AMAN GOEL v. STATE OF NCT DELHI THOURGH SHO PS NEW ASHOK NAGAR DELHI & ANR.
CRL.M.C./5678/2026 · 2026-08-06
Prateek Jalan
body2026
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 14455 (DEL) · dailylaw.ai ]
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 14455 (DEL) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 $~94 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010357462026 + CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 & CRL.M.As. 23731-23732/2026 AMAN GOEL .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Anil Tejan, Advocate. versus STATE OF NCT DELHI THOURGH SHO PS NEW ASHOK NAGAR DELHI & ANR. .....Respondents Through: Mr. Hitesh Vali, APP SI KP Singh
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN O R D E R % 06.08.2026
1. By way of this petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”], the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 461/2026, dated 15.07.2026, registered at Police Station New Ashok Nagar, District East, Delhi, under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC”]. 2. The allegations arising of the impugned FIR, which was registered at the instance of respondent No. 2 – complainant, are that the petitioner was running an educational consultancy, namely, Vzdhyam Academy in Mayur Vihar, and collected various amounts from students under the pretext of securing admissions in a college. The complainant states that he had transferred Rs. 16,73,000/-, in the name of booking amount, to the petitioner on behalf of 276 students, with the objective of securing admissions in the college. It is alleged that the admission was to be done through counselling process, but the petitioner assisted the students to This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 10/08/2026 at 12:26:06
CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 only do online registration, for which the payable fee was only Rs. 50/- each. Allegedly when the petitioner was asked to provide college admission slips, he failed to provide them, and returned only a sum of Rs. 50,000/- out of the entire amount paid. It is further alleged that the petitioner closed his office without informing the complainant, and opened a new office in Noida in the name of Jagat Study. Upon the complainant approaching the petitioner at the new office, petitioner’s wife entered into a Memorandum of Settlement dated 26.11.2024 with the complainant, admitting that Rs. 16,38,000/- had been paid to her by the complainant in various installments between 8th March 2024 to 2nd September 2024, and that she would refund an amount of Rs. 13,00,000/- to the complainant in installments, between 5th December 2024 to 30th June 2025. However, the complainant alleges that only a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- was returned, after which the payments stopped, and the new office was also suddenly closed down. 3. I am informed that the matter is still at the stage of investigation. 4. At this stage, the contention of Mr.
Anil Tejan, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that impugned FIR does not disclose the offence of cheating under Section 420 of IPC. Mr. Tejan submits that the petitioner was unable to procure admission for the students on account of the death of the owner of the college in which the admission was to be taken. He states that an amount of Rs.12,66,500/- has already been paid to the complainant pursuant to the settlement, and only Rs. 33,500/- is remaining to be paid. 5. Mr. Hitesh Vali, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, states that during the course of the investigation, the police has also This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 10/08/2026 at 12:26:06
CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 identified various other victims from whom the petitioner had taken sums of money, on the pretext of securing college admissions. 6. The grounds upon which an FIR may be quashed have been clearly stated, inter alia, in the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] [hereinafter, “Bhajan Lal”]. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as follows:
“102.
In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. This is a digitally signed order.
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CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” Further, in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, [(2021) 19 SCC 401], the Supreme Court considered precedents including Bhajan Lal, and laid down principles governing quashing of an FIR, as follows:
“13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [AIR 1945 PC 18], the following principles of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences. 13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences. 13.3.
However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court.)
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 10/08/2026 at 12:26:06
CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. 13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage. 13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. 13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC. 13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping. 13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. 13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. 13.12.
The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure. 13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [1960 SCC OnLine SC 21] and Bhajan Lal [Supra], has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. 13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
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CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.”
7. In view of the allegations in the FIR, and having heard Mr. Tejan and Mr. Vali, I do not find any of the grounds, available for quashing of the FIR, to be made out at this stage. In the present case, on a reading of the impugned FIR, it is evident that the allegations against the petitioner concern receipt of a sum of over Rs. 16,00,000/-, on the promise of securing college admissions to as many as 276 students. It is contended that he did not do so, and has also failed to return the entire amount. In fact, the failure to return the entire amount is admitted from the
contentions of the petitioner himself.
8. Therefore, I am of the view that this is not a case in which it can be said that no offence is made out against the petitioner in the FIR. Furthermore, at this stage, there is no material on record to indicate that the registration of the FIR, or the continuation of the investigation, otherwise amounts to an abuse of the process of law. The petitioner’s
contentions instead point towards his defence to the allegations, which cannot be agitated at this stage, while the investigation remains in progress.1
9. In these circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to exercise the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of BNSS, at this stage. The matter is still under investigation, and it is for the prosecution to take a call after investigation, as to whether the material is sufficient for filing of a chargesheet against the petitioner. Even at the stage of arguments on charge, the remedies of the petitioner, including filing a discharge 1 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, paragraph 103; and Neeharika This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 10/08/2026 at 12:26:06
CRL.M.C. 5678/2026 application, are available to him, and filing of the present petition in this Court at this stage is premature.
10. The petition, alongwith the pending applications, is dismissed in terms of the aforesaid.
PRATEEK JALAN, J AUGUST 6, 2026 tg/MK/ Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, paragraphs 13.12. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 10/08/2026 at 12:26:06