- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. NATARAJ REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1814 OF 2023 (SP) BETWEEN: 1. MR. L.S. SUBRAMANIAN S/O LATE L.N. SESHADRI AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, R/AT A-503, HILL SIDE RAHEJA VIHAR, CHANDIVALI STUDIO, SAKINAKA MUMBAI-400072 2. MRS. S. PARVATHI W/O SURESH SITARAMAN AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS, R/AT NO.201, L/A MAISON DE REPOSE 269, 100 FT ROAD, INDIRANAGAR BENGALURU-560038 3. MR. L.S. NARAYANAN S/O LATE L.N. SESHADRI AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS, R/AT NO.164, 4TH CROSS, CHIKKANEPPA LAYOUT BYRATHI KOTHNUR BENGALURU-560077 …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRASANNA KUMAR C.S., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. MRS. DHANALAKSHMI S D/O SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, R/AT NO.8, 1ST MAIN, 2ND CROSS, CHIKKASUBBANNA STREET, OPP. CSI CHURCH, UDAYANAGAR, Digitally signed by HEMALATHA J Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 NEAR TIN FACTORY BENGALURU-560016 2. MR. JASBIR SINGH BAJAJ S/O DILIP SINGH BAJAJ MAJOR 3. MR. DILIP SINGH BAJAJ S/O ATMA SINGH MAJOR 4. MR. SULTAN MAHAMOOD MOHIUDDIN S/O JANAB AHMED SAYOOD AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS RESPONDENT NOS.2-4 ARE RESIDING AT NO.3/3, CHINNASWAMY MUDALIAR ROAD, TASKER TOWN, BENGALURU-560001 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.S.LIKITH, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. SOMASEKHAR NAIDU B., ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.1; VIDE ORDER DATED 28.04.2025, NOTICE TO RESPONDENT NOS.1 TO 4 IS HELD SUFFICIENT BY WAY OF PAPER PUBLICATION) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W ORDER XLI RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 05.07.2016 PASSED IN OS NO.5471/2014 ON THE FILE OF XXXI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU CITY, DECREEING THE SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. NATARAJ - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 ORAL JUDGMENT This is an appeal filed by non-parties to the decree in O.S.No.5471/2014 on the file of the XXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH-14) (henceforth referred to as 'Trial Court') challenging the judgment and decree dated 05.07.2016 passed therein. 2. (i) The appellants claim that they are the children of Sri. L. N. Seshadri and Smt. Bhagirathi Seshadri. They claim that Sri. L. N. Seshadri was the owner of site bearing No.21, measuring 63 + 61/2 x 36 feet carved out of Sy.No.72/3, situated at Dyavasandra Village, Krishnarajapuram Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk. They claim that the respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein being the erstwhile owners of the aforesaid property, had conveyed the same through their power of attorney to Sri. L. N. Seshadri in terms of a sale deed dated 06.01.1967. They claim that their father Sri. L. N. Seshadri died intestate on 03.05.1997 and his wife Smt. Bhagirathi Seshadri died on 29.04.2012. They contend that from the date of purchase, their father was in possession of the aforesaid property and he continued to do so till he died. After his death and the death of his wife, the appellants divided the estate left - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 behind by them and it was agreed that the property in question would be allotted to the appellant No.1 herein. They contend that the appellant No.1 is a permanent resident of Mumbai and used to visit the aforesaid property occasionally. During one of his visits in May 2023, he found that some people were cleaning the property and had locked the gates, which was fixed. When enquired, they were informed that some work is being carried on in the property by the respondent No.1. Thereafter, the appellants made enquiries and found that the respondent No.1 had entered into an agreement of sale with the respondent Nos.2 to 4 on 02.12.2011 and thereafter, she filed O.S.No.5471/2014 for specific performance of the sale agreement, which was decreed ex-parte on 05.07.2016. They also came to know that an execution petition was filed in Ex.P.No.2555/2016 to enforce the ex-parte decree passed in O.S.No.5471/2014. (ii) The appellants, therefore contend that the respondent Nos.2 to 4 having sold the property to their father in the year 1967 could not have agreed to convey the same property to the respondent No.1. They also contend that the agreement of sale dated 02.12.2011 is concocted by the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 respondent No.1 as it is stated in the agreement that the age of the respondent No.4 was 47 years as on 02.12.2011 while in a sale deed dated 06.02.1967, he was shown as 56 years old, which meant that as on 02.12.2011, respondent No.4 was 100 years old. It is also claimed that the sale agreement allegedly executed in favour of respondent No.1 was drawn on a stamp paper whose face value was Rs.200/-. Hence, it is claimed that the respondents have conspired to bring about the sale agreement dated 02.12.2011 so as to deprive the appellants of their valuable right, title and interest in the property. (iii) The appellants have therefore filed this appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.5471/2014. 3. This Court while considering an application for permission for leave to appeal had allowed the same in terms of an order dated 03.07.2025. The said order is not challenged and has therefore, become final. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the above submissions and submitted that the respondent Nos.2 to 4 had conveyed several properties formed in the - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 aforesaid survey numbers between the years 1966 and 1970 through their power of attorney. He contends that the sale deed executed in favour of the appellants' father was also executed by the very same power of attorney. He contends that since the appellant No.1 is a resident of Mumbai, he could not keep a watch on the property and taking advantage of that, the respondent Nos.2 to 4 have brought about an unconscionable agreement in favour of the respondent No.1 and have conspired with her in getting an ex-parte decree in O.S.No.5471/2014. He thus, contends that the effort of the respondents is to eclipse the title of the appellants and somehow grab the property in question in the garb of executing the ex-parte judgment and decree. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submitted that the appellants claimed that their father had purchased the suit property from the power of attorney of the respondent Nos.2 to 4. He submits that the question whether there was a power of attorney or not and whether the father of the appellants had derived lawful right, title or interest in the suit property or not, cannot be tested in the suit in O.S.No.5471/2014. He submits that in a suit for specific - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 performance, the only question that has to be considered is, whether the defendant in the suit had executed an agreement of sale or not. Therefore, he contends that allowing the appellants to challenge the decree in O.S.No.5471/2014 would be enlarging the scope of the suit for specific performance. He therefore, submits that without disturbing the impugned judgment and decree, the appellants be granted liberty to seek declaration of their title in respect of the suit schedule property. He thus, contends that the impugned judgment and decree does not suffer from any infirmity as the defendants in the suit did not contest and did not deny the lawful execution of the agreement and the receipt of consideration. He therefore, submits that there is no need to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. 6. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. 7. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is, - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 "Whether the impugned judgment and decree can be upset at the hands of the appellants who are not parties to the suit in O.S.No.5471/2014?" 8. The suit in O.S.No.5471/2014 was filed for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 02.12.2011 executed by the respondent Nos.2 to 4 in favour of the respondent No.1 for a total sale consideration of Rs.14,00,000/- of which a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- was purportedly paid on the date of the agreement. The notice issued by the Trial Court to the respondent Nos.2 to 4 returned unserved with an endorsement "addressee left". Thereafter, suit summons was served through substituted service by publication in a newspaper and as the defendants remained absent, notice to them was held sufficient and they were placed ex-parte. 9. The plaintiff in the suit (respondent No.1 herein) was examined as PW1 and she marked Exs.P1 to P11 of which Ex.P1 was the sale agreement dated 02.12.2011, Ex.P2 was the notice dated 02.07.2014 issued to the respondent Nos.2 to 4. Exs.P3 to P5 were the postal receipts, Ex.P6 was the certified - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 copy of the sale deed dated 11.01.1966, which purportedly showed the prior title of the respondent Nos.2 to 4 in respect of a larger extent of land, while Exs.P7 to P11 were the encumbrance certificates. A witness to the agreement was examined as PW.2. The respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein (defendants in the suit) did not lead any evidence and did not cross-examine the plaintiff. 10. The Trial Court after noticing that there was no challenge to the contention of the plaintiff (respondent No.1 herein) about the execution of the agreement of sale, the payment of sale consideration and also the readiness and willingness of the respondent No.1 to conclude the transaction, decreed the suit in terms of its judgment and decree dated 05.07.2016. Following the judgment and decree, the respondent No.1 filed Ex.P.No.2555/2016 for drawing up a sale deed and registering it. The executing Court, after approving a sale deed, directed registration of the document and accordingly, a sale deed was duly executed on 24.01.2018. The property that was conveyed to the respondent No.1 in terms of the aforesaid sale deed was the site No.21 formed in Sy.No.72/3 measuring east to west : 60 feet, north to south : - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 35 feet situated at Devasandra Village, Krishnarajapura Hobli, Bengaluru East Taluk, Bengaluru, bound on the east by Siddappa Layout, west by road, north by site No.20, south by site No.22. 11. The documents filed by the appellants in this appeal give an impression that the respondent Nos.2 to 4 being the owners of the aforesaid site had conveyed the aforesaid site through their power of attorney to the father of the appellants on 06.01.1967. The property that was conveyed to the father of the plaintiffs was Site No.21 measuring 63 + 61/2 x 36 ft, bound on the east by land of Pillaiha and others, west by proposed layout road, north by Site No.20, south by Site No.22. It therefore, appears that the respondent Nos.2 to 4 being the erstwhile owners of the property had initially conveyed it to the father of the appellants on 06.01.1967 and thereafter, they purportedly have executed an agreement of sale dated 02.12.2011 in favour of the respondent No.1. Assuming that the respondent Nos.2 to 4 had conveyed the aforesaid site through their power of attorney to the father of the appellants in the year 1967, they did not have any subsisting right, title or interest to convey or agree to convey - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 the property to the respondent No.1. The appellants were therefore, proper and necessary parties in the suit for specific performance as the decree directly impacted and affected their right, title and interest in respect of the suit property. Therefore, they are entitled to challenge the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.5471/2014. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of H. Anjanappa and others versus A. Prabhakar and others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 183], where the principles governing the grant of leave to appeal was summarized as follows: "43. The principles governing the grant of leave to appeal may be summarised as under: i. Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC respectively provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or decree in appeal respectively; ii. The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal; iii. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the court - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person; iv. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the court; v. A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned; vi. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; vii. It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment; and viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings." - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 12. The appellants being the present owners of the property in question, are entitled to step into the shoes of the respondent Nos.2 to 4 and are entitled to raise all defences including the lawful execution of the agreement, the payment of consideration, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to conclude her part of the contract, the liability of the respondent Nos.2 to 4 to conclude the transaction, the question whether the respondent Nos.2 to 4 have any subsisting right, title or interest to execute a conveyance in favour of the respondent No.1 etc., In this regard, it is profitable to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and others [2005 (6) SCC 733], where the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering the entitlement of a third party to come on record and contest a suit for specific performance. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that a person who is claiming title to the very same property through the defendant would be a proper and necessary party unlike a third party who is claiming independent right, title and interest in the property, which is a subject matter of the suit for specific performance. For the sake of convenience, the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court is extracted below:- - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 "19. …….Accordingly, it was submitted that the presence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would be necessary for proper adjudication of such dispute. This argument which also weighed with the two courts below although at the first blush appeared to be of substance but on careful consideration of all the aspects as indicated hereinearlier, including the scope of the suit, we are of the view that it lacks merit. Merely, in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale because the Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are not necessary parties as there was no semblance of right to some relief against Respondent 3 to the contract. In our view, the third party to the agreement for sale without challenging the title of Respondent 3, even assuming they are in possession of the contracted property, cannot protect their possession without filing a separate suit for title and possession against the vendor. It is well settled that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale the lis between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 shall only be gone into and it is also not open to the Court to decide whether the Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have acquired any title and possession of the contracted property as that would not be germane for decision in the suit for specific performance of the contract for - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 sale, that is to say in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale the controversy to be decided raised by the appellant against Respondents 2 and 3 can only be adjudicated upon, and in such a lis the Court cannot decide the question of title and possession of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 relating to the contracted property." 13. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bharat Karsondas Thakkar vs. Kiran Construction Company and others [(2009) 13 SCC 46], where the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:- "In addition to the above, Mr. De'Vitre submitted that by allowing the amendment sought for by the respondent No.1 of his plaint, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had allowed the respondent No.1 to completely change the nature and character of his suit from one for specific performance of an agreement to one for declaration of title against a third party to the agreement for which specific performance had been claimed. It was submitted that the suit, as amended, was no longer maintainable as one under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963." - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 14. (i) The learned counsel for respondent No.1 therefore, submits that the question, whether the respondent Nos.2 to 4 had executed a power of attorney and whether they had authorized such power of attorney to execute a sale deed in favour of the father of the appellants, throws up a complicated question of title of the appellants. He therefore, submits that the scope of the suit for specific performance cannot be enlarged and inter se disputes regarding title cannot be gone into. He also referred to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, where it was held, "Mr. De'Vitre also referred to another decision of this Court in Anil Kumar Singh vs. Shivnath Mishra (1995 3 SCC 147) where also, in an almost identical fact situation, this Court held that having regard to the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the respondent in the said case was neither a necessary nor a proper party to adjudicate upon the dispute arising in the suit since he was not a party to the agreement of sale in respect of which specific performance had been prayed." (ii) He thus, contends that the appellants were not parties to the agreement of sale and therefore, they are not necessary party and that their right, if any, is to file a separate - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 suit for declaration of their title to the suit property against the respondent No.1. 15. The answer to the aforesaid contention is simple in as much as the appellants have stepped into the shoes of the respondent Nos.2 to 4. The respondent Nos.2 to 4 having executed a sale deed in favour of the father of the appellants, have nothing to loose by not contesting the suit filed by the respondent No.1. The appellants have now stepped into the shoes of the respondent Nos.2 to 4 and by virtue of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, they are entitled to raise all defences that are available to them as provided in the law of contracts. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, the right of the appellants having been affected and eclipsed, by virtue of the impugned judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.5471/2014, the appellants are entitled to take appropriate steps to nullify the decree passed in O.S.No.5471/2014. In that view of the matter, the point for consideration framed by this Court is answered and it is held that the appellants are entitled to seek for dilution of the decree passed in O.S.No.5471/2014 in view of their antecedent right in respect of the suit schedule property. - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 16. Hence, the following order is passed: ORDER (i) The appeal is allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment and decree dated 05.07.2016 passed by the XXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH- 14) in O.S.No.5471/2014 is set aside. (iii) The suit is restored on the file of the Trial Court. The Trial Court shall implead the appellants herein as defendants in the suit and proceed in accordance with law. (iv) The parties shall appear before the Trial Court on 30.06.2026. (v) The appellants are entitled to refund of the Court fee. Likewise, the respondent No.1 is entitled for refund of any amounts deposited by her before the Trial Court. - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:20184 RFA No. 1814 of 2023 (vi) Office is directed to refund the Court fee by drawing a cheque in the name of the appellant No.1. Sd/- (R. NATARAJ) JUDGE PMR List No.: 1 Sl No.: 35