Page No.# 1/24 GAHC010249512018 2026:GAU-AS:13090 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/7759/2018 SUNIL KUMAR SENAPATY S/O- LATE GOGON CHANDRA SENAPATI, R/O- BISHMILE, CHABUA, P.S- CHABUA, DIST- DIBRUGARH, ASSAM VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPTT OF PUBLIC ENERPRISES, ASSAM SACHIBALAYA, DISPUR, GUWAHATI- 6 2:ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LIMITED REP. BY ITS M D HOUSEFED COMPLEX BLOCK C 7TH FLOOR DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 3:EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND REP. BY THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER BHANGAGARH GUWAHATI- 78100 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. J SARMAH, MR. A BHATTACHARJEE,MR. M C DAS Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, MR. M DUTTA (r-2),MR J MAHANTA (r-2),MR. P K ROY (R3),MR. S K CHAKRABORTY (R3) Page No.# 2/24 Linked Case : WP(C)/1050/2022 SUNIL KUMAR SENAPATI S/O LATE GOGON CHANDRA SENAPATI R/O BISHMILE CHABUA P.S.-CHABUA DIST- DIBRUGARH ASSAM VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM PUBLIC ENTERPRISES DEPARTMENT ASSAM SACHIBALAYA DISPUR GUWAHATI-06 2:THE ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LTD REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR HOUSEFED COMPLEX BLOCK C 7TH FLOOR DISPUR GUWAHATI-06 3:THE MANAGING DIRECTOR THE ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LTD HOUSEFED COMPLEX BLOCK C 7TH FLOOR DISPUR GUWHATI-06 4:THE SENIOR ASSISTANT MANAGER THE ASSAM TEA CORPORATION LTD HOUSEFED COMPLEX BLOCK C 7TH FLOOR DISPUR GUWHATI-06 5:EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER BHANGAGARH GUWAHATI-781005 Page No.# 3/24 ------------ Advocate for : MR. S ISLAM Advocate for : GA ASSAM appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR ORDER Date : 07-09-2026 Heard Mr. J. Sarmah, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018 and Mr. S. Islam, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022. Also heard Mr. L. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the Assam Tea Corporation Ltd./ respondents in the above noted two writ petitions. 2. The issues involved in the above noted two writ petitions, being inter-connected, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the said writ petitions were taken up for hearing, analogously and are being disposed of by the present order. W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018 The petitioner has instituted the present writ petition assailing the order dated 17- 03-2008, issued by his Disciplinary Authority, imposing the penalty of removal from service upon him, in pursuance to a decision arrived at, in this connection, by the Board of Directors of the Corporation, upon conclusion of a departmental proceeding, instituted against him. W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022 The petitioner in the present writ petition, has presented a challenge to the Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of Assam Tea Corporation Ltd., in its 209th Page No.# 4/24 meeting held on 03-09-2020, to make deductions from the arrear salaries and other pensionary benefits, receivable by the petitioner against the quantified amount, which has been established to have been misappropriated by the petitioner. 3. The facts, in brief, requisite for adjudication of the issue arising in the above noted two writ petitions, is noticed as under:- 3.1. The petitioner, herein, was initially appointed as probationary Assistant Manager vide order dated 16-10-1982, with the Assam Tea Corporation Ltd. The services of the petitioner as Assistant Manager, was regularized vide order dated 11-12-1983. As the petitioner was continuing in his services, the petitioner was issued with a notice dated 01- 08-2006, directing him to submit his explanation as to why, appropriate action against him in the matter should not be initiated for the allegation as contained, therein. Vide the said notice dated 01-08-2006, it was alleged that the petitioner had received an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), being the compensation amount for the land of the Tea Estate of the Corporation acquired by the ONGC authorities on 12-03-2003, from the establishment of the Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj. It was alleged that the said amount was not entered in the cash-book of the garden and/ or deposited in the Corporation’s bank account. It was further alleged that during the tenure of the petitioner, as the Manager of the Longai Tea Estate, he was found to be involved collecting tolls from the trucks passing through the garden gate carrying forest materials. It was alleged that the said gate was so installed by the petitioner without any direction from the Head Office to erect such gate and collect toll. It was further alleged that the toll amount so collected was also not deposited in the Page No.# 5/24 account of the Corporation. 3.2. The petitioner on receipt of the said notice dated 01-08-2006, submitted his reply, thereto, on 19-08-2006 and therein, denied of having committed any misappropriation of money. It was projected that he was only given a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh), by the office of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner and had retained the said money on the belief that the same was not due to the Tea Estate, as the compensation was already paid to it, during the year 1989-90. However, the petitioner undertook to refund the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh), paid to him by the establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner. 3.3. With regard to the collection of toll at the gate of the Longai Tea Estate, the petitioner had projected that since the year 1989, such practice was continuing in the garden and the amount collected during his tenure as the Manager of the garden was spent on welfare activities of the garden and for which proper record was maintained and is available in the office. It was further contended that even after the departure of the petitioner from the said Tea Estate, the said practice of operating of a check-gate, was continued with. 3.4. The Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, not being satisfied with the reply submitted by him, proceeded vide communication dated 22-08-2006, to place him under suspension. It is also to be noted that an FIR also came to be lodged against the petitioner on 11-09-2006, basing on the allegations as contained in the said notice dated 01-08-2006. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, issued to the petitioner a charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006 containing, therein, two charges which were Page No.# 6/24 based on the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the said notice dated 01-08- 2006. The petitioner, on receipt of the said charge-sheet, vide a communication dated 09- 01-2007, sought for inspection of documents, as set out, therein. The respondent/ Corporation by the communication dated 09-02-2007, proceeded to inform the petitioner that the documents, basing on which, the charges were framed against him was sought to be substantiated, was already made available to him for inspection and he had completed the inspection on 08-01-2007. Further, it was contended that the request of the petitioner for inspection of documents, which was sought by the petitioner, vide his communication dated 09-01-2007, was examined and it was held that the said documents had no relevance to the charges levelled against the petitioner and accordingly, the prayer of the petitioner for inspection of the said documents was rejected. 3.5. Thereafter, an Enquiry Officer was appointed in the matter and the petitioner is also found to have participated in the enquiry. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. A copy of the said report was forwarded to the petitioner vide a communication dated 25-02-2008, requiring him to submit a representation against the same, within the timeframe mandated, therein. The petitioner, vide a communication dated 15-03-2008, proceeded to submit his representation against the said enquiry report. Thereafter, the enquiry report along with the evidences coming on record, in the enquiry as well as the representation submitted by the petitioner was placed before the Board of Directors of the Corporation, in its meeting held on 27-11-2007. The Board of Directors, thereafter, on perusal of the relevant materials, proceeded to resolve that the penalty of removal from service be imposed upon the petitioner and accordingly, vide Page No.# 7/24 order dated 17-03-2008, the Managing Director of the Corporation proceeded to intimate to the petitioner the fact of imposition of the penalty of removal from service upon him. 3.6. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of instituting writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018. 4. During the pendency of the W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018, the respondent authorities on quantification of the loss occasioning to it, on account of the misconduct proved against the petitioner in the enquiry held against him in pursuance to the issuance of the charge- sheet dated 16-11-2006, proceeded to direct for recovery of the amounts involved from the petitioner. The recovery was directed to be effected from the arrear salaries receivable by the petitioner as well as from his retirement benefits and accordingly, the petitioner has assailed the said decision arrived at in this connection by way of instituting a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022. 5. Mr. J. Sarmah, learned counsel for the petitioner, by reiterating the facts noticed, hereinabove, has submitted that in the enquiry held, the charges framed against the petitioner vide the charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, was not established. He submits that basing on a presumption drawn in the matter of the petitioner having received amounts due to the Corporation from the establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner, the Enquiry Officer had proceeded to hold the Charge No. 1, levelled against the petitioner to have been established. Mr. Sarmah submits that with regard to the Charge No. 2, a general observation was recorded by the Enquiry Officer to the effect that the collection of tolls in the gate of the Longai Tea Estate was so carried out by the petitioner without informing his higher authorities and there was no record of the collection of tolls Page No.# 8/24 made from the trucks passing through the said gate. Mr. Sarmah submits that while the said finding was recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the Enquiry Officer, had failed to appreciate the contention of the petitioner that such collection of toll was, in vogue since long, even before the joining of the petitioner as the Manager of the Longai Tea Estate and had also continued after the petitioner had left the said Tea Estate. 5.1. In the above premises, Mr. Sarmah submits that the charges framed against the petitioner vide the charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, cannot be held to have been established in a manner known to law against the petitioner, herein, and accordingly, the penalty of removal from service imposed upon him vide order dated 17-03-2008, in pursuance to the decision arrived at in the matter by the Board of Directors of the Corporation would mandate interference from this Court. Mr. Sarmah, in support of his such submission has placed reliance on the judgment and order dated 31-08-2017, passed by the court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (S), Karimganj, wherein basing on the allegation involved in the Charge No. 1, levelled against the petitioner vide the Charge-Sheet dated 16-11-2006, the trial court on an examination of the matter had proceeded to acquit the petitioner, therefrom. He submits that the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceeding so instituted against him would have to be given a primacy, inasmuch as, the same was so arrived at after evidences were led in the matter by the prosecution. On a query made by this Court, as to why the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the petitioner, vide order dated 17-03-2008, was not assailed promptly before this Court and/ or before any Appellate Authority prescribed in the matter, Mr. Sarma has fairly submitted that the petitioner was awaiting conclusion of Page No.# 9/24 the criminal proceeding instituted against him in the matter and the petitioner now having been acquitted from the charges framed against him in the criminal proceeding, the penalty of removal from service as imposed upon him basing on similar charges would mandate interference from this Court. 6. Mr. S. Islam, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022, has adopted the submissions made by Mr. J. Sarmah, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 7759/2018. Mr. Islam has submitted that the respondent authorities after institution of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018, had placed the matter with regard to the recovery to be effected from the petitioner, before the Board of Directors of the Corporation in its 209th meeting held on 03-09-2020. He submits that the Board of Directors, in a most illegal manner, had proceeded for directing recovery of the misappropriated amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) from the arrear salaries receivable by the petitioner as well as the terminal benefits receivable by him. Mr. Islam submits that the balance payable amount of Rs. 3,16,074/- (Rupees Three Lakh Sixteen Thousand Seventy Four) was, however, released to the petitioner. Mr. Islam submits that the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022, was so instituted claiming payment of the amount of Rs. 10,34,923/- (Rupees Ten Lakh Thirty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Three) after deducting the amount of Rs. 3,16,074/- (Rupees Three Lakh Sixteen Thousand Seventy Four) already released to the petitioner, with due interest. 6.1. Mr. Islam further submits that the respondent authorities for the purpose of effecting the said recovery, had not quantified the amount so liable to be recovered from Page No.# 10/24 the petitioner, herein. Mr. Islam submits that the recovery having been so made with regard to the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), purportedly received by the petitioner from the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner, however, the said amount not having been demonstrated to be receivable by the Corporation, the respondent authorities could not have proceeded to effect recovery of the said amount from the arrear salaries receivable by the petitioner, as well as from the terminal benefits receivable by him, after being imposed with the penalty of removal from service. 7. Mr. L. Deka, learned counsel for the Assam Tea Corporation Ltd. (respondent), has submitted that the charges framed against the petitioner vide the charge-sheet dated 16- 11-2006 were specific. He submits that the first charge levelled against the petitioner pertains to the misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) by him, which was required to be deposited in the account of the Corporation. Mr. Deka submits that the petitioner misusing his position as the Manager of the Longai Tea Estate had proceeded to draw the amount of Rs, 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) from the establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner, which was the compensation, determined for the land of the tea garden acquired for the ONGC authorities. 7.1. Mr. Deka, submits that the said charge was established in the enquiry and the petitioner had also admitted to have received the amount towards payment of the cost of acquisition to the Corporation from the ONGC authorities. He submits that from the Page No.# 11/24 evidences coming on record in the enquiry, it was established that the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) was withdrawn under the signature of the petitioner, from the establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner. However, he submits that the petitioner had admitted to have been received an amount of only Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh). He submits that the said admission on the part of the petitioner would go to establish the charges framed against him under Article of Charge No. 1. Mr. Deka has submitted that during the enquiry, the factum that the petitioner had received an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) from the establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner and had misappropriated the said amount, was duly established. Mr. Deka further submits that the petitioner during his deposition had submitted that an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine) was withdrawn from the bank by the officials of the establishment of the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner, under his signature. Accordingly, Mr. Deka submits that the said admission on the part of the petitioner, proceeds to establish the Charge No. 1, framed against him. 7.2. With regard to the Article of Charge No. 2, framed against the petitioner vide the said charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, Mr. Deka submits that, in the enquiry it was established that there was collection of tolls from the trucks passing through the gate of the Tea Estate, during the period when the petitioner was functioning as the Manager of the said Tea Estate. He submits that the amount so collected were not deposited in the account of the Corporation and the petitioner had miserably failed to explain the manner Page No.# 12/24 in which the toll amount collected was being utilized. He submits that the petitioner had only made a vague statement to the effect that the amount collected were being used for welfare activities of the garden, without specifying the actual welfare activities so carried out. Accordingly, he submits that applying the principle of preponderance of probability, Article of Charge No. 2, must also be held to have been established against the petitioner, herein. Mr. Deka further submits that the misappropriation of the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), being established in the enquiry, the respondent authorities were within their powers to recover the said amount from the arrear salary receivable by the petitioner, as well as from his gratuity amount and other terminal benefits due to him, on he being imposed with the penalty of removal from service. Accordingly, Mr. Deka submits that the misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/-, (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), by the petitioner having been established in the enquiry held against the petitioner, the amount which was recovered from the arrear salaries, as well as, the terminal benefits receivable by the petitioner, has to be held to have been quantified in the manner know to law and accordingly, the recovery so effected would not mandate interference from this Court. Mr. Deka submits that the balance amount receivable by the petitioner after effecting the recovery, in question, was duly released to the petitioner and he had received the same. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the materials available on record. 9. The petitioner was issued with a charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006 and therein, two Page No.# 13/24 Article of Charges were framed against the petitioner. The Article of Charge framed against the petitioner being relevant, the same is extracted, here-in-below:- “Article of charge-I That while you were functioning as Manager, Longai Tea Estate an amount of Rs 7,18,849/-(Rupees seven lakhs eighteen thousand eight handed forty nine) only being compensation/requisition cost of land acquired by ONGC was received by you on 12-03-2003 through the Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj (land acquisition branch). The said amount was drawn by you without the knowledge of the Managing Director, ATCL or without any authority from the Corporation and purposefully did not enter the said amount in the garden cash book nor remit the said amount to Head Office with the clear intention of misappropriation. You are therefore charged with (a) An act of dishonesty and fraud. (b) Causing damage/harm to the Corporation through dishonesty (c) Misappropriation of land compensation Amounting to Rs.7,18,849/- of Longai T.E. Article of Charge-II That while functioning as Manager Longai Tea Estate of the Assam Tea Corporation Ltd. during the period from 29-03-2001 to 30-06-2005, you had set up check gate in front of the factory gate of the Longai Tea Estate and you used to collect money (as toll) from each truck that passed through the garden carving goods such as forest products. The amount so collected was not accounts for in the garden i.e. Longai Tea Estate's account. The amount was collected by the staff under your instruction on a Kutcha slip and it is alleged that the money so collected were handed over to you. You were not given any authority to set up such check gate. The collection of money in such manner was illegal and unauthorized. The Corporation at no time gave such authority to collect money to any Officer of the Corporation. You thus got involved in such unauthorized and illegal activities harassing the public also misappropriate public money by dishonest practice which is grossly immoral. You are therefore hereby charged for- (1) An act prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation (2) An act unbecoming of a responsible officer of the Corporation. (3) An act grossly immoral and is unsafe to remain in service.” 10. A perusal of the Article of Charges framed against the petitioner would go to reveal Page No.# 14/24 that therein it was alleged that the petitioner had received an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj towards compensation/ requisition cost of land acquired by the ONGC. It was further alleged that the petitioner had withdrawn the said amount without the authority and/ or approval of the Managing Director of the Corporation. It was further alleged against the petitioner that he had not entered the said amount in the garden cash book nor remitted the said amount to the Head Office of the Corporation and with the clear intention to misappropriate the same. 11. A perusal of the Article of Charge No. II, levelled against the petitioner would go to reveal that during the period the petitioner had function as the Manager of the Longai Tea Estate, he had set up a check gate in front of the factory gate of Longai Tea Estate and had collected amounts as tolls from the trucks passing through the garden carrying goods such as forest products. It was further alleged that the amounts were not entered in the Longai Tea Estate’s accounts. It was further alleged that the petitioner had no authority to set up such check gates and the collection of money in such manner was illegal and unauthorized. 12. The petitioner had denied the allegation of charges levelled against him. The petitioner on receipt of the said charge-sheet had sought for inspection of certain documents, however, the same was not granted by the authorities of the Corporation. The petitioner, however, had submitted earlier an explanation in the matter, and therein, with regard to the Article of Charge No. I, he had contended that he was directed to appear in the office of the Deputy Commissioner to withdraw the amount involved and he was informed that the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Page No.# 15/24 Hundred Forty Nine), did not belong to the Corporation or the Longai Tea Estate and the amount involved was already paid to the Estate and the money was so drawn on account of extra expenditure incurred by the office of the Deputy Commissioner while surveying the land for giving it to ONGC. He further contended that he had received a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) only, which was accepted by him in the belief that the money did not belong to the Corporation and/ or to Longai Tea Estate and accordingly, he had not reflected the said amount paid to him in the accounts of the Corporation. The petitioner had undertaken to refund the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) paid to him by the Corporation authorities. 13. With regard to the Article of Charge No. II, the petitioner had submitted that the check gate, in question, were in existence even before he had joined the Longai Tea Estate as the Manager and the amount so collected were being spent on the various welfare activities of the garden, for which proper record was maintained and was available in the office of the garden. He submits that after he had left the garden, the said process of collection of tolls was continued with. 14. As noticed, hereinabove, an enquiry was instituted in the matter and on conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer had submitted his report. On a perusal of the Enquiry Report, this Court finds that in the enquiry, it was established that an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), was withdrawn under the signature of the petitioner on 12-03-2003, from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj. However, the said amount was not reflected in the accounts of the said Tea Estate. The contention raised by the petitioner about the Page No.# 16/24 disclosure made to him by the officials of the establishment of the Deputy Commissioner, Karimganj, was not established in the enquiry. Accordingly, from the evidences coming on record in the enquiry, the amount being found to have been withdrawn by the petitioner, the Article of Charge No. I, was held to have been established. 15. With regard to the Article of Charge No. II, the contentions of the petitioner that the said collection of tolls was being continued with by him following the earlier procedure, in place and spent on various welfare activities of the garden, the Enquiry Officer had concluded that although the petitioner had made the said contention, he could not establish the same by way of production of records. Accordingly, the said charge was also held to have been established against the petitioner. 16. The Enquiry Report submitted in the matter was forwarded to the petitioner by his Disciplinary Authority and he was required to submit a representation, thereon. The petitioner, submitted his representation on 15-03-2008. A perusal of the said representation would go to reveal that the petitioner had not brought on record any material to dispute the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Accordingly, the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner vide order dated 17-03-2008, reckoning the admissible evidences coming on record in the enquiry as well as the findings recorded thereon by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry Report, proceeded to concur with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and imposed upon the petitioner the penalty of removal from service. On a perusal of the materials coming on record, in the enquiry, this Court finds that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are all based on admissible evidences coming on record as well as admission made in the matter by the petitioner. Page No.# 17/24 The conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer of the two Article of Charges framed against the petitioner to have been established, is found by this Court, to have been so drawn based on admissible evidences coming on record in the enquiry and accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the findings of the Enquiry Officer as recorded in the Enquiry Report would not mandate interference. 17. This Court has carefully perused the order dated 17-03-2008 issued by the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner and therefrom, finds that the said order was so based on an appreciation of the admissible evidences coming on record in the enquiry and this Court finds that the conclusions drawn by the Disciplinary Authority to be not erroneous. Further, this Court finds that the penalty of removal from service in view of the establishment of both the charges levelled against the petitioner, to be also not disproportionate. 18. The scope of examination and interference, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in a case like the present nature, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR (1963) SC 1723 and had drawn the following conclusions : “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding Page No.# 18/24 on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 19. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557, had drawn the following conclusions : “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 (1964) 3 SCR 25 (1964) 2 LLD 150). First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer, is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations Page No.# 19/24 extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. XXX 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR 64]. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do. XXX 26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and Page No.# 20/24 bear their own costs. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI Vs. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 had drawn the following conclusions:- 28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [[1949] 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262], the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [[1984] 3 All ER 935: [1984] 3 WLR 1174: [1985] A.C. 374, HL] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity". To illustrate take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [[1964] A.C. 40: [1963] 2 All ER 66: [1963] 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of Page No.# 21/24 dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [[1980] A.C. 574: [1979] 2 All ER 440 [1979] 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43: 1984 SCC (L&S) 62]) it would be a case falling in the latter category violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid." 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Bharti Airtel Ltd. Vs. A.S. Raghavendra reported in (2024) 6 SCC 418 had drawn the following conclusions : “29. As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.” 22. A perusal of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would bring to the forefront that the legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision, but is confined to the decision making process. This Court does not sit in judgment on the merits of the decision. Further it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate and re-appraise the evidences laid before the Enquiry Officer and examine the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, as a Court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. The scope of the judicial review, is limited to the deficiency in the Page No.# 22/24 decision making process and not the decision itself. 23. Accordingly, in view of the settled position of law that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed, hereinabove, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate any anomaly existing in the departmental proceeding instituted against him and/ or findings of the Enquiry Officer to be perverse, this Court is of the considered view that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is not disproportionate to the charges framed against him and accordingly, the enquiry report as well as the order dated 17-03-2008, in the considered view of this Court, would not mandate interference. 24. Having drawn the said conclusions, this Court would now consider the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the criminal proceeding instituted against the petitioner basing on the Article of Charge No. I, so framed against him vide the charge-sheet dated 16-11-2006, having resulted in the acquittal of the petitioner, the same would now be required to be given a primacy and the findings of the Enquiry Officer as well as the order dated 17-03-2008 would mandate interference from this Court. The said submission is noticed only to be rejected. It is a settled position of law that a subsequent acquittal in a criminal proceeding, basing on similar charge involved in a departmental proceeding initiated against the delinquent, cannot be highlighted, to set aside a concluded departmental proceeding. The manner of establishment of charge in a departmental proceeding and in a criminal proceeding is different. While the departmental proceeding, the charge is permissible to be established by applying the principles of preponderance of probability, in a criminal proceeding, the charge is to be established beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the said contention of the learned counsel for the Page No.# 23/24 petitioner would not mandate acceptance from this Court. 25. The respondent authorities had proceeded to recover from the petitioner an amount of Rs. 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), from the arrears of salary receivable by the petitioner as well as from his gratuity and leave encashment benefits. In the enquiry held against the petitioner, the charge of he having received an amount of Rs, 7,18,849/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), from the establishment of the District Commissioner towards the cost of acquisition of land of the Longai Tea Estate, having been found to be established, the petitioner having not disputed the said position and it being established in the enquiry that the amount was so drawn under the signature of the petitioner, this Court is of the considered view that the amount now sought to be recovered from the petitioner being established and quantified in the enquiry held against him in the matter, the recovery of the amount of Rs. 7,18,849/-, (Rupees Seven Lakh Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine), from the petitioner, in the considered view of this Court is not erroneous and accordingly, the same would also not mandate interference by this Court. 26. For the reasons assigned, hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the claim made by the petitioners, in the above noted two writ petitions, would not mandate acceptance. Consequently, the writ petitions being W.P.(C) No. 7759/2018 and W.P.(C) No. 1050/2022, stand dismissed. However, there would be no order as to cost. JUDGE Page No.# 24/24 Comparing Assistant