Page No.# 1/15 GAHC030001182026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Crl.)/13/2026 The State of Mizoram (Through Mizoram Lokayukta) Aizawl VERSUS Sh. C. Vanlalmawia S/o Lianhleia, Mission Veng, Aizawl Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr C Lalfakzuala (Special PP) Advocate for the Respondent : Mr C Lalramzauva Sr. Adv. BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH MAZUMDAR JUDGEMENT Date : 15-09-2026 Heard Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, learned Special PP for the applicant. Also heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. C. Tlanthianghlima, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The present interlocutory application has been filed by the State of Mizoram, through the Mizoram Lok Ayukta, under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 for condonation of delay of 193 days in filing the connected appeal against Page No.# 2/15 the impugned judgment and order dated 18.6.2025, passed by the Special Judge Prevention Of Corruption Act Mizoram Aizawl in SR (PCA) number 01/2024 under section 409/420 IPC and sections 13 (2) read with sections 13(c) and (d) of the Prevention Of Corruption Act 1988. By the aforesaid order passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Mizoram had acquitted the respondent/opposite party herein of the charges levelled against him. 3. The time allowed for preferring an appeal in case of acquittal under section 419 (5) of the BNSS 2023 is 60 days, and there has been a delay of 193 days in preferring the connected appeal. It is further to be noticed that the applicant, namely the Mizoram Lok Ayukta, has also filed an application praying for leave to appeal against the criminal appeal since the criminal proceedings had been initiated and prosecuted by the State of Mizoram. 4. Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, learned Special PP appearing for the applicant, has submitted that the delay caused in preferring the connected appeal was due to bona fide reasons and circumstances beyond the control of the applicant and there has been no laches or negligence on the part of the appellants. The learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the contents of paragraph 3 of the application to contend that the impugned judgment and order dated 18-6-2025 was furnished to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mizoram Lok Ayukta on 23-6-2025. The present appellant had received a copy of the judgment and order in the connected appeal on 7-7- 2025. 5. On 11-7-2025, a meeting had been called for on 22-7-2025 to discuss the feasibility of filing an appeal. After detailed instructions, a draft of the letter to Page No.# 3/15 be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Mizoram, for exploring the prospect of filing an appeal was prepared on 23-7-2025 and was issued on 24- 7-2025, seeking permission for filing an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the learned Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act. On 4-9-2025, the Under Secretary to the Government of Mizoram had requested the present appellant to obtain the opinion of the Additional Public Prosecutor, and on 10-9- 2025, the Deputy Secretary of the Appellant had requested the Additional Public Prosecutor to furnish his opinion. 6. An application for supply of the certified true copy of the impugned judgment and order dated 18-6-2025 had been made on 12-9-2025, and the certified copy of the judgment and connected documents were received on 28- 10-2025. The learned APP submitted his opinion on 22-9-2025, and on 8-12- 2025, the Undersecretary to the Government of Mizoram conveyed the permission of the Government to file an appeal. Since the court remained on vacation from 13-12-11, the Lokayukta requested the SPP Mizoram Lokayukta to initiate necessary steps for filing an appeal on 13-12-2026. 7. The appeal, having been finalized on 4-2-2026, was then sent to the Secretary for his vetting and the applications seeking leave to appeal and the condonation application were sent by the Learned Counsel on 12-2-2026 to the Appellants. The Learned Counsel for the Applicants have placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the State of Nagaland versus Lipak Ao and others, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 to submit that what counts in consideration of an application for condonation of delay is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause. Shortness of the delay is only one of the circumstances to be taken into account in exercising the discretion by the court Page No.# 4/15 considering the application for condonation of delay. He has submitted that as per the contents of paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment, the Court has to consider the position of the person concerned and find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded, in the peculiar circumstances of each case, as being sufficient. He has submitted that although there is no requirement to show special indulgence to the government, one should take a practical view of the working of the government, without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 8. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sheoraj Singh versus Union of India and another, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, where the Apex Court had held as follows: 28. This Court in Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634] , had the occasion to observe that it would not be necessary for the State to provide a day-to- day explanation of delay while seeking condonation of the same. The relevant observations therein read as follows : (SCC p. 635, para 2) “2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day-to-day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of Page No.# 5/15 filing the appeal. The approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every day's delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.” 31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication. 9. He has then referred to the case of N. Balakrishnan versus M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, where the Apex Court had held as follows:- 8. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic Page No.# 6/15 consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against Page No.# 7/15 acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. 10. He has accordingly prayed that the present application for condonation of the delay may be considered and allowed by this Court and, upon condoning the delay, the application for grant of leave to prefer the appeal may be taken up. 11. The respondents have filed the affidavit in opposition resisting the prayer for condonation of delay. The Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that it is not the case of the applicants that only the opinion of the Learned APP had been submitted by the letter dated 7-7-2025, but rather it would be apparent that the copy of the order dated 18-6-2025 had also been supplied along with the opinion furnished by the Learned APP. 12. The Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the reference by the applicants to the vacations or holidays in this Court would be of no consequence to the prayer for condonation of delay, since the holiday list for the year 2025 issued by the Government of Mizoram does not tally with the list of holidays for the High Court, and in any event, filing of cases during the vacations is also open. The applicant could have approached the registry if the filing was required to be done during the vacations of the High Court. The Learned Senior Counsel has thereafter submitted that the delay on the part of the Government in the Vigilance Department has not been explained in any manner whatsoever and it is apparent that the Vigilance Department of the Government of Mizoram had slept over the request made by the present appellant for filing of an appeal. The Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the applicant in the present Page No.# 8/15 application has not explained as to what steps had been taken when the matter was allegedly being delayed at the level of the Government. There is no assertion made in the application that any reminder or request had been sent to the Government of Mizoram or to the Vigilance Department pursuing the appeal. He has submitted that the applicant is also guilty of latches and negligence when it merely sat idle and inactively waiting for the permission from the Vigilance Department to file an appeal. The Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the delay of 45 days from 11-1-2026 to the date on which the appeal was filed has not been satisfactorily explained by the applicants. 13. The Learned Senior Counsel has finally submitted that the present is an appeal sought to be filed against an order of acquittal. He has submitted that in the meantime, enough and more time has passed, for which the Court may consider that the matter has now received finality and reopening of the matter at this stage would put the respondent, who was the accused in the criminal trial, to face extreme hardship. The Learned Senior Counsel has referred to the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and another versus the State of Gujarat, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 495, which related to an application under the Limitation Act in the matter of a criminal appeal, where at paragraph 6, the Apex Court held as under:- 6. At the outset, it is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal, and the appeal should have been dismissed as barred by limitation. We have examined the facts carefully. It appears that initially the State Government took a decision not to file an appeal and it allowed the period of limitation to lapse. Subsequently, on certain observations made by the High Court while considering a revision petition by Bhulabhai that it was a fit case where the State Government should file an appeal and on notice being issued by the High Court to the State Government in the matter, the appeal was filed. It was filed three months after Page No.# 9/15 limitation had expired. A faint attempt was made to show that when the initial decision was taken not to file an appeal all the papers had not been considered by the department concerned, but we are not impressed by that allegation. The truth appears to be that the appeal was not filed at first because the State Government saw no case on the merits for an appeal, and it was filed only because the High Court had observed — and that was long after limitation had expired — that the case was fit for appeal by the State Government. Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay. 14. He has thereafter referred to the case of Pundalik Jalam Patil, (dead) by LRS versus Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, where the Apex Court at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 had held as below. 11. Whether the respondent made an incorrect statement in the application seeking condonation of delay? There is no dispute whatsoever that the respondent being the beneficiary of the acquisition has been duly impleaded as a party-respondent in the reference cases as is required in law. It not only appeared in the matter through a properly instructed counsel but also filed its written statement opposing the claim for enhancement of compensation but did not choose to lead any evidence whatsoever. In the application filed in the High Court the plea taken by the respondent is as under: “The applicant submits that, although the applicant being the acquiring body, was arrayed as the opponent in the said reference, Opponent 4 herein (original Opponent 1) SLAO or his subordinate contested the said reference by filing a written statement. Therefore, this applicant was unaware about the stand taken by SLAO as well as the impugned judgment and award.” (emphasis supplied) This averment in the application on the face of it is totally incorrect. Page No.# 10/15 12. The Law & Judiciary Department as early as on 13-4-2000 i.e. to say within the period of 15 days from the date of the award of the Reference Court communicated its decision to acquiesce in the decision of the Reference Court and communicated the same to all the concerned including the beneficiary of the acquisition. It is not the case that the Executive Engineer did not receive the said communication. Having received the said communication, the respondent did not act in the matter and initiated any steps for filing the appeals if it was really aggrieved by the decision of the Reference Court. There is no doubt whatsoever in our mind that the respondent made totally incorrect statement in the application filed in the High Court. We express our reservation as to the manner in which a public authority conducted itself in its anxiety to somehow get the relief from the Court. In our considered opinion, incorrect statement made in the application seeking condonation of delay itself is sufficient to reject the application without any further inquiry as to whether the averments made in the application reveal sufficient cause to condone the delay. That a party taking a false stand to get rid of the bar of limitation should not be encouraged to get any premium on the falsehood on its part by condoning delay. [See Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India [(1993) 1 SCC 572] .] 14. It is true that the power to condone the delay rests with the court in which the application was filed beyond time and decide whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay and ordinarily the superior court may not interfere with such discretion even if some error is to be found in the discretion so exercised by the court but where there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay but the delay was condoned, it is a case of discretion not being exercised judicially and the order becomes vulnerable and susceptible for its correction by the superior court. The High Court having found that the respondent in its application made incorrect submission that it had no knowledge of the award passed by the Reference Court ought to have refused to exercise its discretion. The High Court exercised its discretion on wrong principles. In that view of the matter we cannot sustain the exercise of discretion in the manner done by the High Court. 15. The Learned Senior Counsel thereafter referred to the case of Postmaster General and others versus Living Media India Limited and another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, where at paragraphs 27-29, the Apex Court had held as follows. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Page No.# 11/15 Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 16. The Learned Senior Counsel has thereafter referred to one of the judgments delivered by this Court in Interlocutory Application (Civil) No. 116/2025, delivered on 11-8-2026. He has referred to paragraph 37 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- 37. From the above discussion and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time till the case of Shivamma (supra), it is discernible that no undue leniency can be given to any government department or entity or agency if no "sufficient cause" could be justifiably placed before a court by such entities. The court has to treat a government entity or department at par and on the same platform as that of a private litigant. The court is required to do justice to both the litigants, i.e., the government entity or department and the private party. The court cannot ignore the fact that giving a leeway and leniency to a government department can do irreparable harm and loss to the private litigants who may have a favorable order in their hands and they have 145/150 been waiting for years for the same to be executed. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a Page No.# 12/15 statutory provision and the same needs to be complied with in its soul and spirit, without denying the fact that an exception can always be made under the provisions of Section 5 and the discretion has been given to the court so that no party suffers due to certain genuine and bona fide reasons. It is also a fact that due to the result flowing from a statutory provision, the same can, be at times, harsh to one party, but the same cannot save the party and a court does not possess any power to ignore such statutory provision if it results in a hard decision which is not favorable to one party. Moreover, the Hon’ble Apex Court is quite clear in its observations that changing time and technology is also a factor to be considered in the present cases. The leniency provided to the government agencies or departments or entities may not be possible to be given at the present stage if the explanations of “sufficient cause” are only due to certain typical bureaucratic inefficiencies or procedural aspects. This is due to the reason that due to the evolution of modern technology, the communication and transmission of information have become much easier than the earlier days when the transmission and communication were not so easy. Due to such disability, a swift action from the part of the government entity or agency or department may not have been possible, but in modern times, things have changed and the same has become much easier. Therefore, though the courts must adhere to a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented approach, the same has to be done with caution and the courts should always stick to its one principle, i.e., substantial justice 17. The Learned Senior Counsel has finally referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Shivamma versus Karnataka Housing Board and others, reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 1969, in which at paragraph 261, the Apex Court has held as follows. V. CONCLUSION 261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the Page No.# 13/15 constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 265. In the result, this appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is hereby set aside. Apart from the costs of Rs. 25,000/- imposed by the High Court, to be paid by the respondent no. 1 to the appellant, we impose an additional cost Page No.# 14/15 of Rs. 25,000/- on the respondent no. 1, to be paid to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period of four weeks from today. 18. I have gone through the contents of the Interlocutory Application, and I have also gone through the objections taken on behalf of the respondent. 19. On going through the Interlocutory Application, I find force in the submissions of the Learned Senior Counsel that the applicants have not given any explanation for the delay which has been caused between the 24th of July 2025 and the 4th of September 2025 and thereafter, again, between the 22nd of September 2025 and the 8th of December 2025. Without even being specific about the time period for which the delay has not been explained, I have gone through the different communications, and I find that there has been no explanation for the Government of Mizoram to have taken the leisure to decide whether an appeal is required to be filed or not for such a long time. It is also noticed that despite the opinion of the Additional Public Prosecutor being on record at the very initiation of the attempt to file an appeal, the Government of Mizoram has sought another opinion from the same Additional Public Prosecutor on the same issue. 20. It thus appears to me that the delay in filing the appeal and the accompanying application seeking leave to appeal has not been sufficiently explained, supported by causes which can be termed as sufficient cause, for condoning the delay. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in this present application, and it stands dismissed. No costs. Page No.# 15/15 JUDGE Comparing Assistant