1 apl1894.25.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.1894 OF 2025 Prashant S/o Anil Marathe Aged about 28 years, Occ: Music Producer and Web Designer, R/o House No.2342, Yashodhara Nagar, Near Dragon Palace Road, Kamthi, Dist. Nagpur – 441001. (P.S. Kamthi) ...APPLICANT ...V E R S U S... 1. The State of Maharashtra, through Police Station Officer, Police Station, Kapil Nagar, Nagpur. 2. Ms XYZ, aged in Crime No.713/2025 Registered in P.S. Kapil Nagar, District Nagpur through Police Station, Kapil Nagar, Nagpur. ...NON-APPLICANTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shri P.A. Abhyankar, Advocate for applicant. Shri N.H. Joshi, APP for non-applicant no.1/State. Shri Shyam Jaiswal, Advocate (appointed) for non-applicant no.2. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM:- M.W. CHANDWANI, J. RESERVED ON :- 01.09.2026 PRONOUNCED ON :- 30.09.2026 JUDGMENT: 1. Heard. 2. Admit. 2026:BHC-NAG:13134-DB 2 apl1894.25.odt 3. The applicant seeks quashing of the First Information Report bearing Crime No.713/2025 registered with Police Station, Kapil Nagar, Nagpur for the offence punishable under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNS”), Charge- sheet No.147/2025 as well as consequent proceedings arising out of the same. 4. The allegation against the applicant is of committing sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means i.e. by making a false promise of marriage. It is alleged in the FIR that the applicant committed sexual intercourse with the complainant/non-applicant no.2 on 29.04.2024, 30.04.2024 and continued the same frequently thereafter by making a false promise of marriage and eventually, avoided to marry her. Therefore, on the complaint of the complainant, the aforesaid offence came to be registered against the applicant. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the relationship between the applicant and the complainant was consensual in nature. Both of them had agreed to the sexual intercourse which allegedly happened at various places out of free consent. According to him, the victim consciously and after due deliberation, indulged into consensual sexual intercourse with the 3 apl1894.25.odt applicant. She did not do the same because of the promise of marriage. The relationship continued for a long period. Even if the allegations levelled in the FIR are taken at their face value, they do not disclose a direct nexus between the promise of marriage and the sexual intercourse. Just because the relationship between the applicant and the complainant turned sour, the present FIR came to be lodged by the complainant. To buttress his submission, he seeks to rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra 1 . 6. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor assisted by learned counsel for the complainant objected to the application on the ground that the applicant made a proposal of marriage to the complainant and therefore, she consented to the sexual intercourse. According to him, from time to time, the applicant used to give a promise of marriage but ultimately, he failed to keep the same, which itself goes to show that he had made a false promise in order to commit sexual intercourse with the complainant by deceiving her. Therefore, they sought rejection of the application. 1 (2024) 11 SCC 398 4 apl1894.25.odt 7. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties. I have gone through charge-sheet. 8. Under the IPC, false promise of marriage was prosecuted under Section 375 read with Section 90. Therein, the requirement was to find out whether the consent, if at all coming out from the facts, was tainted insofar as the victim having been led to believe a promise of marriage and physical relations having been permitted only on the belief that the promise will be complied with; which the promisor even at the time of giving such promise had no intention to comply with. Misconception of fact cannot be alleged if the promise is made with good intention and later for unavoidable circumstances, the person is forced to resile from the aforesaid promise. The BNS, by incorporating Section 69, brought in a separate offence carving out the fraudulent and deceitful conduct as spoken of therein from the grave offence of rape, while at the same time providing a penalty for the deceptive conduct alleged therein. The words “employing deceitful means or by making a promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same” brings in the same rigor of the promise having been given with an intention of never being fulfilled, which is the deceitful conduct sought to be punished. 5 apl1894.25.odt 9. Section 69 of BNS is reproduced as under: “69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc. Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— “deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.” 10. Thus, to bring the case of the applicant under the ambit of Section 69, the prosecution has to demonstrate that the applicant made a false promise with intention to have a physical relationship with the prosecutrix. This fact must have direct nexus with the sexual intercourse. To fasten the criminal liability upon the accused under Section 69, the Court has to be satisfied that from the very beginning, the accused never really intended to marry the prosecutrix and on that very pretext, he lured the prosecutrix into sexual intercourse and that she succumbed to it only and only on the promise of marriage. 6 apl1894.25.odt 11. In the present case, the charge-sheet indicates that the applicant and the complainant came in contact through a digital platform. A friendship developed between them, which later turned into a love relationship. The FIR and the statement of the complainant reveal that on 29.04.2024, the complainant and the applicant went for shopping at VR Mall where the applicant gifted her a dress. Thereafter, the applicant took her to Paradise Hotel and committed sexual intercourse with her against her will. When she was weeping, he consoled her and stated that he will marry her. Thus, the initial sexual intercourse, which according to the complainant happened on 29.04.2024, was not proceeded by any promise of marriage. The consent of the complainant was not obtained just by making a promise of marriage, followed by sexual intercourse. Rather, the allegation of forceful rape is not supported by the material placed on record. More particularly, there is no evidence that the complainant resisted the said act at that time or even thereafter. Further reading of the FIR reveals that the same act was repeated on 30.04.2024 and multiple times thereafter, at different places and lastly, on 01.10.2025 at the house of the applicant. 7 apl1894.25.odt 12. The complainant alleged that all the incidents of subsequent sexual intercourse were under the pretext of marriage. It is to be noted here that if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage, to hold him criminally liable, it has to be demonstrated that the physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or considerations. Here in this case, as stated above, the initial sexual intercourse was not on the pretext of promise of marriage. On the first occasion when they met, the complainant and the applicant established physical relations. It is only after the alleged intercourse, that the promise to marry was made by the applicant. Merely because the applicant expressed his desire to marry the complainant in future, it cannot be said that the applicant made any false promise to obtain consent or used any deceitful means. Even the statement of the complainant or any other material in the entire charge-sheet does not reveal that it is only because of the promise of marriage that the complainant consented for subsequent sexual intercourses. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that since inception, the applicant never intended to fulfill the false promise of marriage that he had made to the complainant in order to obtain her consent. 8 apl1894.25.odt 13. This takes me to further case of prosecution. It is alleged that after the first sexual intercourse on 29.04.2024, the applicant promised the complainant to marry her but again on the very next day, the complainant herself accompanied the applicant to his place and committed sexual intercourse. This act was then repeated frequently. The FIR as well as the statement made by the complainant herself clearly indicates that relationship between the applicant and the complainant continued over a period for more than one and half year. Had he promised for marriage on second occasion still the complainant continued the relation with the applicant and went on indulging into sexual intercourse. There was a physical relationship between the applicant and the complainant without any protest from the complainant. The complainant is an educated lady. It will be very difficult to assume that the complainant was unable to discover the deceitful behaviour of the applicant who continued to have a sexual relationship with her for such a long period on the false promise of marriage. This is indicative of the fact that it was a consensual relationship. There is nothing on record to demonstrate the deceitful conduct of the applicant having induced the complainant into sexual intercourse which she succumbed to only on the promise to marry. 9 apl1894.25.odt 14. In this regard a reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, wherein it has been held as under: “27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. 28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact. ….. ….. 10 apl1894.25.odt 31. In the present case, even assuming that the appellant had made the promise since 2008 when they met for the first time, the fact that they remained unmarried for a long period till 2017 without there being any protest or objection by the complainant, does not indicate the intention at the initial stage itself to make the promise falsely to marry the complainant. Making an allegation of non-fulfilment of promise to marry without undue delay by the promisee would, on the other hand, be an indicator of a false promise being made from the initial stage. In the present case, what is not in dispute is that the physical relationship between the appellant and the complainant continued for a long period of about a decade and as such it is difficult to infer that the appellant had made a false promise since the initial stage and continued to make false promises to marry her on the basis of which she also continued to have physical relationship with him. 34. In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of fact. 35. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was made to the complainant initially by the appellant, even though no such cogent evidence has been brought on record before us to that effect, the fact that the relationship continued for nine long years, would render the plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years was under misconception of fact that the 11 apl1894.25.odt appellant would marry her implausible. Consequently, the criminal liability attached to such false promise would be diluted after such a long passage of time and in light of the fact that no protest was registered by the complainant during all those years. Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship without demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in effect takes out the sting of criminal culpability and neutralises it. 36. It will be very difficult to assume that the complainant who is otherwise a mature person with two grown-up children, was unable to discover the deceitful behaviour of the appellant who continued to have sexual relationship with her for such a long period on the promise of marriage. Any such mendacious act of the appellant would have been exposed sooner without having to wait for nine years. 37. The inference one can draw under the circumstances is that there was no such false promise made to the complainant by the appellant of marriage by continuing to have physical relationship so as to bring this act within the province of Section 376 IPC and therefore, there was no vitiation of consent under misconception of fact. 39. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious consequences. It will open the scope for imputing criminality to such long term relationships after turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even at a belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of 12 apl1894.25.odt stringent criminal process. There is always a danger of attributing criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil relationship of which the Court must also be mindful.” 15. Thus, the material placed on record reveals that the relationship between the applicant and the complainant is an outcome of a consensual love relationship and prolonged deliberation. There is nothing on record to suggest that deceitful means were employed by the applicant. Thus, there is no incriminating material against the applicant to show that sexual intercourse was committed by the applicant with the complainant by employing deceitful means i.e. by making a false promise of marriage. 16. It would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajanlal and others 1, which reads thus: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 13 apl1894.25.odt of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion 14 apl1894.25.odt that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 17. In view of the above, the case of the applicant is squarely covered by clauses (1) and (3) of Para 102 of the decision of Bhajanlal (supra). 18. Considering the facts mentioned above, a case is made out for exercising the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for quashing the FIR and the consequent proceedings. Hence, the following order is passed: (i) The application is allowed. 15 apl1894.25.odt (ii) First Information Report bearing Crime No.713/2025 registered with Police Station, Kapil Nagar, Nagpur for the offence punishable under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Charge-sheet No.147/2025 as well as consequent proceedings arising out of the same are hereby quashed and set aside qua the applicant. (iii) Professional fees of the learned counsel appointed for non-applicant no.2 be quantified and paid as per the relevant Rules. With this, the application stands disposed of. (M.W. CHANDWANI J.) Wagh Signed by: Mr. S.R. Wagh Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 05/10/2026 14:36:41