2026:JHHC:2933 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No. 3516 of 2003 Smt. Uttim Raj Devi wife of Shri Rajendra Dubey, resident of village Khiribar, P.O.- Purbdih, P.S.- Chainpur, District- Palamau … … Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, Ranchi. 3. The Deputy Commissioner, Palamau 4. The Land Reform Deputy Collector, Daltonganj (Sadar), District- Palamau 5. Ambika Dubey, son of Late Makhan Dubey (died and substituted vide order dated 29.07.2013) 5(a) Rumalo Devi, w/o late Ambika Dubey 5(b) Anjani Dubey, 5(c) Sanjay Dubey, 5(d) Ajit Dubey, 5(e) Satish Dubey All sons of Late Ambika Dubey 5(f) Pratima Kumari 5(g) Renu Kumari All daughters of Late Ambika Dubey Residents of Turk Talleya, P.O. & P.S. Chainpur, Palamau. 6. Birju Ram 7. Ram Ishwar Ram 8. Lalan Ram All sons of late Nanhak Ram. All residents of village Turk Telleya alias Purbdiha, P.S. Chainpur, District- Palamau. 9. Ragni Kumari daughter of Shri Rajendra Dubey Wife of Shri Rajendra Dubey resident of village Khiribar, P.O.- Purbdiha, P.S. Chainpur, District- Palamau … … Respondents With W.P.(C) No. 3532 of 2003 Ragni Kumari, daughter of Sri Rajendra Dubey, resident of village Khiribar, P.O.- Purbdiha, P.S.- Chainpur, District- Palamau … … Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, Ranchi. 3. The Deputy Commissioner, Palamau 4. The Land Reform Deputy Collector, Daltonganj (Sadar), District- Palamau 2026:JHHC:2933 2 5. Ambika Dubey, son of Late Makhan Dubey (died and substituted vide order dated 29.07.2013) 5(a) Rumalo Devi, w/o late Ambika Dubey 5(b) Anjani Dubey, 5(c) Sanjay Dubey, 5(d) Ajit Dubey, 5(e) Satish Dubey All sons of Late Ambika Dubey 5(f) Pratima Kumari 5(g) Renu Kumari All daughters of Late Ambika Dubey Residents of Turk Talleya, P.O. & P.S. Chainpur, Palamau. 6. Birju Ram 7. Ram Ishwar Ram 8. Lalan Ram All sons of late Nanhak Ram. All residents of village Turk Talleya alias Purbdiha, P.S. Chainpur, District- Palamau. 9. Srimati Uttim Raj Devi wife of Shri Rajendra Dubey, resident of village Khirbar, P.O. Purbdiha, P.S. Chainpur, District- Palamau … … Respondents --- CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Petitioner : Mr. Kundan Kr. Ambastha, Advocate : Mr. Anurag Chandra, Advocate : Mr. Sachin Kr. Shah, Advocate For the Resp. No. 5 : Mr. Rajeev Ranjan Tiwary, Advocate : Mr. Ranjit Kr. Tiwari, Advocate : Mr. Anjumar Dewarshi, Advocate : Mr. Ritesh Kr. Singh, Advocate --- 15/04.02.2026 Learned counsel for the parties are present. 2. These two writ petitions have been filed for the same relief. 3. W.P.(C) No. 3516 of 2003 has been filed for the following reliefs: “That in this writ petition the above named petitioner prays for issuance of a writ of certiorari of any other appropriate writ/Rule/Order/Direction to quash the order dated 10.5.2003 (Annexure-5) passed by respondent no.2 in L.C. Revision Case No.31 of 2002, whereby the respondent no.2 has illegally allowed the Revision and set aside the order dated 24.9.2002 passed by respondent no.3 in L.C. Appeal No.XV/68 of 1998-99, AND further to quash the order dated 19.8.98 (Annexure-3) passed by respondent no.4 in L.C. Case No.6 of 1997 whereby 2026:JHHC:2933 3 the respondent no.4 has illegally allowed the application filed by the respondent no.5 under Section 16(3) of Bihar Land Reform (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), AND for issuance of such other writ/Rule/Order/Direction as your Lordship may deem fit and proper.” 4. W.P.(C) No. 3532 of 2003 has been filed for the following reliefs: “That in this writ petition the abovenamed petitioner prays for issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate Writ/Rule/Order/Direction to quash the order dated 10.5.2003 (Annexure-5) passed by the respondent No.2 in L.C. Revision Case No.32 of 2002 whereby the respondent no.2 has illegally allowed the Revision and set aside the order dated 24.9.2002 passed by respondent no.3 in L.C. Appeal No.XV/68 of 1998-99, AND further to quash the order dated 19.8.98 (Annexure-3) passed by respondent no.4 in L.C. Case No.6 of 1997 whereby the respondent no.4 has illegally allowed the application filed by the respondent no.5 under Section 16(3) of Bihar Land Reform (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), AND for issuance of such other Writ/Rule/Order/Direction as your Lordship may deem fit and proper.” 5. The writ petitions have been filed for quashing of the order dated 10.05.2003 (Annexure-5) passed by the respondent no. 2 in L.C. Revision case Nos. 31 of 2002 and 32 of 2002 by which the revision petitions have been allowed and the order dated 24.09.2002 passed by the respondent no. 3 in L.C. Appeal No. XV/67 of 1998-99 and L.C. Appeal No. XV/68 of 1998-99 has been set-aside. Another prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 19.08.1998 (Annexure-3) passed by respondent no. 4 in L.C. Case No. 6 of 1997-98 whereby the application filed by the original respondent no. 5 under section 16(3) of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1961’) was allowed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that Ragni Kumari [writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 3532 of 2003] is the person in whose favour registered gift deed was executed in relation to the property which was involved in the pre-emption case instituted under 2026:JHHC:2933 4 section 16(3) of the Act of 1961. Ragni Kumari is the daughter of Shri Rajendra Dubey. 7. So far as W.P.(C) No. 3516 of 2003 is concerned, the same has been filed by Uttim Raj Devi who is wife of Shri Rajendra Dubey. Uttim Raj Devi is the purchaser of the property in connection with which the case under section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 was filed. 8. It is not in dispute that the property involved in the present was sold to Uttim Raj Devi by virtue of registered sale-deed dated 20.10.1993 which was registered only on 16.09.1997. Ambika Dubey claiming to be a co-sharer and adjoining raiyat filed an application under section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 before the respondent no.4 on 10.12.1997 which was registered as L.C. Case No. 6 of 1997-98. Uttim Raj Devi appeared and filed her show-cause stating that the application was not maintainable against her as she was no more raiyat of the disputed land and that she had already transferred the said land by a registered deed of gift dated 29.09.1997 in favour of her daughter namely, Ragni Kumari, who had accepted the gift and was in possession of the property. 9. It transpires that the gift deed in favour of Ragni Kumari is dated 18.11.1997 but was registered only on 01.01.1998 which happened during the pendency of the petition filed under section 16(3) of the Act of 1961. 10. The pre-emption case under section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 was filed on 10.12.1997. Consequently, the applicant filed application for impleading Ragni Kumari [respondent no. 9 in W.P.(C) No. 3516 of 2003] in the proceeding before the respondent no. 4. 11. It is the case of the petitioners that no allegation was made that the gift deed was sham, farzi or otherwise illegal. The respondent no. 9 in W.P.(C) No. 3516 of 2003 (Ragni Kumari) appeared and produced the deed of gift and it has been stated in the writ petition of W.P.(C) No. 3532 of 2003 in paragraph 10 that due to strike of non- gazetted employees, the gift deed, which was presented for registration on 18.11.1997, was registered only on 01.01.1998. 2026:JHHC:2933 5 12. It is further case of the petitioners that the applicant (Ambika Dubey) filed a rejoinder to the aforesaid show-cause filed by Ragni Kumari and asserted for the first time that the gift-deed was sham, farzi, fraudulent and illegal and also asserted that the gift-deed was hit by the principles of lis-pendence as the document was not registered till the date of filing the case and the gift deed cannot defeat or take away the right of the pre-emptor. The allegation was denied by Ragni Kumari. However, the respondent no. 4 allowed the application of pre- emption vide order dated 19.08.1998 (Annexure-3). 13. Both, Uttim Raj Devi [petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 3516 of 2003] and her daughter Ragni Kumari [petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 3532 of 2003] filed separate appeals before the respondent no. 3 which were numbered as L.C. Appeal No. XV/67 of 1998-99 and L.C. Appeal No. XV/68 of 1998-99. The respondent no. 3 allowed both the appeals vide common judgment dated 24.09.2002 and set-aside the aforesaid order dated 19.08.1998. 14. The original respondent no. 5 – Ambika Dubey filed two separate revision petitions against the appellate order dated 24.09.2002 passed by the respondent no. 3 which were registered as L.C. Revision case Nos. 31 of 2002 and 32 of 2002 and they were taken up for hearing simultaneously. 15. The respondent no. 2 i.e., Member, Board of Revenue, vide impugned order dated 10.05.2003 set-aside the order passed by the respondent no. 3 dated 24.09.2002 by holding that the gift deed is not a deed of gift and also by holding that the gift deed was drawn up to defeat the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act, 1961 on account of the fact that Uttim Raj Devi was well aware that she was not the adjoining raiyat of the disputed land. The authority also held that the gift deed was sham and farzi and could at best be given the status of a 2nd transfer through sale. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while assailing the impugned order, has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court reported in 2021 (1) JBCJ 278 (HC) (Radhika Devi Vs. State of Jharkhand and others) and has submitted that the present case is 2026:JHHC:2933 6 squarely covered by the said judgment and therefore, both the writ petitions be allowed. He has submitted that the order allowing the application under section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 be set-aside and the order passed in the revision cases be also set-aside. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the original authority dealing with petition under section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 did not declare the gift deed as sham and farzi. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 5, on the other hand, has submitted that he is the pre-emptor. He has submitted that there is no doubt that the gift deed which was registered on 01.01.1998 would relate back to 18.11.1997 which is the date on which the deed was executed and presented for registration. He further submitted that in spite of this, the fact remains that as soon as it came to light to the pre- emptor that the property has been transferred through gift, appropriate amendment was carried out and the donee was made party in the proceedings and at the initial stage, i.e., before the authority deciding the proceeding under section 16(3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961, a stand was taken that the gift deed was sham and farzi. 19. The learned counsel submits that the authority had given a finding that the deed was sham and farzi and allowed the pre-emption application. So far as the appellate authority is concerned, the order was set-aside. 20. Before the revisional authority, i.e., the Member, Board of Revenue, after considering the materials including the gift deed itself, it was recorded that the transaction of gift was sham and farzi. He submits that in such circumstances, the judgment which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners reported in 2021 (1) JBCJ 278 (HC) (Supra) is actually in his favour. He submits that it has been held in the said case that the gift deed, upon registration, would relate back to the date of its execution but if the transaction is found to be sham and farzi then the petition under section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 is to be allowed. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 has further referred to the said judgment and has submitted that the Hon’ble Division Bench 2026:JHHC:2933 7 has also considered the scope of article 226 of the Constitution of India and has held that it is settled position of law that while exercising the power of writ of certiorari the writ court is to consider the facts on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or perversity in the finding, being its limited scope. The learned counsel submits that since the finding of the learned Member, Board of Revenue that the gift deed was sham and farzi is based on material on record , the same may not be interfered in writ jurisdiction and therefore, these writ petitions are devoid of any merits. 22. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 has also submitted that the Hon’ble Division Bench has also taken note of the fact that in the connected writ of the said case, the daughter of the writ petitioner who was gifted the property was not impleaded in the proceedings. He has submitted that the aforesaid judgment passed in 2021 (1) JBCJ 278 (HC) (Supra) is in his favour and therefore, the writ petitions be dismissed. 23. At this, the learned counsel for the petitioners who has cited the aforesaid judgment reported in 2021 (1) JBCJ 278 (HC) (Supra), has submitted that one SLP has been filed against the said judgment being Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Diary No. 25302 of 2022 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was lastly listed on 20.09.2023. He submits that the matter is sub-judice before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 24. To this, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 has submitted that there can be no dispute that if the gift deed is found to be farzi, then under such circumstances, the petition for pre-emption is to be allowed and such finding was based on numerous previous decisions of the court which has been referred to in the judgment passed in the case of 2021 (1) JBCJ 278 (HC) (Supra). Findings of this Court 25. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 3516 of 2003 is the purchaser of the property and the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 3532 of 2003 is the donee, to whom the purchaser had gifted the property. The vendor of 2026:JHHC:2933 8 the property are respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8. The respondent no. 5 is the pre-emptor. 26. The foundational dates are also not in dispute. The purchaser had purchased the property by way of registered sale-deed which was dated 20.10.1993, but the sale-deed was registered on 16.09.1997. The petition for pre-emption under section 16(3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961 was filed within the period of limitation i.e., on 10.12.1997. After filing the petition for pre-emption, it was placed on record that the property was already transferred by the purchaser to the donee by virtue of registered gift-deed executed on 29.09.1997 which was presented before the registry for registration on 18.11.1997 and it was ultimately registered only on 01.01.1998. The deed was registered during the pendency of the application of pre-emption. It is not in dispute during the course of argument that the date of registration of the gift deed would relate back to its registration i.e., 29.09.1997 in view of section 47 of the Indian Registration Act. 27. It also appears from the records of this case that before the authority dealing with the petition under section 16(3) of the aforesaid Act of 1961, the donee was made party and she appeared before the authority and contested the proceedings. The pre-emptor had made an allegation that the gift deed was sham and farzi. 28. It is not in dispute that the pre-emption application was allowed by the authority against which two appeals were filed before the appellate authority; one by the purchaser and another by the donee which were allowed. Thereafter, the matter came up before the Member, Board of Revenue in the revision petitions being Revision case No. 31 and 32 of 2002 filed by the pre-emptor which were decided by common judgment which is impugned in the present proceedings. 29. The Member, Board of Revenue referred to the judgment reported in 1985 BLJ 697 (Smt. Priyambada Devi and another Vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna) and observed that in the said ruling it was laid down that section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 will not be applicable to gifts of land, but in the said ruling it 2026:JHHC:2933 9 was also laid down that the gift must fulfill the condition that it was not challenged as sham and farzi. 30. The Member, Board of Revenue closely examined the gift deed and found that the gift deed was sham and farzi and the recital of the gift deed itself revealed about repayment of the fund invested by the purchaser of the land and such refund was being made by the donee and observed that the gift deed referred to a consideration in its recital. 31. The Member, Board of Revenue also observed that it was evident that the so-called gift deed was drawn up to defeat the provision of the Act of 1961 as the opposite party no. 1 (Uttim Raj Devi) was well aware that she was not the adjoining raiyat of the disputed land and held that the gift deed was sham and farzi. The Member, Board of Revenue ultimately set-aside the order of the appellate authority and decided the case in favour of the pre-emptor. 32. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court reported in 1972 SCC OnLine Patna 189 (Gujan Yadav and Another Vs. Sitaram Choudhary and others) and has referred to paragraph 9 of the said judgment to submit that the authority had the necessary jurisdiction to examine the fact as to whether the gift deed was sham and farzi and such exercise has been rightly taken up by the authority. Paragraph 9 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: “9. I am not impressed by the third point urged on behalf of the petitioners either. The proceeding before the revenue court under Section 16(3) of the Act is not a summary proceeding as the expression is generally understood. Within its scope it is a full- fledged proceeding subject to the right of appeal to the aggrieved party under Section 30 of the Act and the revisional power of the Board of Revenue under Section 32. Section 43 bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to settle, decide or deal with any question which is, by or under the Act, required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Board of Revenue, the Commissioner, the appellate authority or the Collector. If it were to be held that the question raised by the transferor that there was no transfer of land by him—whatever may be his ground for saying so—was not to be dealt with or decided by the revenue court in a proceeding under Section 16(3) of the Act, it will lead to anomalous results and multiplicity of litigation. In a civil court 2026:JHHC:2933 10 it would be open to the transferor to raise the same question because in that event Section 43 will not be a bar. If the civil court decides the matter in favour of the transferor, the entire proceeding under Section 16(3) and all the orders passed therein will be set at naught. It does not seem to be either obligatory or expedient to take the view as urged on behalf of the petitioners— rather the scheme of the Act and the Rules suggests that all relevant questions which can be raised either by the transferor or by the transferee should be raised before and conclusively settled or dealt with by the revenue courts so that the jurisdiction of the civil courts may be barred.” 33. This Court finds that the finding that the gift deed was sham and farzi is based on the materials on record and the finding cannot be said to be perverse nor it is the case of the petitioners that the impugned order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue is without jurisdiction. 34. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Division Bench reported in 2021 (1) JBCJ 278 (HC) (Supra), the Hon’ble Division Bench has clearly observed that it is settled position of law that while exercising the power of writ of certiorari the writ court is to consider the fact on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or perversity in the finding being its limited scope. A reference has also been made to numerous judgments with regard to the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India while issuing a writ of certiorari and a reference has been also been made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 (Sawarn Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab and others) whose relevant paragraphs have been quoted. The same are also being quoted as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in writ proceedings under Article 226. It is well settled that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob case, 2026:JHHC:2933 11 “this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.” 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 35. Considering the limited scope as laid down by the Hon’ble Division Bench, this Court has no doubt that the finding of fact recorded by the Member, Board of Revenue that the gift deed is sham and farzi, does not call for any interference. 36. Further, from the aforesaid judgment itself, it is apparent that the Hon’ble court had recorded that the donee was not made party and had also referred to the judgment passed in the case of “Smt. Priyambada Devi and another Vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna” reported in 1985 PLJR 662 wherein it has been held that the gift deed executed before filing of pre-emption application, but registered during pendency of the application, is excluded from the purview of pre-emption, but such a transaction can be hit by the provision of section 16(3) of the Act only if there is allegation of sham and farzi transaction and the authorities find the allegation true. The relevant extract from the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in paragraph 13 is quoted as under: “13. …………………………………….. In the case of Smt. Priyambada Devi V. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna & Ors., (1985 PLJR 662), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held that 2026:JHHC:2933 12 the deed of gift executed before filing of pre-emption application but registered during the pendency of the application is excluded from the purview of pre-emption. Such a transaction can be hit by the provision of Section 16(3) of the Act only if there is an allegation of sham and farzi transaction and the authorities find the allegation true. ………………………………” 37. This Court finds that the law appears to be well-settled by now that a transaction in connection with gift can be hit by the provision of section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 if there is an allegation of sham and farzi transaction and the authorities find the allegation true. In the present case, as held above, the allegation that the gift deed was sham and farzi has been found true by the Member, Board of Revenue which is the final court of fact. 38. This Court is of the view that merely because SLP has been filed by the pre-emptor of the said case against the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench reported in 2021 (1) JBCJ 278 (HC) (Supra) and the same is pending, the pendency of the case will have no bearing in the present proceedings in view of the fact that till date, as it appears from the order-sheet of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no leave has been granted so far. 39. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court finds no merit in these writ petitions, which are hereby dismissed. 40. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Date of order: 04.02.2026 Pankaj Date of Uploading:09.05.2026