1 / 23 2026:CGHC:21284 The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 10.04.2026 07.05.2026 -- 07.05.2026 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 963 of 2014 1. Mohammad Yusuf Quraishi, S/o Mohd. Rajjab Quraishi (Died and appeal abated as per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 08-04-2025. 2. Smt. Gulshana Quraishi W/o Mohammad Yusuf Quraishi, Aged About 51 Years, R/o Mastan Para, Sukma, P.S. Sukma, Civil District Sukma and Revenue District Sukma C.G.. 3. Mohammad Anwar Quraishi S/o Mohammad Yusuf Quraishi, Aged About 34 Years, R/o Mastan Para, Sukma, P.S. Sukma, Civil District Sukma And Revenue District Sukma C.G. 4. Mohammad Sarwar Quraishi S/o Mohammad Sarwar Quraishi, Aged About 32 Years R/o Mastan Para, Sukma, P.S. Sukma, Civil District Sukma And Revenue District Sukma C.G. ... Appellants 2 / 23 versus  State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sukma, Civil District Sukma, Revenue District Sukma C.G. ...Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Paranjape, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Aditya Dhar Diwan, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Siddhant Tiwari, Panel Lawyer. (Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey) (C A V Judgment) 1. This Criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentenced dated 19.09.2014 passed in Session Trial No. 111/2008 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), South Bastar Dantewara (C.G.) has convicted the appellants under Section 304-B (2) of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for 07 years. 2. Prosecution story, in brief, is that the marriage of deceased Noor Bano was solemnized with accused Anwar Qureshi about five years prior to the incident dated 14.04.2008. Soon after the marriage, the accused persons started demanding dowry, on account of which the deceased remained at her parental home for a considerable period, where she also gave birth to a male child. On the occasion 3 / 23 of the marriage of her younger sister, the accused persons were invited, and after attending the ceremony, they took the deceased with them to their house at Sukma on 10.04.2008. On 14.04.2008, the deceased telephonically informed her father that she was being assaulted by the accused persons, whereupon her parents and relatives went to Sukma and, after counselling the accused, were returning to Chhindgarh when they received information that the deceased had sustained burn injuries and had been admitted to the hospital. The deceased was initially taken to Sukma Hospital, where intimation was given to the police, and considering her critical condition, she was referred to District Hospital, Jagdalpur. Her dying declaration (Ex.P-3) was recorded on 15.04.2008 by the Executive Magistrate (PW-2) at Maharani Hospital, Jagdalpur, where she succumbed to her injuries on the same day. Merg intimation was registered, inquest proceedings (Ex.P-4) were conducted, and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination which was conduced vide Ex.P-1. During investigation, statements of the witnesses Abdul Tahir Quraishi and Saleem Quraishi, brother-in-law and brother of deceased were recorded wherein it was revealed that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of dowry demand. Consequently, offence under 4 / 23 Sections 304-B, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC was registered against the accused persons. 3. After due investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused for the offence under Section 304-B, 201, 34 of IPC before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sukma, from where the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and thereafter transferred to the learned Trial Court for trial. After filing of the charge sheet, the trial Court framed the charge against accused/appellants under Section 304-B (2) of IPC. 4. So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. 06 defence witnesses were examined by the accused/appellants in their defence. Statements of the accused/appellants were also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they denied the charges levelled against them and pleaded innocence and false implication in the case. 5. After hearing counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants as mentioned above in para 1 of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 6. Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned counsel for the appellants submits that Learned counsel for the appellants submits that 5 / 23 the charge framed against the appellants under Section 304-B of the IPC is wholly misconceived as it has not come in the evidence on record, and has resulted in serious prejudice to the appellants. It is contended that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate that demand of dowry is a sine qua non for constituting an offence under Section 304-B IPC, however, in the present case, there is not even an iota of evidence to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution witnesses, who have attempted to introduce allegations of dowry demand, have admitted during their cross- examination that such allegations are being made for the first time before the trial Court and were never stated either in the written report or in their statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC. This material omission renders their testimony unreliable and unworthy of credence. It is also contended that once the essential ingredient required to establish an offence under Section 304-B IPC is absent, the appellants are entitled to acquittal, particularly when no alternative charge has been framed against them. It is further submitted that as per the prosecution case itself, the door of the room was found locked from inside, which 6 / 23 clearly rules out the involvement of the appellants in the alleged offence. Learned counsel further argues that PW-5 has specifically stated that an earlier dying declaration had already been recorded by the Tahsildar at Sukma, but the same has been deliberately withheld by the prosecution, which creates serious doubt about the fairness of the investigation and suggests that the best evidence has been suppressed to falsely implicate the appellants. 8. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in not properly appreciating the dying declaration (Ex. P-3) of the deceased, which clearly indicates that the quarrel took place on account of an issue relating to her son. There is not even a whisper in the entire dying declaration that the deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of dowry demand. Even PW-2, the Tahsildar who recorded the dying declaration, has categorically admitted in paragraph 10 of his deposition that the deceased did not make any statement regarding demand of dowry. The prosecution has failed to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand soon before her death. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bajaj v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2001) 9 SCC 417), wherein it has been held that in absence of any specific 7 / 23 material indicating demand of dowry, conviction under Section 304-B IPC cannot be sustained merely on vague and general allegations. 9. It is contended that the doctor who allegedly certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give the dying declaration has neither been cited as a prosecution witness nor examined before the Trial Court. In absence of such crucial evidence, it cannot be said that the deceased was in a fit mental and physical condition at the time of making the statement. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the this High Court in Vinay Kumar Pandey vs. State of Chhattisgarh and connected matters [CRA No.1306/2022, Neutral Citation No.2025:CGHC:21002], wherein it has been held that non-examination of the doctor certifying the fitness of the deceased renders the dying declaration unreliable and liable to be discarded. 10. It is also contended that the circumstances under which the dying declaration was recorded create serious doubt about its voluntariness and truthfulness. It is submitted that presence or influence of relatives of the deceased at the time of recording of the dying declaration raises the possibility of tutoring or prompting. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 8 / 23 Phulel Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2023) 10 SCC 268, wherein it has been held that where there exists a reasonable suspicion of tutoring or influence, the dying declaration cannot be safely relied upon. 11. Learned counsel further submits that the law relating to dying declaration is well-settled that though it can form the sole basis of conviction, it must be wholly reliable, voluntary and inspire full confidence of the Court. Where the dying declaration suffers from infirmities, inconsistencies or suspicion, it would be unsafe to base conviction solely on such evidence. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Varikuppal Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2009) 3 SCC 415, wherein the principles governing appreciation of dying declaration have been comprehensively laid down. It is further contended that the prosecution has relied upon oral dying declaration, which is inherently a weak piece of evidence and such oral dying declaration, in absence of corroboration and when surrounded by suspicious circumstances, cannot form the basis of conviction. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of this High Court in Manish Soni & Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh and connected matter [CRA No.821/2014 and 1161/2014, Neutral Citation No.2025:CGHC:21002], 9 / 23 12. Learned State Counsel submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court is well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, and does not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Court. It is contended that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the accused/appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the death of the deceased was admittedly unnatural, having occurred due to burn injuries within seven years of her marriage, thereby attracting the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. The evidence on record clearly demonstrates that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused persons. Merely because the dying declaration does not contain elaborate details of dowry demand, the same does not dilute the prosecution case, particularly when the surrounding circumstances and testimonies of prosecution witnesses establish that the deceased was subjected to ill-treatment in her matrimonial home. 13. Learned State counsel also submits that the evidence of witnesses cannot be discarded merely on account of minor discrepancies or improvements, as such variations are natural and do not go to the root of the prosecution case. 10 / 23 The consistent version of the witnesses establishes that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused persons. It is argued that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective and has recorded a finding of guilt based on cogent and credible material. So, the appeal being without any merit is liable to be dismissed. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 15. It is clear from the record of the learned trial Court that the learned trial Court framed charges under Section 304-B (2) of IPC against the accused/appellants and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court convicted the appellants accordingly. 16. It is an admitted position in the case that the marriage of deceased Noorbano was solemnized with accused/appellant Anwar Quraishi prior to 5 years of the incident and deceased Noorbano committed suicide on 14.04.2008 within seven year of her marriage. 17. It is evident from the record that the learned Trial Court heavily relied upon the dying declaration (Ex.P-3) of the deceased, however, perusal of the same goes to show that 11 / 23 the deceased alleged that she does not know who had set her on fire from behind. Even, the dying declaration did not mention the harassment or torture on account of dowry. 18. O.P. Dhawai (PW-2) is the Tahsildar who received letter (Ex.P-2) on 15.04.2008 for recording dying declaration of the deceased. He has stated that he had recorded dying declaration of the deceased and admitted his signature on ‘A to A’ and ‘B to B’ part thereof & identified the signature of Doctor and thumb impression of the deceased on ‘C to C’ part. This witness, in para 10 of his cross-examination, has admitted that the certificate issued by the doctor is mentioned below the last question. He did not ask the doctor present at the spot about the percentage of burns sustained by the deceased; and he only asked whether the deceased was in a condition to give a statement or not, and the doctor informed him that the deceased was in a condition to give a statement. He also admitted that the deceased did not say anything regarding dowry harassment. 19. The prosecution did not examine Dr. Sandeep Singh who endorsed and certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to given her statement. 20. While dealing with the issue where certifying doctor was not examined by the prosecution and render the dying 12 / 23 declaration unreliable, this High Court referring the decision of Hon’ble Apex in Gopal Singh (supra), in the matter of Vinay Kumar (supra), held in para 21 to 23 as under :- “(21) In that view of the matter, since the doctor i.e. Dr. Jagrani Lakra, who has certified the deceased the deceased to be in fit state of mind at the time of recording of dying declaration (Ex.P/32), has neither been cited as a witness nor brought to the witness-box to be examined before the learned trial Court and neither Executive Magistrate, namely, Prerna Singh (PW- 14), who has recorded the dying declaration (Ex.P/32), has recorded her satisfaction either the in dying declaration or in her statement before the Court that the deceased was in fit mental and physical condition to give statement at the time of recording of the dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) therefore, it is not established on record that the deceased was in fit state of mind to give statement at the time of recording of dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) . Moreover, though the deceased remained alive till 16.07.2017, i.e. around 02 months after the incident, but no additional dying declaration in presence of any doctor has been recorded. As such, there is no evidence brought on record to hold that the deceased was in fit state of mind at the time of recording of dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) and, in absence of which, dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) cannot be relied upon, as the same is not true 13 / 23 and voluntary. Consequently, the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in relying upon the dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) to convict the appellants herein for the offences in question. It is held accordingly. (22) Furthermore, the deceased in her dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) has stated that in connection with demand of dowry, her saas, pati, sasur and jethani, caused her burn injuries. Neither the exact name alongwith other particulars like father's/husband's name or address etc. of the accused/appellants have been mentioned or spelled out by the deceased in the dying declaration ( Ex .P/32). (23) The Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal Singh (supra) has clearly held with reference to Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that a dying declaration which does not contain complete names and addresses of the persons charged with the offence, even though may help to establish their identity, is not of such a nature on which conviction can be based and it cannot be accepted without corroboration and observed in Para-07 & 08 as under: "7. We have already referred to the fact that the learned Sessions Judge was not prepared to accept the evidence of Umraodas, P.W. 1 and Chhotulal, P.W. 7, that deceased Modsingh had named the appellants as assailants when they 14 / 23 met him in the morning at 8.00 a.m. on the roadside. Detailed reasons have been given by the learned Sessions Judge why he considered their evidence unsatisfactory. The High Court, however, in one sentence expressed its opinion that the evidence of these two witnesses, amongst others, corroborated the dying declaration in respect of the identity of the appellants without giving any reasons why it differed on the point from the learned Sessions Judge. It is obvious that the High Court was so well satisfied by the written dying declaration as establishing the identity of the appellants that it ignored to consider the evidence of Umraodas, PW 1 and Chhotulal, PW 7 independently to see how far they were reliable. In an appeal against acquittal we think the High Court ought to have expressed itself more fully why it considered that the learned Sessions Judges' conclusion was unreasonable. In our opinion that conclusion is unexceptionable. 8. But even if we assume that the High Court was right in concluding that the dying declaration established the identity of the appellants, it was certainly not of that of Bombay. In this 15 / 23 case, it must be first remembered that though the names of the appellants' fathers were known to Modsingh and others who accompanied him to the Police Station, their fathers' names and present residence have not been mentioned. It is rather unusual for Police Officers not to enquire and record in the first information the full name and address of the persons complained against........" character as would warrant its acceptance without corroboration. It is settled law that a court is entitled to convict on the sole basis of a dying declaration if it is such that in the circumstances of the case it can be regarded as truthful. On the other hand if on account of an infirmity, it cannot be held to be entirely reliable, corroboration would be required. See: Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22. In this case, it must be first remembered that though the names of the appellants' fathers were known to Modsingh and others who accompanied him to the Police Station, their fathers' names and present residence have not been mentioned. It is rather unusual for Police Officers not to enquire and record in the first information the full name and address of the persons complained against........" 16 / 23 21. Further, while dealing with the issue where dying declaration termed to be a weak piece of evidence in absence of corroboration and surrounded by suspicious circumstances, this Court in the matter of Manish Soni (supra) held in para 24 as under :- “24. It is well-settled law that oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence. In the matter of Darshan Devi v. State of Punjab reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 126, with regard to oral dying declaration, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that an oral dying declaration can form basis of evidence in a given case, but such a dying declaration has to be trustworthy and free from every blemish and inspire confidence.” 22. In the present case also, the deceased in her dying declaration (Ex.P-3) had only stated that someone set her on fire from behind, and when a question was asked to the deceased that who set her on fire?, the deceased answered that she does not know, as such, the name of any of the appellants was not uttered by the deceased in her dying declaration. 23. Thus, in the light of judicial pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court in Gopal Singh (supra), the dying declaration which evidently does not contain name and address of the 17 / 23 appellants, is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Even otherwise, the deceased did not mention/utter any demand of dowry or any torture regarding demand of dowry and the deceased only stated that the dispute took place concerning her son. Furthermore, the Doctor who endorsed/certified the deceased to be in fit state of mind to give statement has neither been cited as witness nor brought to the witness box to be examined before the learned Trial Court, which also castes serious doubt with regard to credibility and reliability of the dying declaration. 24. The next question which arises for consideration by this Court whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry soon before her death or not. 25. Gulam Waris (PW-5), father of the deceased, has stated that all the accused/appellants tortured and harassed his deceased daughter for bringing less dowry and due to this, he had given Rs.10,000/-, Rs.15,000/-, and Rs.25,000/- total Rs.50,000/- to appellant Yusuf (A-1), however, in para 15 of his cross-examination, he admitted that he had disclosed in his police statement (Ex.D-1) that he had paid Rs.10,000/-, 15,000/- and Rs.25,000/- total Ra.50,000/- to appellant Yusuf Quraishi but if the said statement is not recorded in his police statement, he cannot tell the reason thereof. He 18 / 23 has also admitted that before the incident, he did not complain about the demand of dowry or torture of his daughter by the accused persons. 26. Saleem Quraishi (PW-6) is the brother of deceased. He has also stated the same story as has been stated by Gulam Waris (PW-5), father of the deceased. However, in cross- examination, he has admitted that he did not tell the police in his police statement (Ex.D-2) regarding the demand of money by the accused persons, and for the first time, he is deposing the aforesaid factum before the Court. 27. Abdul Tahir Quraishi (PW-7) is the brother-in-law (Jija) of the deceased. He has also stated the same story as has been stated by father of the deceased (PW-5) and brother of the deceased (PW-6) that father of deceased gave Rs.10,000/- and Rs.15,000/- on two different occasions and that all the accused persons harassed and tortured the deceased. In cross-examination, he has stated that what has been stated by him before police, the same do not find in his police statement (Ex.D-3). 28. Shanu Quraishi (PW-10) has also stated that her father (PW-5) had given Rs.10,000/-, Rs.15,000/- and Rs.25,000/- to the accused/appellants on three different occasions as the accused/appellants were harassing her deceased sister 19 / 23 for demand of dowry. She has also stated after giving money, the accused/appellants kept the deceased well and thereafter started harassing her for car. In cross- examination, this witness has admitted that she did not mention in her police statement the name of the accused person who demanded Rs.10,000/-, Rs.15,000/- and Rs.25,000/-. Further, this witness has stated that she had disclosed in her police statement that the in-laws (accused) of her deceased sister had demanded money, but if the said statement is not recorded in her police statement, she cannot tell the reason thereof. 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bajaj (supra), has held that under Section 304-B of the IPC relating to dowry death, the provision being a deeming one with severe punishment requires strict scrutiny of evidence by the Court. The prosecution must establish essential ingredients, particularly that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” and that such conduct was in connection with demand for dowry. In the present case, these key ingredients were not proved. Consequently, the accused husband cannot be held guilty under Section 304-B IPC and observed in para 5 as under :- 20 / 23 “5. We have given our attention and consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Normally this Court will be slow and reluctant, as it ought to be, to upset the order of conviction of the trial court as confirmed by the High Court appreciating the evidence placed on record. But in cases where both the courts concurrently recorded a finding that the accused was guilty of an offence in the absence of evidence satisfying the necessary ingredients of an offence, in other words, when no offence was made out, it becomes necessary to disturb such an order of conviction and sentence to meet the demand of justice. In order to convict an accused for an offence under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied: (1) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (2) such death must have occurred within 7 years of her marriage; (3) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by relatives of her husband; (4) such cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection of demand of dowry.” 30. In the light of above judicial pronouncement, in the present case, it is evident that the dying declaration (Ex.P-3) of the deceased without examination of doctor who 21 / 23 endorsed/certified the deceased to be in a fit state of mind, is not admissible in evidence. That apart, in the dying declaration (Ex.P-3) of the deceased, the factum of harassment on account of bringing less dowry or dowry is not mentioned and there is also no mention of name of any of the accused person that who set the deceased on fire. Furthermore, evidence of father of deceased (PW-5), brother of deceased (PW-6), brother-in-law of deceased (PW-7) and sister of deceased (PW-10) reveals material contradictions and significant omissions in their testimonies. While all these witnesses have alleged demand of dowry and payment of amounts, they have admitted in cross- examination that such material facts were either not stated in their police statements or do not find place therein and the brother of deceased (PW-6) has admitted that he was deposing the demand of dowry and payment made by his father for the first time before the Court. There is also no prior complaint made regarding alleged harassment or dowry demand. These improvements and inconsistencies create serious doubt about the credibility of their version and suggest afterthoughts. Thus, the essential ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B of IPC has not been proved and the prosecution has only proved that the deceased died otherwise than under normal circumstances 22 / 23 within 07 years of her marriage but it has failed to prove that soon before her death she was subjected to any cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry. Evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfill the pre-requisite to invoke presumption under Section 304-B IPC or Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. As such, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove all the ingredients required to hold the appellants guilty under Section 304-B of IPC. 31. On the basis of aforesaid analysis of the evidence, I am of the view that the finding of the learned trial Court convicting the present appellants under Section 304-B(2) of IPC is not based on proper appreciation of evidence and not sustainable and they deserve to be acquitted of the charge leveled against them. 32. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment is hereby set aside and the appellants are acquitted of the charge under Section 304-B (2) of IPC. 33. The appellants are on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.), the appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety in the like amount 23 / 23 before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) Judge pekde