( 2026:HHC:26972 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.344 of 2026 Decided on:- 06.07.2026 Guman Singh …Petitioner Versus Union of India and Ors. …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 _______________________________________________________________ For the petitioner : Mr. Vinod Chauhan and Ms. Nandita, Advocates. For the respondents : Ms. Rita Thakur, Central Government Counsel, for respondents No.1 and 3. Mr. Mohinder Zharaick and Mr. H.S. Rawat, Additional Advocates General, with Ms. Ranjna Patial, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.2 and 4. Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) Petitioner-Guman Singh has filed the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 12.05.2026, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the First Appellate Court), in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.3 of 2026. 2. By way of order dated 12.05.2026, the learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal, preferred 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) by the petitioner, which has been filed against the order dated 18.01.2025, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge, Shillai, District Sirmaur, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the trial Court), in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.6 of 2023, in Civil Suit No.108/2022, titled as Guman Singh versus Union of India and others. 3. By way of order dated 18.01.2025, learned trial Court has dismissed the application, under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, filed by the petitioner. 4. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis, are, hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court. 5. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition before this Court, as borne out from the documents, annexed with the petition may be summed up, as under:- 5.1. Plaintiff-Guman Singh has filed a suit for declaration against the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff being co-owner in possession of the land bearing Khata-Khatauni No. 382 min/793 min, Khasra No.1450/393 min, measuring 21-01-00 bighas, situated in Mauza Ashyadi, Tehsil Shillai, District Sirmaur, H.P., as 3 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) per Jamabandi for the year 2013-14 and further declaration that he is entitled to have and receive the compensation amount of the suit land, bearing Khasra No.1450/393/1, measuring 6-04 bighas from the defendants, which is acquired from them for the purpose of construction of National Highway No.707. 5.2. In addition to this, the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction has also been sought against the defendants to restrain them from paying such amount to any other person or third party and further directions to them to pay the amount of compensation to the plaintiff. 5.3. The said relief has been sought on the ground that the subject matter of the lis is in his possession, as co-sharer, being Shamlat Deh. Being right holder and co- sharer in the Shamlat Deh, he is entitled for the amount of compensation from the defendants. But according to him, the defendants, while preparing a list of right holders and beneficiaries of the acquisition of land had willfully omitted the name of plaintiff therefrom. 6. On the basis of the above facts, he has sought the relief, as claimed, in the plaint. 4 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) 6.1. Along with the suit, application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, has also been filed, seeking interim relief, by restraining the defendants from making the payment of the compensation amount. 6.2. The suit, as well as, the application has been contested by defendants No.1 and 3, by taking the preliminary objections; that the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit. In addition to this, preliminary objection has also been taken that the suit is not maintainable, as the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No.1299 of 2015, titled as Kuldeep Singh versus NHAI has observed as under:- “We further direct that no Court/Authority shall entertain any application or proceeding for grant interim relief in relation to the land acquired for the purpose of widening of Kalka-Shimla National Highway and it shall be open for any of the aggrieved parties to approach this Court. Registrar General is directed to communicate this order to District Judge of the concerned District” 6.3 Highlighting the fact that the project in question is national importance and once, this issue has already been covered under the judgment passed by the High Court, then, the suit is not maintainable. In addition to this, a preliminary objection has also been taken that 5 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) the plaintiff has not approached to the Court with clean hands. On the similar line, application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC has also been contested. 7. The learned trial Court after hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties has dismissed application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, vide order dated 18.01.2025, by holding that the Land Acquisition Act, is a complete Code and parties can agitate their grievances, before the Authority concerned, under the Land Acquisition Act, as such, the relief of injunction has been declined. 8. Against the said order, Civil Appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(R) CPC has been filed before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court has also dismissed the application, on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to establish three ingredients governing the relief, under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC. 9. Now, the plaintiff is before this Court for assailing the above orders mainly, on the ground that both the Courts below have wrongly concluded that the plaintiff is not having a prima-facie case in his favour. According to 6 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) the plaintiff, the complex question regarding title and possessary rights over Shamlat Deh land, cannot be summarily adjudicated, by the Land Acquisition Authority, as such, a full trial is necessary to determine the rights of the parties and as such, according to the plaintiff, the protective relief under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, is required to be given to him. 10. The orders passed by both the Courts below have also been assailed, on the ground that it has not been considered that in case, the compensation amount is disbursed to the third party, during the pendency of the suit, then, the same will cause irreparable loss or injury to the plaintiff. 11. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Vinod Chauhan, Advocate, appearing for the plaintiff has prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed by setting aside the orders passed by the learned trial Court and the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, may kindly be allowed, as prayed for. 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in “K. Valarmathi & Ors. Versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606” has elaborately 7 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) been discussed the scope of interference. Relevant para 9 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.” 13. Even otherwise, in a recent decision in “Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Versus B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of interference has again be explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:- “35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.” 8 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) 14. Being guided by the above decisions, now, this Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact whether the finding, so recorded, by the learned trial Court, as up- held by the learned First Appellate Court, falls within the definition of ‘perverse findings’ or not. 15. Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor & Another, (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, has elaborately discussed the term ‘perverse findings’. Relevant paragraphs 24 to 30 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:- “24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1 SCC 501 this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others AIR 1966 Cal. 31, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, 9 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition “Perverse – Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition “Perverse – Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.” 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition “Perverse – Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.” 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) “Perverse – Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.” 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition “Perverse – A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus: "We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is 10 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to 11 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness – as distinguished from the legal permissibility – of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 16. The learned trial Court, in the present case, has elaborately discussed the stand, as taken, by the parties to the lis and thereafter held that the relief cannot be granted to the plaitniff as the Land Acquisition Act, is complete Code and parties can agitate their grievances, before the concerned authorities. Moreover, the pleadings are totally silent as to whom the defendants are going to disburse the amount. 17. Admittedly, the defendants would disburse the amount to some one and the plaintiff has not able to make out a case that to whom the defendants are going to disburse the amount. He has asserted his possessary right 12 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) but, the pleadings are totally silent about the person, who is denying his possessary right, title or interested in denying the same. The relevant paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint, are reproduced, as under:- “2. That the plaintiff owns and possesses agriculture land in Mauja Ashyadi, Tehsil Shillai for the last couple of decades since the time of his forefathers and therefore, the plaintiff is a right holder in the Shamlat Deh Hasb Rasad Khewat No.382 and therefore, is co-owner in possession thereof. The plaintiff being cosharer and right holder of the Shamlat Deh of Mauja Ashyadi is in physical and cultivating possession of the suit land detailed in Khata Khatauni No.382 Min/973 Min, Khasra No.1450/393 Min, measuring 21-01-00 Bighas, situated in Mauja Ashyadi Tehsil Shillai, H.P., as per latest Jamabandi for the year 2014-15 and prior Jamabandis thereto which are attached herewith for the kind perusal of this learned Court. 3. That the defendants have acquired an area of 6-04 Bighas from the said land which is reflected as Khasra No.1450/393/1 in award No.18, which is herein after called the suit land. It is submitted that the plaintiff being a right holder and co sharer in the Shamlat Deh of Mauja Ashyadi and in physical and cultivating possession of Khasra No.1450/393 Min, supra, is legally entitled to have and receive the amount of compensation from the defendant. But the defendants while preparing a list of right holders and beneficiary of the acquisition of land from Shamlat Deh at Mauja Adhyadi supra, willfully omitted the name of the plaintiff therefrom. In other words the plaintiff has been intentionally and willfully debarred from receiving amount of compensation of the acquisition of the suit land measuring 6-04 Bighas as reflected in the Award No.18 of acquisition of land of Mauja Ashyadi Tehsil Shillai. In the last 13 ( 2026:HHC:26972 ) Week of February, 2022, the plaintiff came to know that his name in thelist of right holders and beneficiary to whom the amount of compensation of amount is to be paid under Award No.18, was omitted or missing, the plaintiff approached defendant No.1 and filed an application on 11.03.2022 requesting him to pay the amount of compensation of the suit land but defendant No.1 did not give any satisfactory reason as to why the name of the plaintiff was missing from the list of claimant. Now the plaintiff has come to know that the amount of compensation of the suit land and other acquire land is being paid within a period of 10 days or so.” 18. When, the plaintiff himself is not sure about the person to whom the defendants are going to disburse the compensation, then, both the Courts below have rightly considered the contentions of the parties, as such, those findings do not fall with the definition of ‘perverse findings’, which require interference, by this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. 20. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of. (Virender Singh) July, 06, 2026 Judge (subhash sharma)