2026:HHC:26988 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 495 of 2011 Reserved on: 20.06.2026 Date of Decision: 07.7.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Arjun Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent : Mr Kulwant Chauhan, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.03.2011, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 21.12.2006 and order of sentence dated 27.12.2006, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. II, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:26988 Trial Court) were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Udham Singh (PW-1) was posted as a conductor and Karam Chand (PW- 5) was posted as a driver with HRTC. Both of them were deputed with the bus bearing registration No. HP-33-5410 on 24th September, 2001. When the bus reached Pull Gharat, a tanker bearing registration No. HR-37A-2035 came from the opposite side at high speed. The tanker hit the bus on the wrong side. 10- 12 persons travelling in the bus were injured, and two persons died in the accident. The bus was badly damaged in the accident. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the tanker. The matter was reported to the police, and the police recorded an entry in the daily diary. K.D. Sharma (PW-18) went to the spot and took the photographs (Ext.PW-18/A1 to Ext.PW- 18/A11), whose negatives are Ext.PW-18/A12 to Ext.PW-18/A22. 3 2026:HHC:26988 K.D. Sharma recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-10/A) was registered. K.D. Sharma (PW-18) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-18/B). He found the total width of the metalled road to be 22 feet and 8 inches. The tanker bearing registration No. HR-37A-2035 had hit the bus bearing registration No. HP33-5410 on the wrong side of the road. K.D. Sharma seized the bus and tanker vide memos (Ext. PW-3/A and Ext.PW-18/C). Mohan Singh (PW-7) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW-7/A and Ext.PW-7/B). Dr Sunil Thakur (PW-8) examined Dharam Pal and Meena Devi and found that they had sustained injuries that could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-8/A and Ext.PW-8/B). Dr Harish Behl (PW-9) examined Karam Singh, Arjun Singh, Jaswant, Khem and Kushal. He found that they had sustained simple and grievous injuries. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-9/A to Ext.PW-9/C and Ext.PW-9/E). Harish Kumar also examined Kushal Kumar and found that he had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He 4 2026:HHC:26988 issued the MLC (Ext.PW-9/D). Dr Anuradha Sharma (PW-10) examined Sita and found that she had sustained injuries that could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. She issued MLC (Ext.PW-10/A). Dr Jiwa Nand (PW-11), examined Kehar Singh and found that he had sustained simple and grievous injuries. He issued MLC (Ext.PW-11/A). Dr K.S. Malhotra (PW- 15) conducted the post-mortem examination of Rudar Mani and found that he had died due to poly-trauma to internal organs, which could have been caused within 5 to 6 hours in a motor vehicle accident. He issued a post-mortem report (Ext.PW-8/A). He also conducted a post-mortem examination of Punn Ram and found that he had died due to multiple injuries leading to shock. He issued the post-mortem report (Ext.PW-8/B). Rakesh Sharma (PW-9) went through the X-rays of Meena Devi, Karam Chand, Arjun Singh, Sita, Jaswant Singh, Kushal Kumar, Khem Singh, Kehar Singh and the CT scan of Arjun Singh. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of 5 2026:HHC:26988 accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nineteen witnesses to prove its case. Udham Singh (PW1), the informant, was a conductor in the HRTC bus. Dharam Pal (PW-2) did not support the prosecution's case. Suresh Chand (PW-3) and Kehar Singh (PW-14) witnessed the recoveries. Kehar Singh (PW-4), Chattar Singh (PW-6), and Khem Singh (PW-12) were travelling in the bus. Karam Chand (PW-5) was driving the bus. Mohan Singh Thakur (PW-7) mechanically examined the vehicles. Dr Sunil Thakur (PW-8), Dr Harish Behl (PW-9), Dr Anuradha Sharma (PW-10) and Dr Jiwa Nand (PW-11) examined the injured. Om Parkash (PW-13) filed an application for the post-mortem examination of Rudar Mani and Punn Ram. Dr. K.S.Malhotra (PW-15) conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr Rakesh Sharma (PW-9) went through the X-rays. ASI Ghanshyam (PW- 16) signed the F.I.R. Bhikem Singh (PW-10), sic, proved the entry in the daily diary. K.D. Sharma (PW-18) investigated the matter. 6 2026:HHC:26988 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that one car was moving behind the HRTC bus, which overtook the bus. He turned the tanker towards the right side to avoid the accident. He could not turn the tanker towards the left because there was a hill on the left side of the tanker. He examined Paramjeet Singh (DW-1) to prove his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not disputed that he was driving a tanker, which had met with an accident. His defence was that he had turned the tanker to avoid a collision with the Maruti car overtaking the bus. This defence was not proved on record. There was no Maruti car on the spot, which falsified the defence taken by the accused. The tanker was taken towards the right side without any justification, and the accused was negligent. Hence, the Learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Section(s) Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of 7 2026:HHC:26988 the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days. 337 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days. 338 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 30 days. 304-A The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 30 days. It was ordered that all the aforesaid substantive sentences shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that the plea taken by the accused that he had turned the tanker to avoid the collision with the Maruti car appeared to be highly probable. There were skid marks behind the bus, suggesting that the bus was being driven at a high speed. The tanker was loaded and 8 2026:HHC:26988 could not have been driven at a high speed. When two versions appeared on record, the version in favour of the accused had to be preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. Hence, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in its proper perspective. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. The eyewitnesses clearly proved that the accused was driving the tanker in a rash and negligent manner at a high speed, which led to the accident. The bus was towards its extreme left side, and the accused had taken the tanker towards his right side, which led to the accident. The defence version that a Maruti car had tried to overtake an HRTC bus was not proved on record, and the Learned Appellate Court erred in accepting this version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the Learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9 2026:HHC:26988 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Kulwant Chauhan, and learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. It was duly proved on record that the accused had taken the tanker towards the right side of the road. Even if the version of the accused is accepted to be correct, that he was trying to save the Maruti Car, he could have applied the brakes and could not have put the passengers of the bus in danger by swerving the tanker. The tanker was taken towards the right side of the road, which is a violation of the Rules of the Road Regulations. The Appellate Court failed to advert to the Rules of Road Regulations and erred in acquitting the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr Kulwant Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that when two versions are appearing on record, 10 2026:HHC:26988 the version in favour of the accused has to be preferred. The defence version was duly proved by the testimony of Paramjeet Singh (DW-1), and the learned Appellate Court had rightly accepted his testimony. Learned Appellate Court had taken the reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: 11 2026:HHC:26988 “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Learned Trial court had rightly pointed out that the facts in the present case were not in dispute. The accused did not 12 2026:HHC:26988 dispute in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C, that he was driving the tanker at the time of the accident and that the tanker had left its side and swerved towards the right side. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: “51. That brings us to the question of whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an 13 2026:HHC:26988 answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the 14 2026:HHC:26988 presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub- section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub- section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this 15 2026:HHC:26988 statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 18. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of 16 2026:HHC:26988 recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 19. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761: - 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 17 2026:HHC:26988 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 18 2026:HHC:26988 20. Therefore, the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the accused was driving the tanker and the tanker was taken towards the right side. 21. Paramjeet Singh (DW-1) stated that he was going to Sunder Nagar on 24.09.2001. A car tried to overtake an HRTC bus. There was a slight gap between the bus and the tanker. When the car tried to overtake the HRTC bus, the driver of the tanker swerved the tanker towards its right side. The bus and the tanker collided with each other. The tanker would have hit the car had it not swerved. There was a deep gorge towards the left side, and it was not possible to take the tanker towards the left side. The tanker was being driven at a slow speed. He stated in his cross-examination that he could not produce any document to show that he was going towards Sunder Nagar. The police had arrived in his presence. He admitted that the road was wide and the accident occurred on a National Highway. 22. He claimed that the police had reached the spot in his presence; however, he did not make any statement to the police describing the accident, which is highly unusual. Learned 19 2026:HHC:26988 Trial Court had rightly noticed that the car would have been present on the spot had the car tried to overtake the HRTC bus. However, no car was found on the spot, which falsifies the defence version that the car had tried to overtake the HRTC bus. 23. The defence version shows that the accused had tried to take the benefit of Section 81 of the IPC. This benefit is not available to the accused. It was laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kutcharlapati Krishnam Raju vs. State of H.P. 2003(2) APLJ 469 (HC) that Section 81 of IPC applies where a smaller harm is caused while trying to protect a major harm. It was observed: “10. Now, coming to the contention of the learned counsel that the facts and circumstances attract the provisions under Section 81 of the IPC, it is necessary to have a look at the above provisions, which read thus: Section 81: Act likely to cause harm but done without criminal intent and to prevent other harm- Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property. Explanation - It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm. 20 2026:HHC:26988 Illustrations (a) A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence o his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers onboard, unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course, he must incur risk of running down a boat (c) with only two passengers on board, which he may possible clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may rundown the boat C by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be sound as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to a void was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down C. B) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from spreading. He does this with the intention in good faith of saving human life or property. Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such nature and so imminent as to excuse A's act, A is not guilty of the offence. It recognises the doctrine of self-preservation. It gives legislative sanction to the doctrine of salvage common in the law of all nations. In fact, it is a doctrine of necessity which has, since the sacrifice of Iphigenia, found ready recognition in all mundane transactions. It sanctions doing evil so that good may come. It permits the infliction of a lesser evil to avert a greater evil. The only thing that is required is that the act done should be without criminal intention. The Supreme Court in BASDEO v. STATE OF PEPSU made a distinction between intention and knowledge and observed that motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention. Intention is a state of mind consisting of the desire that certain consequences 21 2026:HHC:26988 shall follow from the party's physical act. The distinction between motive, intention and knowledge can be stated in the language of the Supreme Court in Baseo's case (supra 3) as follows. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention, and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases, intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less, and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin, but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. 11. In Dr Hari Singh Gour's Penal Law of India, 11th Edition Volume No. 1, at note 9, page No. 606, it was stated as under: As has already been remarked, this section is grounded on the wide doctrine of necessity. It is the universal law that all good involves some expectancy of an abundant harvest, which is probably appealing to the same law of necessity that led Agamemnon to make the sacrifice of Iphigenia. The captain who capsizes a boat to save his own, a person who dismantles houses to arrest the progress of fire, appeals to the same law of necessity as those who deal blow for blow, or even take away another's life to save their own. Necessity vincit legem. How far the Indian Legislature has thought fit to sanction this doctrine will be manifested from this section. It places no limit on the extent of the injury that may be caused, and the question may be whether this injury may extend to the slaughter of a fellow being to assuage hunger. Such a question arose in England, and it forms the leading case on the point. It laid down that the law does not recognise in man the absolute necessity of preserving his life and that, as regards morality, it recognises the duty of sacrificing it for the sake of saving another life. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excuse 22 2026:HHC:26988 unless the killing was justified by what has been called necessity. But the temptation to the act which existed there was not what the law has ever called necessity, nor is it to be regretted. It was also observed in the said case that to preserve one's life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in which it is a man's duty not to live but to die. The duty in the case of a shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and children. These duties impose on men the moral necessity not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others. 12. The illustrations under Section 81 IPC also make it clear that to avoid major harm, a minor harm can be caused without any intention. The accused is entitled to invoke the principle laid down under the maxim 'vincit legem', which has been met with approval under Section 81 IPC. This aspect has not been considered or adverted to by both the Courts below. In that view of the matter, this Court is inclined to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for consideration of the above aspect. In the instant case, the petitioner-accused gave dash to the stationary vehicle while preventing a head-on collision between his vehicle and the vehicle coming in the opposite direction. Had there been a collision, it would have caused more damage and loss of lives. Further, nobody expects a vehicle to be stationed on the road itself. As already stated, there may be an error of judgment as he has been driving the vehicle at speed, which is not prohibited on a national highway, and the speed of the vehicle is not specified or limited under any statute.” 24. In the present case, even if the plea of the accused is accepted as correct that he was trying to save the occupants of the car, he put the occupants of the bus in danger, who were 23 2026:HHC:26988 more in number than the occupants of the car. Therefore, the accused cannot claim the benefit of Section 81 of the IPC. 25. The site plan shows that the tanker was being driven towards the right side of the road. 3 feet 2 inches of space was available towards the left side of the bus, and 15 feet of space was available towards the left side of the tanker. The photographs (Ext.PW-18/A1 and Ext.PW-18/A9) show that a huge space is available towards the left side of the tanker. Thus, the prosecution's version that the accused had left its side and had driven the tanker towards the right side of the road was duly proved. 26. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was 24 2026:HHC:26988 on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 27. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW- 6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is 25 2026:HHC:26988 always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 29. In the present case, the accused had breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, which led to the accident, and the learned trial court had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the tanker. 30. The site plan shows 17 feet of skid marks behind the tanker, which shows that the tanker was being driven at a high speed and the accused was unable to bring it to a halt even after applying the brakes. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. versus Dinesh Kumar, 2008 Cr. L.J 2024, the skid marks of 74 feet on the road indicated that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed, and the accused could not control it, which amounts to the negligence of the accused. It was observed: 10. Once again reverting to the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A, the skid marks on the road were 74 feet in length. For the vehicle going from Hamirpur to the Nadaun side point 'A' shown in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is on the extreme right side. It is not the case that the accident took place on the left side of the road for a vehicle going from Hamirpur 26 2026:HHC:26988 to Nadaun, or even in the middle of the road. The skid marks of 74 feet on the road are clear to show that the jeep was being driven at high speed. The respondent could not control the jeep due to his rash or negligent driving and high speed, and the jeep went from the left side to the right side and crushed the girl at point 'A'.” 31. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the tanker, which led to the accident. 32. Learned Appellate Court had also held that the bus had the skid marks of 72 feet, which showed that the bus was being driven at a high speed. This finding will not help the accused. The high speed of the bus did not contribute to the accident. Had the tanker been driven towards its own side, the accident would not have occurred. Thus, the proximate cause of the accident was driving the tanker towards the right side and not driving the bus at a high speed. The judgment cited by the learned Appellate Court in State of H.P. vs. Kalam Singh 1994(2) S.L.J. 1254 will not help the accused because the high speed was not the proximate cause of the accident in the present case. 33. Learned Appellate court held that when two versions appear on record, the version in favour of the accused has to be preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. There can 27 2026:HHC:26988 be no dispute with this proposition of law. However, in the present case, even if the version propounded by the accused is accepted as correct, it is not in favour of the accused because it does not provide any defence to the accused. Learned Appellate Court had not even noticed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, and provisions of Section 81 of IPC and erred in recording the acquittal. Had the provisions of Section 81 of the IPC and Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, been followed, it would not have fallen into the error of acquitting the accused. 34. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, and the judgment of the Appellate Court cannot be sustained. 35. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the convict to undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC, three months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of IPC and 338 of IPC each and six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. Learned Trial Court had taken a very lenient view 28 2026:HHC:26988 considering the number of persons injured, the injuries sustained by them, and the number of dead persons. 36. Therefore, in view of the above, the present appeal is allowed. Judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court in Criminal appeal No.1 of 2007, decided on 23.03.2011, is ordered to be set aside, while the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court in Police Challan No. 3-I/2002/3-II/2002, passed on 21.12.2006 and 27.12.2026, respectively, are ordered to be restored. The respondent shall surrender before the Learned Trial Court within a period of 30 days in case no stay order is granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and in case of appeal, the same shall be dealt with as per the order passed by the Learned Supreme Court. 37. The present appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, and so also the pending applications, if any. 38. The records of the learned Courts below be returned forthwith along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 07th July, 2026 (ravinder)