2026:HHC:26637 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal Nos. 296 and 394 of 2010 Reserved on: 20.06.2026 Date of Decision: 06.07.2026 1. Cr. Appeal No. 296 of 2010 Sarishta @ Settu & Ors ...Appellants Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent _____________________________________ 2. Cr. Appeal No. 394 of 2010 Rakesh Kumar & Anr. ...Appellants Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellants : Mr Anuj Nag, Advocate in Cr. Appeal No. 296 of 2010 and Mr Digviijay Singh, Advocate in Cr. Appeal No. 394 of 2010 For respondents/State. : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, in both the appeals. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:26637 Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeals are directed against the judgment of conviction dated 07.08.2010 and order of sentence dated 11.08.2010 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) vide which the appellants (accused before the learned Trial Court) were convicted and sentenced as under: Sections Sentences Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years each, pay a fine of ₹5000/-each, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years each, pay a fine of ₹5000/- each and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Section 368 of the Indian Penal Code The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years each, pay a fine of ₹5000/- each and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each, pay a fine of ₹2000/- each and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one 3 2026:HHC:26637 month. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, and 368, read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the victim (name being withheld to protect her identity) was about 17 years old. She was found missing on 24.12.2007. The efforts were made to locate her, but she could not be traced. The informant reported the matter to the police, and a missing entry was recorded on 26.12.2007. Subsequently, the informant found that the victim was taken away by the accused Rakesh Kumar @ Khanna with the intent to marry her. He was also found missing from his home. The police registered the FIR (Ext.PW1/A). ASI Sunil Mohammad (PW15) investigated the matter. He filed an application (Ext.PW7/C) for obtaining the birth certificate of the victim. Smt. Sanju Bala (PW7) prepared the birth certificate of 4 2026:HHC:26637 the victim (Ext.PW7/B) showing that the victim was born on 20.01.1991 and her birth was registered on 28.01.1991. This birth certificate was seized vide memo (Ext.PW7/C). Ex-Pradhan, Jaram Singh (DW1) produced the victim and the accused Rakesh Kumar @ Khanna at Police Station Nurpur on 03.01.2008. The informant identified the victim as his daughter, who was found missing. Memo of identification (Ext.PW1/C) was prepared. Custody of the victim was handed over to the informant vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). ASI Sunil Mohammad (PW15) filed an application (Ext.PW2/A) for the medical examination of the victim. Dr Suman Sexena (PW2) made enquiries from the victim. The victim refused to undergo her medical examination. MLC (Ext.PW2/B) was issued. ASI Sunil Mohammad (PW15) filed an application (Ext.PW3/A) for the medical examination of the accused Rakesh Kumar. Dr Ashutosh Joshi (PW3) examined the accused and found that there was nothing to suggest that the accused was incapable of performing sexual intercourse. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW3/B), preserved the samples, and handed them to the police official accompanying the accused. The accused Rakesh Kumar led the police to a temple where he had solemnised the marriage with the victim. A memo (Ext.PW11/A) 5 2026:HHC:26637 was prepared. The spot memo of the temple (Ext.PW15/A) was also prepared. The accused, Rakesh, led the police to the house of the accused Situ @ Sureshta and disclosed that he and the victim had stayed in the house with effect from 24.12.2007 till 31.12.2007. Memo (Ext.PW11/B) and Spot Map (Ext.PW15/B) were prepared. Accused Rakesh Kumar also showed the spot where he and the victim had boarded the van on 24.12.2007. A memo (Ext.PW11/C) and the spot map (Ext.PW15/C) were prepared. Situ @ Sureshta produced two photographs (Ext.D1 and Ext.D2) of the solemnization of the marriage between the victim and the accused. These were seized vide memo (Ext.PW15/D). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and was presented before Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nurpur, District, Kangra, who committed it to the learned Sessions Judge, Dharamshala (learned Trial Court). 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused Rakesh Kumar @ Khanna with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, and 376 read with Section 120-B of IPC and the other accused with the commission of offences 6 2026:HHC:26637 punishable under Sections 363, 366, 368 and Section 120B of IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its case. Informant (PW1), victim's brother (PW4), and victim's mother (PW5) deposed about the circumstances in which the victim had left the home. Dr Suman Sexena (PW2) questioned the victim. Dr Ashutosh Joshi (PW3) examined the accused. Victim (PW6) deposed about her kidnapping. Sanju Bala (PW7) produced the birth certificate of the victim. Bhaga Devi (PW8) witnessed the recoveries. Veer Singh (PW9) saw the accused, Satya Devi and the victim together. Ravinder Kumar (PW10) was driving the van in which the victim was taken. Rai Singh (PW11) witnessed the disclosure statements made by the accused. Rattan Chand (PW12) had solemnised the marriage between the accused and the victim. Inspector Megh Nath (PW13) signed the FIR and prepared the challan. Dharam Chand (PW14) had entered the missing report (Ext.PW14/P). ASI Sunil Mohammad (PW15) investigated the matter. 7 2026:HHC:26637 5. The accused, Rakesh Kumar, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat had produced the victim’s birth certificate. He stated that he had himself produced the victim in the Police Station. He admitted that he had shown the place from where he and the victim had boarded the vehicle and that the photographs of his marriage with the victim were seized by the police. He stated that the prosecution witnesses falsely deposed against him due to the fear of the villagers. He was innocent and was falsely implicated. The other accused denied the prosecution's case in its entirety and claimed that they were innocent and they were falsely implicated. Accused Satya Devi stated that witnesses deposed against her because of enmity. Accused Settu stated that the accused and the victim had solemnised the marriage themselves. They visited her house, but she turned them out of the house. They examined Jaram Singh (DW1) in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the victim was forcibly taken away and kept at Talwara. She was forced to marry Rakesh Kumar against her Will. She was a minor on the date of the incident, aged about 16 years and 11 months. Her consent was 8 2026:HHC:26637 immaterial. She had refused to undergo the medical examination, and the prosecution's case that the accused Rakesh Kumar had raped her was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Any person taking away or enticing a minor girl out of the guardianship of her father would be guilty of kidnapping. Kidnapping was with the intent to marry the victim to the accused Rakesh. The victim was concealed in the house. The prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 368, read with Section 120B of the IPC. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as mentioned above. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused have filed separate appeals. In the appeal filed by the accused, Sureshta @ Situ, it was asserted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the material on record. The statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The victim had refused to undergo a medical examination, which showed her consent. The victim's date of birth was not proved as per the law. The victim had disclosed her age to the Medical Officer as 19 9 2026:HHC:26637 years, which made the prosecution's case doubtful that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. In the appeal preferred by Rakesh Kumar and Satya Devi, it was asserted that the judgment is based on conjectures and surmises. The statements of the prosecution witnesses were not reliable. The date of birth of the victim was recorded by one Chunni Ram, who had no connection to the victim. Dr Suman Saxena (PW2) specifically stated that the victim had disclosed her age to be 19 years and that the accused Rakesh Kumar was her husband. The victim had voluntarily refused to undergo a medical examination. All these circumstances showed that the victim had married the accused voluntarily, without any influence from any person. She had also accompanied the co- accused as per the prosecution's case without raising any protest. She was compelled to make a false statement in the Court by her relatives. There were material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, and the learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be 10 2026:HHC:26637 allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Anuj Nag and Mr Digvijay Singh, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State. 10. Mr Anuj Nag, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the learned Trial court erred in appreciating the material on record. The victim had disclosed her age to be 19 years to the Medical Officer, clearly showing that she was not a minor on the date of the incident. The prosecution's evidence proved that she had solemnised the marriage with the accused voluntarily without any influence from any person. She had even refused to undergo medical examination, and her statement to this effect was recorded in the MLC by the Medical Officer. She was subsequently threatened to make the statement against the accused, and learned Trial Court erred in relying upon her testimony. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11 2026:HHC:26637 11. Mr Digvijay Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the learned Trial Court had not properly appreciated the material on record. As per the prosecution, the victim had accompanied the co-accused Sita Devi. She was seen in the bazar and had not raised any hue and cry. This suggested that she was a consenting party. She had herself stated to the driver of the van that she was accompanying the accused on her own. She had disclosed her age to be 19 years to the Medical Officer, a fact that was ignored by the learned Trial Court. The date of the birth certificate was not proper because no person related to her had mentioned her date of birth. All these circumstances made the prosecution's case doubtful. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 12. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the date of birth was recorded by a public official in discharge of his official duty, and it was per se admissible. The mere fact that the entry was recorded by some third person does not mean that the entry was false. The burden was upon the accused to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the official acts, and no 12 2026:HHC:26637 evidence was led to rebut the presumption. The accused Rakesh admitted, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, that he had solemnised the marriage with the victim and that he had produced her before the police. These admissions prove the prosecution's case that the accused had kidnapped the victim. There is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 13. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. Sanju Bala (PW7) stated that she had supplied a copy of the victim’s birth certificate (Ext.PW7/P) showing that the victim was born on 20.01.1991 and her date of birth was registered on 28.01.1991. She stated in her cross-examination that the date of birth in the register was recorded at the instance of Chuni Ram, and the relationship between Chuni Ram and the victim was not mentioned. The entry was made in the presence of the ward member and Pradhan, but their signatures were not obtained regarding their presence. 13 2026:HHC:26637 15. It was submitted that the statement of this witness made the prosecution's case highly doubtful. The entry was recorded at the instance of Sh. Chuni Ram, and there is no evidence to show that Chuni Ram was related to the victim. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIDCO v. Vasudha Gorakhnath Mandevlekar, (2009) 7 SCC 283, that the death and birth register maintained by the statutory authority raises a presumption of correctness. It was observed: 18. The deaths and births register maintained by the statutory authorities raises a presumption of correctness. Such entries made in the statutory registers are admissible in evidence in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. It would prevail over an entry made in the school register, particularly in the absence of any proof that the same was recorded at the instance of the guardian of the respondent. (See Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit [1988 Supp SCC 604: AIR 1988 SC 1796] .) 16. Therefore, the entry in the birth register is to be presumed to be correct. In the present case, such an entry was made within 8 days of the birth, when no dispute had arisen. Therefore, the entry cannot be discarded simply because it was recorded at the instance of Chunni Ram. 14 2026:HHC:26637 17. Dr Suman Sexena (PW2) stated in her cross- examination that the victim had disclosed her age as 19 years during the enquiries made from her. It was submitted that the statement of Dr Suman Sexena (PW2) will make the prosecution's case suspect that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident. This submission will not help the accused. The victim cannot have any personal knowledge regarding her date of birth, as she was too young to comprehend her date of birth and her date of birth is usually told to a person by his/her relatives. Therefore, a statement made by the victim regarding her date of birth is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statement made by the victim before the Medical Officer. 18. Veer Singh (PW9) saw Satya Devi and the victim together on 24.12.2007. He stated in his cross-examination that he did not make any inquiry from them because he thought that they might be going to some temple. Ravinder Kumar (PW10) stated that he met Khanna @ Rakesh Kumar at Raja Ka Talab, and he had left after the accused had assured to pay the fuel charges. The victim met them at Rehan. Accused Khanna asked him to stop the vehicle. The victim boarded the vehicle. He 15 2026:HHC:26637 enquired from the victim where she was going, and she disclosed that there was some function in the house of the sister of the accused, and she was going to the function with the accused. He dropped them at Talwara and left for Mukerian. 19. It was submitted that the testimonies of these witnesses show that the victim had voluntarily accompanied the accused and learned Trial Court had erred in convicting the accused of kidnapping. The submission will not help the accused, because the victim was proven to be born on 20.01.1991. Thus, she was aged less than 18 years on 24.12.2007 and incapable of giving any consent. 20. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship as under: 361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship. 21. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the section that the offence of kidnapping is committed against the guardian, and the consent of the minor is immaterial. It was laid 16 2026:HHC:26637 down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2004) 1 SCC 339: 2004 SCC (Cri) 290: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1339 that the offence of kidnapping is for the protection of the minor, and the only consent of the guardian can take it out of the purview of section 361. It was observed at page 342: “7. …The object of this section seems as much to protect the minor children from being seduced for improper purposes as to protect the rights and privileges of guardians having the lawful charge or custody of their minor wards. The gravamen of this offence lies in the taking or enticing of a minor under the age specified in this section, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian without the consent of such guardian. The words “takes or entices any minor … out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor” in Section 361 are significant. The use of the word “keeping” in the context connotes the idea of charge, protection, maintenance and control; further, the guardian's charge and control appear to be compatible with the independence of action and movement of the minor, the guardian's protection and control of the minor being available whenever necessity arises. On plain reading of this section, the consent of the minor who is taken or enticed is wholly immaterial; it is only the guardian's consent that takes the case out of its purview. Nor is it necessary that the taking or enticing must be shown to have been by means of force or fraud. Persuasion by the accused person, which creates willingness on the part of the minor to be taken out of the keeping of the lawful guardian, would be sufficient to attract the section. 8. In State of Haryana v. Raja Ram [(1973) 1 SCC 544: 1973 SCC (Cri) 428], English decisions were noticed by this Court for the purpose of illustrating the scope of the protection of minor children and of the sacred right of the 17 2026:HHC:26637 parents and guardians to the possession of their minor children under English law. The decisions noticed were R. v. Job Timmins [169 ER 1260: Bell 276], R. v. Handley [175 ER 890: 1 F & F 648] and R. v. Robb [176 ER 466: 4 F & F 59]. In the first case, Job Timmins was convicted of an indictment framed upon 9 Geo. IV, ch. 31, Section 20 for taking an unmarried girl under sixteen out of the possession of her father, and against his will. It was observed by Erle, C.J., that the statute was passed for the protection of parents and for preventing unmarried girls from being taken out of the possession of their parents against their will. Limiting the judgment to the facts of that case, it was said that no deception or forwardness on the part of the girl in such cases could prevent the person taking her away from being guilty of the offence in question. The second decision is authority for the view that in order to constitute an offence under 9 Geo. IV, ch. 31, Section 20, it is sufficient if, by moral force, a willingness on the part of the girl to go away with the prisoner is created; but if her going away with the prisoner is entirely voluntary, no offence is committed. The last case was of a conviction under the statute (24 & 25Vict., ch. 100, Section 55). The inducement by previous promise or persuasion was held sufficient to bring the case within the mischief of the statute. In the English statutes, the expression used was “take out of the possession” and not “out of the keeping” as used in Section 361 IPC. But that expression was construed in the English decisions not to require actual manual possession. It was enough if, at the time of taking the girl continued under the care, charge and control of the parent — see R. v. Mankletow [(1853) 6 Cox Criminal Cases 143: 169 ER 678]. These decisions were held to confirm the view that Section 361 is also designed to protect the sacred right of the guardians with respect to their minor wards. 9. The position was again reiterated in Thakorlal D. Vadgama v. State of Gujarat [(1973) 2 SCC 413: 1973 SCC (Cri) 18 2026:HHC:26637 835: AIR 1973 SC 2313] wherein it was, inter alia, observed as follows : (SCC p. 421, para 10) “The expression used in Section 361 IPC is ‘whoever takes or entices any minor’. The word ‘takes’ does not necessarily connote taking by force, and it is not confined only to the use of force, actual or constructive. This word merely means ‘to cause to go’, ‘to escort’ or ‘to get into possession’. No doubt it does mean physical taking, but not necessarily by use of force or fraud. The word ‘entice’ seems to involve the idea of inducement or allurement by giving rise to hope or desire in the other. This can take many forms, difficult to visualise and describe exhaustively; some of them may be quite subtle, depending on their success on the mental state of the person at the time when the inducement is intended to operate. This may work immediately, or it may create a continuous and gradual but imperceptible impression culminating after some time, in achieving its ultimate purpose of successful inducement. The two words ‘takes’ and ‘entices’, as used in Section 361 IPC, are, in our opinion, intended to be read together so that each takes to some extent its colour and content from the other. The statutory language suggests that if the minor leaves her parental home completely uninfluenced by any promise, offer or inducement emanating from the guilty party, then the latter cannot be considered to have committed the offence as defined in Section 361 IPC.” 22. This position was reiterated in Anversinh v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 3 SCC 12: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 18: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 19, and it was held at page 20: 16. A bare perusal of the relevant legal provisions, as extracted above, shows that the consent of the minor is immaterial for purposes of Section 361 IPC. Indeed, as borne out through various other provisions in the IPC and other laws like the Contract Act, 1872, minors are deemed 19 2026:HHC:26637 incapable of giving lawful consent. [Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 7 SCC 359, para 15 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 108] Section 361 IPC, particularly, goes beyond this simple presumption. It bestows the ability to make crucial decisions regarding a minor's physical safety upon his/her guardians. Therefore, a minor girl's infatuation with her alleged kidnapper cannot, by itself, be allowed as a defence, for the same would amount to surreptitiously undermining the protective essence of the offence of kidnapping. 23. Therefore, the consent of the minor would be immaterial, and no advantage can be derived from the fact that the victim had not raised any protests when she was with the accused. 24. The victim (PW6) stated that she was born on 20.01.1991. She knew the accused Rakesh Kumar, and his house was located at a distance of 10-20 metres from her house. Her father had gone for work, and her mother had left the house for the forest to collect fuel wood on 24.12.2007. She was at home with her brother and sister. Her mother returned after collecting firewood and left for the house of her aunt. Satya Devi came to the house and asked her to visit the temple. She (the victim) initially refused because her mother was not present at home. Accused, Satya insisted that they would be returning very shortly. She accompanied Satya. Satya took her to the Rehan bus 20 2026:HHC:26637 stand. She (Satya) said that she wanted to purchase medicine from the bus stand, and they would be returning after some time. However, Satya did not bring any medicine from the bus stand. Rakesh Kumar (accused), Shashi and a driver of a van came within 10 minutes. She was asked to board the vehicle by Satya. Satya also told her that she would also be boarding the vehicle, but she did not do so, and the victim was forcibly made to sit in the vehicle by Satya, Shashi and Rakesh. The vehicle was taken towards the Talwara side. She asked the accused to take her to her home. But the accused did not listen to her. She was taken to the house of Settu. Accused Rakesh Kumar forced her into marriage. She was beaten and kept in a room, and thereafter taken to a temple by Settu, Rakesh and a woman. She was married to Rakesh Kumar despite her unwillingness. She was taken to the Court and forced to sign some papers. She, Settu and Khanna stayed in the Gurudwara during the night. They were returning from Una, and Jaram Singh (DW1) met them. They were brought to the village, where they spent the night in the house of Jaram Singh. She and Rakesh were produced by Jaram Singh at the Police Station, Nurpur, where she narrated the incident to the police. 21 2026:HHC:26637 25. She stated in her cross-examination that she was not a frequent visitor to the house of Rakesh Kumar and used to visit his home in connection with some work. She had visited the bazar with Satya Devi 2-3 times. Her mother left at about 10- 11:00 am to collect the fuel wood and returned at about 4:00- 4:30 PM. Her aunt’s house is located at a distance of about 10 minutes walk from her house. Her father had left for work at about 8 AM. She and Satya went through the field to Rehan. The distance between the village Dhak and Rehan is about 6-7 kilometres. She did not have a watch and could not tell the precise time when she was asked to board a vehicle. They walked on foot for about 20 minutes and stayed at Rehan bus stand for about 10-15 minutes. She had enquired from Satya as to why she was not purchasing the medicine. But Satya asked her to keep her mouth shut. The bus stand, Rehan, was a busy place, and many people were present in the bus stand at that time. She remained silent after she was told to keep her mouth shut. She was not aware of the fact that the Police Post was also located at Rehan. She did not raise any hue and cry because it would have brought her a bad name. The driver of the van had not asked her anything. She was threatened by the accused in the vehicle, and 22 2026:HHC:26637 she became unconscious due to fear. She had not cried in the vehicle because she was alone. Accused Rakesh, Shashi and Settu told her that she was married to the accused Rakesh. She cried loudly in the house of Settu, but nobody saved her. She was kept in the house for about 2-3 days, and she kept weeping during this time. She was not allowed to move out of the house and could not say whether any houses were located in the vicinity. She was forced to solemnise the marriage, and the photographs were taken. She had raised a hue and cry in the Gurudwara. Many people came and enquired from her, but the accused took her to a side and did not allow her to say anything. She had not said anything in the Court because she was not permitted to do so. Only her signatures were obtained in the Court. She reached the house of the Pradhan during the night and was produced in the Police Station the next day. She was confronted with various portions of her statement, and she denied having made such statements to the police. She admitted that she was married to some other person. She denied that she had voluntarily gone to Rehan and married Rakesh. 26. The cross-examination of the victim shows that the accused has not disputed the fact that she had married the 23 2026:HHC:26637 accused. In fact, the marriage photographs were produced by the accused in her cross-examination. The accused Rakesh also stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that the photographs of the marriage were taken. He also admitted that he had pointed out the place from where he had taken the victim in the van. He claimed that he had produced the victim in the Police Station. All these admissions corroborate the victim's version that the accused Rakesh had taken her and solemnised a marriage with her. It was held by the Orissa High Court in Bagula Naik v. State of Orissa, 1999 SCC OnLine Ori 118: (1999) 87 CLT 808: 1999 Cri LJ 2077, that even if the victim had left the home voluntarily, but the accused had taken her to his house or some other place, the offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC would be attracted. It was observed at page 810: “6. Second contention of the petitioner, as noted above, is twofold. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while arguing on this point, has contended that PW3, having left her house of her own, the petitioner cannot be accused of kidnapping for merely accompanying her to certain places, and therefore, his conduct cannot be termed as kidnapping or abduction. In that context, he relied upon the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 942: S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras; 1979 Crl. L.J. 1094: Pramod Kumar v. State and 1983 Crl. L.J. 1819: Lawrence Kanandas v. The State of Maharashtra. 24 2026:HHC:26637 7. In the case of S. Vardarajan (supra), a college-going girl on the verge of majority from her side telephoned the accused and thereafter both of them went to the Sub- Registrar's office for registering the marriage agreement. The Apex Court judged the totality of the facts and circumstances and held it not to be a case of kidnapping. No such evidence is available in the record so far, in the present case, that it is at the instance of the p.w. 3 that the petitioner took her to his house or Athgarh. Hence, the aforesaid ratio is not applicable to the present case. 8. In the case of Pramod Kumar (supra), a grown-up boy aged about 16 years, committing theft of gold ornaments from his house, moved away from his town along with the accused. Prosecution alleged that the said accused was instrumental in the kidnapping of that boy. From the facts and evidence available in the record, it was found that the boy, of his own accord, not only left the house but also accompanied the accused and voluntarily stayed with him for a considerable period. Under such circumstances, the Allahabad High Court held it was not a case of kidnapping. Needless to say, the facts of that case are quite distinguishable from the present case. 9. In the case of Lawrence Kanandas (supra), a school- going girl aged about 13 to 14, after attending the examination on the date of kidnapping, went away with the accused-petitioner, and he was convicted for the offence u/s. 363, I.P.C. Learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court, taking into consideration the evidence suggesting to the fact that it was the girl who had induced the accused to come to her School and to take her to different places and also the other facts and circumstances existing in that regard, found the appellant not guilty. Facts and circumstances of the present case are not similar since there is no evidence worth the name to make an inference that p.w. 3 ever requested the petitioner to take her away, either to his house or to Athgarh. Even the accused has not taken such a stand while cross-examining witnesses or giving his 25 2026:HHC:26637 statement u/s 313, Cr. P.C.. Hence, the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court is of no help to the petitioner. 27. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Raja Ram, (1973) 1 SCC 544: 1973 SCC (Cri) 428: 1972 SCC OnLine SC 497, that accused cannot escape conviction because he had not gone to the house of the victim to bring her, if the victim was persuaded by the act of the accused in leaving the home, he would be guilty. It was observed at page 549: - “9. In the present case the evidence of the prosecutrix as corroborated by the evidence of Narain Das, PW 1 (her father), Abinash Chander PW 3 (her brother) and Smt Tarawanti PW 4 (her mother) convincingly establishes beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that Jai Narain had tried to become intimate with the prosecutrix and to seduce her to go and live with him and on objection having been raised by her father who asked Jai Narain not to visit his house, Jai Narain started sending message to the prosecutrix through Raja Ram, respondent; (2) that Raja Ram, respondent, had been asking the prosecutrix to be ready to accompany Jai Narain; (3) that at about 12 noon on April 4, Raja Ram went to see the prosecutrix at her house and asked her to visit his house when he would convey Jai Narain's message to her; (4) that on the same day after some time Sona was sent by her father to the house of the prosecutrix to fetch her to his house where the prosecutrix was informed that Jai Narain would come that night and would take the prosecutrix away and (5) that Raja Ram accordingly asked the prosecutrix to visit his house at about midnight so that she may be entrusted to Jai Narain. This evidence was believed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge who convicted the respondent, as already noticed. The learned Single Judge also did not disbelieve her statement. Indeed, in the High Court, the 26 2026:HHC:26637 learned Counsel for Raja Ram had proceeded on the assumption that the evidence of the prosecutrix is acceptable, the argument being that even accepting her statement to be correct, no offence was made out against Raja Ram. Once the evidence of the prosecutrix is accepted, in our opinion, Raja Ram cannot escape conviction for the offence of kidnapping her from her father's lawful guardianship. It was not at all necessary for Raja Ram to have gone to the house of the prosecutrix to bring her from there on the midnight in question. It was sufficient if he had earlier been soliciting or persuading her to leave her father's house to go with him to Jai Narain. It is fully established on the record that he had been conveying messages from Jai Narain to the prosecutrix and had himself been persuading her to accompany him to Jai Narain's place, where he would hand her over to him. Indisputably, the last message was conveyed by him to the prosecutrix when she was brought by his daughter Sona from her own house to his, and it was pursuant to this message that the prosecutrix decided to leave her father's house at midnight in question for going to Raja Ram's house for the purpose of being taken to Jai Narain's place. On these facts, it is difficult to hold that Raja Ram was not guilty of taking or enticing the prosecutrix out of the keeping of her father's lawful guardianship. Raja Ram's action was the proximate cause of the prosecutrix going out of the keeping of her father, and indeed, but for Raja Ram's persuasive offer to take her to Jai Narain, the prosecutrix would not have gone out of the keeping of her father, who was her lawful guardian, as she actually did. Raja Ram actively participated in the formation of the intention of the prosecutrix to leave her father's house. The fact that the prosecutrix was easily persuaded to go with Raja Ram would not prevent him from being guilty of the offence of kidnapping her. Her consent or willingness to accompany Raja Ram would be immaterial, and it would be equally so even if the proposal to go with Raja Ram had emanated from her. There is no doubt a distinction between taking 27 2026:HHC:26637 and allowing a minor to accompany a person. But the present is not a case of the prosecutrix herself leaving her father's house without any inducement by Raja Ram, who merely allowed her to accompany him.” 28. Similarly, it was held in Anversinh v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 3 SCC 12: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 18: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 19 that where the accused had the intent to marry the victim, her enticement was duly proved. It was observed at page 20:- “13. A perusal of Section 361 IPC shows that it is necessary that there be an act of enticing or taking, in addition to establishing the child's minority (being sixteen for boys and eighteen for girls) and care/keep of a lawful guardian. Such “enticement” need not be direct or immediate in time and can also be through subtle actions like winning over the affection of a minor girl. [Thakorlal D. Vadgama v. State of Gujarat, (1973) 2 SCC 413, para 10: 1973 SCC (Cri) 835] However, mere recovery of a missing minor from the custody of a stranger would not ipso facto establish the offence of kidnapping. Thus, where the prosecution fails to prove that the incident of removal was committed by or at the instigation of the accused, it would be nearly impossible to bring the guilt home as happened in King Emperor v. Gokaran [King Emperor v. Gokaran, 1920 SCC OnLine Oudh JC 32: AIR 1921 Oudh 226] and Emperor v. Abdur Rahman [Emperor v. Abdur Rahman, 1916 SCC OnLine All 63: AIR 1916 All 210]. 29. It was submitted that the victim had made the false statements before the Court, which adversely affected her credibility. She claimed that the driver of the van had not talked to her, whereas Ravinder Kumar, the driver of the van, had specifically stated that he had made enquiries from the victim, 28 2026:HHC:26637 and the victim replied that she was going to attend some function at the house of the sister of the accused. Further, she claimed that she had raised hue and cry in the van and the accused had threatened her. Ravinder Kumar (PW10) had not stated any such fact; rather, he stated in his cross-examination that the accused and the victim were laughing in the rear seat of his van. They appeared to be happy in the van. This submission will not help the accused. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus does not apply to India. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab versus Hari Singh, AIR 1974 SC 1168, that it is very difficult to find a witness whose evidence is so flawless that it has to be wholly, completely and unqualifiedly accepted. The principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, does not apply in India, and the Court has to separate the grain from the chaff. It was observed: “As human testimony resulting from widely different powers of observation and description is necessarily faulty and even truthful witnesses not infrequently exaggerate or imagine or tell half-truths, the Courts must try to extract and separate the hard core of truth from the whole evidence. This is what is meant by the proverbial saying that Courts must separate "the chaff from the grain''. If, after considering the whole mass of evidence, a 29 2026:HHC:26637 residue of acceptable truth is established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt, the Courts are bound to give effect to the result flowing from it and not throw it overboard on purely hypothetical and conjectural grounds. Insofar as the grounds given for rejecting the evidence of Zora Singh appear to us to be patently unreasonable and highly conjectural, we think that the case before us calls for interference by this Court. That evidence, as we have already pointed out, is corroborated by medical evidence as well as by the statements of Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh. Hence, although, the statements of Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh, taken by themselves, may not have been enough to warrant the conviction of the respondents, yet, when the evidence of Zora Singh, strongly corroborated by medical evidence is there, we think that the statement of Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh could be used to support the conclusion thus reached without going to the extent of holding that Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh must be wholly believed before their evidence could serve any useful purpose at all as the High Court seems to have erroneously thought. Indeed, it is very difficult to find a witness whose evidence is so flawless that it has to be wholly, completely, and unqualifiedly accepted. We think that the High Court had, without saying so, ignored the principle repeatedly laid down by this Court in appraising evidence, that Courts do not, in this country, act on the maxim: "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus''. In considering the effect of each allegation proved to be incorrect or the likelihood of its being true or untrue, we have to view it in the light of a whole setting or concatenation of facts in each particular case. 30. This position was reiterated in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Pullagunmi Kasireddy 2018(7) SCC 623, and it was held that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus had not been accepted in our country. It was observed: 30 2026:HHC:26637 “The principle of 'Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' has not been accepted in our country. See Bhagwan Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 (10) SCC 537. Even if some accused are acquitted on the ground that the evidence of a witness is unreliable, the other accused can still be convicted by relying on the evidence of the same witness. See Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, 2002 (8) SCC 381. Minor contradictions and omissions in the evidence of a witness are to be ignored if there is a ring of truth in the testimony of a witness. See State of U.P. v. Dan Singh, 1997 (3) SCC 747. The High Court was oblivious to this settled position of law.” 31. Similar is the judgment in Menoka Malik v. State of W.B., (2019) 18 SCC 721: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 658: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1196, wherein it was observed at page 729: 14. It is a well-settled position of law that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded in toto merely due to the presence of embellishments or exaggerations. The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, which means “false in one thing, false in everything”, has been held to be inapplicable in the Indian scenario, where the tendency to exaggerate is common. This Court has endorsed the inapplicability of the doctrine in several decisions, such as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366: 1957 Cri LJ 550], Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar [Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 256], Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1697], Narain v. State of M.P. [Narain v. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 455: 2004 SCC (Cri) 569] and Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar [Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2018) 6 SCC 433 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 113]. In Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar [Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220], this Court highlighted the dangers of applying the doctrine in the Indian scenario: (Krishna Mochi case 31 2026:HHC:26637 [Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220], SCC pp. 113-14, para 51) 51. … The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India, and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance, nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of the weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366: 1957 Cri LJ 550] )… The doctrine is a dangerous one, especially in India, for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because the witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help but give embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or, at any rate, exaggeration, embroidery, or embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. [Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751: 1972 SCC (Cri) 819] and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar [Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 256].) An attempt has to be made to, as noted 32 2026:HHC:26637 above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood.” 15 [Ed.: Para 15 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./93/2018 dated 30-1-2019. It is not uncommon for witnesses to make exaggerations during the course of evidence. But merely because there are certain exaggerations, improvements and embellishments, the entire prosecution story should not be doubted. In Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 16 SCC 752: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 439], this Court observed: (SCC p. 762, para 26) “26. It is trite that even when exaggerations and embellishments are galore, the courts can and indeed are expected to undertake a forensic exercise aimed at discovering the truth. The very fact that a large number of people were implicated in the incident in question who now stand acquitted by the High Court [Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 3268] need not have deterred the High Court from appreciating the evidence on record and discarding what was not credible while accepting and relying upon what inspired confidence. That exercise was legitimate, for otherwise the Court would be seen as abdicating and surrendering to distortions and/or embellishments, whether made out of bitterness or any other reason, including shoddy investigation by the agencies concerned. The ultimate quest for the court at all times remains “discovery of the truth”, and unless the court is so disappointed with the difficulty besetting that exercise in a given case as to make it impossible for it to pursue that object, it must endeavour in that direction.” 16. This Court in State of Punjab v. Hari Singh [State of Punjab v. Hari Singh, (1974) 4 SCC 552: 1974 SCC (Cri) 588], observed as follows: (SCC p. 559, para 16) “16. As human testimony, resulting from widely different powers of observation and description, is 33 2026:HHC:26637 necessarily faulty and even truthful witnesses not infrequently exaggerate or imagine or tell half-truths, the courts must try to extract and separate the hard core of truth from the whole evidence. This is what is meant by the proverbial saying that courts must separate “the chaff from the grain”. If, after considering the whole mass of evidence, a residue of acceptable truth is established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt, the courts are bound to give effect to the result flowing from it and not throw it overboard on purely hypothetical and conjectural grounds.” 17. Thus, it cannot be doubted that it is the duty of the court to separate the chaff from the grain. Moreover, minor variations in the evidence will not affect the root of the matter, inasmuch as such minor variations need not be given major importance, inasmuch as they would not materially alter the evidence/credibility of the eyewitnesses as a whole. 32. Therefore, the testimony of the victim cannot be discarded simply because she had made some false statements during the course of her deposition. 33. The victim's brother (PW4) Ravi Kumar stated that the victim is his elder sister. He, the victim and other children were present in the house. Their parents were away from the house. Satya Devi came to their house at about 12:00-12:30 noon and asked the victim to accompany her to a temple. The victim went away with Satya Devi and did not return thereafter. His mother returned in the evening, and he disclosed that the victim 34 2026:HHC:26637 had gone with Satya Devi to the temple. He stated in his cross- examination that his mother had gone to get rations from Village Dhak. She returned at about 05:30 P.M. Satya Devi called the victim from outside the house. He was playing cricket with other children. The victim had not collected any articles from the house. He denied that he had not seen the victim accompanying Satya Devi, and he was making a false statement. 34. The testimony of this witness corroborates the testimony of the victim that Satya Devi had taken her from her home. 35. It was submitted that this witness stated that his mother had gone to village Dhak to get ration, whereas the victim stated that her mother had gone to the Village to collect fuel wood and thereafter to the house of the victim's aunt. These testimonies show that the witnesses were making a false statement. This submission will not help the accused. The absence of the victim's mother from the house was a matter of detail not related to the core of the prosecution case, and if there is some discrepancy in the testimonies of the witnesses regarding the reasons for the absence of the victim's mother, it 35 2026:HHC:26637 would not adversely affect the prosecution case. Thus, the testimony of this witness cannot be discarded simply because of some discrepancy regarding the reasons for the absence of her mother. 36. Jaram Singh (DW1) stated that he visited the Police Station along with the cousin brother of the accused on 31.12.2007. The police said that the relatives of the accused would be aware of the whereabouts of Rakesh and the victim. He received a call from the sister of the accused at about 04.00 p.m. that accused Rakesh and the victim had visited her house. She had advised them to return to their village. The police told him and the relatives of the accused to bring the accused and the victim from Una. The victim and the accused met near the petrol pump bus stand in Una. The victim said that she had married the accused and did not want to go back to her parents' house. The victim agreed to accompany him to Nurpur. He called the Investigating Officer and told him that he was bringing Rakesh and the victim with him. He produced the accused and the victim before the police at Police Station Nurpur. The victim disclosed that she was a major and was happily married to the accused. 36 2026:HHC:26637 37. The statement of this witness does not support the defence version; rather, it supports the version of the prosecution that the accused, Rakesh, had taken the victim with him and solemnised marriage with her, as this witness had specifically stated that the victim disclosed to him that she had married the accused. Since the victim was a minor, her consent was immaterial, and his testimony that the victim wanted to reside with the accused and did not want to go to the house of her parents would not demolish the prosecution’s version. 38. The victim's father (PW1) stated that he had left for a walk in the morning. His wife and children were present in the house. He reached home during the evening and found that the victim was missing. He made enquiries, but he could not trace the victim. He reported the matter to the police. He stated in his cross-examination that 2-3 offers for the marriage of the victim were received. He denied that he was aware of the love affair between the victim and the accused and had beaten the victim because of this. 39. It was submitted that the admission made by this witness in the cross-examination that 2-3 offers were received 37 2026:HHC:26637 for the victim's marriage would probabilise the version that the victim was major and that is why the offers for the marriage were being received. This submission cannot be accepted. The victim was on the verge of the majority, and the marriage would not have been solemnised immediately. Therefore, the mere receipt of the offers for marriage does not mean that the victim was a major. 40. A suggestion was made to him in the cross- examination that he knew about the love affair between the accused and the victim, clearly showing that the accused is taking a defence that he was in love with the victim. This defence will not assist the accused; rather, it will go against his interest because it will show that the victim was persuaded by the acts of the accused to leave the house. 41. The victim's father did not say that the victim had left the home with his consent, which was the material question in a case of kidnapping. 42. The victim's mother (PW5) stated that her husband had gone from the house for his work, and she had gone to the forest to collect fuel. She left her children at home. She returned 38 2026:HHC:26637 at about 2:00-2:30 PM and saw that the victim and other children were present at home. She went to the depot to purchase the sugar. When she returned at about 05.30 p.m., she found the victim missing. Her son disclosed that the accused Satya had taken the victim with her. She disclosed this fact to her husband on his return. She stated in her cross-examination that she had gone to collect fuel wood at about 08.30 a.m. and her husband had left the home at about 08.00 a.m. She denied that the victim was present at home when she returned after purchasing the sugar. She searched for the victim in the neighbourhood. She denied that the house of Satya was open and stated that her house was bolted. She admitted that she was not interested in getting the victim married to the accused. The victim had never left the home before that day without seeking permission. She denied that she had falsely implicated the accused. 43. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness contradicts the testimonies of the victim and her brother because she stated that she had gone to purchase sugar from the ration depot, whereas the victim stated that she had gone to the house of the victim's aunt. This contradiction will not be 39 2026:HHC:26637 significant because it is a minor detail not related to the incident, and a person is bound to forget such a minor detail with the lapse of time. 44. It was submitted that there is a discrepancy between her testimony and the testimony of her son regarding the time of her return, since her son stated that Satya Devi had visited the house at about 12-12:30 p.m., whereas she stated that the victim was present at home at about 2:00-2:30 PM. This submission will not help the accused. The victim stated that she did not have the watch. Her mother stated that she was an illiterate person. Therefore, the statement made by the victim's mother was based on guesswork. The victim's brother was a minor and could not have been expected to keep a watch to note the time. Thus, the testimonies of these witnesses cannot be discarded because of the discrepancy in the time. 45. Therefore, the testimonies of the victim's parents corroborated the victim's version that she was a minor and was taken out of the guardianship of her parents without the consent of her parents. The statement of the victim and her brother showed that Satya Devi had visited the victim's house and had 40 2026:HHC:26637 taken the victim with her. The victim and Satya Devi were seen together by Veer Singh (PW9). It was laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Dalchand v. State, AIR 1969 All 216, that if the child is taken out of the keeping of her parents, the offence is complete, and it is immaterial whether she was taken for some distance or permanently away. It was observed: 21. The taking need not be by force, and it is immaterial whether the minor girl consents or not. All that is necessary is that there must be taking of a child out of the keeping of the parents. Nor need enticement be confined to any single form of allurement. Offer of sweetmeats is one such form. Even the enticing away of a child playing on a public road is sufficient. The act of taking is not, in the proper sense of the term, a continuous act. But where the minor has been actually taken out of the keeping of her guardian, the act is a completed one. There is consequently not the slightest doubt that the minor girl was kidnapped. 46. Punjab High Court also took a similar view in Chhajju Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1968 P&H 439 and observed: 6. The next argument advanced by the appellants' counsel was that the prosecutrix in this case was removed only a few yards from the house of her father and, therefore, it would not amount to taking her out of the lawful keeping of her guardian. In determining whether a person takes a minor out of the lawful keeping of its guardian, the distance is immaterial. In my opinion, even if a person takes a minor girl without the consent of her guardian to a distance of twenty or thirty yards, as in this case, it would amount to taking her out of the keeping of 41 2026:HHC:26637 her lawful guardian as required by section 361 of the Penal Code, 1860. I am, therefore, of the view that the case against the appellants is proved. The sentence under the circumstances is adequate. I accordingly dismiss this appeal and the revision filed by the complainant. 47. Therefore, taking of the minor victim in the present case was complete when she was taken from her home on the pretext of visiting the temple, and she was not returned to the custody of her parents. 48. The statement of Ravinder Kumar (PW10) shows that the victim was waiting at Rehan. The victim stated that she was with Satya Devi and was made to board the vehicle. This shows that the accused Rakesh and Satya were acting in concert to take away the victim from the lawful guardianship of her parents. The victim was subsequently taken to the house of Seetu, where she was kept for about 2-3 days. The victim stated that she was not permitted to leave the home. Thus, as per her testimony, the victim was confined in the home of Settu, which would constitute an offence punishable under Section 368 of the IPC. 49. In the present case, the victim was kidnapped from the lawful guardianship of her parents with the intent to force her to marry the accused Rakesh. Thus, an offence punishable under Section 366 of the IPC was committed. The offence 42 2026:HHC:26637 punishable under Section 366 of the IPC is an aggravated form of an offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC. A person cannot be sentenced for the commission of a minor offence when he has been sentenced for the commission of a major offence as per Section 71 of the IPC. Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in sentencing the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC. 50. The evidence shows that all the accused were acting together. Satya Devi had taken the victim from her home. Rakesh had taken her in a van to the house of Settu, where she was confined to the house and was forced to marry Rakesh. The conspiracy is not proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the circumstances. In the present case, the fact that all the accused were acting together shows that they had entered into a conspiracy to take the minor out of the lawful guardianship of her parents to marry her to Rakesh and for this purpose, they had kept her in the house of the accused Settu. Thus, there is no infirmity in the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 366, 368 and 120B of the IPC. 43 2026:HHC:26637 51. The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 years each for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 366 and 368 of the IPC. The offence punishable under Section 366 of the IPC is punishable with an imprisonment of 10 years, and the offence punishable under Section 368 punishes a person in the same manner as if he had kidnapped or abducted such person with the same intention or knowledge and for the same purpose for which he had concealed him. Thus, the offence would be punishable with imprisonment of 10 years. The fact that a minor girl was taken out of the lawful guardianship of her parents shows the gravity of the offence, and the learned Trial Court had taken a lenient view while imposing a sentence of 3 years, which does not require any interference from this Court. 52. No other point was urged. 53. In view of the above, the present appeals are partly allowed, and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC is set aside. 44 2026:HHC:26637 54. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are upheld. 55. The present appeals stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 56. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 6th July, 2026 (Nikita)