Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2026: JHHC:2446 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
S.A. No. 80 of 1994
1. Most. Sukru Devi, wife of Late Gauri Mahto
2. Gulal Mahto
3. Fulchand Mahto
4. Jaleshwar Mahto Nos.2 to 4 sons of late Gauri Mahto, all residents of village Oraondih, P.S. Sonahatu District Ranchi
… … Plaintiffs/Respondents/Appellants
Versus
1. (a) Raj Narayan Mahto (dead & substituted v.o.d. 19.09.2022) 1 (a) (i) Chaiti Devi, wife of late Raj Narayan Mahto 1 (a) (ii) Bhushan Mahto, son of late Raj Narayan Mahto Both residents of village Oraondih, P.O. and P.S. – Sonahatu, District Ranchi 1 (a) (iii) Maheshwari Devi, daughter of late Raj Narayan Mahto, resident of village – Murdi, P.O. and P.S. – Sonahatu, District - Ranchi (b) Sanatan Mahto (c ) Most. Lakhimini Devi, wife of late Jairam Mahto of village Parandih, B – Nawadih, P.S. Sonahatu, District Ranchi (d) Rukmani Devi, wife of Umesh Chandra Mahto, village – Swadih, P.O. Chokahatu, P.S. Sonahatu, District Ranchi (e) Champa Devi, wife of Mochi Ram Mahto, village – Jajodih, P.O. Ulidih, P.S. Tamad, District Ranchi Sl No. (i) and (ii) are sons and sl. No. (iii), (iv) and (v) are daughters of late Jaideo Mahto, village – Oraondih, P.S. Sonahatu, District - Ranchi
… … Defendant/Appellant/Respondent ---
CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY ---
For the Appellants : Mr. K.K. Ambastha, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Sandeep Verma, Advocate
: Mr. Abdul Wahab, Advocate
--- 26/30.01.2026
Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
2. This appeal has been filed against the judgement and decree dated 05.07.1994 (decree signed on 08.07.1994) passed by learned Vth Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi in Title Appeal No.5 of 1991 reversing the judgement and decree dated 30.11.1990 (decree signed on 10.12.1990) passed by learned Munsif, Khunti in Title Suit No.10 of 1989.
2026: JHHC:2446 2
3. This appeal has been admitted for final hearing vide order dated 02.11.1995 on the following two substantial questions of law: (a) “Whether on the basis of the Exhibit – B, the defendant acquired any right, title and interest over the suit land? (b) Whether the finding of adverse possession of the defendant is based on materials on record?”
4. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs, seeking declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit land and for confirmation of their possession and for delivery of the same if found dispossessed.
5. So far as the substantial question of law no.(a) is concerned, the
learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the law is well settled that immovable property cannot be transferred by way of unregistered sale deed. He has submitted that the defendant in the written statement had claimed title on the basis of unregistered sale deed of the year 1960 which was exhibited as ‘Exhibit B’.
6. The learned counsel submits that findings was recorded that even the sale consideration did not pass pursuant to ‘Exhibit B’. However, he submits that ‘Exhibit B’ being unregistered, no title can pass through ‘Exhibit B’, which is required to be compulsorily registered. The value of the consideration amount as mentioned in ‘Exhibit B’ itself is Rs.300/-.
7. Although, the learned counsel for the respondents has opposed the submission but being a counsel and first, an officer of the court, he also does not dispute that right, title and interest with respect to immovable property having value of more than Rs.100/- cannot be transferred by unregistered sale deed.
8. In view of the aforesaid submission, this Court has no hesitation to hold that on the basis of unregistered ‘Exhibit B’, the defendants have not acquired any right, title and interest over the suit property. The 1st substantial question of law is accordingly answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondents.
9. This takes us to the 2nd substantial question of law.
10. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that upon reading of the written statement filed by the defendant, it is clear that
2026: JHHC:2446 3
the defendant was claiming title by virtue of the unregistered sale deed executed by Shankar Mahto, in favour of the defendant against
consideration amount. The learned counsel has also submitted that the defendant had claimed possession by virtue of unregistered sale deed. 11. The learned counsel has further submitted that although the defendant has mentioned the term adverse possession in paragraph 2 of the written statement, the other pleadings are based on the defendant’s alleged title derived from Exhibit B and possession claimed by virtue of Exhibit B; however, there is no foundational pleading with respect to adverse possession. He submits that the defendant never acknowledged the title of the true owner, and the law is well settled that adverse possession and title of ownership, both being contradictory, cannot be claimed, particularly, when it refers to the same date of possession. 12. The learned counsel submits that the trial court had recorded a clear finding that there was no foundational plea of adverse possession, but the learned 1st appellate court had referred to paragraphs 2 and 12 of the written statement to say that the plea of adverse possession was taken. He submits that upon reading of paragraphs 2 and 12 of the written statement, it cannot be said that the plea of adverse possession has been taken. This is over and above the fact that the plea of title is contrary and in conflict with the plea of adverse possession. The learned counsel submits that in absence of any foundational pleading seeking adverse possession and the basic ingredients to claim adverse possession having not been pleaded, the learned 1st appellate court was not justified in decreeing the suit on the ground of adverse possession. Although the learned 1st appellate court had not conferred title on the basis of ‘Exhibit B’. 13. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgement passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2006) 7 SCC 570 (T. Anjanappa & Ors. Vs. Somalingappa & Anr.) paragraph 15, (1991) 1 SCC 441 (Om Prakash and others Vs. Ram Kumar and others) paragraph 4, (1982) 0 AIR (Pat) 185 (Thakur Sah Vs. Sheo Pujan Prasad) paragraph 6 to submit that mere long possession is not adverse
2026: JHHC:2446 4
possession; ingredients of adverse possession must be specifically pleaded and proved. Reliance has been placed on the judgement reported in (2019) 8 SCC 729 (Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. Vs. Manjit Kaur & Ors.) paragraph 57. 14.
The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer and submitted that the plaintiffs claimed title on the basis of two registered sale deeds executed by Rohini Devi, daughter of Shankar Mahto and it is not in dispute that Shankar Mahto, was the owner of the property. He has also submitted that although it was claimed that Shankar Mahto had died in the year 1979 but this fact was denied by the defendant. He has also submitted that Rohini Devi was examined as P.W. 1 and from perusal of her evidence at paragraphs 7, 11, 12 and 15, it appears that the defendant namely Jaidev Mahto was in possession and for that purpose, he has also referred to the evidence of P.W. 2 paragraph 7. 15. The learned counsel has submitted that there was enough material on record to show that the defendant Jaidev Mahto, had perfected his title by way of adverse possession. 16. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon paragraph 15 of the judgement reported in (2006) 7 SCC 570 (supra) and submitted that it has been held at the end of paragraph 15 that the person, who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. He submits that the basic ingredients of adverse possession have been satisfied and it was based on foundational pleading and the evidence led before the court. 17. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the plaintiffs were claiming title by way of registered sale deeds executed by Rohini Devi, daughter of Shankar Mahto and that Shankar Mahto, had expired in the year 1979.
On the other hand, the defendant though stated in paragraph 2 that the suit was barred by limitation and adverse possession and denied the death of Shankar Mahto, but asserted that Shankar Mahto had transferred the suit
2026: JHHC:2446 5
property in toto to the defendant in the year 1960 by making payment of consideration amount and that the defendant had built a house of over the suit property. 18. Some of the relevant paragraphs of the written statement are quoted as under:
“2. That the suit is barred by law of limitation and adverse possession. 10. Para 4 of the plaint: - It is denied that Rohini was in possession of any land in R.S. plot nos.126 and 127 of village Oraondih or that any land in these two plots was inherited by the said Rohini. Shankar Mahto had no land in these plots in 1979. The entire share of the said Shankar was transferred by himself to the defendant as far back is in
1960. This Shankar had no share to the extent of 0.085 acres which the plaintiff claims to have purchased from Rohini. It is also false that Shankar had or has any son or that the sons of Shankar have sold any land in these plots. 12. Para 6 of the plaint: - It is denied by the defendant. The defendant never disturb the possession of any body for less the possession of the plaintiff. However the defendant is in possess of the land purchased by him from Shankar Mahto in the year 1960. The proceeding u/s 144 Cr.P.C was initiated by the plaintiff only to take forcible possession of the land which is in peaceful possession of the defendant. 13. Para 7 of the plaint: - It is incorrect that the defendant is claiming land through a forged documents. The sale deed executed by Shankar Mahto is a genuine deed and through the said deed Shankar transferred land to the defendant on payment of adequate consideration.
After the sale aforesaid, Shankar Mahto put the defendant in possession thereof. Shankar Mahto after the sale to the defendant shifted to village Barwadih a village situated close to village Oraondih and built a house there. Shankar Mahto took away all the building materials namely Dharna, ballies, and tiles
2026: JHHC:2446 6
from the house situated in the land transferred to the defendant and resided there till his arrest in the murder case. Rohini was married from the Barwadih house. Immediately after the purchase aforesaid the defendant got his name mutated and pays rent regularly to the state of Bihar and possessnes up-to-date rent receipts. 14. That in 1961-62 the defendant built a house in the land purchased by him from Shankar and put boundary wall on three side namely East, West and South. In the Northern side the house of the defendant stands and beyond the house of the defendant there is a village Chhaour. The defendant has also excavated a well in the suit land in 1963.”
19. The learned trial court had framed the following issues for
consideration:
“I. Have the plaintiffs any cause of action for the suit?
II. Is the suit maintainable in its present form?
III. Is the sale deed by Smt. Rohini Devi, d/o Shankar Mahto in favour of the plaintiffs legal and valid and has it conferred title to them?
IV. Has the defendant acquired any right, title or interest and possession by the alleged sada deed?
V. To what reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled?”
20. Issue nos.III and IV were taken up together. The learned trial court considered the materials on record and recorded that not only ‘Exhibit B’ was without any consideration and was void ab initio, but admittedly the same was an unregistered document, and therefore, the claim of the defendant on the basis of ‘Exhibit B’, sada sale deed, is hit by the provisions of Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act. The learned court thereafter recorded that the defendant had tried much to prove his possession adverse to the plaintiff, but there was no foundational pleading. The learned court ultimately held that the defendant was a trespasser and observed that the plaintiff was claiming title on the basis of registered sale deed no.4609 dated 31.03.1971 and no.18422 dated 30.12.1974 (Exhibit 1/a and 1/b). The
2026: JHHC:2446 7
court held that Rohini had rightly sold her property to late Gauri Mahto and the issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff except on the point of possession. The plea of adverse possession was rejected.
21. The learned court ultimately decreed the suit and directed the defendant to deliver the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff forthwith.
22. The learned 1st appellate court framed the following points for determination:
“(i) Whether the plea of adverse possession was taken in written statement and whether it was available to the defendant appellant? (ii) Whether the unregistered deed could be taken into
consideration for any purpose? (iii) Whether the plaintiff/respondent had acquired a valid title to the suit land and were entitled to get recovery of possession as held by the learned court below? (iv) Whether the finding was available on any point or fit to be set aside on any ground?”
23. While considering point nos. (i) and (ii), which were taken up together, the court observed that the learned trial court has mentioned in the judgement that the plea of vendor’s possession was not taken in the written statement and so he could not be allowed to take the plea of adverse possession in evidence. However, the 1st appellate court referred to written statement at paragraphs 2 and 12 to observe that it was clear that the plea of adverse possession and limitation was taken at the very initial stage. The court also recorded the submission of the defendant that though unregistered document which was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Limitation Act cannot be admitted in proof of the terms embodied in it and could not confer any title to the transferee of the property yet its possession is a proof that the possession was delivered. 24. The learned court recorded the finding in paragraph 9 and 12 of the judgement, and was of the view that the defendant was able to establish his claim of adverse possession and the plaintiff was
2026: JHHC:2446 8
precluded from enforcing right against the defendant. The finding of the learned trial court in deciding issue nos.3, 4 and 5 was held to be erroneous. 25. So far as the 2nd substantial question of law is concerned, which relates to adverse possession, upon a complete reading of the written statement, this Court finds that the defendant claimed title over the suit property on the basis of a sada sale deed executed in the year 1960 and also claimed possession pursuant to that sada sale deed. The defendant claimed that Shankar Mahto had transferred the property to the defendant on payment of adequate consideration. Even as per sada sale deed, consideration amount was Rs.300/-, and certainly the same was compulsorily registrable. Except the word adverse possession used in paragraph 2 as an ornamental pleading, there was complete lack of basic pleadings so far as adverse possession is concerned. 26.
It is also important to note that the defendant never acknowledged the title of Shankar Mahto in the written statement. The law is well settled that in order to claim adverse possession one has to acknowledge the title of the true owner and claim adverse possession thereafter. The law is also equally well settled that the plea of adverse possession and title are conflicting and cannot be claimed simultaneously. The law is equally well settled that long possession is not equivalent to adverse possession. 27. Considering the written statement, this Court is of the view that the learned trial court had rightly observed that the plea of adverse possession was missing in the written statement. In absence of foundational plea of adverse possession, no evidence can be looked into. 28. The law is equally well settled that the plea of adverse possession is required to be pleaded and also proved. 29. In view of the aforesaid fact and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the finding of adverse possession allowed by the learned 1st appellate court in favour of the defendant, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 2026: JHHC:2446 9
30. Both the substantial question of law having been answered in favour of the appellants, the judgement passed by the learned 1st appellate court is hereby set aside. 31. This second appeal is hereby allowed. 32. Let a soft copy of this order be communicated to the court concerned through FAX/email. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) 30.01.2026 Saurav/ Uploaded on 21.05.2026