2026:JHHC:12262 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(L) No. 3639 of 2019 B. Venkata Ramana, aged about 62 years, Son of Sri B. Hari Narayana, Resident of Flat No. 93, KF-4, Dhatkidih, P.O. & P.S.- Bistupur, Town-Jamshedpur, District-Singhbhum (East). … … Petitioner Versus 1. State of Jharkhand. 2. NUVOCO Vista Corporation Limited through its Senior Vice President (Plant Manager), having its office at P.O. & P.S.- Jogobera, Town-Jamshedpur, District-Singhbhum (East). … … Respondents --- CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Petitioner : Mr. Parth S. A. Swaroop Pati, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate : Mr. Ajay Kr. Sah, Advocate --- 23/27.04.2026 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. 2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 19.12.2018 (Annexure-7) passed by the learned Labour Court at Jamshedpur in B.C. Case No. 5 of 2001 whereby the learned court has been pleased to dismiss the complaint filed by the petitioner under Section 26(2) of Bihar Shops & Establishment Act, 1959 by holding that it was not maintainable. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was earlier working as Assistant Electrical Engineer in the Department of Electricity of the company namely M/s Lafarge India Limited which originally belonged to Tata steel and was taken over by M/s Lafarge India Limited on 01.11.1999. His specific case was that he was forced to resign while he was working in M/s Lafarge India Limited in the capacity of manager purchase. 4. Learned counsel has submitted that the learned court framed two points for consideration as to “whether the petitioner is an employee within the meaning of the aforesaid Act of 1959” And 2026:JHHC:12262 2 “whether the letter of resignation dated 12.12.2000 was under force and coercion”. 5. He has submitted that the second point was not answered as the first point itself was answered against the petitioner by holding that the petitioner was not an employee within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. 6. He has submitted that the materials placed on record have not been properly considered by the learned labour court and therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law. He has also submitted that merely because the petitioner was engaged in the activity relating to purchase and handing over the purchased items for the purposes of manufacturing of cement, the same by itself will not bring the activity of the petitioner under the term incidentally engaged in the manufacturing process of the cement. He has submitted that the impugned orders be set aside and the matter be remanded for decision on the merits of the case. 7. Learned counsel has also submitted that it was the specific case of the petitioner that he was doing a work of clerical nature and have nothing to do with the manufacturing process, directly and indirectly. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the petitioner was found to be incidentally engaged into manufacturing process on the basis of the materials which have brought on record by the management and the petitioner himself did not disclose as to what clerical nature of work he was doing. He has submitted that the learned labour court has considered the materials on record and come to specific finding after appreciating the same and there is no perversity in the impugned order calling for interference. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2026 livelaw SC 424 equivalent to 2026 INSC 416 [Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh vs. Natwarlal Shamji Gada and Another] to submit that the high court cannot review or reassess the materials on record that was taken into consideration by the learned trial court. Learned 2026:JHHC:12262 3 counsel has submitted that the law is well settled that in absence of any perversity there is no scope of interference in the order passed by the learned labour court. Learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that even if it is assumed that the petitioner was engaged in clerical work, but there can be no doubt on the basis of materials on record that he was connected with the manufacturing work and therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported on (1978) 2 SCC 140 [M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. Shri Ramlakhan Singh and others] and has referred paragraph 7 to submit that the very same provisions were subject matter of consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held that the persons who are employed in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process, are excluded from the purview of applicability of Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. He has submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that the purchase of raw materials in the manufacturing process is integrally connected to the manufacturing process. 10. After hearing learned counsel for the parties this Court finds that it has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that any kind of work incidentally to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process are excluded from the purview of applicability of the Bihar Shops and Established Act 1959. Paragraph 7 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. (Supra) is quoted as under:- “7. The respondent was not employed “in any manufacturing process or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process”. But the question for consideration is whether he was employed in “any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process”. This Court in State of U.P. v. M.P. Singh did not decide as to what was the precise meaning of the expression “subject of the 2026:JHHC:12262 4 manufacturing process” in Section 2 clause (l) of the Factories Act. We are called upon to decide this question in this appeal. Raw materials used in the manufacturing process for producing paper and its various products, undoubtedly, will be a “subject of the manufacturing process”, whatever else may or may not be such subject. If that be so, the respondent was engaged in a work which was connected with the subject of the manufacturing process. And as we see the evidence discussed in the order of the Labour Court, there cannot be any doubt that he was working in the factory premises or its precincts in connection with the work of the subject of the manufacturing process namely, the raw materials. In our judgment, therefore, he was a factory worker within the meaning of clause (l) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Hence he was not an employee within the meaning of the Bihar Act and the petition of complaint filed by him under Section 26(2) was not maintainable.” 11. This Court finds that the learned labour court has considered all the materials on record and held that on the one hand the petitioner did not disclose as to what clerical work he was doing and on the other hand, the management had brought on record the work being undertaken by the petitioner and ultimately found that the work of the petitioner would at least come within the purview of incidentally engaged in the manufacturing process of the plant. It has also been considered that the petitioner was engaged in purchase of the articles to be used in the manufacturing process of cement. 12. This Court finds that learned court has meticulously examined the materials on record and no perversity in the matter of appreciation of the materials on record to be pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner calling for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The law is well settled that in absence of any perversity there is no scope of re-appreciating the materials and coming to a definite finding in the matter of orders passed by the learned labour court. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment reported in 2026 livelaw SC 424 equivalent to 2026 INSC 416 (Supra) has held in paragraph 16 that in a writ application, it is not open for the High Court to review or reassess the 2026:JHHC:12262 5 material that was taken into consideration by the court while passing the impugned order as the High Court is not an appellate court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that so far as the order passed by the learned labour court is concerned, this Court acts in supervisory jurisdiction and there is no scope for re- appreciating the materials in absence of any perversity. Accordingly, this Court finds no merits in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed. 13. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. 14. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the concerned court through “Fax/e-mail”. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) 27.04.2026 Rakesh/- Uploaded On:-26.05.2026