HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT - C No. - 18842 of 2026 Court No. - 21 HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J. HON'BLE KUNAL RAVI SINGH, J. 1. Heard Sri Pradyumna Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Ambrish Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondents. 2. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for the following relief :- "(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in nature of mandamus directing to respondent no.2 Additional Commissioner (Arbitration) Agra Division Agra to decide the case No. RST/1054/2025 (Computerized Case No. C20250100001054) (Hari Singh V/S NHAI and others) under section 3G (5) National Highway Act 1956, filed by petitioner, with in stipulated time fixed by this Hon'ble court. Otherwise the petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss and injury." 3. At the outset, Sri Ambrish Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondents has raised an objection qua the maintainability of the instant writ petition on the premise that the controversy in hand is no more res integra and has relied upon the judgment and order dated 28.11.2025 passed in Writ C No. 28215 of 2025 (Suryadev Pathak Vs. Union of India and 4 others). 4. For ready reference, the relevant portion of the judgment and order dated 28.11.2025 is quoted as under :- Versus Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Pradyumna Kumar Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.S.G.I., C.S.C. Hari Singh .....Petitioner(s) Union Of India And 8 Other .....Respondent(s) " F. CONCLUSION 7. In view of the detailed discussion above, this Court holds as follows : 7.1. The arbitration proceedings under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 are governed by the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 by virtue of Section 3G(6) of the Act, 1956. 7.2. Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, 1996 prescribes a specific timeline for completion of arbitration proceedings and provides that after expiry of the statutory period, the mandate of the arbitrator can be extended only by the "Court" as defined in Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the said Act. 7.3. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction and therefore does not fall within the definition of "Court" under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Consequently, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 7.4. Once the statutory period prescribed under Section 29A has expired, the mandate of the arbitrator stands exhausted, and he becomes functus officio. After expiry of the mandate, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued by this Court directing the arbitrator to decide the arbitration proceedings. Any extension of the mandate can be granted only by the competent civil court upon a proper application under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 7.5. The existence of a specific statutory remedy under Section 29A(4) before the competent civil court bars the maintainability of writ petitions seeking mandamus for expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings, especially when the statutory period has expired. 7.6. Out of the above-noted eight writ petitions under consideration, in four cases including the leading case, the statutory period prescribed under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has already expired and the mandate of the arbitrators has lapsed. In the remaining four connected cases, the statutory period of eighteen months has not yet expired. However, this Court holds that irrespective of whether the WRIC No. 18842 of 2026 2 statutory period has expired or not, the writ petitions are not maintainable. In the four cases where the statutory period has expired, the facts are almost similar to the facts in Jai Bahadur Singh (supra), where the petitioner had approached this Court after the expiry of the statutory period and the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the mandate of the arbitrator had lapsed and could be extended only by the competent civil court. In the four cases where the statutory period has not yet expired, this Court holds that even in such cases, the appropriate forum for seeking directions regarding arbitration proceedings is the competent civil court as defined under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, and not this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, all the above-noted writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. G. FINAL ORDERS 8. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons stated above, all the writ petitions are dismissed. 8.1. However, it is clarified that this order is confined to the issue of maintainability and jurisdiction and does not express any opinion on the merits of the claims of the petitioners in the arbitration proceedings before the Arbitrator. 8.2. It is further clarified that the dismissal of these writ petitions shall not preclude the petitioners from approaching the competent civil court under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 for appropriate orders including extension of the mandate of the arbitrator or substitution of the arbitrator, as the case may be, in accordance with law. 8.3. The competent civil court, if and when approached by the petitioners, shall decide the application on its own merits in accordance with law and without being influenced by any observations made in this order. 8.4. There shall be no order as to costs." 5. So far as factual and legal aspects are concerned, the same is not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion WRIC No. 18842 of 2026 3 that the instant matter is also liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the instant writ petition sans merits and stands dismissed in the same terms as have been given in the case of Suryadev Pathak (supra). May 14, 2026 Sumit S WRIC No. 18842 of 2026 4 (Kunal Ravi Singh,J.) (Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.) Digitally signed by :- SUMIT SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad