaholi Wotsa, learned Government Advocate for the State respondent Nos. 1-3. Discussion and Analysis:- 10. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties, we have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also gone through the decisions referred by her as well as the relevant file, so produced by Ms. Inaholi Wotsa, learned Government Advocate for the State respondent Nos. 1-3. 11. It is well settled in the case of Adam Kasam Bhaya(supra) and also in the case of Sunil Fulchand Shah(supra), that the period of three months of the detenue for which the order of detention was passed has to be counted from the date of execution of the order not from the date of passing the order. 11.1. In the case of Adam Kasam Bhaya(supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph No.5, has held as under:- “5. We have not been told by Mr Rana whether the first part or the second part of Section 10 applies to the facts of the case. He has made the submission on the assumption that the second part of Section 10 applies and the period of two years prescribed by the second part already expired. In our opinion, the submission has Page No.# 15/29 no force. In Section 10, both in the first and the second part of the section, it has been expressly mentioned that the detention will be for a period of one year or two years, as the case may be, from the date of detention , and not from the date of the order of detention. If the submission of learned counsel be accepted, two unintended results follow: (1) a person against whom an order of detention is made under Section 3 of the Act can successfully abscond till the expiry of the period and altogether avoid detention; and (2) even if the period of detention is interrupted by the wrong judgment of a High Court, he gets the benefit of the invalid order which he should not. The period of one or two years, as the case may be, as mentioned in Section 10 will run from the date of his actual detention, and not from the date of the order of detention. If he has served a part of the period of detention, he will have to serve out the balance. The preliminary objection is overruled.” (Underline is ours’) 11.2. In the case of Sunil Fulchand Shah (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “19. Section 10 of COFEPOSA prescribes not only the maximum period of detention but also the method of computation of that period and on a plain reading of the section, the period of detention is to be computed from the date of actual detention and not from the date of the order of detention. The period of one or two years, as the case may be, as mentioned in Section 10 will run from the date of the actual detention and not from the date of the order of detention. Any other interpretation would frustrate the object of an order of detention and Page No.# 16/29 a clever person may abscond for the entire period mentioned in the order of detention and thereby render the order of detention useless claiming on being apprehended that “the period has already expired”. The view expressed in Adam Kasam Bhaya case reported in (1981) 4 SCC 216” and Ismail Jumma case reported in (1981) 4 SCC 609, in this behalf lays down the correct law and I adopt that reasoning and hold that the period of detention specified in the order of detention would commence not from the date of the order but from the date of actual detention. That period is the maximum period of detention. Would that period get automatically extended by any period of parole granted to the detenu is the next question. I shall deal with the other observation in Adam Kasam Bhaya case reported in (1981) 4 SCC 216 viz. “if he has served a part of the period of detention, he will have to serve out the balance” separately, in the latter part of this order.” (Underline is ours’) 11.3. In the instant case, it appears that the first detention order of the petitioner was passed on 18.05.2026. Though at the relevant point of time, the petitioner was in judicial custody, yet the order dated 18.05.2026 was communicated to him on 20.05.2026, having obtained the thumb impression of the detenue over the Acknowledgement Certificate, in presence of witness. It is also stated in the letter of the Dy. SP (N&P) & I/C, PITNDPS Cell dated 29th May 2026, addressed to the Special Secretary(Home), Home Department, Govt. of Nagaland, which is available in the file produced before the Court by Ms. Inaholi, learned Government Advocate. 11.4. And if the period of 3 (three) months is counted from the Page No.# 17/29 aforementioned date, i.e. 20.05.2026, then the same would elapse on 19.08.2026. And on the same date the extension order dated 19.08.2026 was passed. And that being so, we find the submission of Mr. Surien devoid of substance, and accordingly, the same stands repudiated. 12. In the instant case the Advisory Board has already given a favourable opinion under Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution of India and based upon the said opinion the respondent authority had already passed the confirmatory order under Section 12 of the Act, and in that view of the matter and as held in the case of Pesala Nookaraju (supra), the detention of the person concerned shall continue for a maximum period of twelve months as specified in Section 13 of the Act, or till the date, if any, fixed in the confirmatory order. And under such factual position the submission of Ms. Inaholi, learned Government Advocate, merit acceptance. 13. Further, it appears that the state respondent had referred the matter of detention to the State Advisory Board on 03.06.2026. And this date is within the prescribed period of five weeks from the date of detention of the detenue. Thus, the contention of Mr. Surien that there was violation of Section 9 (b) of the Act as the detaining authority referred the matter before the Advisory Board within the prescribed period of five weeks from the date of detention of the detenue left this Court unimpressed. 14. However, we find merit in the submission of Mr. Surien that the detaining authority has neither in the said impugned detention order, nor in the impugned rejection orders, had mentioned that the detenue was already under judicial custody in connection with Sub-Urban P.S. Case No. Page No.# 18/29 008/2026, under Section 21 (b) NDPS Act, 1985. 14.1. In the case of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat Through his sister KM. Archana Chelawat Suganchand Kanhaiyyalal Chelawat through his daughter KM Archana Chelawat V. Union of India and Others, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 746, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that for a person already in judicial custody, the grounds of detention must show (i) awareness of the custody and (ii) satisfaction, based on antecedent activities, that detention is necessary to prevent engagement in prejudicial activities if released. Further it has been held that the ‘Compelling reasons’ require cogent material indicating likelihood of near-future release and likelihood of prejudicial activity thereafter. Mere statements without supporting material are insufficient. 14.2. In the case of Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and Another, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 128, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that even for a person already in custody, a preventive detention order can validly be passed only if: (i) The authority is aware that the person is actually in custody; (ii) On the basis of reliable material, there is reason to believe that – (a) that there is a real possibility of release on bail, and (b) that on being so released the person would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (iii) It is felt essential to detain the person to prevent such activity. Page No.# 19/29 (iv) Further the satisfaction must be based on cogent material, not mere apprehension or assumption. 14.3. Again in the case of Union of India vs. Paul Manickam and Another, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “14. So far as this question relating to the procedure to be adopted in case the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a Page No.# 20/29 person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of T.N. (1989) 4 SCC 418 and Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 746. The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128. The principles were set out as follows : even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed : (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail. 14.4. Thus, the proposition laid down in the aforesaid cases can be crystallized as under:- (i) Awareness of custody and a real possibility of bail, however, not speculative, must appear from the order/grounds or the material considered. (ii) Non-mention or non-consideration of bail status, or pending or likelihood of bail applications, especially when custody or bail is a core relevant fact, reflects non-application of mind and can render the order illegal. Page No.# 21/29 (iii) Preventive detention cannot be used as a shortcut to keep someone in custody when ordinary criminal processes, including opposing or challenging bail, suffice, or merely on the apprehension of reoffending after bail. These principles apply across preventive detention laws and the detaining authority must apply its mind to the specific facts rather than mechanically invoking the Act. 14.5. In the instant case the impugned detention order, dated 18.05.2026, is reproduced herein below for proper appreciation of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARTMENT : POLITICAL BRANCH ORDER Dated Kohima, the 18th May, 2026. NO. CON PITNDPS/04/2026/37 - Whereas, the Addl.DGP(L&O), Nagaland has sent a proposal for detention of Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar, V/o- Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist Golaghat. Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur, under PITNDPS Act, 1988 along with records under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. And whereas, on perusal of records as submitted by the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland, it appears that Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs). S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar. V/o- Furkating College Tin Alli. Dist Golaghat, Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur, was involved in the following case:- (1) Sub- Urban PS Case no. 008/26 U/S 21(b) NDPS Act. Page No.# 22/29 And whereas, the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland has proposed to prevent Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar. V/o-Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist. Golaghat, Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur, under PITNDPS Act, 1988 from continuing his harmful and prejudicial activity by engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which poses a serious threat to people's health and welfare as his activities in such illegal traffic has a deleterious effect on the national economy. And whereas, I, Limasunep Jamir, Special Secretary (Home). Nagaland, specially empowered under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. 1988 (as amended), am satisfied on careful examination of the proposal of the Addl. DGP (L&O), Nagaland and other supporting documents, found sufficient grounds for detention of Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M26 yrs). S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar. Vio-Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist Golaghat, Assam, PA- Garage Colony Rail Gate. Dimapur, and being satisfied that with a view of preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in NDPS. it is necessary to detain him. Now, therefore, the undersigned, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. 1988 do hereby issue this order directing Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar, V/o-Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist Golaghat, Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate. Dimapur, be detained and kept in Central Jail. Dimapur for an initial period of three months. Sd./ (LIMASUNEP JAMIR) IPS. Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland. Page No.# 23/29 14.6. Further, the impugned order of rejection of the representation filed by the petitioner to the Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland, dated 02.07.2026, read as under:- GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARTMENT POLITICAL BRANCH ORDER Dated Kohima, the 02nd July, 2026. NO. CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/51:: Whereas, 1, Limasunep Jamir, IPS, Special Secretary (Home), Nagaland, has perused the representation dated 25.06.2026 submitted by PITNDPS detenue Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar, V/o-Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist. Golaghat, Assam, P/A-Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur. And whereas, after careful examination of all records/Police report concerning the detenue Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar, V/o- Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist Golaghat, Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur, I am satisfied that there are no justified grounds to revoke the order of detention. Now, therefore, the prayer of the detenue, Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar, V/o- Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist. Golaghat, Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur, for revocation of the detention order dated 18.05.2026 passed against him under PITNDPS Act, 1988 is not acceded to. Sd./-LIMASUNEP JAMIR, IPS. Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland. Page No.# 24/29 14.7. Again, the impugned order dated 07.07.2026, of rejection of the representation filed by the petitioner to the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland read as under:- GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARTMENT : POLITICAL BRANCH ORDER Dated Kohima, the 07th July, 2026. NO. CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/53 :: Whereas, Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar, V/o- Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist. Golaghat, Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur, has been detained under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, vide order NO.CON/PITNDPS/04/ 2026/37 dated 18.05.2026 passed by the Special Secretary (Home), Nagaland. And whereas, the said detenue filed a representation praying for revocation of the detention order passed against him; And whereas, the said representation has been carefully examined, and also, all the relevant records including the material on the basis of which the Special Secretary (Home), Nagaland was satisfied to direct detention of Mr. Pawan Karmakar (M/26 yrs), S/o-Lt. Bharat Karmakar, V/o- Furkating College Tin Alli, Dist. Golaghat, Assam, P/A- Garage Colony Rail Gate, Dimapur. And whereas, the authority found that there are no valid grounds for revocation of the Detention Order issued vide NO.CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/37 dated 18.05.2026. Now, therefore, the prayer of the petitioner is rejected by the State Government. Page No.# 25/29 By order and in the name of the Governor of Nagaland. Sd./ -SENTIYANGER IMCHEN,IAS Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland. 14.8. Thus, from a bare perusal of the impugned detention order and also the impugned rejection orders with regard to the representations filed by the petitioner failed to record in the said order the following requirements as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases discussed in the foregoing paragraphs:- (i) The authority is aware that the person is actually in custody; (ii) On the basis of reliable material, there is reason to believe that – (a) there is a real possibility of release on bail, and (b) on being so released the person would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (iii) It is felt essential to detain the person to prevent such activity. (iv) Further the satisfaction must be based on cogent material, not mere apprehension or assumption. 14.9. Thus, having tested the impugned orders, as discussed herein above on the touchstone of the principles laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the same failed to withstand the test. Mr. Surien, learned counsel for the petitioner, has rightly pointed it out during the course of hearing and we are inclined to record concurrence to the same. Page No.# 26/29 15. Moving forward to the other submission of Mr. Surien, that the detenue knows and understands Hindi and Adivasi languages only and that the ground of detention, handed over to the detenue were in English language which is not the language which he understands, we find force in his submission. Indisputably, the grounds of detention were communicated to him in English language which is not the language which he understands since we find from the record that he put his thumb impression in the acknowledgement of ground of detention and other documents on the record. And also indisputably the same is not communicated to him in Hindi and Adivasi languages which the detenue understands, as contended by Mr. Surin, learned counsel for the petitioner. 15.1. However, the state respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3, in their affidavit, especially in paragraph No. 16, has stated that the grounds of detention were communicated to the detenue in Nagamese which the detenue understands though the language used is English. But, having gone through the letter of communication of grounds of detention to the detenue we do not find anything to demonstrate that though the grounds were in English, the same were communicated to him in Nagamese. There is no endorsement as such in the communication letter, dated 18.05.2026, which is available in the File produced before the Court by the learned Government Advocate. 15.2. Thus, the grounds of detention handed over to the detenue appears to be not properly explained in detail in the language which he understands. Now, it is to be seen whether on such count the impugned detention order is vitiated or not. 15.3. Section 3(3) of the PITNDPS Act expressly provides that the Page No.# 27/29 communication of grounds under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, shall ordinarily be made within 5 days of detention, extendable to 15 days in exceptional circumstances, with reasons recorded. 15.4. Again Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India requires that the authority making the detention order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made; and afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Here the communication does not mean mere formal service of documents. It means bringing home to the detenu effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the detention order is based, so that the detenu can make a meaningful and effective representation. 15.5. In the case of Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1962 SC 911, a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- (i) A person who is not conversant with English, service of the detention order and grounds in English, even with oral translation/explanation by a police officer, does not fulfill the requirements of Article 22(5). (ii) The grounds must be given to the detenu in a language which he understands and in a script which he can read, if he is literate. (iii) Oral translation by the serving officer is inadequate, especially when the documents are lengthy or complex, because the detenu cannot be expected to memorise the contents and later formulate an effective representation. 15.6. This principle has been consistently followed and applied to Page No.# 28/29 preventive detention laws, and also in the case of Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India and Others, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 427. Relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below for ready reference. “20. It is an admitted position that the detenu does not know English. The grounds of detention, which were served on the detenu, have been drawn up in English. It is true that Shri C.L. Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention on the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati to the detenu. But, that is not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the grounds of detention must be “communicated” to the detenu. “Communicate” is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the “grounds” should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the “ground” to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the “grounds” are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Article 22(5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra [1962 Supp 2 SCR 918 : AIR 1962 SC 911] and Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate [(1969) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1969 SC 43 : 1969 Cri LJ 274].” 15.7. What can be crystallized from the aforesaid discussion is that- non- Page No.# 29/29 supply of the detention order, grounds, and supporting documents in a language/script understood by the detenue and also mere oral explanation in the local language, is insufficient and is violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 3(3) of the PITNDPS Act and thereby rendering the detention illegal. And as such the impugned detention order is vitiated and hence liable to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. Conclusion: 16. Under the given factual and legal matrix we find sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly the same stands allowed. 17. The impugned detention Order No. CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/37, dated 18.05.2026, passed by the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland under Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act; and the Rejection Order No. CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/51, dated 02.07.2026, passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, and the Confirmation Order No. CON/PITNDPS/04/2026/53, dated 07.07.2026, passed by the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland, stands set aside and quashed. 18. The petitioner shall be released from the custody forthwith, if not warranted in any other case. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant