Page No.# 1/17 GAHC010279862025 2026:GAU-AS:13598-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Writ Petition (Civil) No.145/2026 1. KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN THROUGH THE JOINT COMMISSIONER ADMINISTRATION, 18 INSTITUTIONAL AREA, SAHEED JEET SINGH MARG, NEW DELHI- 100016 2. THE COMMISSIONER, KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN, 18 INSTITUTIONAL AREA, SAHEED JEET SINGH MARG, NEW DELHI-1100016 3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN, REGIONAL OFFICER SILCHAR NEAR LION’S EYE HOSPITAL, CAPTAIN N.M. GUPTA SARANI, SILCHAR- 788001, ASSAM 4. THE PRINCIPAL-IN-CHARGE KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA, BSF, GOKUL NAGAR, P.O.- BISHALGARH, DISTRICT – SEPAHIJALA, TRIPURA, PIN 799102 ……Petitioners Page No.# 2/17 -Versus- Shri Kallol Roy, Son of Late Birendra Chandra Ray, Residential Address: C/o Nibas De, Adjacent to Bishalgarh English Medium School, Gokul Nagar, P.O. Bishalgarh, District- sepahijala, Tripura, PIN- 799102 …… Respondents – B E F O R E – HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY Advocate for the petitioner(s) : Mrs. R.S. Chowdhury, Advocate Advocate for the respondent : Mr. Kallol Roy, respondent-in-person Date of Hearing : 10.09.2026. Date of Judgment : 10.09.2026. Page No.# 3/17 J UDGMENT & O RDER (ORAL) (Ashutosh Kumar, C.J.) We have heard Ms. R.S. Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the petitioners/Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) & 3 Ors. and Mr. Kallol Roy, respondent-in-person. 2. The petitioners have come up before this Court against the order dated 12.11.2025, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred as “Tribunal”), Guwahati Bench, in O.A. No.94/2025, whereby the termination of the service of the sole respondent from the post of Principal Grade-II of the newly opened Kendriya Vidyalaya, BSF, Gokul Nagar, Sepahijala, District-Tripura, has been interfered with and a direction has been issued for his reinstatement. 3. The respondent was appointed as Vice Principal (designated as Principal Grade-II) in the Kendriya Vidyalaya in Tripura, which post he joined on 10.11.2023 on probation for a period of two years, which was extendable by one year under the direct recruitment Rules of 2023. The appointment of the respondent was governed by a memorandum of appointment which contained specific terms, including Clause-5 thereof, which allowed termination during the extended probation period, if performance of the probationer would be found to be unsatisfactory or he/she would be found lacking suitability. Page No.# 4/17 4. It appears from the records that during the probation period, several issues arose which ultimately led the respondent being subjected to a disciplinary proceeding, in which he was awarded a minor penalty of reduction of one stage in pay for one year without cumulative effect, along with recovery of salary for an unauthorized absence period. It may be noted that several allegations were raised against him of his unauthorised absence from the school and also with respect to irregularities in maintaining the attendance register. 5. Thereafter, the period of probation of the respondent was extended by one year, effective from 10.11.2025. This obviously was for the reason that his performance was not found satisfactory during the two years’ probation period. Later, it appears, a fact-finding inquiry committee was constituted by the Regional Office, Silchar, regarding the respondent’s unauthorised absence from duty; his unauthorised station leaves; wilful manipulation of official records; lack of devotion to duty and doubtful integrity. The members of the fact-finding inquiry committee comprised Assistant Commissioner, KVS, Regional Office, Silchar and the Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya, ONGC, Agartala. The fact-finding inquiry committee, referred to above, was provided with necessary documents which have been listed in the report. 6. During the course of inquiry by the fact-finding committee, statements of witnesses were taken and the respondent was also asked to submit his written statement, which he had promptly submitted. 7. After a thorough inquiry, the fact-finding inquiry committee Page No.# 5/17 found that the respondent had been on unauthorised absence from official duty and had wilfully manipulated the official records. He was found to be lacking in devotion to duty and his integrity was also found to be doubtful. The fact-finding inquiry committee concluded that all the allegations levelled against the respondent were proved, which were quite unbecoming of any KVS employee. The committee, therefore, recommended for initiation of appropriate disciplinary action against the respondent. 8. This report was submitted on 09.01.2025. 9. Three months later, vide order dated 11.04.2025, the service of the respondent was terminated by invoking Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Appointment. The respondent was found to be entitled to receive a sum equivalent to his pay and allowances for the period of one month’s notice, at the same rate at which he was drawing salary immediately before termination of his services. It may be noted here that before the impugned order of termination was passed, the Deputy Commissioner, Regional Office, Silchar had sent a proposal for action under Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Appointment to the Additional Commissioner (Admn.), KVS (Headquarter), New Delhi. 10. Challenging the termination of his service, the respondent approached the Tribunal with a grievance that without subjecting the respondent to any disciplinary inquiry/formal inquiry, his services were terminated on the recommendation of the fact-finding inquiry Page No.# 6/17 committee, which actually meant that the termination was stigmatic. The very foundation and the motive of the constitution of the fact-finding inquiry committee was to find out the truth of the allegation made against the respondent. Under such circumstances, the sequel order of termination, even though was issued ostensibly invoking Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Appointment, was punitive and not a termination simpliciter during the probation period. 11. The Tribunal, on consideration of the facts presented before it, found that the basic reason/foundation for the termination of the respondent was the proven charges against him and, therefore, those foundational facts were very akin to motive for termination. This could not have been done by invoking Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Appointment and, perforce, if so deemed necessary by the organisation/KVS, the respondent deserved to be subjected to a disciplinary proceeding before this termination so that he could have voiced his cause. 12. The original application filed by the respondent was thus allowed. The respondent was directed to be reinstated in service, who had to be permitted to continue as probationer with all consequential benefits, including the wages for the period that he was kept off from employment. 13. While saying so, the Tribunal relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh and other -Vs- State of Punjab & Ors. :: 1986 (3) SCC 277; Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi -Vs- State of Page No.# 7/17 U.P. & Ors. :: (1991) 1 SCC 212; Pradeep Kumar -Vs- Union of India :: (2012) 13 SCC 182; Radhey Shyam Gupta -Vs- U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Anr. :: (1999) 2 SCC 21; Dipti Prakash Banerjee -Vs- Satyendra Nath Bose, National Centre for Basic Science, Calcutta & Ors. :: (1999) 3 SCC 60; V.P. Ahuja -Vs- State of Punjab & Ors :: (2000) 3 SCC 239 and Chandra Prakash Shahi -Vs- State of U.P. & Ors :: (2000) 5 SCC 152. 14. The Tribunal noted the distinction made by the Supreme Court in Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra) between the motive and foundation. In the afore-noted judgments of the Supreme Court, it was held that the important principles which are deducible on the concept of "motive" and "foundation", concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during, or at the end of the period of probation, on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If, for the determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an enquiry is held and it is on the basis of that enquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an enquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that enquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the enquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In that situation, the order would be founded on Page No.# 8/17 misconduct and it would not be a mere matter of "motive". 15. The "Motive", on the other hand, is to be construed as the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, "motive" is a factor, which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. 16. The Supreme Court went on to explain that an order terminating the services of an employee is an act performed by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action, is what has to be assessed. If it were the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary enquiry is held behind his back or in his presence to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct, which were found to be true in the preliminary enquiry. 17. Challenging the afore-noted decision of the Tribunal, Mrs. R. Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the petitioners has strenuously argued that the very contents of the letter of termination makes it very obvious that it was on the invocation of Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Appointment. The respondent’s service was terminated on grounds of unsuitability during the extended period of probation of the respondent. Any inquiry, which preceded before such termination, ought not to be Page No.# 9/17 read as the motive for assessing the truth in the allegation so raised. Holding an inquiry for an allegation, or a set of allegations, is very different from holding an inquiry to assess the suitability of a candidate/employee. Even though the inquiry, referred to above, was with respect to some of the allegations raised against the respondent, that cannot be said to be the impelling factor for the employer/KVS to invoke Clause-5 of the Memorandum of Appointment, which was an independent exercise after taking into account the entire facts scenario, where the respondent had suffered two more inquiries in the past and had been subjected to a departmental proceeding which ended in a minor punishment imposed upon him for his unauthorised absence from the school. These are the issues on which the employer assesses the suitability of an employee who, in this case, is the Vice Principal of the school whose probation period had been extended. It presupposes that during the initial probation period of two years, the respondent did not prove his suitability and, therefore, the period was extended for one more year. 18. Mrs. Chowdhury, therefore, has submitted that even if adverse material existed against the respondent, the termination order does not ipso facto becomes punitive. Here, she has argued, the termination order was absolutely innocuous and non-punitive/non-stigmatic, as it does not allude to any misconduct for it to be held as the foundation, and that it was only a motive. 19. In order to buttress her contentions, Mrs. Chowdhury has relied on the following paragraphs of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Page No.# 10/17 Court in Pavenendra Narayan Verma -Vs- Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sci. & Anr. :: (2002) 1 SCC 520 : “21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. 22. ……….. 23. ……….. 29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a probationer’s appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer’s appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job.” 20. As opposed to the afore-noted contention, the respondent-in- person reiterated the arguments advanced before the Tribunal to assail the termination order as stigmatic. Page No.# 11/17 21. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments raised on behalf of the parties and have found that though the order of termination was couched in simple terms as if it were a plain invocation of Clause-5 regarding the unsuitability of the respondent, but in substance, it imputes misconduct, attributes blameworthiness and does cast a moral stigma. 22. We say so on the strength of the background facts; the narration of which would only be a repetition of what has been said before and it would only make this judgment prolix. To put it shortly, the period of probation of the respondent was extended. During the unextended period of probation, certain allegations were raised against the respondent and for few of such allegations, two fact-finding committees were constituted. The respondent was also put to a disciplinary proceeding which culminated in a minor punishment being imposed upon him, the appeal against which order also could not be sustained. 23. These being the background facts, another inquiry having been constituted/initiated for the purposes of finding out the truth in approximately four charges against the respondent, makes it very obvious that though, in form, the termination order is innocuous, but in substance, it is stigmatic. 24. In Radhe Shyam Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court has clarified that the termination of service of a temporary servant, or one on probation, on the basis of adverse entries, or on the basis of an Page No.# 12/17 assessment that his work is not satisfactory, will not be punitive in as much as the above facts are merely the motive and not the foundation. The reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with the object to find out any misconduct on the part of the officer; rather, it is done only with a view to decide whether he has to be retained or continued in service. It was further adumbrated that the position would not be different even if a preliminary inquiry is held because the purposes of preliminary inquiry is to find out if there is a prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental inquiry, as was held in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah -Vs- The Union of India :: AIR 1964 SC 1854. 25. The purpose of the preliminary inquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of the officer and, if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where regular departmental inquiry is started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained and an inquiry officer is appointed, then, if at that point of time the inquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because the inquiry officer has not recorded any evidence nor has given any findings on the charges. However, in cases where the termination is preceded by an inquiry, evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice in as much as the purpose of such inquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish the employee and not merely to Page No.# 13/17 gather evidence for a future regular departmental inquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded on misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee’s conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the inquiry officer. 26. A clear reading of such distinction made by the Supreme Court in Radhe Shyam Gupta (supra) only enunciates a substance and not a form test. The distinction becomes stark, when the termination order is preceded by an inquiry. True it is that there was no formal inquiry, as contemplated in a disciplinary action against an employee, where charge-memo is framed, inquiry officer and presenting officer are appointed and such officers of the organisation are named as the friend of the employee/proceedee; evidence is taken with opportunity given to the employee to rebut the charges and a conclusion is arrived at by the inquiry authority, which forms the basis for taking action by the disciplinary authority. 27. Here, in the case at hand, though there was no disciplinary proceeding started against the respondent but, for all practical purposes, the fact-finding committee comprised such members who could have acted as the inquiry officer and the presenting officer and they also recorded the statements of the witnesses with respect to the gist of charges and concluded that all the charges had been proved and that disciplinary action be taken against the respondent. If this is not an inquiry against the misconduct, then, perhaps, no other proceeding Page No.# 14/17 would. 28. We have also noted that the concluding part of the report of the fact-finding committee did not ask for any departmental inquiry against the respondent, but recommended for a disciplinary action against him as if all the charges in the inquiry were proved and it was only left to the disciplinary authority to impose requisite punishment. 29. Precisely, similar views have been expressed by the Supreme Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), wherein also it has been held that it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the language or words employed in the order of termination of the probationer, to judge whether the words employed amounted to a stigma or not. The principle remains the same, namely, that if, in an inquiry into any alleged misconduct, the findings are arrived at with or without a regular departmental inquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated to have been founded on the allegation and it shall be bad. But if the inquiry is not held, no findings are arrived at and the employer is not inclined to conduct any inquiry, but at the same time, he does not want to continue the employee in service, against whom there are complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. 30. Similar would be the position if the employer does not inquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceeding, or he is doubtful about securing adequate evidence, in which circumstances, the inquiry into the allegations would be a motive Page No.# 15/17 and not foundation, and such a simple order of termination would be valid. 31. We have already explained the background facts to arrive at the conclusion that the plain/innocuous order of termination, even though not referring to the proven guilt of the respondent, was actually punitive in nature in substance. 32. The conundrum of the entire decision-making process becomes further clear by the determinative test applied by the Supreme Court in case of Pavenendra Narayan Verma (supra). The test has very pithily been laid down in para 21 of the afore-noted judgment, which has been quoted herein above. 33. It has been explained that before considering the facts of any case, so far as the first test is concerned, it is required to be seen as to what language in a termination order would tantamount to a stigma? Generally speaking, when a probationer’s appointment is terminated, it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, but a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer’s appointment, is also not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. 34. The Supreme Court further clarified that if an inquiry is held Page No.# 16/17 prior to the order of termination, all innocuous orders may not be termed as punishment. An employer would be entitled to satisfy itself as to the competence of a probationer to be confirmed in service and, for this purpose, satisfy itself as to the very truth of any allegation that may have been made about the employee. A charge-sheet merely details the allegation so that the employee/proceedee may deal with them effectively. It need not be repeated that the constitution of the fact- finding committee preceding the order of termination was with a specific intent, namely, to find out the truth in respect of the gist of the allegations, which committee recorded the statements of the witnesses, including the respondent, and came to a finding that all the charges were proved and that the disciplinary authority must award punishment. 35. These facts make the termination order clearly punitive and stigmatic, which may not be permissible in the eyes of law. 36. During the course of arguments, several other grounds were raised with respect to territorial jurisdiction of this Court as the respondent was terminated while he was serving in Tripura and, for judging his suitability, Annual Performance Appraisal Reports were important and, in which case, the respondent, indeed, was much above the threshold bench-mark and that the extended period of probation had not even begun when the order of termination was passed. However, we are of the view that these issues are not required to be answered, as those were not pressed to their logical conclusion. 37. Thus, we hold that if the respondent was to be terminated from Page No.# 17/17 service, he deserved to be subjected to a departmental inquiry on the charges levelled against him, which formed the basis of his termination. 38. We, thus, uphold the order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the Tribunal and direct for reinstatement of the respondent, with the liberty to the petitioner/KVS to initiate a departmental proceeding against the respondent, if so deemed necessary, in accordance with law. 39. Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed, with the liberty as aforesaid. 40. Any interim order passed by this Court stands rescinded. JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant