1 apl2044.25.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.2044 OF 2025 Vaibhav s/o Shankarrao Pise Aged 30 years, Occ: CISF Constable R/o Niljai, Tah. Warora, Dist. Chandrapur At present : NTPC, Vidyut Nagar, Dadari, Uttar Pradesh. ...APPLICANT ...V E R S U S... 1. The State of Maharashtra, through Police Station Officer, Police Station, Wani, Dist. Yavatmal. 2. XYZ, aged 24 years, Occ: Student, in Crime No.1043/2023 Through Police Station Officer, Police Station, Wani, Dist. Yavatmal. ...NON-APPLICANTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shri Karan Bhende, Advocate for applicant. Shri H.D. Futane, APP for non-applicant no.1/State. Ms Ayushi Dangre, Advocate (appointed) for non-applicant no.2/complainant. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM:- M.W. CHANDWANI, J. RESERVED ON :- 24.08.2026 PRONOUNCED ON :- 30.09.2026 JUDGMENT: 1. Heard. 2. Admit. 3. The applicant in the application filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 2026:BHC-NAG:13140-DB 2 apl2044.25.odt “BNSS”) seeks quashing of the First Information Report (for short “FIR”) bearing Crime No.1043/2023 registered with Police Station, Wani, District Yavatmal for the offences punishable under Section 376 (2) (n), 417 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and Section 3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short “Act of 1989”) and charge-sheet filed in Special Case No.08/2024 before the District Judge-1 and Additional Sessions Judge, Kelapur, District Yavatmal. 4. Briefly stated the facts of the case as per the charge- sheet are as follows: (i) The complainant/non-applicant no.2 and the applicant met each other at a wedding in April 2021. Eventually, they became friends and their friendship developed into a love relationship. On 10.08.2022, the applicant took the complainant at an OYO hotel and on the promise of marriage, he established sexual intercourse with the complainant. Thereafter, the applicant and the complainant continued to maintain a sexual intercourse on regular basis. On 15.09.2023, the applicant visited the house of the complainant and assured her mother and brother stating that he will marry the complainant. Thereafter, on 18.09.2023, the 3 apl2044.25.odt applicant took the complainant to Taj OYO Hotel and entered into sexual intercourse with her. (ii) Thereafter, it is alleged that on 30.09.2023, the applicant called the complainant and informed her that he has met someone else. That he does not wish to continue the relationship with her and he will not marry her. He warned the complainant of having to face dire consequences if the complainant reported him to the police. Therefore, on the complaint of the complainant, the aforesaid offences came be registered against the applicant. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the sexual intercourse between the applicant and the complainant was consensual in nature and consent of the complainant is not solely based on the promise of marriage by the applicant. According to him, there is nothing on record to suggest that the applicant had made a false promise. Rather, record shows that the applicant expressed his desire to marry the complainant, to her mother, who refused to allow the applicant to marry her daughter. According to him, consent of the complainant to enter into sexual intercourse is not vitiated. Rather, according to him, the long-standing nature of the relationship between the applicant and complainant itself suggests that it was a consensual 4 apl2044.25.odt relationship. Thus, prosecution against the applicant is nothing but an abuse of the process of court. Therefore, he sought quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings. 6. Per contra, learned APP, assisted by the learned counsel appointed for the complainant, opposed the application on the ground that the complainant succumbed to the applicant’s insistence to have a sexual intercourse with her, as the applicant had promised to marry her. According to them, the complainant was induced by the applicant on false promise of marriage and later on, avoided the applicant. Rather, he married another girl. Therefore, according to them, consent of the complainant is vitiated and the sexual intercourse between the applicant and the complainant was not consensual in nature. According to them, the facts of the case require to undergo trial and therefore, they sought rejection of the application. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties. I have gone through the charge-sheet. 8. Perusal of the record indicates that the applicant and complainant met at a weeding and thereafter, came in contact with each other through a digital platform. Thereafter, they 5 apl2044.25.odt became friends and their friendship turned into a love relationship. It appears from the charge-sheet that in June 2021, the applicant was selected in CISF service and went to Delhi. It is alleged that the applicant and the complainant were in touch with each other through WhatsApp. It is alleged that on 10.08.2022, the applicant came at Wani, called the complainant and took her to an OYO hotel, where it is alleged that he promised her to marry and thereafter established sexual intercourse with the complainant. Thereafter, the applicant and complainant met at various hotels and places including Taj OYO at Wani, OYO situated at Mukutban and Sanskriti OYO at Warora and physical relationships were established between them at all the aforesaid places. Lastly, on 18.09.2023, applicant took the complainant at Taj OYO, where he entered into sexual intercourse with the complainant. Thereafter, he called the complainant on 30.09.2023 informing her that he met another girl, that the complainant should not contact him and that he will not marry the complainant. Therefore, the complainant lodged the aforesaid complaint against the applicant. 9. Since, the offence under Section 375 of the IPC has been charged against the applicant, it will be appropriate to reproduce Section 375 of the IPC, which reads thus: 6 apl2044.25.odt “375. Rape.—A man is said to commit “rape” if he— (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:— First.—Against her will. Secondly.—Without her consent. Thirdly.—With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly.—With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly.—With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly.—With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly.—When she is unable to communicate consent. 7 apl2044.25.odt Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. Explanation 2.—Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1.—A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” The offence committed under Section 375 of the IPC is punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. The provision under Section 376 of the IPC as relevant for the present case is reproduced below: “376. Punishment for rape.— ------- ------- (2) Whoever, – ------- (n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.” Thus, if the consent of the complainant is taken under misconception of the fact and if the person committing the sexual 8 apl2044.25.odt intercourse knows that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception, then the offence of rape is committed. 10. The question of misconception of the fact came before the Apex Court for consideration many times and it has been consistently held that if the person acts on an actual understanding of circumstances, actions and consequences of the act, it would indicate the presence of consent. In recent past, in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra 1, the Supreme Court has observed in para 12, 14, 16 and 18, which are reproduced as under: “12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Sonar [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100] which was a case involving the invoking of the jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court observed : (SCC para 15) “15. … An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of.” This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of this Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala [Kaini Rajan v. 1 (2019) 9 SCC 608 9 apl2044.25.odt State of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] : (SCC p. 118, para 12) “12. … “Consent”, for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance of the moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances.” 14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh [Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509] , this Court held : (SCC para 12) “12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 IPC.” Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] (Deepak Gulati) : (SCC p. 682, para 21) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;” 10 apl2044.25.odt 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. * 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come 11 apl2044.25.odt within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] .” (emphasis supplied) 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.” 11. The complainant has taken the plea that the applicant established sexual intercourse with her against her consent by making a false promise that he would marry her. In this regard, it has to be considered whether making a false promise to marry amounts to an offence. If a false promise of marriage is made to a woman by a man, thus deceiving the woman leading her to engage in sexual relations, it may amount to misconception of fact, in which case the consent given by the woman may be vitiated. In this regard one may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in 12 apl2044.25.odt the case of Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) 1, which reads thus: “21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of law and the case fell under the Clause — Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376.” 12. The material in the entire charge-sheet does not reveal that the complainant was succumbed into establishing sexual intercourse only on the basis promise of marriage. Before initially establishing sexual intercourse the applicant told her that he is going to marry her and she kept faith on him and the sexual intercourse were established between them. Thus, there is no 1 (2023) 15 SCC 385 13 apl2044.25.odt allegation in the entire complaint that merely based on the promise of marriage the complainant succumbed to enter into sexual intercourse with the applicant. 13. Be that as it may, even otherwise there is nothing on record to suggest that the applicant made a promise to marry the complainant with an intention to not fulfill the same. Meaning thereby there is nothing on record to suggest that the applicant had intention since its inception to not marry and to deceive the complainant and succumb her to enter into sexual intercourse on account of false promise of marriage. Rather, statements of the brother and the mother of the complainant indicate that the applicant presented his willingness to marry the complainant but both of them refused to the said proposal on account that he is an inveterate drinker. Thus, there is nothing on record to suggest that false promise of marriage was given by the applicant and the complainant was succumbed to his enticement of promise of marriage. 14. That apart, it appears that there are instances of sexual intercourse at multiple occasions between the applicant and the complainant for more than one year without any resistance and insistence for marriage by the complainant. This would be indicative of the consensual sexual relationship between the 14 apl2044.25.odt applicant and the complainant rather than relationship based on the false promise of marriage by the applicant. I am unable to discover any deceitful behaviour of the applicant; rather, the complainant continued to have sexual relationship with him for such a long time without insistence from her for the marriage. 15. In the decision of Uday v. State of Karnataka 1, the Supreme Court has observed that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. Additionally, in a recent pronouncement the Supreme Court with regard to deceitful means i.e. of false promise of marriage, in the case of Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani Vs. State of Gujarat and another 2 has observed in para 5, which reads as under: “5. …. The statements made in the complaint clearly indicate a consensual relationship and we do not find anything to find a deceitful conduct, of, the appellant having induced the complainant into sexual intercourse, which he succumbed to only on the promise to marry. Here we reiterate that on the first occasion when they met, the complainant succumbed to the appellant’s entreaties, is the specific statement without even stating that it was on the promise to marry that physical relationship was permitted.” 1 (2003) 4 SCC 46 2 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1818 15 apl2044.25.odt 16. That apart, the material in the entire charge-sheet suggests existence of a consensual relationship between the applicant and the complainant and does not show a deceitful conduct of the applicant having induced the complainant into sexual intercourse which he succumbed her into only on the promise of marriage much less false promise of marriage. 17. In view of the foregoing discussions, prima facie, there is nothing on record against the applicant of having committed rape of the complainant within the meaning of Section 376(2)(n) or of cheating the complainant as punishable under Section 417 of the IPC even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at their face value. Now, what remains is to determine whether the charges levied under Section 506 of the IPC, Section 3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 is made out or not. 18. Analysis of ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC is necessary to come to a reliable conclusion, which reads as under: “506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 16 apl2044.25.odt seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” The Section prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. In essence, it provides two levels of punishment depending on the gravity of the threat. The basic rule is that whoever commits criminal intimidation i.e., threatening another with intent to cause alarm or compel them to do or omit something they are legally entitled to do shall be punished. However, if the threat is of a more serious nature, such as causing death, grievous hurt, destruction of property by fire, commission of a grave offence punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment up to seven years, or imputing unchastity to a woman, then the punishment is enhanced. 19. As regards the offence punishable under the aforesaid Section 506 of the IPC, the issue is not whether the applicant is alleged to have uttered threatening words, since the statement attributed to him that he would not remain without causing harm to the complainant, if she approached the police, cannot be said to contain no element of threat. The question, however, is whether the said statement was made with the requisite intention to cause 17 apl2044.25.odt alarm to the complainant so as to constitute criminal intimidation within the meaning of Section 503 of the IPC. The aforesaid principle was elaborated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P.1 , in paragraphs 48 and 49 as quoted below: “48. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intends to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention of the accused to cause alarm must be established by bringing evidence on record. The word “intimidate” means to make timid or fearful, especially to compel or deter by or as if by threats. [ “Intimidate”, Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2024.] The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in the charge-sheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word “threat” refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Injury involves doing an illegal act. 49. This Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 , had referred to Section 506 which prescribes punishment for the offence of “criminal intimidation” as defined in Section 503IPC, to observe that the offence under Section 503 requires that there must be an act of threating another person with causing an injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. This threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do an act which he is entitled to do. Mere expression of any words without any intent to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring home an offence 1 (2024) 14 SCC 122 18 apl2044.25.odt under Section 506IPC. The material and evidence must be placed on record to show that the threat was made with an intent to cause alarm to the complainant, or to cause them to do, or omit to do an act. Considering the statutory mandate, offence under Section 506 is not shown even if we accept the allegation as correct.” 20. Thus, it is well settled that the intention to cause alarm must be established from the evidence on record and that the threat must have been communicated with the purpose of influencing the mind of the person threatened. Mere expression of words, in the absence of such intention, would not constitute criminal intimidation; the material on record must disclose that the words were uttered with the requisite intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 21. Tested on the aforesaid principles, in the present case, apart from the solitary assertion in the FIR that, during the telephonic conversation in which the applicant informed the complainant that he did not intend to marry her and had found another girlfriend, he further stated that, if she approached the police, he would not refrain from causing her some harm, there is no material in the charge-sheet from which it can prima facie be inferred that the applicant intended, by making the said statement, to cause alarm to the complainant or to deter her from 19 apl2044.25.odt approaching the police. There is no further material regarding any subsequent conduct of the applicant, repetition or escalation of the alleged threat, or any other circumstance lending assurance to the allegation that the statement was made with the requisite intention to cause alarm. 22. Thus, even if the statement attributed to the applicant is accepted in its entirety, the material on record, at the highest, establishes the utterance of a threatening statement, but does not prima facie establish the requisite intention to cause alarm contemplated under Section 503 of the IPC. The existence of threatening words and the intention to cause alarm are not synonymous. In the absence of material disclosing the latter, the allegation, by itself, would not constitute criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 of the IPC. 23. So far as the alleged offence under Sections 3(1)(w) (i) and 3(1)(w)(ii) of the Act of 1989 are concerned, the act of the complainant of indulging in sexual intercourse with the applicant was a conscious and informed choice made by her after due deliberation. More particularly when the relationship is spread over a long period of time, coupled with the conscious positive action of not to protest or raise voice or insist upon performance of 20 apl2044.25.odt marriage by the complainant. The offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(1) (w)(ii) of the Act of 1989 are not made out against the applicant. Lastly, in furtherance to the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989, as the scheduled offence under Section 506 of the IPC does not stand, offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 also does not stand against the applicant. 24. It would be appropriate to mention the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajanlal and others 1, which reads thus: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 21 apl2044.25.odt facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 25. In view of the above discussion, the case of the applicant is covered by clause (1) and (4) of Para 102 of the decision of Bhajanlal (supra). 22 apl2044.25.odt 26. Considering the facts mentioned above, a case is made out for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings. Hence, the following order is passed: (i) The application is allowed. (ii) First Information Report bearing Crime No.1043/2023 registered with Police Station, Wani, District Yavatmal for the offences punishable under Section 376 (2) (n), 417 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and charge-sheet filed in Special Case No.08/2024 before the District Judge-1, Additional Sessions Judge, Kelapur, District Yavatmal are hereby quashed and set aside. (iii) Professional fees of the learned counsel appointed for non-applicant no.2 be quantified and paid as per the Rules. (M.W. CHANDWANI, J.) Wagh Signed by: Mr. S.R. Wagh Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 05/10/2026 17:09:50